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1
Spatial Concentration
of American Poverty
Should We Care, and What Are the Options?
An expanding economy no longer seems a panacea, allowing us to reduce
poverty while we all become richer.
—Rebecca Blank, a member of the Clinton administration’s Council of
Economic Advisers, speaking about how poverty rose in the 1980s
The best antipoverty program is still a job.
—President Bill Clinton at a 1996 news conference on welfare legislation
The intergenerational poverty that troubles us so much today is predominantly
a poverty of values.
—Vice President Dan Quayle in his famous 1992 “Murphy Brown” speech,
arguing that a lack of personal values is the primary cause of poverty

Concern about the well-being of the least fortunate Americans has
ebbed and flowed over the last century. The New Deal initiatives of
the 1930s stimulated interest in helping those hit hardest by the Great
Depression. During the war years and the prosperous 1950s, the presence of the poor faded from the consciousness of many Americans, but
concern for their plight again intensified during Lyndon Johnson’s War
on Poverty in the 1960s. Since then, interest in reducing poverty has
continued to experience ups and downs: poverty rates are no lower today than when the War on Poverty ended in the late 1960s; on the contrary, high poverty exists in many regions of the country. To be sure, the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina once again reminded Americans that
concentrations of high poverty remain within our borders.
Much of the current popular discourse is driven by the view that
public efforts to reduce poverty are not worthwhile, let alone effective
(Moore 1997). One result of this skepticism was the landmark 1996
reform of federal welfare policy, which greatly increased the personal
responsibility of the disadvantaged for their own well-being. In fact,
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reducing overall poverty was not even an explicit goal of the 1996 welfare reform legislation (Ellwood and Blank 2001). Policies designed
to eliminate regional pockets of poverty have been criticized on the
grounds that it would be more effective to direct policies at individuals
and not at places (Peters and Fisher 2002).
Even as interest in antipoverty efforts waned and skepticism grew,
the U.S. poverty rate fell to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest it had been
since 1974), including a record low average rate of 13.4 percent in nonmetropolitan areas (ERS 2004). This could be interpreted as being the
result of a favorable link between growth and poverty-rate reduction
that had seemingly been nonexistent from the 1970s through the early
1990s but that had reestablished itself since then (Blank and Card 1993;
Freeman 2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill
and Hill (2001) argue that welfare reform was the impetus behind the
reduced number of welfare caseloads, which may then have contributed
to lower poverty. Yet others note the potential interaction between a
strong economy and the success of welfare reform (e.g., Moffitt 1999).
Despite the nationwide antipoverty gains of the 1990s, poverty
rates remained high in many metropolitan central cities and inner suburbs (Jargowsky 2003) and in remote nonmetropolitan areas (Miller
and Weber 2004). This raises the question of whether these areas experienced subpar economic performance compared to the nation or
whether there was less of a connection between local economic growth
and poverty in these areas. The answer to this question would relate to
whether there is a need for place-based policies and would help inform
their design.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first provide a rationale for
society to become more engaged in reducing poverty, including at the
regional level. We then briefly review the evidence on the connection
between employment growth, welfare reform, and poverty at the national level. The implications of the national trends for regional poverty
follow; we particularly consider the relative merits of place-based and
person-based policies for evening out spatial concentrations of poverty.
This includes a discussion of the role space plays in poverty outcomes,
because national growth policies alone may do little to ameliorate persistent regional pockets of poverty. We introduce the possibility that
local economic growth, using place-based employment supports, may
be a needed tool for reducing poverty. The chapter concludes with an
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overview of the remainder of the book, whose primary emphasis is the
spatial dimension of the relationship between economic performance
and poverty, including an examination of competing explanations such
as federal and state welfare reform.

Why Society Should Care about Poverty
There are both philosophical and practical reasons why the American public should be concerned with the well-being of its poorest members. For one, according to the Rawlsian view, if individuals in a group
selected a distribution of income for the members of the group before
they knew how each of them would fare—i.e., if they had a “veil of
ignorance” concerning the outcome—risk-averse individuals would
pick the distribution that maximized the well-being of the least-well-off
member of the group (Rawls 1971). In our wealthy society, application
of Rawlsian logic would eliminate poverty. Nevertheless, while the notion that individuals are risk-averse and interested in justice before the
fact is thought-provoking, public policy does not work in the realm of
the “veil of ignorance.” Rather, it is affected by politicians reliant on
voters who are fully aware of their actual or most probable place in the
income distribution.
Beyond the abstractions of philosophical arguments, Americans are
well grounded in notions of justice, equity, and a sense of fair play.
Madden (2000) presents evidence showing that a strong majority of the
U.S. public prefers a more equal distribution of income. However, the
catch is that the public tends to be very skeptical of whether government
intervention is the proper vehicle to satisfy its desire for equity. Indeed,
the issue reflects a fundamental tenet of neoclassical economics, which
is that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff (Okun 1975): societies can
achieve more equity and less poverty through redistribution of income,
but by blunting economic incentives, attaining this goal comes at the
expense of economic efficiency and growth. Yet other economists argue
against the existence of an inverse relationship between equity and efficiency, instead contending that greater inequality reduces growth by
producing societal upheaval, inefficient government redistribution, and
suboptimal investment in human and physical capital.1
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Besides notions of equity and fairness, there are practical reasons
for society to be concerned about the well-being of its lowest-income
members. For example, lower poverty may encourage disadvantaged
segments of the population to become more civilly engaged in their
communities because they feel they are legitimate stakeholders. Higher poverty, on the other hand, adversely affects the physical health of
the workforce, which, besides reducing poor people’s quality of life,
reduces their workplace productivity and ultimately increases public
health care expenditures and their reliance on other government programs (Scott 2005). If poverty is reduced through improved labor market participation, then benefactors will enjoy long-term gains through
enhanced labor market experience, increased skills upgrading, and, in
turn, higher future earnings (Bartik 2001).
Perhaps the largest societal gains from poverty reduction occur
through intergenerational linkages. The environment created by families facing severe financial stress is not optimal for raising children, particularly for developing their cognitive and noncognitive skills. There
are significant ramifications in adulthood when children from difficult
circumstances fall behind early. There is growing consensus in the literature that the income of a child’s family has long-term impacts on that
child’s health, education, nutrition, and future income and welfare as
an adult (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2003;
Karoly et al. 1998). These intergenerational effects suggest the potential
benefits from poverty reduction can be large simply in terms of future
earnings and health care savings from the children of disadvantaged families. In contrast, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) note that later interventions, such as tuition policies for underprivileged college students, likely
have smaller marginal effects on improving future earnings.
Another indirect benefit of poverty reduction relates to the link between labor market conditions and crime (Freeman 2001; Freeman and
Rodgers 1999; Raphael and Winter-Ember 2001). These studies suggest
that 33–40 percent of the large decrease in crime during the 1990s can
be attributed to the strong economy of those years.2 This effect implies
large antipoverty benefits in terms of savings from reduced victimization, lower expenditures on protective measures, and lower incarceration costs associated with reduced recidivism.
In summary, reducing poverty can provide substantial benefits in
many ways: improved social engagement, higher economic potential,
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greater long-term earnings for positively affected individuals, lower
crime, and significant long-term gains for affected children in terms of
health, education, and income in adulthood. Associated gains include
eventual reductions in government expenditures for public assistance,
health care, and the criminal justice system. Along with even modest
concerns for equity and fairness, these advantages provide continued
justification for aggressively fighting poverty. And the potential gains
are likely greatest where poverty is geographically most concentrated.

National Poverty and Economic Growth
Numerous measures of poverty exist, each with relative advantages
and disadvantages. We use the official federal poverty rate (see Box
1.1), which is not perfect but is well known and has been consistently
measured over time. Also to its advantage, the official federal rate is
used both in assessing and in setting government policy. As an example
of the federal definition of poverty, a household with one adult (under 65 years of age) and two children had to have earned more than
$14,824 to be above the poverty line in 2003, while a household containing two adults (under 65) and two children had to have earned more
than $18,660.
As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, there were remarkable reductions
in poverty during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was true regardless of
whether one considered person or family poverty rates (Figure 1.1), or
even female-headed-family poverty rates (Figure 1.2). With that progress, an observer in the early 1970s had reason to be optimistic that
the War on Poverty would ultimately be won. Nevertheless, subsequent
trends show that poverty has remained a persistent element of American
society.
Even though the 1980s and 1990s had two of the three longest economic expansions on record, the person and family poverty rates in
2002 were little changed from what they were when the War on Poverty
ended more than 30 years ago (Figure 1.1). In fact, U.S. Census Bureau
(2004a) data suggest that while real median-family income rose by 7
percent between 1973 and 1993, the person poverty rate increased from
11.1 percent to 15.1 percent (the second highest rate since 1965). Figure
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Box 1.1 Official Federal Poverty Thresholds
Social Security Administration economist Mollie Orshansky
originally developed the official federal poverty criteria in 1963–
1964 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004h; Fisher 1997). Orshansky calculated the economy food budgetary requirements of 58 family
types based on age and family size (currently 48 family types are
used). For each family type, she simply multiplied this figure by
three to obtain what is now called the poverty threshold. For the
most part, Orshansky’s definition has remained unchanged except
that it is adjusted upward for inflation every year.
In determining poverty status, before-tax income is used, including public assistance but not capital gains. The official poverty
rate is not adjusted for several factors such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit or in-kind public welfare programs like Medicaid. Nor
is it adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences. To give a feel
for the resulting thresholds, we present the following examples: a
three-person household with one adult (under 65 years of age) and
two children needed to earn more than $15,219 to be above the
poverty line in 2004, while a two-adult (under 65) and two-child
household needed to earn more than $19,157. Comparable threeand four-person households needed to earn $13,423 and $16,895
in 1999 and $9,990 and $12,575 in 1989—the increase reflects
inflation (U.S. Census Bureau 2005e).
The official definition can be criticized for not adjusting for
taxes and in-kind contributions. It also does not account for the
notion that poverty is often viewed as a relative concept: what is
considered economic deprivation changes over time with rising
living standards.a For example, an upper-middle-class standard of
living a century ago would now be one devoid of modern conveniences. Nonetheless, developing alternative measures of poverty
rates is full of pitfalls in that they can be ad hoc and they may not
capture true conceptions of poverty. For more details on alternative poverty measures, see U.S. Census Bureau (2003).
Despite these concerns, the official poverty rate measure is
used because it is well known, has been consistent over time, and
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Box 1.1 (continued)
is used in both assessing and setting government policy. Even more
important is that it is widely reported for various demographic
groups and geographical areas. To be sure, the Census Bureau has
recently reported a variety of alternative poverty rate thresholds.
Yet these are not as widely reported across geographical areas,
and their data usually only cover a short time span, dating back to
the latter 1990s. Moreover, at least in terms of the change in poverty rates, the alternative poverty rate measures tend to follow the
official one quite closely (see, for example, U.S. Census Bureau
2003). That is, while the actual poverty rate percentage may depend on the particular alternative used, the more critical measure,
change in poverty rate, is approximately the same over time.
a

See Slesnick (1993) for a detailed discussion of problems with official poverty
thresholds.

1.2 shows that the poverty rate increased for female-headed families
during this 20-year period from 32.2 to 35.6 percent, or slightly less
than the increases in overall rates in Figure 1.1. This reversal in trend
led many experts to question whether economic growth was continuing to trickle down to the poor (Blank and Card 1993; Cutler and Katz
1991).
With the link between growth and poverty seemingly broken and
poverty rates stagnant or rising, questions arose as to whether governmental efforts to eliminate poverty had instead made matters worse.
Indeed, Stephen Moore (1997) contended that the “War on Poverty,
launched by Lyndon Johnson thirty years ago, has probably been the
most destructive government concept ever invented.” However, the argument that growth was no longer “lifting all boats” also did not go unchallenged. For instance, Bartik (2001) argues that it is counterintuitive
to expect economic growth not to reduce the poverty rate unless there is
an accompanying increase in income inequality.
Even as the debate raged about the role of economic growth in reducing poverty, the poverty rate began a precipitous decline near the
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Figure 1.1 u.S. Family and Person Poverty Rates, 1959-2003 (%)
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end of the 1990s economic expansion, as shown in Figure 1.1. It fell
from 15.1 percent in 1993 to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest mark
since 1974). Subsequently, however, sluggish economic conditions and
rising unemployment yielded a modest increase in poverty from 2001
to 2003. One possible explanation for the seemingly closer link with
economic conditions is that growth has its strongest influence on lifting
households out of poverty when the unemployment rate falls to levels
so low that businesses are forced to hire the chronically unemployed
and less skilled (Freeman 2001). This reasoning may explain the successes of the 1960s and latter 1990s, as the unemployment rate fell
below 4 percent in both cases. The disappointing persistence of the poverty level during the expansions of the latter 1970s and 1980s may have
resulted from relatively loose labor markets. Although firms may have
been hiring workers during those times, there was a sufficient queue
of applicants that employers never had to reach down to hire the more
disadvantaged. Such a nonlinear response suggests that the influence of
policies on poverty will vary depending on labor market conditions.
Figure 1.3 shows the changes in the U.S. individual and family
poverty rates from 1960 to 2003, along with the annual changes in the
unemployment rate. While the correlation is not perfect, there appears
to be a clear, positive relationship between the change in the unemploy-
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Figure 1.2 Female-Headed
Family
Poverty
Rate,
1959–2003
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Figure 1.3 Change in U.S. Poverty and Unemployment Rates,
Figure 1.3 Change in u.S. Poverty and unemployment Rates, 1960-2003 (%)
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ment rate and changes in poverty rates. The simple correlation between
the change in unemployment and the change in family poverty is 0.66,
while the corresponding correlation between the change in unemployment and the change in person poverty is 0.65.
Welfare Reform and Policy Changes in the 1990s
The 1990s was a period of significant public policy change, as it
related to the working and nonworking poor. The first change was the
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which greatly increased work incentives. Then came the Clinton administration’s accelerated issuance of state waivers from the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, beginning in 1993 (Council of Economic
Advisers 1999; Ellwood and Blank 2001). Most waivers made welfare
more restrictive, such as by adding sanctions for non-compliance with
work requirements and by adding time limits for receiving benefits.
A third initiative was the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
Known as “welfare reform,” the 1996 act eliminated the welfare entitlement and placed a strict 60-month federal lifetime limit on most
recipients; it also put stringent requirements on states to shift most recipients into work by 2002 (Blank 2002; Ellwood and Blank 2001).
New legal immigrants faced restrictions in using TANF, and there were
other changes to help reduce births to unwed mothers. Financing was
changed to a federal block grant, and states were given great latitude to
set program parameters, including those for benefits and eligibility.
Between August 1996, when welfare reform was signed, and September 2001, the number of recipients declined by a remarkable 56 percent (Administration for Children and Families [ACF] 2002a). Even
with the sluggish economy, the number of welfare recipients fell slightly in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (ACF 2002b, 2004). Congress has
periodically worked on renewing welfare reform, but progress has been
slow. Most indications are that the act will remain largely unchanged;
however, some likely changes include increased child care support,
greater flexibility for states in counting “work-related” activities, and a
modest increase in work requirements (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services [DHHS] 2004).
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Many economists argue that welfare reform and the work-promotion effects of the expanded EITC were key factors behind the almost
10-percentage-point increase between 1994 and 2000 in the labor force
participation of unmarried females with children (Blank and Schmidt
2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill and Hill
(2001) hold that welfare reform was the impetus for reducing the number of welfare recipients. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) conclude that
60 percent of the increase in employment of single mothers relative
to single women without children over the 1984–1996 period was attributable to the federal and state EITC and other tax changes, whereas
welfare reforms over the 12-year period were much less important―although they did have significant effects. Yet others contend that welfare
reform’s supposed initial success had little to do with policy and is more
of an artifact of the robust economy of the late 1990s.3 A comprehensive
literature review by Blank (2002) suggests that welfare reform and the
strong economy both reduced welfare usage.
Though welfare reform is important, we are ultimately interested
in whether it affects poverty. The poverty rate for unmarried women
with children—a key welfare-recipient cohort—fell from 41.9 percent
in 1996 to 33.0 percent in 2000, before rising to 33.7 percent in 2002
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004b). Yet this could be more economy-driven
than welfare-reform driven. Also, even if welfare reform did greatly
reduce the rolls, it is still possible that it had little influence on changing the average household income at the lower end of the distribution;
it may have merely reallocated income from welfare benefits to labor
earnings and the EITC (Blank 2002; Primus 2001).
Welfare reform has also expanded the low-skilled labor supply by
encouraging work. The increased labor supply should have a deleterious effect on the wages and employment of low-skilled nonrecipients,
which would indirectly increase poverty rates (Bartik 2000, 2002a,b).
The possible indirect spillovers suggest that the impact of welfare reform could extend well beyond the most directly affected groups, which
means aggregate labor market assessments are necessary to explore
how welfare reform affected the overall poverty rate.
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Person- vs. Place-Based Policy
Despite declining U.S. poverty in the 1990s, the gains were not
spatially uniform, and many high-poverty pockets remain (Jargowsky
2003). It is unclear why all geographic areas did not experience the same
favorable developments as the nation as a whole. It could be that some
areas experienced lower growth. Alternatively, spatial factors unique
to certain areas may have affected the connection between growth and
poverty. If so, person-based antipoverty policies alone may be inadequate; instead, what may be required are policies tailored to place.
There is wide debate within the academic and policy communities
on whether policies aimed at helping the poor should include placespecific elements to complement person-specific programs (Kraybill
and Kilkenny 2003). However, critics contend that policies designed to
help distressed communities or regions with concentrations of poverty
are misguided and wasteful, and that the best way to aid the disadvantaged is to tailor policies to directly help needy individuals (e.g., Peters
and Fisher 2002). Policies such as providing education, training, job
and family counseling, relocation assistance, and certain types of health
care assistance form the core of person-based approaches.
Critics of place-based subsidies contend that they can induce the
disadvantaged not to migrate to localities with better employment opportunities, which creates a culture of dependency in the region (Glaeser 1998; Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz 2001; Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003).
They contend that virtually all of the newly created jobs will instead go
to commuters and new residents who already have the necessary skills
and experience that employers prefer, and not to the intended disadvantaged beneficiaries (Peters and Fisher 2002). Therefore, policies aimed
at improving a distressed local economy (e.g., tax breaks) may primarily help business and property owners instead of the disadvantaged.
Critics of place-based policy also point out that economic development efforts may fail in high-poverty areas. For example, the smallscale economies of remote rural areas may hinder their economic
development: not only may there be insufficient public infrastructure
for such areas to be economically competitive (Lucas 2001; Jalan and
Ravallion 2002; Glasmeier and Farrigan 2003), but there may be a backwash effect of jobs and capital being drawn toward urban centers and
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away from these areas (Barkley, Henry, and Bao 1996; Henry, Barkley,
and Bao 1997). Further, the exodus of highly mobile, highly skilled
labor from high-poverty regions may lower the pay of those remaining
(Gibbs 1994).
On the other hand, there are traditional and emerging arguments for
place-based policies to be part of the optimal policy mix, based on the
“new economic geography.” As discussed in Chapter 3 of this book,
equilibrating market responses are impeded if labor is not perfectly mobile, particularly the low-skilled segment of labor, which is the most
likely to be in poverty (Ravallion and Wodon 1999; Yankow 2003).
Such arguments form the core of the urban spatial-mismatch models
(Holzer 1991). Rural areas’ remoteness and greater distance to potential migration destinations increases the transport and psychic costs for
those who may wish to relocate (Greenwood 1997). Therefore, while
remoteness, small scale, or social and geographic isolation may be hindrances to successful economic development, they also may lead to disadvantaged residents garnering more of the benefits if economic development is successful, suggesting the potential efficacy of place-based
antipoverty policies. That is, if job creation occurred in these distressed
areas, more of the benefits would go to the disadvantaged because the
area’s remoteness would cut down on employment competition from
new commuters or migrants.
Other arguments for place-based policies include the notion that
geographical space produces monopolistic power, in which entry and
exit costs reduce free-market adjustments (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003).
New-economic-geography arguments include agglomeration economies where productivity increases with greater urban scale or arises
from the co-location of similar firms in the same industry. Agglomeration economies can arise because of factors such as more specialized input markets, specialized labor supply, and knowledge spillovers across
firms. Rural areas also can experience agglomerations when industry
“clusters” co-locate to take advantage of enhanced vertical integration
of inputs. Place-based policy advocates also argue that economic development policies can effectively enhance local growth and reduce
poverty because of factors such as neighborhood effects, economic role
models, and knowledge spillovers.
In addition, advocates of place-based policies note that personbased policies are expensive and that programs such as job training
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may have relatively low returns, depending upon the location of the
disadvantaged (Bartik 2001; Carneiro and Heckman 2003). Thus, sole
reliance on people-based policies may be inadequate in addressing the
spatial concentration of poverty (Blank 2005). Blank argues that place
and related contextual effects influence economic vitality and shape the
character of the people.
The wide spatial variation in local attributes can thwart “one size fits
all” person-based policies. In isolated inner cities and remote rural areas,
many of the disadvantaged have less access to job training, counseling,
health care, child care, and transportation, suggesting that government
service delivery should reflect these spatial differences (Allard, Tolman,
and Rosen 2003). Work-support policies such as the provision of child
care, transportation, education, and training also may have higher payoffs if jobs are nearby. Policies that improve a distressed community’s
vitality and job accessibility may do more for its disadvantaged residents than approaches that give them lengthy training and hope they
eventually find work nearby where there are very few jobs, or, failing
that, hope they move elsewhere (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003).
Practically speaking, to ignore the spatial dimension of poverty is
also to overlook the basic fact that most politicians and policymakers
represent specific jurisdictions. They may have less interest in the necessary person-based human capital development without the added attraction of well-planned (or even poorly planned) policies aimed at particular locations. Place-based policies also have the simple advantage
that governments may find it easier to target appropriate poor places
than to identify the appropriate poor households with specific attributes
(Ravallion and Wodon 1999). Likewise, because of the unpopularity of
person-based programs such as welfare assistance with voters, it may
be easier to obtain public support for policies aimed at distressed regions than for policies directed at low-income individuals.

Overview of this Book
The following chapters explore the spatial dimension of U.S. poverty, stressing differences across states, metropolitan areas, and counties,
with an eye toward state and local policy prescriptions. We find poverty
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to be very unevenly distributed across the country, varying widely even
within states and metropolitan areas. The great diversity in poverty outcomes leads us to explore finer geographical areas: within metropolitan areas, we look at central-city counties and suburbs; beyond metropolitan areas, we look at metro-adjacent and outlying, nonmetropolitan
counties. The spatial detail of our study allows us to draw more focused
policy conclusions. We conclude that the policy prescriptions should
vary greatly across space.4
In assessing poverty, we explore the underlying spatial, demographic, and economic contributors to poverty rates. Although we do not
need elaborate statistical analysis to know that single-mother-headed
households tend to have high poverty rates and that areas with high
unemployment also have elevated poverty, we still need to know the
relative importance of each factor. If personal characteristics such as
race and the prevalence of married-couple households are the overriding factor, policy should be focused more on supports to encourage
stronger families and to mitigate racial discrimination. Alternatively, if
the uneven geographical location of employment opportunities and an
unfavorable industry composition are the important causal factors, then
place-based policies aimed at improving employment opportunities in
distressed areas would be more effective. Without a detailed statistical
assessment, we will not be able to ascertain the proper policy mix and
make informed policy prescriptions for different geographic areas. For
example, policies that are effective in prosperous suburbs will likely
differ from those that prove effective in more remote, rural areas.
Our assessment of the geographical diversity of American poverty
begins in Chapter 2, where we examine the spatial variation of state and
county poverty rates and their trends over time. Fully understanding the
spatial distribution of poverty requires examining multiple geographical aggregations of poverty rates. Analysis of national poverty rates is
necessary if one wants to determine the overall effectiveness of national
full employment. Yet to understand the relative importance of economic growth versus welfare policies, states should be examined, because
they form the political entity that greatly sets and defines differential
welfare policies. Understanding the underlying causes and policy solutions that differ within metropolitan areas, or between urban centers and
rural communities, requires analysis of disaggregated regions such as
counties.

Partridge.indb 15

7/27/2006 1:40:58 PM

16 Partridge and Rickman

Chapter 2 notes that state poverty rates vary greatly. The South
tends to have the highest poverty rates. When examining the state patterns over the period of 1969–1999, we find that there is some persistence. Yet Southern states generally experienced marked reductions
in poverty, while others, such as many Western states, had relatively
lackluster performances.
When examining counties, we find even more diversity. First, there
are homogeneous low-poverty-rate clusters, such as in the upper Midwest, and high-poverty-rate clusters, such as in Appalachia or the Mississippi Delta. Yet poverty can vary greatly within a given state. For
example, even in Southeastern states with high average poverty, there
are low-poverty pockets within each state. Poverty can also take on a
more haphazard pattern, such as the wide range found within larger
metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, local poverty rates remain strikingly
persistent. For example, areas that had higher poverty rates in the 1950s
tend to have higher poverty rates today.
Chapter 3 discusses the elements of local low-wage labor markets
that provide the theoretical justification for antipoverty policies. Local labor markets respond differently to policies than does the national
labor market. Improving the employment opportunities of the disadvantaged would seem to be a reasonable solution to persistently high
poverty rates in certain locales. Yet a major complication is that newly
created jobs often go to new migrants or commuters from elsewhere.
The intended beneficiaries—the original, poor residents—can end up
with few of the new jobs. Hence, the notion that “a rising tide lifts all
boats,” which seems reasonable in macroeconomic discussions, may
not apply at the local level, though this differs by local area.
Chapter 4 provides a statistical assessment of the determinants of
state poverty rates. In it, we emphasize roles of economic growth and
state public welfare policies. In particular, we try to further determine
whether the 1996 welfare reform had a major role in the dramatic poverty rate outcomes in the 1990s. If so, this would give us grounds to be
optimistic that Bush administration efforts to further emphasize workfirst initiatives will be successful. We find that state economic growth
is an important cause of change in state poverty rates, and that this effect is especially large when the labor market is tight. This influence is
both direct, through enhanced labor market opportunities, and indirect,
through affecting other outcomes such as teen birthrates. In contrast, we
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find that policies related to welfare reform have virtually no statistically
significant effect on state poverty rates. Any favorable effects on the labor force behavior of potential welfare recipients appear to be offset by
adverse spillovers on other disadvantaged workers through increased
labor market competition. In Chapter 5, we look at case studies of four
states, which confirm the results of the statistical analysis and provide
context on the nexus between poverty, labor market performance, and
welfare reform.
Chapter 6 examines 1989 and 1999 poverty rates for more than
3,000 U.S. counties. One finding is of the importance of family characteristics such as marital status and education. Female labor market
participation and male unemployment rates are key labor market factors. Yet we find that, generally, employment growth has only a modest
impact on local poverty rates. Without some sort of targeting of the
neediest, this suggests that local policies that increase employment will
likely have only modest impacts on poverty; it further implies that a
strong state and national economy are important reinforcing forces. Another pattern we see is that areas that had higher shares of foreign immigrants arriving in the latter 1990s also had higher 1999 poverty rates.
This was a distinct change from the 1980s, when immigrant shares had
no detectable influence.
One weakness of the empirical models in Chapter 6 is that they do
not fully capture the geographical diversity of low-wage labor markets.
Chapters 7 and 8 address this concern by separately considering metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. One conclusion of Chapter 7 is
that metropolitan areas are not a monolithic block that should be examined in unison. Rather, they are often composed of a mosaic of distinct
central-city and suburban counties. Labor market conditions appear to
have an even weaker influence on metropolitan poverty rates than on
the nation as a whole. But this overlooks the greater responsiveness of
poverty rates in central-city counties to changes in labor market conditions. Conversely, new suburban jobs are so regularly filled by in-commuters that poverty rates are hardly influenced by job growth. Thus,
we argue that economic development policies can help disadvantaged
central-city residents, as job accessibility appears to be a constraint, but
that such policies will likely be ineffective in the suburbs. We describe
job-creation strategies for central-city counties and indicate how they
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can be targeted to ensure that the intended disadvantaged beneficiaries
capture more of the benefits.
Chapter 8 explores the dimensions of nonmetropolitan and rural
poverty. Examination of rural poverty has been a relatively neglected
field. A key determinant of rural poverty is whether a nonmetropolitan
county is adjacent to a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropolitan counties that border on metropolitan areas have significantly better
access to jobs, child care, and government services. Because remote
nonmetropolitan counties are more isolated, it is not surprising that local labor market conditions are much more important there. Moreover,
if local employment growth is concentrated in industries that are faring
well at the national level, there will be even more significant declines
in rural poverty rates. Hence, all other things being equal, we argue that
economic development policies likely have their largest benefits in rural
areas, though these policies may be more expensive to implement in remote areas. In contrast, we contend that the countless billions that have
been spent on specific resource-based industries, such as agriculture,
have had less-than-spectacular results on overall rural economic growth
and should be redirected to higher-valued uses for rural America.
Chapter 9 summarizes our empirical findings and policy prescriptions. Our foremost finding is that, while labor market conditions
have modest impacts on poverty in general, they can have important
impacts in central-city counties and in remote rural counties. Hence,
place-based policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of
disadvantaged workers in those places are in order. We describe how
providing tax credits for newly created jobs and wage subsidies for lowwage workers are two ways of targeting the intended beneficiaries. We
also stress the importance of first-source or community-based organizations in brokering and facilitating job creation. Other policies, such
as offering relocation assistance to disadvantaged families, are most
likely to work in central cities, but even there, the impact will likely be
modest. On the other hand, we argue that child care assistance is more
likely to be needed in remote rural areas. As with the role of economic
development policies, we conclude that a one-size-fits-all geographical
approach to person-based policy is misguided. Each area may instead
require a unique combination of place-based and person-based antipoverty policies.
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Notes
The first epigraph at the beginning of the chapter comes from Gene Koretz (1992),
“Trickle-Down Economics May Not Help the Poor,” in Business Week. The second epigraph comes from the New York Times (1996) article “The Welfare Bill.” The third comes
from a speech made to the Commonwealth Club of California by Quayle (1992).
1. Whether inequality reduces economic growth is a hotly debated topic among
economists. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994) find evidence that it reduces growth, while Forbes (2000) and Partridge
(1997, 2005) find the opposite.
2. The 1990s saw the property crime rate drop by nearly 50 percent and the violent
crime rate drop by nearly 40 percent (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
3. For examples of discussion of the link between economic growth and welfare
roles, see Bartik and Eberts (1999); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); Hoynes (2000b);
and Bennett, Lu, and Song (2002).
4. This book does not empirically examine subcounty poverty rates such as those
found in poverty clusters that can exist at the neighborhood level (Weinberg,
Reagan, and Yankow 2004). For example, rather than asking why a west-side
Chicago neighborhood has higher poverty than a wealthy Highland Park neighborhood in the northern suburbs, we instead ask geographically broader questions, such as “Why do Chicago suburbs have lower poverty rates than the
metropolitan area’s central-city county?” This focus allows us to more directly
consider economic development, which is inherently more widespread than a
neighborhood.
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2
Recent Spatial Poverty
Trends in America
The national poverty trends depicted in Chapter 1 obscure remarkable geographical diversity in the poverty rate outcomes across the
United States. This diversity extends beyond the familiar broad regional patterns of high poverty rates in the South and comparatively low
rates in the upper Midwest. For one thing, poverty varies greatly within
broad regions. Even within narrower areas such as states or metropolitan areas, clusters of high and low poverty often exist in relatively close
proximity. Second, at the state or, more broadly, the regional level, there
can be large relative changes in poverty rates over time, but at the disaggregated county level, relative poverty is often quite persistent.
Census 2000 data reveal broad regional diversity in poverty rates.
In 1999, the South had the highest poverty rate of any region, at 13.9
percent, well above the national average of 12.4 percent.1 The Midwest
had the lowest regional poverty rate, at 10.2 percent, followed by the
Northeast at 11.4 percent and the West at 13.0 percent. Yet, within these
regions, there is tremendous variation in poverty rates across states and
substate areas. Southern poverty rates ranged from 8.5 percent in Maryland to 19.9 percent in Mississippi (the District of Columbia had a 20.2
percent rate). As an example of within-state variation, Virginia’s poverty rates ranged from a low of 2.8 percent in Loudoun County to a high
of 31.4 percent in Radford. Thus, Virginia’s low overall rate of poverty,
9.6 percent, does not mean poverty is not a concern for the state. A similar story can be told for almost every state.
There have been wide disparities in regional poverty trends over
time, as well. For example, the South made remarkable gains in reducing poverty over the latter part of the twentieth century, while the West
and the Northeast had more lackluster performances. Indeed, during
the period from 1969 to 1999, in which the U.S. poverty rate fell by
1.3 percentage points, the poverty rates for Arkansas and Mississippi
fell by 12.0 and 15.5 points. By way of contrast, during the same 30year period, poverty rates rose by 3.2 and 3.5 percentage points in the
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District of Columbia and New York. However, as described later in the
chapter, while there have been some significant changes at the broad
regional level, we see a strong trend of relative persistence when examining counties. Counties that had higher poverty rates in the past tend to
have higher poverty rates today, and counties that had lower rates in the
past tend to have lower rates today.
The overall national poverty rate also obscures tremendous differences in the rate of poverty across demographic groups. For instance,
the 2002 poverty rate for families headed by a married couple stood at
5.3 percent, but it was a remarkable 26.5 percent for families headed by
a female. Children also are considerably more likely to live in poverty.
The poverty rate for children less than 18 years of age is 16.7 percent,
whereas it is only 10.6 percent for adults 18–64 and 10.4 percent for
adults 65 years and over. Poverty also varies greatly by racial and ethnic
origin. In 2002, poverty rates for White non-Hispanics equaled 8.0 percent. The poverty rate among Asians was 10.1 percent, and among African Americans and American Indians it was 24.1 percent each. Among
all Hispanics, it was 21.8 percent.2
In addition, as will be seen in this chapter, demographic groups are
not equally represented in all geographic areas. The diverse spatial and
demographic patterns suggest that poverty eradication efforts need to
be tailored to both person and place. This chapter explores in more detail the spatial patterns of poverty, including potentially related spatial
differences in the demographic composition of the population, employment growth, and welfare reform.

Patterns and Trends in State Poverty
As shown in Figure 2.1, the historical pattern of high Southern poverty was strongly evident in 1969.3 Of the 16 states that had poverty
rates of 16 percent or greater, all but New Mexico and South Dakota were in the U.S. Census Bureau’s South region (Region 3). Nine
states had poverty rates below 10 percent, and all but Nevada were in
the Census Bureau’s Northeast or Midwest regions (Regions 1 and 2).
Following the national trend, by 1999 only six states had poverty rates
in the high category (16 percent or greater), while 17 states had poverty
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rates in the low category, below 10 percent (Figure 2.2). Despite these
trends, poverty generally remained higher in the South, which contained
four of the six high-poverty states, while the low-poverty states were
still mostly found in the Northeast or Midwest. In fact, the correlation
between the 1969 and 1999 state poverty rates equals 0.80.
The change in poverty rates from 1969 to 1999 is shown in Figure 2.3. All but 16 states experienced reductions in their poverty rates.
Except for South Dakota, the largest reductions occurred in the South,
where states had had high poverty rates in 1969. Many Northern industrial states experienced the largest increases in poverty. They were
joined by states in the West, particularly those on the coast.
As shown in Figure 2.4, even during the robust economic period
of the 1990s, 14 states saw their poverty rates rise: 10 Northeastern
states (including the District of Columbia, which we count as a state
for the purposes of our discussion), Nevada, California, Alaska, and
Hawaii. This again illustrates the spatial diversity of poverty outcomes.
Within the South, poverty rate declines during the 1990s were less dramatic in the states of the South Atlantic division of the census (Division
5); larger declines occurred in the East South Central and West South
Central divisions (Divisions 6 and 7). In contrast to the overall period
of 1969–1999, Midwestern states uniformly experienced greater than
average reductions in poverty in the 1990s.
To begin to understand spatial poverty trends in the 1990s, we turn
to the annual state poverty rates compiled from the Current Population
Survey, or CPS (U.S. Census Bureau 2004d). Annual data allows for
examination of the relation between economic growth and poverty in
the late 1990s. Annual data also then allows for examining the potential
link between the timing of the 1996 welfare reform and poverty rates.
One apparent pattern in the decennial census poverty estimates discussed above is the predominance of poverty declines in states with
high initial levels of poverty. Using the CPS data for 1984–2000, we fit
a regression line through a scatter plot of changes in poverty rates and
the average poverty rate over the period (Figure 2.5).4 The regression
line reveals a negative and significant relationship: the states that had
higher poverty tended to be those that experienced the greatest reductions.5
A comparison of state poverty rate changes to state unemployment
rate changes for 1984–2000 (Figure 2.6) confirms the national findings
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shown in Figure 1.3. As Figure 2.6 shows, states with greater reductions in unemployment rates tended to experience greater poverty rate
declines. The positive relationship shown by the regression line fitted
through the scatter plot is statistically significant and appears to be consistent throughout the sample.6 For example, the three states with the
largest reduction in poverty rates also experienced dramatic declines in
unemployment: Mississippi, Kentucky, and Iowa. Likewise, states with
the largest unemployment declines, such as West Virginia and Michigan, experienced large reductions in their poverty rates.
A similar comparison can be made for states that implemented their
TANF welfare reforms in 1996 vs. those that implemented them afterwards. Figure 2.7 shows the (unweighted) average poverty rate in
states that implemented TANF sometime during 1996 and the average
poverty rate of states that first implemented TANF after 1996. Both
groups of states experienced significant poverty rate declines in the late
1990s. However, the poverty rate dropped every year beginning with
1993 in states that implemented TANF in 1996, whereas for the remaining states, the average poverty rate leveled off between 1994 and 1996
before again declining.
Although there was a greater total decline for early TANF implementers from 1993 to 2000, most of the relative improvement came
during 1994 and 1995, before implementation of TANF. This might be
attributable to an announcement effect, in that welfare recipients may
have anticipated the policy change and may have begun to transition
to work, or it may have been that these states were the ones that had
experimented with AFDC waivers. However, the correlation between a
state having an AFDC waiver in effect in 1995 and one implementing
TANF in 1996 was only 0.1, which calls into question the existence of
such effects.7 The result also may have been due to economic conditions becoming relatively more favorable, around 1994–1995, for states
implementing TANF in 1996. The average poverty rate decline for
these states is 1.84 percentage points between 1996 and 2000; the corresponding figure for the remaining states is 2.64.8 This further suggests
that welfare reform was not a causal factor in overall reduced poverty
rates, but rather that stronger economies in the late TANF-implementing states may have underpinned their greater poverty declines. The
narrow window of welfare reform implementation at the state level,
combined with other policy changes and with the strengthening of the
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U.S. economy, make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding
the relative impacts of welfare reform and state economic performance.
This issue is explored more extensively in Chapters 4 and 5.

Patterns and Trends in County Poverty Rates
As illustrated by the 1979, 1989, and 1999 county poverty rates in
Figures 2.8–2.10, considerable variation in poverty rates continued to
exist in recent decades within states as well, and this variation showed
clear patterns of relative poverty persistence. Solely examining states
would mask the considerable variation in substate experiences.9 The
lowest poverty rates are consistently found in the upper Midwest and
along the northeast coastline. Poverty is consistently highest in central
Appalachia, the lower Mississippi delta, the historic Cotton Belt in the
Southeast, counties along the Rio Grande and the Mexican border, and
on Native American reservations in the West and Great Plains. Indeed,
large regions can be characterized as having high or low poverty clusters that often extend across state boundaries.
However, characterizing the spatial dimension of poverty only in
terms of clusters is overly simplistic for many localities, including most
large metropolitan areas. The Washington, DC, metropolitan area exhibits one commonly found pattern. Close up, it looks like a doughnut,
in that it has high poverty rates in the central city and extremely low
poverty rates in almost all surrounding suburban counties. There are
also metropolitan areas like St. Louis, which has more of a checkerboard pattern—in its case characterized by high poverty rates in the
central city, more moderate rates in its eastern suburban counties in Illinois, and quite low rates in its western suburban counties in Missouri.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the 1989–1999 and 1979–1999 changes
in county poverty rates. The maps reveal significant increases in county
poverty rates in Western states and in central Appalachia. There are
some notable decreases during the 20-year period in the upper Midwestern states and in some Southeastern Atlantic states. However, all
regions of the country had some counties with strong performances and
others with weak ones. Another overarching feature is one of persistence in relative poverty rates. In fact, the correlation of county poverty
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rate levels between 1979 and 1999 equals 0.84. Thus, there are enduring features in most localities that either facilitate or hinder the wellbeing of disadvantaged populations.
We explored the spatial dimension of poverty in terms of a place’s
metropolitan or nonmetropolitan status. Table 2.1 reports, for both 1989
and 1999, population-weighted poverty rate statistics for the entire sample by five categories: 1) metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan designation
of the county, 2) age, 3) family type, 4) race/ethnicity, and 5) poverty
severity.10 Metropolitan counties are further examined in terms of the
size of the metropolitan area (MSA) and whether they are in the central
city or suburbs.11 Likewise, nonmetropolitan counties are grouped into
those adjacent to an MSA and those nonadjacent. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report, for 1989 and 1999, population-weighted poverty rate statistics for
these categories of metro and nonmetro counties by age, family type,
race/ethnicity, and poverty severity. Figure 2.13 summarizes the poverty
rate trends for 1989–1999 across the different county types, and Figure
2.14 summarizes the corresponding trends by demographic group.
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.13 reveal that the population-weighted county poverty rate declined from 13.2 percent in 1989 to 12.4 percent in
1999.12 Although poverty rates were higher in nonmetropolitan counties in both years, over the decade the poverty rate declined by only 0.3
percentage points in metropolitan counties, while in nonmetropolitan
counties it declined by 2.4 points. Yet these statistics mask heterogeneity in poverty trends within metro and nonmetro regions.
From Table 2.2 and Figure 2.13 we see that smaller metropolitanarea counties (those with a population of less than one million) on average had a poverty rate that declined from 13.7 to 12.8 percent, while
the average poverty rate in larger metropolitan-area counties remained
unchanged at 11.4 percent. The average poverty rate barely changed in
MSA counties containing a central city, inching down from 13.3 to 13.2
percent.13 Suburban counties fared better; there, poverty declined from
8.5 to 7.8 percent.14 This shows that the more urbanized areas did not
share equally in the prosperity of the 1990s.
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.13 report population-weighted average overall nonmetro county poverty rates, along with average poverty rates
for nonmetro counties that directly border metro areas and those for
more remote nonmetro counties. Nonmetropolitan counties on average
had higher poverty rates than their metropolitan counterparts, which
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somewhat counters the emphasis policymakers and much of the public
places on the issue of urban poverty. Among nonmetro counties, those
not adjacent to metropolitan areas had higher average poverty rates in
both 1989 and 1999. Counties adjacent to metro areas posted a decline
in the average poverty rate from 15.9 to 13.7 percent, while nonadjacent counties recorded a decline in the average rate from 18.8 to 16.0
percent. Compared to MSA counties, average poverty rates fell more in
nonmetropolitan counties in both relative and absolute terms, especially
in more isolated nonmetropolitan counties. The pattern of nonmetropolitan counties faring better is consistent with Jargowsky’s (2003) finding
that the number of nonmetropolitan residents living in “high poverty”
neighborhoods—those with poverty rates exceeding 40 percent—declined by almost one-half during the 1990s, which is a more dramatic
decline than that which occurred in MSAs.

Demographic Patterns and Trends in County
Poverty
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 also report average county poverty rates for various demographic categories, which are summarized in Figure 2.14. As
reported, the average poverty rate of those under the age of 18 declined
from 1989 to 1999 across all county categories. For those 18 to 64 years
of age, the average all-county poverty rate was unchanged. Yet this
group’s average poverty rate increased in large MSA and central-city
counties while it decreased slightly in suburban counties. The decrease
in 18- to 64-year-old poverty rates in nonmetro counties was greater
in counties that were not adjacent to metro areas. Because the 18- to
64-year-old group encompasses the prime working years, the rise in
poverty rates in large MSAs is somewhat surprising given the robust
labor market of the late 1990s and its labor shortages. One explanation
for this unexpected pattern is labor market spillovers from welfare reform depressed wages for low-skilled workers (Bartik 2002a,b), which
more than offset the benefits derived from the strong labor market at
the end of the 1990s. Finally, for those 65 years and older, the average
poverty rate declined in all categories, with dramatic declines occurring
in nonmetropolitan counties.
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Table 2.1 shows that the national-average county poverty rate for all
selected family types declined from 1989 to 1999. In terms of percentage points, the greatest reduction occurred among single-female-headed families with children. Besides the importance of a strong economy,
this decline underlies the contention of supporters of welfare reform
that its work-first emphasis successfully encouraged potential recipients to enter the workforce, which acted to reduce poverty rates (Blank
2002; Haskins 2001; Pear 2003).
The poverty rates by household type in Table 2.2 continue to point
to the disappointing performance in large MSAs during the 1990s.
Poverty rates for married-couple families and married-couple families
with children increased in central-city counties and in counties located
in large MSAs. Conversely, poverty rates showed consistent declines
across all family types in small MSAs and in suburban counties. Poverty rates across all family types also declined in nonmetropolitan counties regardless of adjacency to MSAs.
Following the overall poverty rate trend, the weighted county average percent of the population living below 50 percent of the poverty
line also decreased from 1989 to 1999, from 5.8 to 5.6 percent. It decreased from 6.9 to 6.1 percent in nonmetro counties while remaining
unchanged at 5.5 percent in metro counties. The average population
share below 50 percent of the poverty threshold increased by 0.1 percentage points in central-city counties and in counties located in large
MSAs. These results reinforce the general pattern of larger metropolitan areas not faring as well as nonmetropolitan areas in terms of reducing poverty.
Table 2.1 also indicates that poverty rates declined more rapidly
during the 1990s across all racial and ethnic minority groups. However,
direct comparisons across the two decades cannot be made because
the 2000 census introduced a new racial category of “two or more.”
Nonetheless, the Hispanic ethnic group is generally comparable across
decades, and it, too, suggests a decline between 1989 and 1999. While
the results should be cautiously interpreted, it is noteworthy, in Table
2.2, that “white/Caucasian” is the only racial/ethnic group for which
average poverty rates increased in large MSAs and central-city counties
during the 1990s. This pattern weakly suggests that in large metro areas,
minorities were able to buck the overall trend and make some inroads
reducing poverty rates. Some of these gains may relate to falling labor
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market discrimination in the 1990s (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003).
Likewise, spillovers due to welfare reform may have had an adverse
impact on less-skilled but employed whites if a disproportionate share
of the new job seekers induced to join the labor market were members
of minority populations.

County Patterns in Employment Growth
Figure 2.15 addresses the role of economic performance in the differences in poverty trends across metro and nonmetro county types.
As shown in Figure 2.15, average job growth equaled 8.6 percent over
the 1985–1990 period and 9.2 percent over the 1995–2000 period.
MSA counties experienced greater growth in both periods; however,
their average growth slowed from 15.4 percent to 13.8 percent. In contrast, average five-year employment growth in nonmetropolitan counties accelerated by 1.5 percentage points in the 1990s, to 7.5 percent.
Taken together, these figures show that while MSA counties generally
remained more vibrant than nonmetropolitan counties in the 1990s, the
five-year employment differential shrank from 9.4 to 6.3 percentage
points. Hence, the relative improvement in net nonmetro job creation is
likely one reason for MSA counties’ better showing in poverty reduction during the 1990s. While it is too strong a statement to assert that the
1990s were a decade of rural renaissance, there was clearly a rebound
from the adversity of the 1980s, a decade that included farm crises and
other primary-sector shakeouts in energy, mining, and timber.
The largest reduction in MSA employment growth during the 1995–
2000 period compared to the 1985–90 period occurred in metropolitan
areas of less than one million (13.9 to 11.3 percent) and in central-city
counties (13.5 to 11.2 percent), though it also decreased in the suburbs as well. The continuing superior net job creation performance in
suburbs is consistent with the growing movement of jobs away from
traditional minority residential locations in central cities (DworakFisher 2004; Raphael and Stoll 2002). Somewhat surprisingly, job
growth declined more in small metro areas than in large metro areas,
which is inconsistent with those two areas’ relative performance in poverty rates. Perhaps in small metro areas, access to jobs is a critical ele-
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ment that produced better poverty rate declines even though there was
less job growth.

Conclusions
There is a remarkable spatial dimension to U.S. poverty that is obscured by focusing solely on national poverty rate trends. Poverty rates
vary across broad regions, with the South having the highest poverty
rates and the Midwest having the lowest. Yet within these regions, there
are states with high and low poverty, and there is also significant geographical variation within most states. Likewise, there are wide-ranging differences over time: most Southern states experienced large poverty rate declines between 1969 and 1999, whereas many Western and
Northeastern states experienced modest increases.
At the more detailed county level, the most common pattern is clusters of high and low poverty that often extend across state boundaries.
In metropolitan areas, there are often more irregular patterns between
central-city and suburban counties. Although there are exceptions, another general pattern is that relative county poverty tends to be quite
persistent over time.
Although nonmetropolitan counties consistently had higher poverty
rates than metropolitan counties, nonmetropolitan counties, on average,
experienced larger poverty rate declines in the 1990s. Moreover, it was
the remote nonmetropolitan counties that experienced the greatest declines, not those adjacent to metropolitan areas. For metropolitan counties, the largest poverty rate declines, on average, occurred in small
metropolitan and suburban counties. Poverty rates were unchanged in
large metropolitan-area counties and virtually unchanged for counties
containing the central city of a metropolitan area.
Poverty rate changes among demographic groups generally followed changes in the overall rates for the respective county types.
“White/Caucasian” was the only racial/ethnic group for which the poverty rate increased in large MSA and central-city counties. Poverty rates
for those 18 to 64 years of age and for married families likewise increased in large MSA and central-city counties. A possible explanation
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for these results is that welfare reform increased labor market competition for these groups, depressing their wage rates.
Finally, employment growth patterns were not completely consistent with the poverty rate trends in the 1990s. Metro areas continued
to grow faster than nonmetro areas, particularly metro areas with more
than one million people. Surprisingly, job growth was less rapid in metropolitan areas with a population of less than one million, which contrasts with their better poverty performance. Jobs in suburbs continued
to grow much faster than those in the central cities. Although slower
than in suburbs, employment growth also accelerated in nonmetro
counties, particularly in those not adjacent to metro areas, which may
in part explain their greater poverty rate reductions.

Notes
1. The 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses report income and poverty
data for the year preceding the census, which is why the 10-year census poverty
rates are from 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002a; Bishaw
and Iceland 2003). In this chapter, the decennial census state-level data are taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site. The county-level poverty data in this
chapter are from decennial census data described in Chapter 6.
2. Beginning with the 2002 Current Population Survey, respondents were given
the opportunity to identify themselves as belonging to multiple racial categories.
While the single-race category poverty rates are almost identical to those for the
categories that include multiple designations, the racial groups are not directly
comparable to those from earlier years because of the change in method (U.S.
Census Bureau 2004a,c).
3. Because they would break up the text too much, the many figures and tables for
this chapter have been grouped at the back of the chapter.
4. The t-statistic for the slope equals –3.57. The average poverty rate is used in
place of the initial poverty rate to avoid Galton’s fallacy of regression to the
mean. The relationship remains negative and significant if the dependent variable is defined as the percentage change in the poverty rate rather than as the
percentage point change.
5. Black and Sanders (2004) also report a regression to the mean in terms of poverty rates for Appalachian counties.
6. The slope equals 0.66, and the t-statistic is equal to 3.05.
7. This pattern is akin to that noted by Blank (2002) regarding the decline in AFDC
caseloads in 1994, predating implementation of TANF, which led her to be skeptical as to whether welfare reform was underlying the decline.
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8. Regressing the poverty rate differential on a time trend, on its square, and on a
dummy variable that takes a value of unity for 1996–2000 reveals that from 1996
to 2000 the poverty rate was lower by 1.07 percentage points, in the states that
did not implement TANF until after 1996, than what would have been expected
based on the past trend in the differential. The t-statistic for the 1996 dummy
variables was 2.51. The trend variables were jointly significant below the 0.02
level based on a Wald test.
9. As an example of how state data can mask substate trends, Beeson and DeJong
(2002), using population data, find that state patterns of growth convergence
mask growth divergence at the county level.
10. The metropolitan designation and the counties used in our analysis mostly follow those used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in its 2000
Regional Economic Information System (REIS). The BEA and Census Bureau
definitions are the same except for Virginia, where the BEA combines some of
the independent cities with their neighboring counties to form a more coherent
measure of labor markets. In five cases in Virginia, we took this one step further
by combining the following BEA groups (Federal Information Processing Standards Codes in parentheses): 1) York and Poquoson, (FIPS 51958) with Hampton
(FIPS 51650) and Newport News (FIPS 51700); 2) Halifax County (FIPS 51083)
and South Boston (FIPS 51780); 3) Fairfax, Fairfax City, and Falls Church (FIPS
51919) and Alexandria (FIPS 51510); 4) Norfolk Independent City (FIPS 51710)
and Portsmouth (FIPS 51740); and 5) Roanoke and Salem (FIPS 51944) and
Roanoke Independent City (FIPS 51770).
11. For purposes of consistency in this study, we made our 1989–90 MSA areas correspond to the 1999 MSA definitions that were used for the 2000 Census. These
also were used by Jargowsky (2003) in his study of poverty concentration.
12. Unless indicated, all of the variables are from the 1990 and 2000 censuses, meaning they reflect characteristics of the county’s residents. The county poverty rates
used are from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial census of population, with
the 1979 poverty measures being taken directly from the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s CD-ROM USA Counties 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005f).
13. A central-city county includes the county or counties of the named central city or
cities in the MSA definition in a multiple-county MSA. Suburban counties do not
include any of the central city or cities. The source of the central-city boundaries
is the U.S. Census Bureau publication County and City Data Book: 2000 (U.S.
Census Bureau 2002b). The advantage of this category is that it fully captures the
central-city boundaries but also captures the inner-ring suburbs in the “central
city” designation. This appears to reflect ongoing patterns in metropolitan areas
in that inner-ring suburbs are performing more like their less-vibrant central cities, resulting in a convergence of poverty patterns (Jargowsky 2003). In fact,
the descriptive statistics will reveal a sharp distinction between these categories,
illustrating that they are indeed a distinct grouping.
14. At first glance, this runs counter to Berube and Frey’s (2002) finding that among
MSAs with a population above 500,000, central-city poverty rates fell slightly
during the 1990s, while suburban poverty rates increased slightly. This pattern
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also somewhat counters Jargowsky’s (2003) finding that the population residing
in neighborhoods with high poverty rates—defined as those neighborhoods having poverty rates exceeding 40 percent—declined by 21 percent in central cities
but by only 4 percent in suburbs. This discrepancy is reconciled by the fact that
our definition tends to include inner-ring suburbs in central-city counties and
that these suburbs lagged behind the more vibrant outer suburbs. Together, the
results suggest that poverty became more dispersed in central-city counties, even
as the average poverty rate declined only slightly. In fact, Jargowsky’s (2003)
findings suggest that poverty became more concentrated in the outer fringe of
central cities and in the inner ring of suburbs. Conversely, exclusionary zoning
and housing affordability in outer suburban counties may have limited the dispersion of household poverty during the 1990s. Thus, our definition captures the
performance gap between outer suburbs and the more central parts of metropolitan areas.
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Groupa
Total individual poverty rate
Metropolitan county total poverty rate
Nonmetropolitan county total poverty rate
By age
Children <18 years old

N
3028
824
2204

3028

Adults 18 to 64 years old

3028

Adults > 65 years old

3028

Selected family types
Married

3028

Married with children

3028

Female-headed with children

3027

Female-headed without children

3027

7/27/2006 1:41:00 PM

1989
Mean percent
(std. dev.)

Max.
[min.]

13.2
(6.3)
12.2
(5.5)
17.1
(7.6)

63.1
[2.2]
41.9
[2.2]
63.1
[4.0]

18.0
(8.8)
11.2
(5.5)
12.6
(6.5)

70.1
[1.9]
57.5
[2.0]
58.3
[2.8]

5.6
(3.9)
7.3
(5.0)
40.2
(12.0)
10.0
(6.5)

54.4
[0.7]
58.6
[0.7]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics, 1989 and 1999 County Poverty Rates (%)

N
3028
824
2204

3028
3028
3028

3028
3028
3028
3027

1999
Mean percent
(std. dev.)

Max.
[min.]

12.4
(5.6)
11.9
(5.2)
14.7
(6.2)

52.3
[2.1]
35.9
[2.1]
52.3
[4.0]

16.4
(7.8)
11.2
(5.0)
9.9
(4.5)

61.0
[0.0]
46.3
[2.0]
44.1
[1.9]

5.1
(3.4)
6.7
(4.5)
32.6
(9.9)
9.1
(5.1)

43.2
[0.0]
48.5
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
66.7
[0.0]
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Male-headed with children

3021

18.8
(9.6)

100
[0.0]

3022

17.2
(7.3)

79.5
[0.0]

Racial/ethnic demographic
Caucasian/White

3028
2705

Native American

2925

Asian

2760

Other

2688

Hispanic

2980

56.3
[2.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]

3028

African American/Black

9.8
(5.0)
27.2
(12.9)
22.5
(13.7)
15.4
(12.7)
26.0
(15.8)
22.5
(11.7)

9.3
(4.5)
23.4
(10.2)
20.3
(11.1)
13.2
(9.6)
23.2
(11.1)
21.4
(8.6)
18.8
(7.8)

51.7
[1.9]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
100
[0.0]
83.7
[0.0]

5.6
(2.7)
6.8
(3.0)
8.6
(2.9)

26.5
[0.8]
29.3
[1.3]
22.0
[1.2]

Two or moreb
Relative to poverty threshold
Percent of pop. at < 50% of poverty level

2879
2962
2906
2923
3020
3020

3028

Percent of pop. at 50–100% of poverty level

3028

Percent of pop. at 100–150% of poverty level

3028

5.8
(3.2)
7.3
(3.4)
8.6
(3.1)

39.3
[0.8]
32.2
[1.0]
28.1
[2.2]

3028
3028
3028

a
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Weighted by 1990 or 2000 county population. A county is not included when the census did not report any individuals in that group. A
nonmetropolitan county uses the 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS (Regional Economic Information System) county definitions.
b
Blank = not applicable.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e).
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics, 1989 and 1999 Metropolitan County Poverty Rates (%)
1989
(1)

1999

Groupa

Total

(2)
MSA pop.
over 1
million

Total individual poverty rate

12.2
(5.5)

11.4
(5.3)

13.7
(5.5)

13.3
(5.2)

8.5
(4.7)

11.9
(5.2)

11.4
(5.3)

12.8
(5.0)

13.2
(5.0)

7.8
(3.5)

17.0
(8.2)
10.4
(4.8)
11.2
(4.9)

16.4
(8.4)
9.6
(4.5)
10.5
(4.3)

18.3
(7.6)
11.8
(5.0)
12.5
(5.6)

18.8
(7.8)
11.4
(4.5)
11.5
(4.7)

11.2
(6.5)
7.0
(4.0)
10.3
(5.5)

15.8
(7.6)
10.7
(4.7)
9.2
(3.8)

15.3
(7.8)
10.2
(4.6)
9.1
(3.8)

16.8
(7.0)
11.8
(4.6)
9.3
(3.7)

17.7
(7.2)
11.9
(4.4)
9.7
(3.8)

9.9
(5.2)
6.9
(3.1)
7.6
(3.2)

4.8
(3.0)
6.4
(4.0)
38.0
(10.9)
8.8
(4.9)
17.3
(7.4)

4.3
(2.4)
5.9
(3.4)
35.4
(10.6)
7.8
(4.0)
16.2
(6.6)

5.6
(3.8)
7.3
(4.9)
43.0
(9.7)
10.7
(5.8)
19.4
(8.4)

5.1
(3.0)
6.9
(4.0)
39.8
(9.7)
9.3
(4.6)
18.6
(6.7)

3.6
(2.7)
4.5
(3.5)
32.0
(12.3)
7.0
(5.4)
13.2
(8.1)

4.7
(3.1)
6.3
(4.2)
30.9
(8.9)
8.3
(4.0)
16.3
(6.1)

4.7
(3.0)
6.2
(4.0)
28.9
(8.5)
7.8
(3.6)
15.6
(5.7)

4.8
(3.5)
6.4
(4.7)
34.9
(8.2)
9.3
(4.5)
17.9
(6.5)

5.3
(3.3)
7.2
(4.3)
32.8
(7.9)
9.0
(3.7)
17.7
(5.7)

3.0
(1.8)
3.7
(2.4)
25.2
(9.2)
6.1
(3.9)
12.2
(5.5)

By age
Children < 18 years old
Adults 18 to 64 years old
Adults > 65 years old
Selected family types
Married
Married with children
Female-headed with children
Female-headed w/out children
Male-headed with children

(3)
(4)
MSA pop. Central
under 1
MSA
million
county

(5)
Suburban
MSA
county

(6)

Total

(7)
MSA pop.
over 1
million

(8)
(9)
MSA pop. Central
under 1
MSA
million
county

(10)
Suburban
MSA
county
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Racial/ethnic demographic
Caucasian/White
African American/Black
Native American
Asian
Other
Hispanic

8.7
(4.1)
25.8
(10.0)
20.9
(10.5)
15.1
(10.1)
24.9
(11.7)
21.3
(9.3)

7.8
(3.3)
23.5
(8.9)
19.2
(9.1)
13.3
(7.6)
23.9
(10.8)
20.4
(9.0)

10.5
(4.8)
30.4
(10.4)
24.3
(12.2)
18.8
(12.9)
26.9
(13.2)
23.1
(9.8)

9.3
(4.0)
27.2
(8.8)
22.2
(9.6)
16.7
(9.6)
26.5
(10.2)
22.9
(8.5)

7.0
(3.8)
21.3
(12.1)
16.6
(12.0)
10.2
(10.1)
19.8
(14.6)
16.4
(10.2)

8.7
(4.1)
22.4
(7.8)
19.4
(8.5)
12.8
(7.3)
22.4
(8.4)
20.5
(7.2)
17.9
(6.4)

8.1
(3.8)
20.4
(6.9)
18.4
(7.6)
11.8
(6.0)
21.4
(8.0)
19.5
(6.9)
16.6
(5.9)

9.8
(4.4)
26.2
(7.9)
21.3
(9.9)
14.9
(9.0)
24.4
(9.0)
22.4
(7.4)
20.6
(6.6)

9.4
(4.1)
23.8
(6.7)
21.0
(7.5)
14.1
(6.9)
23.8
(7.2)
21.9
(6.4)
19.3
(5.9)

6.3
(2.9)
17.9
(9.0)
14.3
(9.5)
8.8
(7.1)
18.1
(10.2)
16.0
(7.6)
13.7
(6.3)

5.5
(2.9)
6.6
(2.8)
7.8
(2.6)
824

5.3
(2.9)
6.1
(2.6)
7.1
(2.4)
341

6.0
(2.8)
7.7
(3.0)
9.0
(2.4)
483

6.1
(2.8)
7.2
(2.6)
8.2
(2.3)
391

3.6
(2.1)
4.9
(2.8)
6.4
(3.0)
433

5.5
(2.7)
6.4
(2.7)
8.0
(2.6)
824

5.4
(2.8)
6.0
(2.6)
7.6
(2.6)
341

5.7
(2.3)
7.1
(2.8)
8.9
(2.5)
483

6.2
(2.6)
7.0
(2.6)
8.6
(2.4)
391

3.5
(1.6)
4.3
(2.1)
6.2
(2.5)
433

Two or moreb
Relative to poverty threshold
% pop. < 50% poverty level
% pop. 50–100% poverty level
% pop. 100–150% poverty level
N
a

Weighted by 1990 or 2000 county population. For some groups, there are fewer counties than listed when the census did not report any individuals in that
category. A metropolitan county employs 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions using the MSA population from the 2000 census.
b
Blank = not applicable.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e).
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics, 1989 and 1999 Nonmetropolitan County Poverty Rates (%)
1989
(1)

1999

Groupa

Total

(2)
Adjacent to
MSAb

Total individual poverty rate

17.1
(7.6)

15.9
(7.0)

18.8
(8.0)

14.7
(6.2)

13.7
(5.7)

16.0
(6.6)

21.8
(9.8)
14.6
(6.8)
18.4
(8.5)

20.5
(9.2)
13.3
(6.1)
17.5
(8.2)

23.6
(10.4)
16.2
(7.2)
19.6
(8.8)

19.0
(8.4)
13.2
(5.7)
12.6
(5.9)

17.8
(7.8)
12.2
(5.2)
12.1
(5.6)

20.5
(9.0)
14.6
(6.1)
13.3
(6.2)

9.0
(5.2)
11.1
(6.4)
49.2
(12.3)
14.7
(9.4)
24.8
(13.9)

8.1
(4.6)
10.0
(5.6)
46.9
(11.9)
13.6
(8.6)
23.3
(12.7)

10.1
(5.7)
12.5
(6.9)
52.0
(12.1)
16.0
(10.2)
26.7
(15.2)

6.6
(3.9)
8.6
(5.0)
39.6
(11.0)
12.1
(7.3)
20.9
(10.2)

6.0
(3.4)
7.8
(4.4)
37.9
(10.5)
11.4
(6.5)
19.3
(8.9)

7.4
(4.3)
9.7
(5.6)
41.9
(11.1)
13.1
(8.2)
22.9
(11.5)

By age
Children <18 years old
Adults 18 to 64 years old
Adults > 65 years old
Selected family types
Married
Married with children
Female-headed with children
Female-headed without children
Male-headed with children

(3)
Not adjacent
to MSAb

(4)
Total

(5)
Adjacent
to MSAb

(6)
Not adjacent
to MSAb
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Racial/ethnic demographic
Caucasian/White
African American/Black
Native American
Asian
Other
Hispanic

14.2
(5.7)
32.8
(20.4)
29.0
(21.2)
16.4
(20.4)
30.9
(26.4)
27.4
(17.5)

13.1
(5.2)
31.0
(17.6)
26.9
(18.9)
15.6
(19.0)
29.7
(24.7)
26.0
(16.0)

15.6
(6.1)
35.3
(23.3)
31.8
(23.5)
17.4
(21.9)
32.5
(28.4)
29.2
(19.1)

12.1
(4.8)
27.9
(16.2)
24.0
(17.9)
14.6
(15.9)
26.7
(18.1)
25.1
(12.2)
22.4
(11.3)

11.3
(4.3)
26.9
(14.2)
21.7
(15.8)
14.5
(15.0)
25.6
(16.3)
24.1
(11.1)
20.9
(10.0)

13.2
(5.1)
29.2
(18.6)
27.1
(19.8)
14.8
(16.9)
28.2
(20.2)
26.5
(13.4)
24.4
(12.6)

6.9
(4.0)
10.3
(4.0)
11.9
(2.8)
2204

6.3
(3.5)
9.6
(3.8)
11.3
(2.8)
974

7.6
(4.5)
11.2
(4.0)
12.6
(2.7)
1230

6.1
(3.1)
8.6
(3.4)
10.8
(2.7)
2204

5.7
(2.8)
8.0
(3.1)
10.3
(2.6)
974

6.6
(3.4)
9.4
(3.5)
11.5
(2.6)
1230

Two or morec
Relative to poverty threshold
% of pop. at < 50% of poverty level
% of pop. at 50–100% of poverty level
% of pop. at 100–150% of poverty level
N
a
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Weighted by 1990 or 2000 county population. For some groups, there are fewer counties than listed, in cases where the census did not
report any individuals in that category. A nonmetropolitan county uses 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions.
b
“Adjacent to MSA” is defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as a nonmetropolitan county adjacent to a metropolitan area, using
1993 definitions. Downloaded from http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/NaturalAmenities/natamenf.xls (ERS 1993).
c
Blank = not applicable.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e).

Figure
2.1: 1969 State Poverty Rates
40 Partridge and
Rickman
Figure 2.1 1969 State Poverty Rates
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Figure 2.2 1999 State Poverty Rates
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Figure 2.3: 1969-1999 State Poverty Rate Changes

Figure 2.3 1969–1999 State Poverty Rate Changes (%)
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Figure 2.4: 1989-1999 State Poverty Rate Changes
Figure 2.4 1989–1999 State Poverty Rate Changes (%)
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Figure 2.5 1984–2000 Poverty Rate Changes vs. Average Poverty Rate
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NOTE: Each diamond represents a state. There are 49 diamonds, as Alaska and Hawaii
are excluded and the District of Columbia is included.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a).
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Figure 2.6 Changes in State Poverty Rates vs. Unemployment Rates,
1984–2000
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a) and unemployment
statistics at www.bls.gov.

Figure 2.7 Poverty in States Implementing TANF in 1996 vs. States
Figure
2.7: Poverty in States
Implementing
TANF in 1996 vs Remaining States
Implementing
TANF
after 1996
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NOTE: TANF ’96 indicates states that implemented TANF in 1996. TANF ’97+ indicates states that implemented TANF after 1996.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a) and CEA (1999).
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Figure 2.8 United States Poverty Rates, 1979 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005b).
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Figure 2.9 United States Poverty Rates, 1989 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Figure 2.10 United States Poverty Rates, 1999 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Figure 2.11 Poverty Rate Change, 1989–1999 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Figure 2.12 Poverty Rate Change, 1979–1999 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005f, 2006e).
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Average Weighted County Poverty Rates MSA and Non-MSA
Figure 2.13 Average
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Figure 2.15 Average Weighted County Employment Growth, 1985–1990
Average Unwighted County Employment Growth
and 1995–2000 (%) 1985-1990 and 1995-2000
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3
Regional Economic
Performance and Poverty
What’s the Theoretical Connection?
The lag between job creation and in-migration provides room for jobless locals
and working locals on the bottom rungs of the occupational ladder either to
become employed or to move up the occupational ladder.
—Alan Peters and Peter Fisher (2004), “The Failures of Economic Development Incentives,” Journal of the American Planning Association
Is the world likely to be very far from an equilibrium in which utility is the
same everywhere? We believe not, on the grounds that mobility in the United
States is quite high and information about alternative locations is good.
—Philip Graves and Thomas Knapp (1988), “Mobility Behavior of the
Elderly,” Journal of Urban Economics
It is shown that it is difficult to develop a satisfactory explanation for continuing
net migration which is compatible with the equilibrium assumption, and that
recent relevant research generally fails to support the idea the U.S. economy
is in equilibrium.
—Alan Evans (1990), “The Assumption of Equilibrium in the Analysis of
Migration and Interregional Differences,” Journal of Regional Science

Chapter 2 illustrated the spatial concentration and persistence of
poverty in the United States. In many areas, labor market rewards plus
transfer payments left significant portions of the population below the
federal poverty line. Labor market rewards reflect both the degree of
participation in paid work activities and the associated wage rate. The
justification and design of antipoverty policies that aim to reduce poverty and eliminate high-poverty clusters depend on the underlying geographical determinants of poverty.
Central to these issues is the debate encapsulated in the three quotations above, regarding whether the geographic distribution of poverty is the result of regions generally being in continuous economic

51
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equilibrium, or whether disequilibrium persists for significant periods
of time. A continuous interregional economic equilibrium explanation
of the spatial distribution of poverty suggests that little can be gained
from place-based antipoverty policy. However, this chapter reviews the
interregional equilibrium perspective on poverty and concludes, based
on both theoretical and empirical considerations, that it is less plausible
than a disequilibrium perspective. We argue that policy intervention
could effectively reduce and equalize local poverty levels.

Interregional Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Perspectives on Poverty
Simple neoclassical economic theory suggests that capital locates
in the place of its highest reward; low-wage regions, then, because they
reflect lower production costs, should attract capital. This increases the
demand for labor in these regions and narrows regional differences in
wages and poverty (Rural Sociological Society Task Force on Persistent
Rural Poverty [RSS] 1993). A pure neoclassical interregional equilibrium would be characterized by an absence of differences between the
regions in wage rates and the incidence of poverty, because labor movements would quickly eliminate wage differentials.
More complex theories of regional labor markets allow for equilibrium differences in labor market outcomes by emphasizing the productivity and amenity attractiveness of place in wage determination
(Beeson and Eberts 1989; Roback 1982). Higher productivity raises
nominal wage rates, greater household-amenity attractiveness lowers
nominal wage rates, and both increase land costs. Productivity depends
on factors such as human and physical capital, location, technology, and
regional public policy. Household amenity attractiveness can depend on
natural features of the region such as climate and topography, as well as
man-made features such as cultural attractions, the quality of schools,
and public infrastructure. Assuming full employment and perfect mobility of factors, wages should be such that no firm or household can
geographically relocate and improve its economic condition in equilibrium. Differences in wages and poverty across regions can still exist
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in equilibrium, because they reflect regional productivity and amenity
differentials.
Equilibrium-based models can accommodate involuntary unemployment and regional equilibrium differentials in unemployment
rates. In equilibrium, a region may have higher unemployment if there
are compensating gains in wages or household amenity attractiveness.
Higher unemployment requires compensation because it represents a
lower probability of workers receiving a given wage rate (Partridge and
Rickman 1997a). With frictionless migration, the utility derived from
each region’s bundle of amenities, wage rates, and unemployment rates
should be equalized in equilibrium. These equilibrium-based models
leave little scope for regional changes in labor demand to increase regional household utility.
Frictions in migration can create long-run utility differentials. Sense
of place, psychic well-being, and moving costs can contribute to equilibrium differentials in unemployment rates. Partridge and Rickman
(1997b) argue that these factors hinder households from relocating to
areas of higher utility, as amenities and expected labor market rewards
create regional utility differentials. Thus, if there were zero adjustment
costs, regional shifts in labor demand could increase overall household
welfare in the nation since households would relocate to areas that provided higher utility.
These frictions may be greater among those in poverty: historically lower migration rates have been observed for individuals with
lower education and skill levels (Schwartz 1976; Yankow 2003), which
makes it likely that regional pockets of poverty will persist (Partridge
and Rickman 2003b). This follows from human capital theory, in which
those with higher levels of human capital are more likely to migrate to
take advantage of their increased potential for higher returns (Becker
1962; Borjas 1996; Nord 1998). In addition, job leads and networks
tend to be more informal for low-skilled workers, whose information
most likely originates from friends and family (Holzer 1996; Ihlanfeldt
1997). Further limiting the mobility of low-skilled individuals is that
they may be more reliant on friends and families for support such as
transportation or child care, making it risky for them to move (Goetz
1999).
Empirical evidence on whether the U.S. economy tends to continuously hover near interregional equilibrium is mixed. In estimating ame-
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nity-compensated wage differentials, studies commonly assume that
the U.S. economy continuously remains in interregional equilibrium
(Beeson and Eberts 1989; Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn 1988). Although in their study of internal U.S. migration Greenwood et al. (1991)
questioned the assumption of equilibrium, they were not able to statistically reject equilibrium for most states.
Yet the U.S. economy routinely experiences shocks, which may
produce heterogeneity in regional fluctuations. Moreover, shocks may
arise within particular regions (Clark 1998). Empirical studies examining the length of disequilibrium adjustment provide conflicting evidence. Marston (1985) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) conclude that
regional labor markets re-equilibrate quickly as migration flows rapidly
dissipate the effects of labor demand shocks. More recently, Partridge
and Rickman (2003b) and Gallin (2004) have found that regional labor
markets take years to re-equilibrate following shocks to labor demand,
although equilibrium typically is obtained within 10 years.1
Other theories suggest even more persistent divergence in wages
and poverty rates, in which differences across regions may even widen.
Such theories involve cumulative causation, growth poles, and agglomeration or localization scale economies (Glaeser et al. 1992; Kaldor
1970; Krugman 1991). According to these theories, the productivity
advantages of regions can be endogenous, and expectations of convergence of productivity, incomes, and poverty are replaced with expectations of divergence. For example, regarding rural development, small
communities that fall below a population and business-service threshold
will experience further population losses because they lose the critical
mass necessary to induce new economic activity, whereas those above
the threshold will be relatively prosperous.

Regionally Asymmetric Labor Demand Shocks
and Poverty: The Role of Migration and
Commuting
The equilibrium perspective discussed above suggests little role for
labor demand in affecting the spatial distribution of poverty. However,
the theoretical and empirical support for the disequilibrium perspective
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of regional economies, along with the observed spatial concentration of
poverty, suggests possibilities for relative labor demand shifts to affect
regional poverty rates. Below, we outline the potential for this to happen.
The simple labor market representation in Figure 3.1 can be used
to illustrate the connection between labor demand shifts and poverty
rate changes. Two regional economies are represented, Region A and
Region B. Suppose labor demand shifts outward in Region A and inward in Region B, i.e., there are regionally asymmetric shocks to labor
demand.
The outward shift of labor demand in Region A causes the wage
rate (W) to rise in the short run from its original equilibrium level at
point A to its new equilibrium level at point B. The economy moves
upward along the short-run supply curve (LSsr) as unemployment falls
and labor force participation (L) rises. The combined effect of these
labor market outcomes, in the short run, is to reduce poverty in the region. In the longer run, however, the higher regional wage rate induces
in-migration, which is represented by the short-run labor-supply curve
(LSsr) shifting out. If, as is consistent with the neoclassical interregional
equilibrium perspective, labor is perfectly mobile, migration continues
until the regional wage, unemployment, and labor force participation
rates are driven back to their original levels (point C), making the longrun supply curve (LSlr) horizontal.
Correspondingly, the inward labor demand shift in Region B causes
the wage rate to decline from the original equilibrium point (A) to its
new equilibrium point (B). In the short run, unemployment rises and
labor force participation falls, and, in conjunction with the fall in the
wage rate, the poverty rate increases. In the longer run, the out-migration to Region A shifts the short-run supply curve inwards until Region
B’s wage, unemployment, and labor force participation rates return to
their original levels at point C.
When the equilibrium returns to point C, the relative shift in labor
demand has no long-run effect on labor market outcomes or the poverty
rate in either region. In addition, the faster these adjustments come, the
more short-lived the gains (or losses) are from a favorable (or unfavorable) labor demand shock. What the equilibrium relationship suggests
is that this adjustment from B to C in both panels is very close to instantaneous, i.e., that poverty changes very little in the long run as a result
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of Dynamic Labor Market Responses to a Labor
Demand Shift
Figure 3.1:
Illustration of Dynamic Labor Market Responses to a Labor Demand Shift
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of labor market shifts. By way of contrast, the disequilibrium approach
implies that either the final adjustment ends somewhere between B and
C or the movement from B to C is prolonged—perhaps lasting a decade
or more. Below, we examine theoretical and empirical considerations
regarding the likelihood of these outcomes for poverty.
In finding no relationship between county employment growth and
poverty, Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman (1998, 2000) argue that the
absence of a relationship likely resulted from significant migration responses. Thus, the original residents, particularly those who are lowskilled or marginal workers, did not benefit from increased employment
growth, which supports the equilibrium approach. Likewise, as suggested by Blanchard and Katz (1992), perfectly mobile labor precludes
demand-induced changes in wage rates, unemployment rates, and labor
force participation rates.
For smaller areas, robust economic growth would also likely attract
commuters from neighboring areas where growth may be weaker (Ellwood and Blank 2001; Peters and Fisher 2002). Businesses may simply find it more profitable to hire migrants and commuters that possess
higher levels of skills and education (Larson 1989; Sawicki and Moody
1997). Thus, the original residents of the area may receive few benefits
of strong growth, and poverty rates may be left relatively unaffected.
In this case, it may be more likely that landowners and local businesses
largely benefit from growth (Bartik 1991).
In addition, when the national labor market is weak, there is greater
likelihood that new migrants will flock to localities where employment
is growing (Partridge and Rickman 2002). That is, a growing region will
be most attractive to potential migrants when the backdrop is a weak
national economy. Greater migration (and commuting) responsiveness
implies that differential regional economic growth can produce smaller
changes in poverty than what would be expected based on national-level evidence. In particular, when the national economy is weak, it would
appear as if changes in local job growth (or unemployment rates), other
things being equal, have little influence on poverty rates because of the
enhanced migration and commuting responses.
Bartik (2001), however, argues that stronger employment growth
should reduce poverty unless there is an accompanying increase in
income inequality. He posits that strong employment growth reduces
poverty when it disproportionately benefits low-skilled workers be-
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cause businesses are forced to hire them. Low-skilled workers have
historically been overrepresented in cyclically sensitive sectors, or sectors with low profit margins, making the low-skilled the most vulnerable to economic downturns (Pissarides 1991). For example, Holzer
and LaLonde (2000) report that unskilled workers are more likely to
lose their jobs during a downturn and that they have greater difficulty in
finding employment when they are out of work. Moreover, low-skilled
individuals have a lower propensity to migrate (Borjas 1996; Yankow
2003), suggesting that they may be less than perfectly mobile. In other
words, the long-run supply curve for labor would not be perfectly horizontal as in Figure 3.1. Bound and Holzer (2000) report that low-skilled
labor market outcomes depend more on local labor demand, which they
attribute to these workers’ lower mobility. This makes it more likely
that low-skilled workers experience permanent changes in their wage,
unemployment, and labor force participation rates in response to labor
demand shocks.
A strong national economy also may reduce interstate migration.
Partridge and Rickman (2002) report that state net-migration rates converged in the red-hot economy of the late 1990s, as workers appeared to
have less reason to relocate for better economic opportunities. With less
migration, the original residents of a region are more likely to be hired
and benefit from strong regional growth. Low-skilled original residents
are most likely to benefit, because they are more likely to be underutilized during sluggish growth; tight labor markets force firms to relax
their hiring standards and enhance workplace support (Holzer 1999;
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003). Thus, local economic growth likely
reduces subnational poverty rates more during periods of low national
unemployment.2
The underlying factors driving increased employment growth can
also affect its relationship to poverty reduction. This can be addressed
using shift-share analysis, where job growth is decomposed into its
industry-composition and competitiveness components. Partridge and
Rickman (1999a) show that net-migration responds differentially to the
source of employment growth. If above-average regional growth is due
to having a high composition of industries that are fast-growing nationally (industry-mix growth), then it is much less likely that migrants will
be attracted to the region, the reason being that potential migrants in
those industries are probably already fully employed. Because employ-
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ers in the region will then be forced to hire more nonemployed original
residents, this type of growth is likely to reduce the local unemployment rate and help disadvantaged residents (Partridge and Rickman
1995). But if job growth is due to the region itself faring well across all
or most of its industries (competitiveness growth), then migrants will
be more likely to relocate to the area from regions that are not faring
as well as the national average. This type of growth produces a smaller
impact on unemployment and poverty in the region.3
Employment growth may have additional effects on poverty beyond influencing unemployment and labor force participation rates. Job
growth also affects the demand for low-skilled workers simply because
it is associated with the number of vacancies in a region (Bartik and
Eberts 1999). Likewise, strong growth may lead workers to upgrade
from lower to higher paying positions (Felsenstein and Persky 1999),
particularly if migration is sluggish (Peters and Fisher 2004). Andersson,
Holzer, and Lane (2002, 2003) find that about three-quarters of those
who escape persistent low-wage status do so after a job change.

Labor Demand and Metropolitan Poverty:
The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis
Poverty differences also may exist across smaller areas within
regions, even when those areas are in equilibrium. Spatial-skills mismatches between residence and job location are regularly offered as an
explanation for the pockets of poverty contained within inner cities.4 A
trend in North American economies has been the movement of jobs in
large metropolitan areas from the inner cities to the suburbs (Ingram
1998). In particular, the deconcentration has occurred among manufacturing jobs (Zax and Kain 1996); more generally, it has occurred
among low-skilled jobs (Stoll 1999). If original residents, particularly
low-skilled workers, are less willing—or are unable—to migrate or
commute to areas of newly created jobs, poverty is less likely to be affected by increased metropolitan labor demand, since in-migrants to the
region will take the new jobs (Sawicki and Moody 1997). Yet this also
means that lessening the poverty among residents in inner city highpoverty pockets depends on having nearby labor demand.

Partridge.indb 59

7/27/2006 1:41:32 PM

60 Partridge and Rickman

Demand-side explanations for the urban deconcentration of jobs include innovations in transportation, higher inner-city crime and taxes,
land price differentials, and suburban proximity to consumer markets
(Mieszkowski and Mills 1993; Raphael, Stoll, and Holzer 2000).5 Supply-side factors such as housing discrimination (Brueckner and Martin
1997; Brueckner and Zenou 2003; Turner 1992) and suburban zoning
practices (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003; O’Regan and Quigley 1991)
may prevent the poor and minorities from relocating to the suburbs.
Parts of urban areas lack accessible public transportation (Stoll, Holzer,
and Ihlanfeldt 2000), and many inner-city residents don’t have a car,
both of which factors limit their commuting responses to the movement
of jobs to the suburbs. Increasing inner-city residents’ access to automobiles and public transit has been found to increase employment rates
among poor minorities (Raphael and Stoll 2002).
In addition, Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994) observe that inner-city blacks are less likely to lengthen their commutes to offset the
relocation of inner-city jobs to suburban areas. Rogers (1997) finds
that unemployment spells are positively related to the distance (hence
commuting time) from the unemployed worker’s residence to the location of job growth. An increased distance also relates to a deteriorating knowledge by the unemployed worker about work opportunities
(Ihlanfeldt 1997; Wasmer and Zenou 2002). For example, suburban
firms may only advertise locally (Turner 1997). Housing constraints and
a lack of transportation may further reduce the scope of job searches by
poor inner-city residents (Stoll and Raphael 2000; Gobillon, Selod, and
Zenou 2003). Smith and Zenou (2003) argue that the economic benefit
of a suburban job does not offset the benefits of low land rent and large
housing consumption in the inner city, which rationally leads to innercity residents searching less intensively in suburban locations.
In addition to housing discrimination, inner-city residents may face
job discrimination by suburban employers (Stoll, Holzer, and Ihlanfeldt
2000). Inner-city residents may be perceived as being unproductive or
criminal (Zenou and Boccard 2000); such perceptions may be related
to their need to commute (Zenou 2002), or they may be related to race
(Holzer and Reaser 2000). Perceived racial discrimination also may
cause minorities to search less intensively in the suburbs, which they
may perceive as being hostile environments (Sjoquist 2001).
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Neighborhood effects such as peer pressure and poor role models
closely follow on spatial mismatches in explaining inner-city poverty
(Corcoran et al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Kasinitz and Rosenberg
1996). In fact, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) find that blacks are worse off in
segregated neighborhoods than in integrated neighborhoods. Weinberg,
Reagan, and Yankow (2004) similarly find that the social characteristics
of a neighborhood affect the labor market attachment of its residents.
One often-cited example of this phenomenon is Chicago’s Gautreaux
program, which, since the 1970s, has relocated thousands of low-income inner-city blacks to the more affluent suburbs. Studies of this program suggest that families that relocated had higher employment rates,
better long-term outcomes for their children, and lower public-assistance usage (Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2000). Yet Page and Solon (2003)
argue that neighborhood effects are mostly spurious, relating more to
urban-wage advantages and the high propensity to live in an urban area
if that is where one spent his or her childhood.6
One of the key elements of the spatially concentrated neighborhood
phenomenon is the possibility that households self-sort on the basis
of income, race, or other preferences (Sethi and Somanathan 2004).
Such Tiebout sorting would make it difficult to identify “true” effects of
neighborhood characteristics as opposed to factors associated with selfselection.7 However, this problem is not very germane here because of
our focus on much-larger-sized counties rather than on smaller census
blocks or census tracts, which resemble neighborhoods.
Closely related to neighborhood effects are sociological explanations, including labor and housing-market discrimination, that underlie
the spatial mismatch hypothesis. However, one prominent sociological
explanation that will be germane in the county-level analysis in Chapters 6–8 is the connection between the marriage market and poverty
(Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1993; Wilson 1987). Not only does
a lack of employment opportunities directly increase poverty rates, but
it can indirectly increase poverty rates as well, by reducing the number of marriageable men, which results in more female-headed households—households that often lack the necessary resources to rise above
the poverty threshold. Indeed, one could imagine how such povertyreinforcing patterns could be particularly alarming in distressed communities or neighborhoods.
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Rural Labor Demand and Poverty
Rural antipoverty effects of increased labor demand will differ as
well, to the extent that migration and commuting responses differ in
rural areas. To be sure, although urban spatial-skills job mismatches
have received the most attention, mismatches may be even more severe
in certain rural settings (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). Rural residents’ geographic isolation and their unwillingness to migrate to
growth centers may contribute to a spatial mismatch between the skills
required by the jobs in their area and the skills of these nearby workers
(Brown and Warner 1991; Leichenko 2003; RSS 1993).
Several factors may contribute to labor demand having differential
poverty effects in rural areas. First, lower economic or population density may hamper skills matching in the labor market. Some studies suggest that low density increases the cost of obtaining information about
jobs (Davis, Connolly, and Weber 2003; Davis and Weber 2002), which
inhibits the matching of skills. This means that a given shift in labor
demand will have less effect on the economic outcomes of the original
residents and on the poverty rate. Another factor that potentially reduces labor market matching is that rural residents may have less access
to job training and placement assistance services (Fletcher et al. 2002;
Kraybill and Lobao 2001). And, just as in the urban spatial mismatch
hypothesis, low rural density is often associated with a greater distance
between where residents live and where the jobs are located. The absence of public transportation and the lack of dependable automobile
transportation (Beale 2004) often limits poor rural residents’ access to
remotely located jobs (Brown and Stommes 2004; Davis, Connolly, and
Weber 2003).
Second, the scarcity of child care centers in rural areas restricts
available formal child care options, which may prevent those in poverty from taking newly created jobs (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001;
Mills and Hazarika 2003; Weber, Duncan, and Whitener 2001). Third,
rural jobs may be more apt to be part-time, low paying, or involve nonstandard hours, which creates additional child care concerns (Findeis
and Jensen 1998; Davis and Weber 2002; Fletcher et al. 2002). For these
reasons, there may be a weaker relationship between demand-induced
employment growth and poverty in rural areas.
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On the other hand, there are theoretical reasons to believe that employment growth may have stronger poverty-reducing impacts on rural
areas. For one, the smaller scale of rural job markets and the stronger
informal communication networks could increase the skills matching
process (Gibbs 2002). This could make the poverty rate more responsive to changing labor demand conditions (Gibbs 2002). For another,
individuals facing transportation and child care constraints may be
more likely to choose to live in metro areas, while those more readily
employable may be more likely to remain in rural areas (Kilkenny and
Huffman 2003).
There also may be smaller in-commuting responses from outside
the area to take newly created jobs in rural areas (Renkow 2003). Low
economic density can create a larger-than-normal gap between information available to local residents on job openings and that available
to nearby outside residents. Likewise, scarcity of formal child care in
neighboring rural areas and a lack of public and private transportation
make in-commuting to the area less likely.
Correspondingly, migration responses to changing labor market
conditions may be lower in rural areas (Renkow 2003; Renkow and
Hoover 2000). The low density of the area may limit in-migration responses to local-area job growth because of a lack of information in
distant areas about these jobs. Out-migration responses to job losses
also may be smaller because of residents’ lack of information about jobs
in other areas.
Smaller in-commuting and migration responses mean the residents
of the area take a greater share of newly created jobs. The smaller overall supply of responses, then—which implies a steeper short-run labor
supply curve and an upward-sloped long-run supply curve, as in Figure
3.1—would lead to larger demand-induced wage rate changes. Both
the larger share of new jobs going to original residents and the larger
wage gains should lift more individuals above the poverty line. Yet it
also means that residents in high-poverty areas are more likely to be adversely affected by job declines. Therefore, a stronger link between employment growth and poverty would be expected in areas that are more
rural. Thus, the primary arguments by Peters and Fisher (2002) against
place-based policies—in-migration and in-commuting—are probably
less applicable in rural areas.
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Cultural and sociological factors also may affect the linkage between formal labor market outcomes and poverty in rural areas. For example, Pickering (2004) reports successes for the Rosebud reservation
in South Dakota in transitioning TANF recipients into formal market
jobs, which she attributes to cooperation between the tribe and the government in providing job placement and support services. In contrast,
on the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota, she notes, the existence
of a strong informal economy weakened the connection between formal
labor market demand and poverty. Improved governance and enhanced
social capital may also be important in rural communities in improving
the prospects for economic development and in ensuring that the benefits of economic development are widely dispersed to all stakeholders
(Blank 2005).
Potential neighborhood effects are not just restricted to inner cities;
they also exist in rural poverty-stricken areas, such as on many reservations for Native Americans.8 However, poverty generally is more
diffused in rural areas than in the inner city (RSS 1993), which would
suggest fewer negative neighborhood effects and a greater prevalence
of “middle class values” among low-income households.

Poverty and Regional Labor Supply Shifts
Exogenous increases in labor supply are more likely to increase
poverty than to reduce it. For a given level of labor demand, increased
labor supply reduces the wage rate. If increased regional labor supply
is caused by in-migration, then increased unemployment and reduced
labor force participation rates should result (Partridge and Rickman
1999b, 2003a). The combined effect of lower average wages and lower
employment rates is higher poverty.
Innovations in interregional labor force migration primarily represent a shift in regional labor supply (Partridge and Rickman 2006).
Although the transfer of associated assets may provide some shift in
demand, those workers who are early in their careers have the highest
propensity for migration and are least likely to possess substantial assets. Offsetting the labor-supply-induced wage reduction is a potential
composition effect: migrants may possess higher ability or motivation
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(Gabriel and Schmitz 1995), although Bartik (1993b) estimates that
only one-fifth of labor-force participation-rate increases that follow accelerated employment growth can be attributed to the changing composition of the population associated with migration. On the other hand,
retired in-migrants, who often possess substantial assets, act more as a
labor demand shift, which may reduce area poverty.
Another notable labor-supply factor that may affect poverty rates
is immigration. Immigrants may directly affect poverty by being disproportionately low-skilled compared to native-born workers. The
U.S. Census Bureau (2001) puts the poverty rate for the foreign-born
at 16.8 percent, compared to 11.1 percent for the entire population. Yet
Chapman and Bernstein (2003) argue that during the 1990s this composition effect was offset by greater increases in income among immigrants than among the general population. Hence they conclude that
immigration affects poverty less than other labor market factors do.
However, immigrants may have other, indirect effects on poverty
rates; for instance, new immigrants might compete for jobs with both
natives and previous migrants. Borjas (2003) estimates that immigration significantly lowers the wages of competing workers through increasing the labor supply. Topel (1994) also finds that wages decline
for low-skilled males in response to greater immigration and increased
labor force participation by females. Likewise, Orrenius and Zavodny
(2003) report an inverse association between the foreign-born share of
workers in an occupation and the wages of low-skilled natives.
As for employment impacts, if immigration significantly reduces
real wages, some individuals may exit the labor force. Yet if immigrants
locate in areas where there are labor shortages, they may simply change
the size of the economy, not the unemployment rate (Saiz 2003). In
addition, at the regional level, less-skilled natives may out-migrate in
response to new immigrants (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996; Frey
1995). The offsetting migration mitigates the local wage and unemployment effects of immigration by dispersing the effects to broader regions
and across the nation.9
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Summary and Conclusions
To the extent that regional economies are continuously near a neoclassical equilibrium, persistent regional pockets of poverty should be
rare, and regional labor demand policies would likely be ineffective at
reducing poverty. Yet there are many theoretical reasons why regional
economies may not be near a neoclassical equilibrium, so that pockets
of high poverty persist. This leaves open the possibility that spatially
targeted labor demand policies can reduce poverty.
Frictions in labor supply responses, particularly among the lowskilled, can preclude long-run equalization of labor market outcomes
across regions, making it possible for labor demand redistribution to reduce poverty rates. And even if economies converge towards a long-run
interregional equilibrium, significantly long disequilibrium adjustment
processes provide avenues for increased labor demand in high poverty
areas having long-lasting or even permanent poverty-reducing effects.
Migration and commuting responses to asymmetric demand shocks
may be sufficiently sluggish or incomplete that the residents of a region
are greatly affected by a localized labor demand shock.
In metropolitan areas, incomplete supply responses to deconcentration of job growth underpin the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Incomplete
commuting and migration responses can be derived from a number of
alternative explanations, including the accessibility of transportation, a
lack of information on job opportunities, and discrimination in housing
and hiring. Thus, movement of jobs in large metropolitan areas from
central cities to their suburbs can create persistent pockets of poverty
in inner cities. Policies that effectively stimulate the demand for skills
in central cities that are consistent with the skills of their residents have
the potential to lift them out of poverty. In our empirical assessment,
metropolitan area poverty rates will be touched upon in Chapter 6 and
more directly assessed in Chapter 7.
The low density of rural areas and their lack of transportation, lack
of formal child care, and constraints on information have been offered
as explanations both for and against employment growth affecting rural poverty. To the extent that these factors mostly lead to incomplete
migration and commuting responses in rural areas, poverty rates can
become greatly affected by localized rural employment growth. This
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is most likely to be true in the most remote rural areas, which will be a
key topic in Chapter 8.
One overriding conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is
that local labor demand can theoretically be expected to influence poverty in an area. This relationship is likely to vary by the size, location,
and spatial configuration of the area. Thus, antipoverty policies may
likely need to be designed for the particular circumstances of the area.
Moreover, given that migration and commuting responses are inversely
related to the geographical extent of the labor market—e.g., workers
are more likely to travel to the next county for a job than to the next
state—we also anticipate different poverty-rate responses to employment growth, depending upon the spatial extent of the labor market. To
assess these different issues, our empirical analysis begins in the next
two chapters at the state level, followed by county- and metropolitanarea level analysis in Chapters 6 through 8.

Notes
Epigraphs. These three quotations appear in Peters and Fisher (2004), p. 28; Graves and
Knapp (1988), p. 3; and Evans (1990), p. 515.
1. These studies do not focus on whether there are persistent effects on poverty, but
Partridge and Rickman (2003a) find permanent changes in employment rates,
which could translate into a permanent change in poverty.
2. These effects are not related to labor supply shocks (such as welfare reform) that
affect labor force participation, which are discussed in the next chapter.
3. The larger industry-mix effect on poverty does not relate to a simple multiplier
effect. All else being equal, the creation of an equal-paying job should have the
same multiplier response regardless of whether it is attributable to industry mix
or competitiveness. In addition, because the multiplier employment response
shows up in the competitiveness term regardless of the exogenous source of the
increase in jobs, the industry-mix effect is understated when both it and competitiveness are included in a poverty-regression equation.
4. Surveys of the spatial mismatch literature can be found in Gobillon, Selod, and
Zenou (2003); Holzer (1991); Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998); and Kain (1992).
5. These also could underlie the population deconcentration to the extent that it
preceded the shift in jobs.
6. A related factor that may contribute to spatial concentrations of poor households
is return migration (see Borjas [1996] for a description of return migration). In
this case, people who migrated to another location may have failed to establish
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themselves or may have been disappointed and returned to their original location (other causes for return migration include returning to established social
networks). Yet it would seem that disadvantaged individuals would be more
likely to return-migrate because they may be more susceptible to experiencing
an economic disappointment in their new destination. Nord (1998) argues that
migration can lead to localized persistence of poverty rates, but he disputes the
human-capital explanation for this outcome. He instead contends that the poor
and nonpoor alike tend to migrate to areas that have a favorable occupational
structure for their skill set. For the poor, that implies an occupational structure
that requires few skills and many entry-level jobs, all of which may be conducive to a higher poverty rate in a particular place. More affordable housing in
low-income nonmetro areas reinforces the attraction of the poor to these areas.
In personal correspondence dated March 31, 2004, Nord notes that the existence
of job openings for the poor in high-poverty counties is consistent with these
locales being “good places to survive but poor places to prosper.”
7. Tiebout sorting is the process whereby individuals choose their location of residence based on the combination of location characteristics that most suits their
likes and dislikes. The result of Tiebout sorting is a collection of neighborhoods
(communities) in which residents of each neighborhood have similar tastes.
8. Leichenko (2003) finds support for the premise that segregation of American
Indians leads to lower incomes. But her study argues that the underlying economic mechanisms on tribal reservations are poorly understood, and it questions
whether traditional economic measures provide an accurate reflection of tribal
community incomes.
9. Card (2001) posits that there are few offsetting native migration effects. Instead,
he finds that local labor markets in gateway cities respond to greater foreign
immigration through lower wages. Card’s study suggests that there is not yet a
consensus regarding the response of native migration to foreign immigration.
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4
An Empirical Analysis
of State Poverty Trends
Welfare Reform vs. Economic Growth
Our growing economy is giving more and more families a chance to work their
way out of poverty.
—President Clinton, quoted in the New York Times (1998), “Black and
Hispanic Poverty Falls, Reducing Overall Rate for Nation”
The resulting drop in welfare rolls is without precedent. Historically, welfare
rolls haven’t declined often, even during economic expansions . . . The real
reason for the historic decline is that we finally said welfare recipients have to
work and that work was preferable to getting a government check.
—Rep. Bill Archer, R-Texas (1998), “Welfare Reform’s Unprecedented
Success,” Washington Post, August 10, 1998
If thrown into a job market in which others were being laid off, these would-be
workers would find themselves competing for already-scarce jobs.
—Daniel P. McMurrer and Isabel V. Sawhill (1997), “Planning for the Best
of Times,” Washington Post, August 18, 1997

Federal welfare reform and the acceleration of economic growth
happened in close proximity. The timing led to competing claims that
each was responsible for declining poverty in the late 1990s. Some held
that the economy was primarily responsible for the reduction in welfare
caseloads, while others emphasized the role of welfare reform. Still others credited both, citing the interaction between a strong economy and
welfare reform (Moffitt 1999).
The near-synchronicity of the two events makes it difficult to disentangle their relative effects on welfare caseloads or poverty reduction
using national data. Although poverty reduction was not an explicit goal
of federal welfare reform (Ellwood and Blank 2001), future attempts to
reduce poverty at the national or regional level should be guided by an
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understanding of the determinants of the 1990s changes. Using regional
data along with national data to examine the connections between economic growth, welfare reform, and poverty should help to pin down
those determinants more closely.
Despite the close timing at the national level, not all states implemented the welfare reform measures at the same time, and many states
experimented with waivers to the AFDC program before passage of
the 1996 welfare reform act. In addition, not all states shared equally
in the economic prosperity of the late 1990s. This potentially makes
state-level analysis more fruitful in disentangling the relative effects
of welfare reform and a robust economy on poverty reduction. If welfare reform underlies the reduction in poverty, then, other things being
equal, states that took advantage of AFDC waivers and implemented
TANF sooner should have experienced greater reductions in poverty.
State-level variation in economic performance and welfare policy also
makes it possible to examine whether welfare reform was more successful in a strong economy.
It should be cautioned, however, that failure to find effects at the
state level does not automatically translate into an absence of such effects at the national level. Migration from economically underperforming states to high-performing states reduces both the adverse effects
on poverty in the poorly performing states and the positive effects on
poverty in the better performing states. Likewise, strong growth nationwide may reduce poverty in all states, but there could be insufficient
variation in poverty-rate performance across states to identify such a
trend using only state-level data. A similar case could be made for the
assessment of welfare policy at the state level. Nonetheless, state-level
analysis remains useful for state policymakers in terms of determining
what types of growth and labor market outcomes most affect poverty
in their states.

Empirical Evidence at the National Level
As shown in Table 4.1, numerous empirical studies have found a
positive relationship between the U.S. unemployment rate and the official poverty rate. For samples with ending dates prior to 1984, the aver-
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Table 4.1 National Estimates of U.S. Unemployment and Poverty
Study
Time period
Estimated effectsa
Blank (1993)
1959–1983
0.66
1983–1989
−0.28
Blank (2000)
1960–1979
0.27
1980–1989
−0.05
1990–1998
0.08
Blank and Blinder (1986)
1959–1983
0.69
b
Cutler and Katz (1991)
1959–1989
0.36–0.45
Richard Freeman (2001)
1959–1999
0.28–0.44
1969–1999
0.34–0.42
Donald Freeman (2003)
1979–1999
0.72–0.98
Haveman and Schwabish (2000)
1960–1972
0.65
1973–1981
0.20
1982–1992
0.11
1993–1998
0.45
Powers (1995)
1959–1982
0.58
1983–1992
−0.17
Romer and Romer (1999)
1969–1994
0.44–0.49
Tobin (1994)
1961–1990
0.39
a

Estimated percentage-point poverty rate change for a 1.00 percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate. Some studies simply used the male unemployment rate.
Where there was a choice between short-run and steady-state estimates, short-run
estimates were selected.
b
A trend variable for 1983–1989 produced estimates from 0.32 to 0.54, indicating an
unaccounted-for rise in unemployment in the 1980s.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.

age unemployment coefficient suggests that every percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate reduces the poverty rate by about 0.5
percentage points. However, several studies done in the 1980s found a
weaker link. To be sure, the average coefficient for samples that primarily consist of years in the 1980s is about zero, while Blank (1993, 2000)
and Powers (1995) find a slightly negative relationship. This suggests
to researchers that growth no longer benefited those at the bottom of
the distribution. Even for 1990–1998, Blank (2000) finds only a slight
reversal of the 1980s trend. Freeman (2001) argues that the reason for
the weaker link between poverty level and economic growth is the reduction in real wages for workers with low skills and education.
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Haveman and Schwabish (2000), however, find that the positive relationship between unemployment and poverty reestablishes itself during the 1993–1998 period, as the estimated coefficient rises nearly to its
average pre-1980s level. For samples running from the 1960s to at least
the early 1990s, the authors find the average increase in the poverty
rate after a one-point increase in the unemployment rate to be about 0.4
percentage points.
To help reconcile these results, we examine, in Table 4.2, three simple models that follow the approaches of Blank and Card (1993) and
Bartik (2001) and that are based on U.S. Census Bureau data (though we
use national data rather than regional data). Table 4.2 shows regressions
of the annual change in the overall U.S. poverty rate for 1960–2002 on
the change in the U.S. unemployment rate, the percent change in U.S.
real median family income, and three time-period dummies.1 Poverty
rates are expected to be positively related to changes in unemployment
rates, while they are expected to be inversely related to changes in median household income.2
Column (1) reports that a 1.00-point decline in the unemployment
rate is associated with a 0.25-point fall in the poverty rate, whereas a
1.00-point increase in median family income results in a 0.15-point fall
in the poverty rate. The poverty rate declined in these two categories an
average of 0.57 and 0.26 points faster per year during the 1960–1973
and 1993–2001 periods than during the 1974–1980 and 1981–1992 periods (the latter being the omitted period).
To test whether poverty rates are more sensitive to economic conditions when the labor market is especially tight, column (2) adds a lowunemployment-rate indicator for the 12 years in which the rate was 5
percent or below, and an interaction of this indicator with the change
in the unemployment rate. The results are strongly consistent with the
arguments made by Freeman (2001). A 1.00-point drop in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.73-point decline in the poverty rate
when the unemployment rate is less than or equal to 5 percent, but with
only a 0.23-point decline when the unemployment rate is above 5 percent. To check on whether there was a lagged unemployment response,
column (3) reports the results obtained when the lagged change in the
unemployment rate is added to the model. These results indicate that the
coefficient corresponding to the lagged unemployment rate is marginally significant, but that the other results are essentially unchanged.3
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Table 4.2 Change in U.S. Overall Poverty Rate Regressions, 1960–2002
(1)
(2)
(3)
(abs. value t-stat) (abs. value t-stat) (abs. value t-stat)
Change in unemployment rate
0.25
0.23
0.23
(4.22)
(3.84)
(4.01)
Lag change in unempl. rate
0.11
(1.52)
(Low unempl. rate) × (change
0.50
0.50
in unempl. rate)a
(2.80)
(3.19)
% Δ in real median family
−0.15
−0.13
−0.12
incomeb
(3.57)
(3.05)
(2.88)
Dummy 1960–1973c
−0.57
−0.51
−0.60
(3.88)
(3.36)
(3.89)
Dummy 1974–1980c
0.04
0.05
0.06
(0.24)
(0.30)
(0.31)
Dummy 1993–2002c
−0.26
−0.16
−0.18
(2.65)
(1.25)
(1.61)
Low unempl. ratea
−0.18
−0.09
(1.16)
(0.58)
Constant
0.22
0.20
0.19
0.77
0.82
0.84
R2
1.95
2.07
2.01
DW
43
43
42
N
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute value of t-statistic. The dependent variable is the 1960–2002 change in the overall poverty rate except in column (3), where
the time period is 1961–2002. The variables are measured in first-difference form to
mitigate any spurious trends and unit roots. The t-statistics are adjusted to correct
for heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. The mean (std. dev.) for the change in
the overall poverty rate is –0.24 (0.78); for the change in the unemployment rate it
is –0.01 (0.93); and for the percentage change in real median family income it is 1.4
(2.4). Blank = not applicable.
a
The low-unemployment-rate indicator variable is for the 12 years when the unemployment rate was 5 percent or below.
b
When the regression in column (2) included a variable in which the percentage change
in real median family income interacted with the low-unemployment indicator, it was
insignificant (t = −0.40).
c
The year dummies reflect the War on Poverty and the robust economic growth of the
1960–1973 period, the sluggish economic growth in the latter 1970s, and the rapid
economic growth and welfare reform changes that commenced in 1993. The omitted
period is 1981–1992, which represents the years of the Reagan and first Bush administrations, a period of rapidly increasing income inequality.
Source: Family poverty rates can be found at U.S. Census Bureau (2004d). Real
median family household income can be found at U.S. Census Bureau (2006a,g).
Unemployment rates can be found at BLS (2006c).
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In sum, these simple models lend support to the notion that the initial strength of the labor market is a key factor in determining whether
economic growth reduces the poverty rate. It is especially true that a
rising tide lifts all boats when the tide is already high. Yet, because the
time dummies only imperfectly control for events such as welfare reform, the results should be interpreted with some caution.

State-Level Empirical Studies of Labor Demand
and Poverty
Although national studies typically use the unemployment rate as
the primary indicator of economic performance, regional studies use a
wider variety of labor market indicators. This is at least partly attributable to the added complexity introduced by spatial economic interactions such as migration. Table 4.3 contains a summary of findings for
various regional aggregations.
As the table shows, regional studies also find a positive relationship
between poverty and unemployment rate; the average coefficient across
all samples equals about 0.5. This is remarkably close to the average
national estimate, given that regional studies typically include more
variables such as additional labor market indicators. As is consistent
with the national pattern, Bartik (2001) reports that the poverty-unemployment link is weakened in the 1980s and strengthened in the 1990s,
while Freeman (2003) also finds a stronger association in the 1990s.
A smaller number of studies include employment rates or labor
force participation rates as indicators of labor demand strength. The
corresponding reported coefficients are smaller in absolute value than
the average unemployment coefficient. The coefficients range from
–0.12 (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000) to –0.30 (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). The studies find different responses across
gender lines and across metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan areas.
Although most studies capture the influence of employment growth
indirectly through including unemployment, employment, or labor
force participation rates, employment growth has also been examined
for its antipoverty role. In panel studies of metropolitan areas, Bartik
(1993a, 1996) finds a negative and statistically significant link between
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Table 4.3 Previous Studies of Regional Poverty and Economic Performance
Study

Dependent variable

Albrecht, Albrecht, and
Albrecht (2000)b

Nonmetropolitan
counties
1990

Household poverty rate

Bartik (1993a)c

Metropolitan areas
1973–1989

Person poverty rate

Bartik (1996)

Metropolitan areas
1975–1987

Probability of being in
poverty translated into
person poverty rate

Bartik (2001)

21 States/regions
1967–1997
1967–1979
1980–1989
1990–1997
9 census divisions
1967–1991

Person poverty rate

Blank and Card (1993)

Family poverty rate

Estimated effectsa
% females employed full time:
−0.12
% males employed full time:
    −0.28
Unemployment rate:
0.33
Employment growth:
blacks: −0.4
whites: −0.1       
Unemployment rate equivalent to
employment growth effects:
female: 0.69
male: 1.09
Employment growth:
female: −0.33
male: −0.20   
Unemployment rate:
0.37
0.65
0.37
0.58
Unemployment rate:
0.28
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Sample
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Study

Sample

Dependent variable

Estimated effectsa
Employment growth:
    low initial poverty tracts: −0.11
    medium initial pov. tracts: −0.35
    high initial poverty tracts: −0.77
Unemployment rate:
0.32d
Unemployment rate:
0.27–0.41
0.37
Unemployment rate:
0.45e
0.65

Crandall and Weber (2004)

Census tracts
1990–2000

Person poverty rate

DeFina (2004)

Panel of states
1991–2001
Panel of states
1959–1999
1989–1998
9 census divisions
1979–1989
1990–1999

Person poverty rate

Gundersen and Ziliak (2004)

State level
1980–1999

Family poverty

Levernier, Partridge, and
Rickman (2000)

U.S. metro and
nonmetro counties
1990 census

Family poverty rate

Richard Freeman (2001)

Donald Freeman (2003)

Person poverty rate

Person poverty rate
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Unemployment rate:
0.50f
1% empl./pop. growth:
−0.15
Empl./labor force:
metro: insignificant
nonmetro: −0.81
Employment growth: insignificant
Labor force participation rate:
female: −0.30
male: −0.13
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Table 4.3 (continued)
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Morgan and Kickham (2001)
Tobin (1994)

Panel of states
1987–1996
Changes for states
1979–1987

Child poverty rate

Female unemployment: 0.63

Person poverty rate

Unemployment rate: 0.71

a
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Estimated percentage-point poverty rate change for a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate, employment rate, or labor
force participation rate, or for a 1 percent increase in employment growth.
b
Reported effects are direct effects from the poverty regression and do not include simulated indirect effects from other estimated equations.
c
Unemployment value reported in Bartik (1996, p. 167, Table 5), and employment-growth values reported in the executive summary of
Bartik (1993a).
d
The coefficient was obtained by using the elasticity reported in Table 2 for all persons and calculating the coefficient using the reported
mean in Table 1 for the official census poverty rate and mean U.S. unemployment rate for 1991–2001.
e
For comparability, these estimates are for poverty rates that are unadjusted for regional differences in inflation.
f
Calculated using the average U.S. family poverty rate of 11.04 percent for 1980–1999 and estimated elasticities from column 1 of Table 1.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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job growth and the poverty rate. Using a cross section of counties for
1990, Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman (2000) fail to find a link between lagged employment growth and poverty, even when omitting
other measures of labor market strength. Even so, Crandall and Weber
(2004), using 1990 and 2000 census tract data, find that employment
growth over the decade reduced poverty, and that the largest effects occurred in tracts that had the highest initial levels of poverty.

Welfare Reform and Poverty
Thirty years of experience with the Great Society should have taught us
at least one important lesson: welfare reform is not cruel; welfare is.
—Stephen Moore (1997), director of fiscal policy studies at the Cato
Institute, Ending Welfare Reform as We Know It, Cato Institute
The states are ending welfare as we know it—but not poverty.
—Robert Kuttner (2000), coeditor of the American Prospect, “The
States Are Ending Welfare as We Know It—but Not Poverty,”
Business Week, June 12, 2000
Significant public policy changes related to the working and nonworking poor were implemented during the 1990s. One key initiative
was a major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1993 (Box
4.1). Another major change was the Clinton administration’s accelerated issuance of state waivers from AFDC, which also began in 1993
(CEA 1999; Ellwood and Blank 2001). Most waivers made welfare
more restrictive, such as by adding sanctions and time limits. Probably
the decade’s largest initiative was PRWORA, the 1996 welfare reform
legislation that replaced AFDC with TANF. This reform eliminated the
welfare entitlement and placed a strict 60-month lifetime welfare limit
on most recipients, while putting stringent requirements on states to
shift most recipients into work by 2002 (Ellwood and Blank 2001). Finally, states were given great freedom to set the parameters of their
programs.
The CEA (1999) and O’Neill and Hill (2001) argue that welfare
reform was the impetus behind the reduced number of welfare case-
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Box 4.1 Earned Income Tax Credit
The federal EITC is a refundable tax credit that dates back to
1975. It was originally designed to return to low-income workers their share of Social Security taxes, but it has evolved into a
more aggressive antipoverty program for the working poor with
children. Its refundable nature gives it powerful effects in reducing poverty.
In 2003, the EITC gave a small maximum tax credit of $382
for childless heads; this credit phased out at an earned income
level of $11,230 for singles and $12,230 for married couples. For
couples with children, the EITC was considerably more generous. For a single or married couple with two children, the 2003
tax credit equaled 40 percent of earned income until it reached
a maximum of $4,204 at an earned income of $10,500. After an
earned income of $13,750 for single parents with two children
($14,750 for a married couple), the EITC declined at a rate of
about 21 percent of additional earned income until it was phased
out at $33,692 ($34,692 for married couples).
In 2004, an additional 18 states had their own EITC, up from
10 states in 1998. Montgomery County, Maryland, also had its
own EITC (and Denver had one earlier in the decade). Almost
all of the states or localities piggyback on the federal EITC. The
2004 state credit equals between 4 and 43 percent of the federal
credit (15 percent is about the median). However, five states—
Iowa, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia—have nonrefundable credits.
SOURCES: Johnson (2001); Johnson and Lazere (1998); Llobrera and Zahradnik
(2004); IRS (2003).

loads. Yet Figlio and Ziliak (1999) and Bennett, Lu, and Song (2002)
conclude that the vast majority of the decline in recipients was due to
the strong economy and not to welfare reform, which is consistent with
the findings of Bartik and Eberts (1999) and Hoynes (2000a) as well as
those cited earlier in this chapter. Blank’s (2002) comprehensive review
of the literature suggests that welfare reform and the strong economy
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both reduced welfare usage, but that interaction between the two makes
the precise shares difficult to determine.
Even if welfare reform did reduce caseloads, welfare programs may
have had only a modest influence on overall poverty rates, for several
reasons. For one, welfare recipients compose a small fraction of the
total number of people who live below the poverty threshold (less than
one-fifth after 1999). For another, the TANF program may have only redistributed the income of poor households from benefits to earnings and
the EITC. Despite the high employment rates of women who left welfare (Blank and Schmidt 2001), their incomes are only slightly above
what they were when those women were welfare recipients (Moffitt
2002).
Schoeni and Blank (2000) report that initially state AFDC waivers
and TANF together reduced state poverty rates by 2.0–2.5 percentage
points, all else being equal, though the effects of TANF were not uniform. They further report that low-income, female high-school dropouts did not benefit from implementation of TANF. Likewise, Bennett,
Lu, and Song (2002) find that TANF is associated with lower income
among poor male and poor female high-school dropouts. Hence, even
if TANF reduced poverty rates, it could have done so while at the same
time hurting the prospects of the poorest of the poor, many of whom
likely have mental or physical disabilities (Freeman 2001). In fact, Moffitt (2002) reports that the women characterized by low job skills, poor
health, or disabilities that left welfare have lower income than those that
remain on welfare.
Even if welfare reform has a relatively small average effect on poverty rates, there may be certain administrative policies that have stronger effects. For example, the CEA (1999) finds that the various AFDC
waivers and TANF rules have differing effects on state caseloads. Policies that sanction recipients for not finding work were found to have
large effects in reducing welfare caseloads, while caps on welfare payments to families did not.
Third, welfare reform has spillover effects (Bartik 2002a,b) on other
groups that are not current or former welfare recipients. Welfare reform
not only pushes current welfare recipients to find employment, it also
discourages many qualified households from enrolling in the first place.
For example, results from randomized experiments in Florida suggest
that potential welfare recipients with very young children are more
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likely than those with older children to remain off public assistance
in order to conserve its availability for future periods (Grogger and
Michalopoulos 2003). The combination of those who exited welfare
programs and those who were discouraged from enrolling in welfare
programs expanded the low-skilled labor supply from what it would
have been in the absence of welfare reform. Bartik (2000) estimates
that welfare reform ultimately increases the labor supply of females
without a bachelor’s degree by approximately 3 percent, whereas the
resulting decrease in wages causes other less-skilled workers to exit
the labor force. His results suggest that for every 10 recipients shifted
from welfare to the labor market, two or three low-wage workers exit
the labor force. Hence, poverty rates could actually increase through
the decline in wages and the related labor force withdrawal. To offset
these displacement effects, Bartik argues, the U.S. economy needs an
additional 300,000–400,000 jobs.4
Extending his analysis, Bartik (2002a,b) finds significant spillover
effects from welfare reform concentrated among single women and
among male high school dropouts. The spillovers produce wage declines for these groups, and employment gains by single women from
welfare reform are almost fully offset by the employment declines of
male high school dropouts. A clear implication of Bartik’s work is that
welfare reform will be felt well beyond those directly affected, reinforcing the need for broader macro studies rather than studies focusing
solely on former recipients. In fact, spillovers may explain the findings
of Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), which suggest that TANF raised poverty rates for married couples, a group that is less likely to be directly
affected by welfare programs.

Empirical Model
Our empirical methodology for examining state poverty trends is
outlined in Box 4.2. Because states vary in their poverty rate trends,
economic performance, and welfare policies, individual states provide
independent information, making it possible to disentangle the separate
effects of the various potential factors underlying poverty. In general
terms, the approach involves examining whether, on average, changes
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Box 4.2 Methodology for Examining State Poverty Trends
Basic Model: The basic model can be written as
(i) povst = β1 labormktst+ π1welfarest+ η1 demogst+ φ1statecharst
+ σs+ σt+ est ,
where pov is the poverty rate. labormkt is a vector of labor market measures including employment growth, unemployment rates
by gender, employment rates by gender, and industry structure.
welfare is a vector of variables; it accounts for timing differences
across states in the implementation of AFDC waivers and TANF.
Although endogeneity between poverty rates and welfare policy
adoption would bias the coefficients, Ziliak et al. (2000) found
no statistical difference between states that applied for AFDC
waivers and those that did not. statechar includes the percentage of the state population residing in metropolitan areas. demog
includes demographic controls such as the age distribution of the
population, the educational attainment of the adult population
aged 25 and older, the rate of international immigration, and the
teen birthrate.
The state fixed effects, σs , account for unmeasured variables
that cause persistent differences across states in poverty rates,
including long-term demographic effects. Any persistent spatial
spillovers across states also would be captured by the state fixed
effects. The year fixed effects, σt , capture common poverty trends
across the nation, such as those attributable to the business cycle,
to aging of the baby-boom generation, or to federal policy changes such as expansion in the eitc (or common national effects from
welfare reform). Some studies that utilize state panel data include
state-specific time trends. We believe that these trends overcontrol
for missing variables, actually picking up much of the time-varying influence of the other explanatory variables (also see Wallace
and Blank 1999). The final term, est , is the stochastic term that
reflects random variation in poverty rates.
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in a variable over time in a given state affect its poverty rate. Regarding
employment growth, the estimated relationship will reflect, on average,
how much state poverty rates change over time in response to annual
deviations in job growth rates. Likewise, variables are included that
reflect the timing of AFDC waivers and the implementation of TANF.
Inclusion of other variables (for example, demographic factors)
helps to isolate the effect of the economy and the effect of welfare reform on poverty rates. Time-fixed effects are included to account for
uniform national effects, leaving only time-series variation across states
to be explained. The empirical approach also accounts for all persistent
long-term state differences in poverty rates by including fixed effects
for states. Among other things, these fixed effects account for persistent
differences in poverty that may relate to equilibrium labor market differences.
Labor Market Variables
Many argue that the unemployment rate, although affected by
growth, is the best measure of demand for those in the labor force near
or below the poverty line, because they are the most likely to experience
unemployment spells (Schoeni and Blank 2000). Though commonly
used at the national level, the unemployment rate does not suffice as a
sole measure of the strength of regional labor markets. For one thing,
regions have different equilibrium unemployment rates (Partridge and
Rickman 1997b,c). A 5 percent unemployment rate would be a remarkable achievement for West Virginia but a sign of severe distress in North
Dakota. Yet, measured in terms of job growth or per capita incomes,
both states have struggled in recent decades. As a comparative measure,
their relative unemployment rates are not particularly informative.
Even in the context of changing labor market conditions, the equilibrium unemployment rate can change (Partridge and Rickman 1997b,c),
and about one-third of newly created jobs are taken by previously nonemployed individuals, residents who were not officially part of the labor force or counted as unemployed (Partridge 2001). This group is
particularly important because many less-skilled individuals may only
be informally attached to the labor market, particularly females and former welfare recipients.
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Therefore, Murphy and Topel (1997), Hoynes (2000a), and Levernier,
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) suggest that the employment-population ratio is another important labor market indicator. The employmentpopulation ratio captures unique effects because it is particularly related
to the availability of all nonemployed workers and is a measure of the
potential size of the untapped labor supply. Because women are more
prone to enter and exit the labor force for household reasons, the female
employment-population ratio particularly reflects their labor market attachment. A high employment rate also suggests that the employment
prospects of marriageable men and women have improved, which may
improve the marriage market and eventually reduce poverty among
current single-female household heads (Hoynes 2000a; Ellwood and
Jencks 2004).
Job growth also is included as an indicator of the labor market.
Through vacancy and job-chain effects, job growth may have additional
poverty-reducing effects beyond reducing unemployment or increasing
labor force participation. Job growth also may be correlated with an increased number of hours worked (such as through overtime) or conversion from part-time to full-time employment status. Strong job growth
also allows workers to move up the occupational job ladder and increase
their wage rate (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2002, 2003; Felsenstein
and Persky 1999; Peters and Fisher 2004). Bartik (1996) argues that
employment growth is more likely to reflect labor demand and is based
on more accurate data than the unemployment rate. But the most important reason to include job growth as an indicator in our model is that job
growth is typically the primary goal of economic development policy
(Bartik 2001). It is worth knowing whether job growth reduces poverty,
even if its primary effects are indirect through reducing unemployment
and increasing labor force participation.
Even though creating high-wage jobs is a common policy goal,
low-wage jobs often form the entry-level positions that disadvantaged
individuals need in the early stages of their careers to get accustomed
to the workforce. By providing needed entry points, job growth in lowwage industries such as trade or personal services may have a greater
poverty-reducing effect than overall job growth. For example, former
welfare recipients are more likely to be employed in food service and retail than in higher-paying jobs (Brauner and Loprest 1999). Andersson,
Holzer, and Lane (2002, 2003) find that workers with persistently low-
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wage jobs—defined as those earning less than $12,000 (1998 $) for at
least three consecutive years—tend to be concentrated in various service and retail sectors. A high-wage industry composition may primarily
benefit the middle class and may even increase the size of welfare rolls
(Bartik 1996, 2001; Bartik and Eberts 1999, p. 138), though Raphael
(1998) reports mixed results.
On the other hand, wage premiums may play a role in changing
poverty rates. The loss of manufacturing jobs (Bluestone 1990), a shift
in demand towards high-skilled occupations (Cutler and Katz 1991),
and declining unionization (Freeman 1993) have been noted as possible
causes for increased poverty and income inequality. Using 1993–2000
national data, Foster-Bey and Rawlings (2002) find that, holding all
else constant, single mothers tend to have higher wages in manufacturing and health services than in other fields. The data left Foster-Bey and
Rawlings sufficiently optimistic to conclude that it may be worthwhile
to target certain low-wage sectors as possible employment outlets for
less-skilled workers.
Greater public-sector employment also may be associated with
lower poverty (Bartik 2001), which may be the result of high unionization and administratively set wage rates in the public sector. Levernier,
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) also found strong poverty-reducing effects from having a higher employment share in goods-producing industries. Besides the direct effects stemming from the possible loss of
higher-paying jobs, greater industry dislocation in general is associated
with large declines in postdisplacement earnings (and greater potential
for long-term joblessness) as workers are forced to switch to occupations for which they have less training (Carrington and Zaman 1994).
Welfare Reform Variables
The effect of welfare reform on state poverty is examined using
three variables. Following the approaches of the CEA (1999) and Figlio
and Ziliak (1999), a TANF variable is added that measures the proportion of the year that TANF was in effect. For example, if TANF was
in effect for the entire year, the variable takes a value of 1.00, while if
TANF was only in effect for half the number of days in the year, the
variable takes a value of 0.50. In addition, many states implemented
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various features of TANF in the form of waivers to the previous program, AFDC.
Thus, a second variable is included; it is calculated as the sum of
the yearly proportions that various AFDC waivers were in effect before
TANF implementation.5 The AFDC waivers include five types: 1) the
imposition of time limits on receipt of welfare benefits, 2) waiver of
job exemptions from work requirements for child care, 3) imposition
of a cap on the amount of welfare benefits that a family can receive, 4)
increased earnings disregards, and 5) sanctions for not having a job or
being engaged in a work-related activity. If these waivers relate to successful features of TANF, their implementation likely reduced poverty
rates in these states.
The third variable is the natural logarithm of the average monthly
welfare payment to a family.6 Generosity of welfare benefits mechanically increases income and reduces poverty, but the adverse effects on a
person’s incentive to work may more than offset this effect and increase
poverty (Moffitt 1999).
Person-Based Poverty Factors
As was described in Chapter 2, poverty rates also contain a demographic component. For example, poverty rates are higher for femaleheaded families nationally, and regions with higher shares of femaleheaded families are found to have higher rates of poverty, other things
being equal (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). Female heads
of families are the sole potential wage earners, are disproportionately
young, less educated, and face child care constraints that limit full participation in the workforce. In a related point, Levernier, Partridge, and
Rickman also report a positive relationship between a county’s average
number of children per family and its poverty rate.
Higher poverty also occurs among minorities. Some possible reasons for higher poverty among blacks include discrimination (Ihlanfeldt
and Young 1996; Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991), their residence
in inner cities (Corcoran et al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Holzer
1991), more attractive nonmarket opportunities (Viscusi 1986), and
low educational attainment (Smith and Welch 1986). Yet Levernier,
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) find that after controlling for numerous
county characteristics such as labor market performance, education,
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and other demographic characteristics, counties with greater shares of
African Americans had lower poverty. This led the authors to suggest
that it is the interaction of race with the other characteristics that underlies higher poverty among African Americans. For example, Levernier,
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) found that employment growth and increased educational attainment had greater poverty-reducing effects in
counties with high African American population shares. Nevertheless,
they report finding higher poverty in counties with greater shares of
non–African American minorities.
Other theories suggest there is an interaction between the economy
and person-based factors. Higher poverty that results from poor regional
economic performance may adversely affect family structure (such as
by increasing single female headship because of a lack of opportunities
for males), which further perpetuates the poverty cycle. This has been
argued to underlie both inner-city poverty (Wilson 1987) and rural poverty (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000). As was discussed in terms
of spatial mismatch in Chapter 3, inner-city poverty may be perpetuated
through negative neighborhood effects, such as less exposure to welleducated and employed residents and more exposure to the unemployed
and to persons engaged in illicit activities.

Regression Results
Descriptions of the variables included in the model and descriptive
statistics can be found in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The results for alternative
specifications of the model shown in Box 4.2 appear in columns (1)–(7)
of Table 4.6.7 Different combinations of explanatory variables produce
the alternative sets of results: the interpretation of the regression coefficients varies depending upon what other explanatory variables are
included in the estimated equation. For example, when unemployment
and employment growth are both included, the employment growth coefficient is interpreted as being the effect employment growth has on
poverty other than through its indirect influence on poverty through unemployment. The R2 statistics reported at the bottom of the table reflect
the combined explanatory power of the included variables.
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Variable

Notes on calculation and data source

% persons in poverty

U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey: Historical Poverty Tables: Table 21

Employment growth rate

[(Total Empl.)t − (Total Empl.)t−1]/(Total Empl.)t−1. BEA Local Area Personal Income SA25 Series

Male employment rate

U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various
years

Female employment rate

U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various
years

Male unemployment rate

U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various
years

Female unemployment rate

U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various
years

% female-headed households

The data is interpolated for intervening periods between census years. U.S. Census Bureau:
Household and Family Characteristics, STF1, from 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses

Population share ≤ age 19

U.S. Census Bureau

Population share ages 20–24

U.S. Census Bureau
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Population share ≥ 65

U.S. Census Bureau

% pop. ≥ 25, h.s. grad, not 4-yr.
college grad

U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998

% pop. ≥ 25, 4-yr. college degree

U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998

% workforce union members

Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the
CPS (Documentation). http://www.unionstats.com

% workforce union-covered

Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the
CPS (Documentation). http://www.unionstats.com
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Tab1e 4.4 Variable Definitions and Data Sources
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# births per 1,000 female teens 15–19 U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998; and National Center for Health Statistics, National
Vital Statistics Reports
(Relative Wage Rate)/(Relative Wage Mix). BEA Local Area Personal Income SA07 Series

Relative wage mix

Ratio of state employment-weighted U.S. industry wages to U.S. average wage rate.
BEA Local Area Personal Income SA07 Series

Industry employment sharesa

BEA Local Area Personal Income SA25 Series

Proportion of yr. TANF implemented

Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table W-1

Proportion of yr. time limit in effect,
AFDC waiver

Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table W-1

Proportion of year family caps in
effect, AFDC waiver

Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table B

Proportion of year job exemption,
AFDC waiver

Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table B

Avg. fam. monthly welfare payment

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

International immigration

“Immigrants Admitted, by State of Intended Residence.” Various issues of the Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

a

Industry-mix employment growth is calculated by multiplying state employment in each industry by the corresponding national growth
rate and then summing the products across industries. Competitiveness-employment growth is then total-employment growth minus the
industry-mix growth.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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Relative competitiveness wage rate

90 Partridge and Rickman
Tab1e 4.5 Descriptive Statistics of the 48 Contiguous States and the
District of Columbia, 1984–2000 (%)
Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

% persons in poverty
Employment growth rate
Male employment rate
Female employment rate
Male unemployment rate
Female unemployment rate
% female-headed households
Population share ≤ age 19
Population share ages 20–24
Population share ≥ age 65
% pop. ≥ 25, h.s. grad, not 4-yr. college grad
% population ≥ 25, 4-yr. college grad
% workforce union members
% workforce union-covered
# births per 1,000 female teens 15–19
Relative competitiveness wage rate
Relative wage mix
Construction employment share
Mining employment share
Durable goods employment share
Nondurable goods employment share
Trade sector employment share
Farm employment share
Low-paying service employment share
High-paying service employment share
Trans., comm., and pub. util’s empl. share
Finance, insurance, and real estate empl. share
Proportion of year TANF implemented
Proportion of yr. time limit in effect, AFDC waiver
Proportion of yr. fam. caps in effect, AFDC waiver
Proportion of yr. job exemption, AFDC waiver
Average family monthly welfare payment ($)
Per capita welfare recipients
International immigration/population share

13.51
0.022
71.55
55.71
5.74
5.77
10.99
0.29
0.08
0.13
57.38
21.20
14.03
16.11
52.60
0.94
1.00
0.05
0.01
0.08
0.06
0.21
0.03
0.04
0.25
0.05
0.07
0.17
0.01
0.03
0.03
321.19
0.04
0.007

4.21
0.018
3.98
5.31
1.81
1.95
2.29
0.03
0.01
0.02
5.58
4.98
5.87
5.99
15.12
0.15
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.36
0.08
0.15
0.15
115.08
0.02
0.024

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Labor Market Results
The results in column (1) of Table 4.6 indicate that current and
lagged state employment growth reduce poverty.8 Summing the three
employment growth coefficients yields a sustained acceleration of job
growth equal to one percentage point, which reduces the poverty rate by
about one-half of a percentage point.
In terms of the other variables, a greater composition of high-wage
industries is negatively associated with the poverty rate. High-wage industries may provide above-poverty wage rates for those who otherwise
may not be able to obtain them, and may also reduce poverty through
positive spillovers on wages in other industries and employment multiplier effects through higher spending in the area.9 Dropping Wage mix
and replacing it with variables consisting of employment shares in various Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) aggregates does not change
the other results.10
Because factors other than job growth may underlie changes in
unemployment or labor force participation, unemployment rates and
employment rates by gender are added to the column (1) model. For
instance, if growth is primarily supply-driven, then strong employment growth increases unemployment rates and lowers employment
rates (Partridge and Rickman 1999b), both of which would increase
poverty rates; thus, the variables contain independent information. The
additional labor market variables caused the lagged-employment variables to become quite insignificant, so these lags were dropped from
the model.
The results of adding the employment and unemployment rates in
column (2) reveal relatively stronger labor market effects on poverty for
females. Morgan and Kickham (2001) likewise found fluctuations in female unemployment rates to be more important than those in male rates
in explaining changes in child poverty rates. Given the inclusion of employment growth, the significance of the female employment rate and
unemployment rate variables suggests that other poverty-reducing factors underlie their changes.11 For example, teen birthrates are no longer
significant with the inclusion of the additional labor market variables,
suggesting that lower teen birthrates reduce poverty through increasing
female employment rates. Except for the relative wage mix coefficient
becoming insignificant, results for the other variables are qualitatively
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Dependent variable: percentage of persons in poverty
Specification Specification Specification
(1)
(2)
(3)
Employment growth
Empl. growth(−1)
Empl. growth(−2)

−20.22
(3.55)
−15.09
(2.61)
−13.52
(2.61)

Specification
(4)

−11.70
(2.06)

Empl. growth × dum96

Specification Specification
(6)
(7)

−9.35
(1.61)

−8.92
(1.52)

−8.66
(1.48)

−20.28
(1.71)

−20.09
(1.66)

−22.33
(1.85)

0.15
(1.49)

0.15
(1.45)

0.16
(1.54)

−41.81
(1.26)
−18.68
(3.12)
−76.09
(2.34)
−11.84
(1.95)
−28.44
(2.49)
−13.70
(0.62)

Industry mix empl. growth
Competitiveness empl. growth
Ind. mix empl. growth(−1)
Comp. empl. growth(−1)
Ind. mix empl. growth(−2)
Comp. empl. growth(−2)
Male unemployment

Specification
(5)

0.13
(1.26)

0.19
(1.96)
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Female unemployment
Male empl./pop.
Female empl./pop.
Metro share
Immigrants/pop.

Pop. share ages 20–24
Pop. share ≥ age 65
% pop. h.s. grad, not 4-yr.
college grad
% pop. college grad
Teen birthrate
Wage mix
Sum of AFDC waivers

0.25
(2.45)
−0.05
(0.83)
−0.18
(3.55)
−10.99
(1.19)
−5.34
(0.63)
22.66
(1.59)
−10.25
(0.60)
42.36
(1.62)
−0.21
(5.11)
−0.26
(4.52)
0.04
(1.96)
−17.96
(1.52)

−6.03
(0.62)
−0.65
(0.07)
56.04
(3.93)
−1.99
(0.11)
115.37
(4.44)
−0.29
(6.74)
−0.32
(5.56)
0.04
(2.01)
−27.74
(2.27)

0.22
(2.13)
−0.04
(0.67)
−0.20
(3.83)
−9.96
(1.06)
−3.72
(0.44)
29.86
(2.07)
−3.63
(0.21)
55.51
(2.07)
−0.23
(5.50)
−0.28
(4.85)
0.03
(1.35)
−12.97
(1.09)

0.22
(2.14)
−0.05
(0.69)
−0.20
(3.70)
−10.78
(1.15)
−1.43
(0.50)
30.97
(2.13)
−2.63
(0.15)
56.31
(2.09)
−0.23
(5.41)
−0.27
(4.79)
0.03
(1.33)
−13.54
(1.13)
−0.03
(0.10)

0.20
(1.97)
−0.05
(0.72)
−0.20
(3.80)
−10.94
(1.17)
−3.50
(0.42)
30.68
(2.11)
−2.29
(0.13)
56.75
(2.12)
−0.23
(5.38)
−0.27
(4.71)
0.02
(1.12)
−12.73
(1.07)
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Pop. share ≤ age 19

−3.14
(0.33)
−1.56
(0.18)
55.50
(3.90)
−10.39
(4.69)
120.59
(6.97)
−0.30
(5.67)
−0.33
(2.37)
0.04
(2.37)
−22.89
(1.92)

0.23
(2.27)
−0.06
(0.90)
−0.18
(3.55)
−8.39
(0.90)
−4.20
(0.50)
25.87
(1.81)
−9.06
(0.53)
55.77
(2.08)
−0.23
(5.36)
−0.27
(4.71)
0.03
(1.45)
−14.50
(1.22)
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Dependent variable: percentage of persons in poverty
Specification Specification Specification
(2)
(3)
(1)
Proportion of year family
caps, AFDC waiver
Proportion of year job
exemption, AFDC waiver
Proportion of year time
limit, AFDC waiver
Proportion of year TANF
implemented
Log(monthly welfare
payment)
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R2

Y
Y
0.86

Y
Y
0.87

Y
Y
0.87

Specification
(4)

Y
Y
0.86

Specification
(5)

Y
Y
0.87

Specification Specification
(6)
(7)

−0.30
(0.34)
0.65
(1.01)
Y
Y
0.87

−0.26
(0.56)
−0.46
(0.95)
1.35
(1.96)
0.21
(0.22)
0.67
(1.05)
Y
Y
0.87

Note: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses. t-statistic = 1.96 corresponds to 0.05 significance level based on a two-tailed test.
t-statistic = 1.645 corresponds to 0.05 significance level based on a one-tailed test. Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ generated regression results.
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unchanged. The coefficient for employment growth is reduced, but some
of the poverty-reducing benefits are now captured in the unemployment
and employment rate coefficients, suggesting the employment growth
coefficients now understate their total poverty effect. Nevertheless, the
continued significance of the employment growth coefficient suggests
that employment growth reduces poverty through channels other than
by reducing unemployment or increasing labor force participation—
e.g., it results in fewer part-time workers.12
In fact, omitting the employment growth variable in column (3)
causes the male unemployment rate coefficient to become significant
while the female coefficient increases only slightly. It appears, then,
that the effect of male unemployment on poverty derives primarily from
the benefits of job growth. The teen birthrate coefficient again becomes
significant, which suggests that strong job growth lowers teen birthrates.
Because job growth in association with in-migration likely has limited effects on unemployment and employment rates, state employment
growth is separated into two components: growth that is attributable to
a state’s composition of fast-growing industries nationally, and growth
that is idiosyncratic to the state.13 This tests the proposition that idiosyncratic growth induces greater in-migration (Partridge and Rickman
1999a) and reduces the employment growth effects on poverty. The
corresponding results in column (4) indicate stronger poverty-reducing
effects in industry-mix employment growth vs. idiosyncratic employment growth, though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.14
To examine whether there are any differences in a tight labor market, we interacted job growth with a dummy variable for 1996–2000,
a period of strong national economic growth and low unemployment.
As shown in column (5), when the interaction variable is added to the
regression, the combined effect of employment growth on poverty for
1996–2000 is more than three times the magnitude of the other years.15
This result accords with Partridge and Rickman (2002), who report
lower interstate net migration shifts in the late 1990s; they argue that
the uniformly strong economy provided little incentive to regionally
migrate, and that new jobs were increasingly likely to be filled by lessskilled original residents.16
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Welfare Policy Results
The TANF variable is found to reduce poverty, but the estimated
relationship is not close to being statistically significant (column [6]).
In a sensitivity analysis conducted to examine whether differences in
TANF implementation strategies affect poverty, the TANF variable interacted with a variable that measured the overall work incentives of
the state’s TANF program as assessed by Blank and Schmidt (2001).
Blank and Schmidt rated the work incentives as weak, mixed, or strong;
these were assigned values of 0, 1, or 2. In results not shown, the interaction term was negative but statistically insignificant (slope = −0.13,
t = 0.64). Adding separate state-time trend variables or lagged poverty
rates (also not shown) did not strongly affect the welfare-reform results.
So, as is consistent with the findings of Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) for
families, there is no evidence to suggest that implementation of TANF
led to a reduction in a state’s poverty rate, even if the TANF program
contained stronger work incentives.
Nevertheless, the uniform effects of TANF across the nation would
be captured in the time fixed effects, and there may be insufficient timeseries variation across states to tease out a relationship between TANF
and poverty. Twenty-one states implemented TANF during 1996 for
an average duration of 0.21 years, whereas 48 states had implemented
TANF by the end of 1997 for an average duration of 0.86 years. For
1998, TANF was operational for the entire year in all 49 contiguous
states (the number counts the District of Columbia as a state). So some
caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from these results
alone, particularly for the effect of welfare reform at the national level.
Nevertheless, the aggregate AFDC waiver and monthly welfare payment variables also are not statistically related to poverty, confirming
the insignificance of the TANF variable. The results also barely change
when the aggregate AFDC waiver variable is dropped and replaced by
the proportion of the year that various individual waivers were in effect
(column [7]).17
Of the individual AFDC variables, only the time limit variable is
significant, but its sign is positive. Although time constraints were unlikely to be binding by 2000, the waiver may have induced individuals
to leave welfare, or discouraged others from becoming recipients, to
avoid exhausting their allotted time. Families also may have entered
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and exited welfare as a buffer against adverse labor market outcomes,
in a manner akin to unemployment insurance (Moffitt and Pavetti
2000).18 Omitting the family payment cap variable and the job exemption variable causes the time limit coefficient to lose statistical significance, suggesting that collinearity may partially underlie the result.19
Even dropping the teen birthrate or employment growth variables does
not alter the welfare policy results.20 TANF and AFDC waiver dummy
variables that were interacted with employment growth also had insignificant coefficients.
When the unemployment and employment rate variables are
dropped, the coefficient on the generosity of welfare payments becomes
positive and significant.21 Thus, welfare-benefit generosity appears to
have adverse labor supply effects on females (Blank and Schmidt 2001;
Moffitt 1999), increasing poverty (Gundersen and Ziliak 2004). Overall, besides generosity of welfare benefits or the potentially adverse
poverty effects of time limits, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that welfare reforms altered poverty rates. However, this is
not to conclude that welfare reforms did not affect welfare dependency
(Bartik 2002b).22
Demographic Poverty Effects
Increased educational attainment also reduces state poverty rates.
Column (1) results show that a 1.00-percent increase in the adult population holding a high school degree (relative to dropouts) is associated
with a 0.30-percentage-point reduction in poverty, while a corresponding change in the college graduate share is associated with a 0.33-point
reduction. Higher shares of population at both ends of the age spectrum
increase state poverty rates. The share of the state’s population that is
composed of immigrants is not a significant factor underlying changes
in state poverty, which may be related to offsetting internal migration.
Likewise, the share of the population that resides in a metropolitan area
does not have a statistically significant relationship to poverty.
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Simulation of Individual Effects
Because the estimated relationship between employment growth
and poverty reduction varies across specifications, a more structured set
of equations is needed to isolate the total effect of a particular factor, including any indirect interrelationships. Six equations are specified and
econometrically estimated. The equations correspond to the following
dependent variables: 1) the poverty rate, 2) the female unemployment
rate, 3) the male employment rate, 4) the female employment rate, 5)
the male employment rate, and 6) the teen birthrate. The simulation
focuses on the predicted quantitative poverty effects regardless of statistical significance.
The estimated poverty equation roughly corresponds to the estimated equation in column (2) of Table 4.6.23 However, as previously
noted, because employment growth may influence the rates for unemployment, employment, and teen births, the coefficients corresponding
to the employment growth variables are likely to understate the poverty-reducing effects of job growth. So, separate equations are specified
to account for the influence of job growth on these other variables. The
welfare variables are included in each equation in an attempt to unravel
their effects on poverty. Other control variables generally thought to be
exogenous also are added, including state and time fixed effects.
Simulated Employment Growth Effects
The estimated equations (Table 4.7) reveal that employment
growth lowers unemployment rates and increases employment rates,
particularly for males.24 Thus, in addition to having a direct povertyreducing effect, job growth also lowers poverty through reducing unemployment rates and increasing labor force participation. Although job
growth has larger effects on male labor market outcomes, female labor
market outcomes are most associated with poverty. So, as shown in Table 4.8, the indirect poverty-reducing effects of employment growth are
larger for females. Summing the unemployment and employment rate
effects reveals that a 1.0-percent acceleration in job growth indirectly
lowers poverty rates by nearly 0.3 percentage points, which exceeds the
estimated direct reduction of less than 0.2 points. This confirms the es-
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timated employment growth effect in Table 4.6 of 0.5 percentage points
when employment and unemployment rates are omitted from the estimated equation.
Employment growth also reduces teen birthrates (column [6] of
Table 4.7), and teen birthrates influence poverty both directly and indirectly through affecting unemployment and employment rates. Column
(1) of Table 4.8 shows that, through its influence on teen birthrates, acceleration of employment growth reduces poverty.25
Simulated Effects of Welfare Policies
Similar calculations can be made for implementation of welfare-reform measures (Table 4.8). Aside from its direct effects, welfare reform
can affect poverty through influencing labor market outcomes such as
employment and unemployment rates. Likewise, welfare reform can
affect poverty through reducing teen birthrates, which can influence
poverty both directly and indirectly through measured labor market
outcomes.
AFDC waivers directly increased poverty (column [2] of Table 4.8)
but indirectly reduced poverty through generally improved labor market outcomes, such as increased employment rates. On the other hand,
early implementation of TANF was directly associated with a slight
reduction in poverty but was indirectly associated with larger increases
in poverty. Although the estimates (not shown) are generally statistically insignificant, implementation of TANF was associated with increased unemployment rates and reduced employment rates. TANF also
appeared to be positively related to teen birthrates. It is intuitive that
unemployment rates increase when welfare recipients exit and seek employment. However, the employment rate effects are counterintuitive
and difficult to reconcile with the fact that many of those leaving welfare found employment. Nevertheless, the results suggest that if there
were any poverty benefits of TANF, they are not reflected in the labor
market outcome estimates in Table 4.7.
The remaining welfare policy variable, average monthly benefit
payment, both directly and indirectly increases poverty (column [4] of
Table 4.8). Aside from its influence on poverty through unemployment
and labor force participation, a 1.0-percent increase in monthly welfare
benefits increases the poverty rate by more than 0.5 percentage points.
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Female
unempl.

Male
unempl.

Female
empl./pop.

Male
empl./pop.

Teen
birthrate

−10.67
−5.22
−2.78
0.11
0.19
−0.06
−0.19
28.12
−5.63
64.44
−0.23

−16.93
−16.74
−20.11

−25.10
−23.93
−23.71

10.52
11.05
17.99

12.40
21.99
23.16

−59.05
−7.90
18.14

36.45
0.69
73.18
−0.12

22.84
6.56
23.21
−0.10

−86.17
16.13
−174.65
0.13

−30.44
38.44
−151.63
0.05

58.95
18.40
221.30
−0.19

−0.26
0.02
−15.56
−0.44

−0.09
−0.02
10.18
−0.51

−0.05
−0.03
7.17
−0.32

0.16
−0.11
48.58
1.05

−0.02
−0.01
31.46
0.65

−0.01
182.35
−1.80

−0.24

0.32

0.38

−0.52

−0.13

0.01

1.23

0.33

−0.20

0.70

1.19

1.67

Ind. variable/dependent variablea

Poverty

Employment growth
Employment growth(−1)
Employment growth(−2)
Male unemploymentb
Female unemployment
Male employment/population
Female employment/population
Population share ≤ 19 years
Population share 20–24
Population share ≥ 65
% population h.s. grad,
not 4-year college grad
% population college grad
Teen birthrate
Wage mix
Proportion of year job exemption,
AFDC waiver
Proportion of year family caps,
AFDC waiver
Proportion of year time limit,
AFDC waiver
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Proportion of year TANF
implemented
Log(monthly welfare payment)
R2

−0.08
0.59
0.869

0.92

0.83

−2.21

−0.52

3.28

0.54
0.858

0.71
0.852

−1.72
0.944

−0.83
0.914

3.06
0.959

The models include state and year fixed effects.
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ generated regression results.

a

b

An Empirical Analysis of State Poverty Trends 101

7/27/2006 1:41:37 PM

102 Partridge and Rickman
Table 4.8 Simulated Total Effects (%)
1%
acceleration
empl. growth

1 year effects,
all AFDC
waivers

1 year
implement
TANF

1% increase
in monthly
welfare benefit

Direct

−0.187

0.546

−0.075

0.547

Female unempl.

−0.105

0.027

0.175

0.104

Male unempl.

−0.082

−0.015

0.091

0.080

Fem empl./pop.

−0.074

−0.234

0.420

0.321

Male empl./pop.

−0.034

−0.103

0.031

0.049

Teen births

−0.690

−0.041

0.048

0.076

Total

−1.183

0.180

0.690

1.177

Channel of
influence

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Higher welfare payments also increase unemployment and reduce labor
force participation, particularly for females. This translates into an additional increase in poverty of more than 0.5 percentage points. Higher
welfare payments also increase teen birthrates, and this effect increases
poverty by slightly less than 0.1 points. That includes the indirect teen
birthrate effects on unemployment and labor force participation. The
simulation results (summed together in column [4] of Table 4.8) suggest that a 1.0-percent increase in monthly welfare benefit payments
increases the poverty rate by approximately 1.2 percentage points.

Conclusion
Regression analysis of reduced-form equations over the 1984–2000
period reveals that state employment growth reduces poverty. There is
some evidence that the magnitude of effect was greater during 1996–
2000, a period of tight labor markets nationwide. This suggests that
state economic development policy is more likely to reduce poverty
when national labor markets are strong. A looser national labor market
likely engenders greater interregional migration in response to differential state economic performance, reducing potential poverty-reducing
effects on disadvantaged original residents. Similarly, there is evidence
that job growth that is attributable to a favorable industry composition
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has a larger estimated effect than competitiveness growth. This likely
follows because strong nationwide growth in particular industries induces less interregional migration, forcing firms to hire locally, which
reduces poverty more.
Employment growth reduces poverty through reducing unemployment and increasing labor force participation. Beyond working through
these channels, job growth also has direct effects such as those associated with more vacancies, increased hours worked among part-time
employees, and conversion from part-time to full-time employment status. Simulations reveal that, both through its direct effect and through
indirect effects from unemployment and labor force participation, a
1.0-percent acceleration in employment growth reduces poverty by
0.5 percentage points. Yet we find job formation to be associated with
lower teen birthrates: lower teen birthrates reduce poverty, including
indirectly through increasing employment rates. After accounting for
these direct and indirect effects from teen birthrates, the estimated poverty-reducing impact of a 1.0 percent greater employment growth rate
rises to 1.2 percentage points.
The simulations also suggest that welfare reform does not contribute to lower poverty rates. Overall, AFDC waivers and TANF increase
unemployment as recipients are pushed into the labor market, though
the AFDC waivers also increase the overall employment rate. The simulated total impact on poverty of a state implementing AFDC waivers
or TANF is positive. There also is no evidence of welfare reform reducing teen birthrates, the estimated effect of which is slightly positive. In
addition, there is no evidence that welfare reform reduces poverty when
state employment growth is stronger.
Yet increasing the generosity of welfare benefits is found to increase poverty. Generosity of welfare benefits is positively associated
with unemployment and negatively associated with labor force participation. The unemployment effect is stronger for males—likely because
they have a stronger attachment to the labor force—while labor force
participation effects are stronger for females. Welfare benefit generosity also is positively associated with teen birthrates. Through its direct
and indirect effects, a 1.0-percent increase in welfare benefit generosity
increases the poverty rate by 1.2 percentage points.
In summary, state-level analysis suggests that job creation reduces poverty. There is some evidence to suggest that a stronger national
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economy increases the likely effectiveness of state and local job growth
policies. There is no evidence that AFDC waivers or implementation
of TANF reduces poverty; in fact, other things being equal, they may
increase poverty. It is more likely that the continued decline in the purchasing power of the median state average monthly welfare payment reduces poverty by increasing the net benefits of being employed (including supplemental government support for such things as housing or child
care). In fact, the average median-state monthly welfare payment fell
by almost 21 percent on an inflation-adjusted basis between 1990 and
2000.26 The results also suggest that employment growth, more so than
welfare reform, was responsible for the late-1990s decline in poverty.
Although states provide a natural laboratory in which to examine the
relationships between economic growth, welfare reform, and poverty,
these relationships at the state level should differ from those observed
nationally, and added labor market features such as commuting imply
that the state results would not apply to local labor markets either. This
cautions against the simple extrapolation of state-level results either to
national or to local policymaking. Nevertheless, the added nuances of
state labor markets make it paramount that state-level data be used to
derive insights regarding state economic development policies, welfare
reform policies, and poverty. For this reason, the next chapter will consider state case studies in attempting to provide additional context to
these findings and help illuminate how poverty rates are linked to economic conditions and state and federal welfare reforms.

Notes
The three epigraphs at the start of the chapter come from the New York Times (1998),
Archer (1998), and McMurrer and Sawhill (1997). The two epigraphs at the start of the
section “Welfare Reform and Poverty” come from Moore (1997) and Kuttner (2000).
1. Other models consider the family poverty rate, but the conclusions are unchanged, so these models are not reported. The variables of the models reported
are measured in first-difference form to mitigate any spurious trends and unit
roots.
2. The 1960–1973 time-period dummy reflects the War on Poverty and expansion
of the safety net during the period. The 1974–1980 dummy reflects the stagflation of that period. The 1993–2002 indicator captures the expansion of the
EITC and the wide-scale welfare reform changes. The omitted category is the
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10.

11.
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1981–1992 period, which represents the Reagan-Bush-I years of scaling back
the safety net as well as a period of rapidly increasing income inequality. Since
1981–1992 is the omitted period, the time-period coefficients are interpreted as
the effects for the periods relative to the effect for the 1981–1992 period.
We also estimated another model (not shown) that added an indicator for the
1997–2002 period to examine whether the TANF era was different. Yet there
was no evidence that the effects of the 1993–1996 period differed from 1997–
2002. The F-statistic equaled 0.02 for the null hypothesis that the 1993–1996 and
1997–2002 coefficients were equal.
The additional workers induced into the labor force as a result of welfare reform
complicate efforts to assess how job growth affects poverty rates. In contrast
to the 1980s, for people who were both on welfare and above the poverty line,
job growth may have helped move large numbers of them off welfare without
dropping them into poverty. Yet the increased labor supply may crowd out some
welfare-ineligible less-skilled workers from employment, pushing them below
the poverty threshold. Consistent with this point is that former recipients who
have left welfare in the post-TANF era have only slightly lower poverty rates
than those remaining on TANF (Moffitt 2002).
We also tried including a binary indicator variable if any AFDC waiver was in
effect, but the results were unaffected.
Given its representation in nominal log form, the time fixed effects capture any
national inflation effects. Note that official state-inflation deflators are unavailable.
Each regression includes both time fixed effects and state fixed effects. The coefficients reflect the average effect of within-state time series variation in the corresponding variable on state poverty rates that is not common across the nation.
The lagged employment growth variables for periods beyond two years were
nowhere near being significant and were omitted from the final model.
The wage-composition measure is calculated by weighting national industry
wages with state employment shares and dividing this by the average national
wage rate. A value in excess of unity indicates that the state has a greater composition of high-paying industries than the national average.
The industry employment share variables are statistically significant below
the 0.01 level. In order of magnitude, the greatest poverty-reducing effects are
found for increased shares in transportation, communications and public utilities, mining, finance, insurance and real estate, trade, manufacturing, low-skilled
services, construction, high-skilled services, and government. Low-paying services include hotel and motel services, personal services, and private household
services. The remaining categories of services are considered high-paying.
For comparison to regional studies that used the unemployment rate as the sole
indicator of labor market conditions, a regression also was run replacing employment growth with male and female unemployment rates and using column (1) independent variables (except teen birthrates). The resulting coefficients were 0.27
(t = 3.34) for male unemployment and 0.36 for female unemployment (3.73).
These estimates lie below the average estimate from the literature of 0.5 reported
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in Table 4.3. Slope interactions for male and female unemployment rates for
1993–2000 were jointly significant (p-value = 0.02), in which the 1993–1998
unemployment effects became 0.41 for males and 0.44 for females. Thus, there
was evidence that lower unemployment rates became more influential in reducing poverty during the 1990s economic expansion compared to the 1980s.
Partridge (2003) finds that strong job growth is associated with falling shares
of the workforce that are involuntarily working part-time for various reasons,
including economic. Partridge concludes that a strengthening economy means
that these part-time workers can increasingly find full-time work. Similarly, he
finds that strong employment growth increases the employment share that is voluntarily employed part-time, which also can reduce poverty if this comes from
the ranks of the jobless.
Employment growth attributable to the state’s composition of industries is calculated by multiplying the state employment share in each industry by the corresponding national growth rate and then summing the products across industries.
Competitiveness employment growth, then, is total employment growth minus
the portion attributable to industry composition.
A Wald test fails to reject the equality of the coefficients for the two growth components (for all years jointly) with a p-value of 0.16. Although the coefficient
values differ noticeably, a lack of time-series variation in the industry-mix variables likely underlies the large standard errors. Recall from Note 3 in Chapter 3,
however, that the coefficient for the industry-mix employment variable understates its effect because part of that effect is picked up in the competitiveness
coefficient.
This is obtained by summing the coefficients of the employment growth variable
and the interaction terms to obtain the 1996–2000 effect, then comparing it to the
employment growth coefficient.
An alternative formulation, in which employment growth interacts with a dummy
variable for 1997–2000, and an additional dummy variable for 1988, 1989, and
1996, produced less significant results. The reason for the alternative formulation
was to determine whether unemployment below 5 percent (as happened in 1997
and afterwards) had a differential effect from that of around 5.5 percent (such as
occurred in the years 1988, 1989, and 1996).
Not all waivers were simultaneously included in the regression because of the
high degree of collinearity among some of the waiver variables. Yet experimentation with the other waivers did not yield additional significant results. Ziliak
et al. (2000) find that, in terms of changes in welfare caseloads, it did not matter
how AFDC waivers were treated. Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) find the same for
state family poverty rates.
Families in Alabama were observed to leave welfare before their time limits
were reached, using it like unemployment insurance (Crowder 2001).
Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) likewise find no family poverty-reducing effects of
pre-TANF welfare reform measures, though such measures did reduce the depth
of poverty for black- and female-headed households.
Several additional regressions were performed to test the sensitivity of the results
by adding other variables to the column (6) model. When a variable measuring
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structural change in the previous two years was added, it was negative but insignificant, while the other results were unchanged. Industrial structure change is
defined as one-half the sum of absolute changes in the share of one-digit industry
employment shares between periods t and t-2. It is interpreted as the share of the
workforce that would have to shift one-digit shares such that the two years have
the same industrial composition (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). In
another case, a variable measuring percent of employment covered by unions
was negative and significant when it was added to the model, yet the other results were essentially unchanged. Nevertheless, replacing union coverage with
the percentage of employees that are union members produced an insignificant
result. The share of the population that was African American and the share that
was Caucasian were insignificant when added, while the other results were not
notably affected. The sample is limited to 1984–1999 when racial categories are
included because racial categories for 2000 are not directly comparable to those
used in previous years.
The t statistic equals 2.76; the largest change results from dropping the female
employment rate.
We again caution that identifying the effects from TANF is very problematic,
and almost all of the identification comes from pre- and post-1997 effects, since
that is the year when almost all states implemented TANF (Bitler, Gelbach, and
Hoynes 2003). With separate time-period effects for the strong economy and
other changes such as the EITC, it is virtually impossible to identify possible
trend effects, such as whether the response to TANF changes with the passage of
time.
The interaction of employment growth with the 1996–2000 indicator is not used
because of the marginal significance of the interaction term, and because in the
remaining four equations the interaction term was insignificant or the wrong
sign. See Note 20 for results.
Although Hoynes (2000b) reports that metropolitan female employment rates
are more cyclically sensitive, she examined responses to U.S. cycles, not local
cycles.
Earlier in the chapter we reported that employment growth reduced poverty rates
more from 1996 to 2000 relative to the rest of the sample, but the simulation results are not strongly affected by replacing lagged employment growth variables
with employment growth that interacts with a dummy variable for 1996–2000.
When we calculate the effects for the 1996–2000 period, we find that the estimated overall effects of employment growth rise only 0.07 percentage points. Despite larger direct poverty-reducing effects (e.g., the final column in Table 4.7),
employment growth generally affected unemployment and employment rates
less in the 1996–2000 period—though it reduced teen birthrates more—which
overall slightly lowered the indirect poverty-reducing effects of employment
growth.
The 1980s somewhat contradict falling real benefits as a primary causal factor
because poverty rates did not decline, even as the inflation-adjusted median-state
average welfare payment fell almost 20 percent.
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5
State Economic Performance,
Welfare Reform, and Poverty
Case Studies from Four States
[The Minnesota Family Investment Program], unlike welfare reform programs in many other states, was designed as an antipoverty
approach to welfare reform, with goals of economic independence and
self-sufficiency in addition to job placement.
—Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota (2000),
Welfare Reform
If you look at the number of jobs that we’re creating today, we’re
leading just about the Southeast in jobs created. We’re going to have a
positive job increase this year for the first time in four years, and they
are good paying jobs. I think this administration has made great progress in moving people out of poverty.
—Alabama Governor Bob Riley (AP 2004), responding to a report
from the U.S. Census Bureau that Alabama had the eighth highest poverty rate in the nation in 2003
To provide more context and an in-depth understanding of the
nexus between poverty, the economy, and welfare reform, we examine four states as case studies. The four states are Alabama, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Washington—one from each of the four major census
regions. We chose these states not only for their geographic diversity
but because they had varied economic experiences and approaches to
welfare reform.
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Regression Sample Period Analysis
Table 5.1 contains economic, poverty, and welfare-caseload statistics for the 1984–2000 sample period and the welfare reform subperiod
of 1996–2000. Despite having the largest decline over the entire sample period, Alabama experienced a more modest poverty rate decline
during 1996–2000, when poverty decreased from 14.0 to 13.3 percent
compared to the U.S. decline from 13.7 to 11.3. For the 1996–2000 period, Minnesota’s poverty rate declined the most of any state’s; it went
from 9.8 to 5.7 percent, greatly exceeding the national percentage-point
decline. Because of that, Minnesota had the second lowest poverty rate
in the nation in 2000. Washington experienced a more modest poverty
rate decline during the late 1990s, a decade in which its poverty rate
actually increased. In fact, Washington’s poverty rate declined to 8.9
percent in 1998 before climbing back up to 10.8 percent in 2000. New
Jersey’s poverty rate only declined from 9.2 to 7.3 percent, falling short
of the national decline in percentage points. Even so, this gave New
Jersey the third lowest poverty rate in the nation in 2000.
As shown in Table 5.1, using the coefficients from column 7 of
Table 4.4 and the 1996–2000 reported statistics for employment rates,
unemployment rates, and employment growth, the predicted poverty
changes for Alabama, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington are
−0.7, −1.1, −1.4, and −1.2 percentage points.1 Except for Minnesota,
these estimates are remarkably close to the corresponding actual poverty rate changes. In addition, for comparability to the poverty studies
that solely use unemployment rates, we multiply the unemployment coefficients reported in Note 11 of Chapter 4 for 1996–2000 (i.e., 0.41 for
males and 0.44 for females) by the respective changes in state rates. The
predicted changes in poverty rates then become −0.4, −0.6, −2.1, and
−1.2 percentage points, respectively. Although these predicted effects
are modestly smaller for Alabama and Minnesota and greater for New
Jersey, they are similar to the first set of estimates.
Alabama
Alabama did not experiment with AFDC waivers; its only preTANF experimentation occurred with the Avenues to Self-Sufficiency
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Table 5.1 State Case Study Statistics by Regression Sample Period
(% change)
1984–2000
Poverty ratea
Empl. growthb
Male empl./pop.
Fem. empl./ pop.
Male unempl.
Fem. unempl.
1996–2000
Pred. poverty ratec
Actual poverty rate
Empl. growth
Male empl./pop.
Fem. empl./pop.
Male unempl.
Fem. unempl.
Welfare casesd

Ala.

Minn.

N.J.

Wash.

U.S.

−5.8
2.1
0.1
11.2
−5.3
−8.1

−3.4
2.3
1.9
8.9
−3.5
−2.4

−2.8
1.4
−0.8
5.1
−2.5
−2.4

−0.5
2.6
3.4
11.5
−4.3
−4.2

−3.1
2.3
0.7
8.6
−3.3
−3.5

−0.7
−0.7
1.4
−0.8
0.9
−0.4
−0.6
−45

−1.1
−4.1
2.4
0.0
1.8
−1.0
−0.4
−31

−1.4
−1.9
2.1
1.9
0.4
−2.5
−2.4
−55

−1.2
−1.1
2.9
−1.2
2.7
−0.7
−2.0
−46

−2.4
2.2
0.6
1.5
−1.2
−1.3
−53

NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
a
The poverty rate, employment growth, and welfare cases are reported for the nation.
The remaining variables are unweighted averages across states in the sample.
b
“Empl. growth” is the annual percentage change in nonfarm employment; “Welfare
cases” is the percentage change in welfare cases; and the remaining variables give the
percentage-point difference between the beginning and the end of the period. Thus all
categories measure percentage change.
c
Predicted 1996–2000 change in poverty rates, based on 1996–2000 employment
growth and changes in male and female unemployment and employment rates. See
text for more details.
d
Measured as the change in the total number of TANF recipients between August 1996
and June 2000 (ACF 2000).
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.

through Employment and Training and Services (ASSETS) program
in three counties from 1991 to 1994 (Holcomb et al. 2001). Alabama
implemented TANF on November 15, 1996. Welfare rolls declined 45
percent from August 1996 to June 2000 (DHHS 2000), and subsequently leveled off, partly because the cases that remained were the most
difficult (AP 2000).
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According to Holcomb et al. (2001), federal welfare reform led Alabama to initially replace education activities with job search activities
as the primary focus. Compared to its AFDC program, Alabama imposed harsher sanctions and increased enforcement for noncompliance,
became less lenient in granting exemptions from work requirements to
care for dependent children, and set the time limit for receiving cash
assistance at the federal maximum of 60 months. Starting in 1998, a
broader variety of activities were counted as “work” activities. In federal Fiscal Year 1998, Alabama had an above-average share of TANF
recipients engaged in job search or education activities and a belowaverage share in unsubsidized employment or in “any activity” (House
Ways and Means Committee 2000). Overall, Blank and Schmidt (2001)
rate Alabama as having mixed work incentives and give it low marks
for low-earnings disregards.
Despite a larger percentage change in TANF program expenditures
from 1995 to 2000, Alabama’s average expenditure per family in 1999
was just under 50 percent of the U.S. average. Its average monthly welfare payment rose from $144 in 1996 to $162 in 2000, compared to an
average increase across the sample of states of $319 to $338 over the
same period. Only South Carolina ($141) and Mississippi ($117) had
lower average monthly cash payments in 2000. Yet with the implementation of welfare reform Alabama began spending significantly more
on child care subsidies for working-poor families than it did on direct
welfare benefits (AP 1999, 2001).
During the 1996–2000 period, Alabama’s average annual employment growth decelerated to 1.4 percent, while the average growth across
states was 2.2 percent. This was associated with a 0.8 percentage-point
decline in the male employment rate, compared to an unweighted average employment-rate increase of 0.6 points for “all 49” states (counting
the District of Columbia and excluding Alaska and Hawaii). The Alabama female employment rate increased 0.9 percentage points, while
the unweighted state average increased 1.5 points. Although Alabama
male and female unemployment rates declined by 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points, they were well below the corresponding average declines
across all states.
Accompanying the deceleration of employment growth in Alabama
was a decline in manufacturing employment of 5.1 percent from the
1995 peak to 2000. By comparison, U.S. manufacturing employment
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growth peaked in 1998 and actually gained 0.1 percent between 1995
and 2000. The larger percentage decline in Alabama manufacturing,
combined with a much greater share of employment in manufacturing
(20.4 vs. 14.7 percent), likely contributed to its less favorable labor
market performance and weak poverty reduction in the late 1990s. The
wagemix variable used in the regression models in Chapter 4 declined
from a peak of 1.4 percent above-average wage composition of industries in 1994 to only 0.6 percent above by 2000. On a favorable note,
from 1989 to 1999 the real median hourly wage increased 8.8 percent
in Alabama, compared to 2.4 percent for the nation. The 20th percentile
hourly wage increased 9.4 percent, compared to 5.6 percent for the nation (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
Minnesota
Minnesota has traditionally been known for its progressive and
generous social policies. Minnesota did not implement AFDC waivers
statewide, but in April 1994 Minnesota began its widely praised Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) in seven counties (Bartik
2001; DHHS 2000). MFIP was expanded statewide in January 1998,
when it became the state’s TANF program.
MFIP merged the AFDC and Food Stamp programs into the state’s
cash assistance program. The program also increased the earned-income disregard and mandated employment of its recipients. MFIP’s
average monthly welfare benefit and income eligibility for child care
and health benefits were significantly above their corresponding U.S.
averages, while sanctions for noncompliance with the work program
were less severe than in other states (Tout et al. 2001). Nevertheless,
the maximum monthly benefit remained at $532 during the 1996–2000
period.
MFIP also subsidized child care costs through the state general fund,
the federal Child Care Development Fund (CCDF), and federal TANF
funds. The 2001 annual family income cutoff for child care assistance
in Minnesota for a one-parent family of three was $42,304, the fourth
highest in the nation. The maximum benefit level for a four-year-old in
center care in 2001 was $8,208, the sixth highest in the nation (National
Center for Children in Poverty 2004).
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Early results from the MFIP pilot program in seven counties suggest
that it increased employment levels and earnings of long-time welfare
recipients and reduced poverty (Gennetian, Knox, and Miller 2000),
while the results for short-term recipients are not as favorable (Tout et
al. 2001). MFIP was modified, however, when it was expanded statewide under TANF. The State of Minnesota lowered the income standard
for disenrollment from 137 percent of the federal poverty level to 120
percent, adopted the 60-month time limit, strengthened sanctions for
noncompliance, and limited education and training possibilities (Tout
et al. 2001).
In a critique of the work incentives of Minnesota’s welfare system by the Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, the office notes
that from 1994 to 1999, welfare caseloads dropped 39 percent, which
compared to 50 percent for the nation. Nine of ten neighboring states
experienced larger declines (Office of the Legislative Auditor 2000,
p. 25). The report (p. 52) further reveals that although welfare recipients’
employment rates and the hours they worked significantly increased,
during 1998 and 1999 less than one-half of welfare cases had a working
adult in the home. In many of those that did, the adult worked only part
time. Only one in four had jobs with health benefits, and those that had
first left MFIP were among the more advantaged. Blank and Schmidt
(2001) similarly rate Minnesota as having weak overall work incentives.
Yet a study by the Minnesota Department of Human Services finds that
34 percent of welfare recipients left welfare within twelve months after MFIP was expanded statewide, and that 64 percent of those who
left reported that they felt life was better under the new welfare system (Hopfensperger 2000). Another evaluation of MFIP concluded that
employment and earnings increased more for those receiving housing
subsidies (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2000).
Between 1996 and 2000, Minnesota’s annual job growth averaged 2.4 percent. Surprisingly, this was associated with no change in
Minnesota’s male employment rate. Yet the female employment rate in
Minnesota increased 1.8 percentage points, which was better than the
average across all states. Although the male and female unemployment
rates in Minnesota declined by 1.0 and 0.4 percentage points, this was
less than the corresponding average decline across all states.
Accompanying overall strong employment growth in Minnesota
was a smaller-than-average decline in manufacturing employment. As
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in the nation, manufacturing employment in Minnesota peaked in 1998;
it then declined 0.9 percent from 1998 to 2000. This compares favorably to the larger U.S. decline of 1.7 percent over the same two-year
period. Minnesota’s wage composition of industries increased throughout the 1990s, reaching 0.9 percent above the national average by 2000.
Median average hourly wages increased 12.8 percent from 1989 to
1999, while average hourly wages at the 20th percentile increased 13.6
percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
Thus it appears that income growth, more than increased employment rates or reduced unemployment rates, was responsible for Minnesota’s greater-than-average reduction in poverty in the late 1990s. Minnesota’s labor market was remarkably tight: its employment rate was
the third highest in the nation in 1996 and by far the highest in 2000 (by
more than a full percentage point). The 2000 female employment-population rate was nearly two percentage points above the closest state (Nebraska). Thus, strong job growth appears to have more directly affected
those at the bottom and manifested itself more in increasing wage rates
than in states with initially looser labor markets. And although Minnesota had lower-than-average reduction in welfare caseloads, its more
generous assistance programs may have had a greater poverty-reducing
effect than those of other states. To be sure, the significantly largerthan-predicted decline in Minnesota’s poverty rate from 1996 to 2000
may have at least partly resulted from Minnesota’s unique approach to
welfare reform.
New Jersey
Along with Michigan, New Jersey was the first to implement a major AFDC waiver; it did so on October 1, 1992, under its Family Development Program. New Jersey changed its work exemptions, jobs sanctions, and caps on family welfare payments. The state first implemented
TANF on July 1, 1997, as Work First New Jersey (WFNJ). The program
sought to “help people get off of welfare and into a job” (New Jersey
Department of Human Services 2006a). WFNJ was combined with other assistance programs to shift program focus from education and training to immediately placing recipients into work (Koralek et al. 2001).
According to Blank and Schmidt (2001), New Jersey’s TANF program
contains strong work incentives, and compared to other states New Jer-
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sey has medium benefit generosity, medium earnings disregards, strict
sanctions, and moderate time limits. If a recipient is unsuccessful in
obtaining a job during an initial search, he or she must continue to seek
work while participating in activities countable as “work” activities under federal law (Koralek et al. 2001).
From August 1996 to September 2000, New Jersey’s welfare caseloads declined by 55 percent, slightly better than the U.S. average of 53
percent. Under contract from the state, Mathematica Policy Research
Inc. tracked a sample of WFNJ families in a series of four surveys over
approximately four-and-one-half years (Wood, Rangarajan, and Deke
2003). The firm found that 50 percent had left TANF, up from 34 percent
three years earlier. Their monthly real income increased from $1,157 a
year and a half after leaving TANF to $1,543 three years later, and the
poverty rate among the former recipients declined from 65 to 45 percent
over the final three years. On a less positive note, about one-tenth were
off TANF and were not able to replace the lost welfare benefits with
alternative income sources, though they tended to either go back on
TANF or obtain employment within a year. Progress also slowed in later years with the weak economy and the greater difficulty in placing the
remaining recipients. Because of temporary extensions to the five-year
time limit, very few WFNJ recipients who reached the mandated limit
had their benefits terminated. Individuals who reached their five-year
limit on cash assistance may have qualified for Supportive Assistance to
Individuals and Families (SAIF), which provided up to 24 more months
of cash assistance, as well as child care and transportation support (New
Jersey Department of Human Services 2006b).
Beginning in 2000, the state created a number of initiatives to assist former and current TANF recipients and low-income families. For
example, New Jersey phased in a state Earned Income Tax Credit. In
2001, career advancement vouchers for up to $4,000 were made available to former recipients for additional training while they are working,
and a program was started that provides monthly support payments of
$200 for working recipients to close their cases.
Over the 1996–2000 period, New Jersey’s average annual employment growth accelerated to 2.1 percent, 50 percent higher than the 1.4
percent posted for the entire 1984–2000 sample period. This was associated with a 1.9 percentage-point increase in the male employment
rate and a 0.4 point increase in the female rate. The reduction in New
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Jersey’s male and female unemployment rates from 1996 to 2000 was
approximately double the unweighted average for all states.
New Jersey experienced a smaller decline in manufacturing employment from 1998 to 2000 than the nation, though its manufacturing
employment continued a long-term trend of decline. New Jersey’s real
median hourly wage decreased 0.5 percent from 1989 to 1999, while its
20th percentile real hourly wages fell 4.2 percent. Yet the state’s 80th
percentile real hourly wages increased 4.0 percent, exceeding the national increase of 3.4 percent (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 2001). Its
wage composition of industries increased throughout the 1990s until,
in 2000, it was only 0.4 percent below the national average. Thus, New
Jersey’s income gains appeared to occur primarily near the top of the
income ladder.
Washington
The State of Washington has long provided generous support for
low-income families (Thompson et al. 2001). The only AFDC waiver
that Washington implemented prior to TANF was a termination limit at
the beginning of 1996 (DHHS 2000). Washington replaced its AFDC
program, Success Through Employment Program (STEP), with WorkFirst. WorkFirst shifted the focus from education and training to immediate employment (Thompson et al. 2001). WorkFirst contained the
federal 60-month time limit, generous income disregards, graduated
sanctions, and a maximum monthly benefit for a family of three of $546
from 1996–2000. Blank and Schmidt (2001) characterize the overall
work incentives in Washington’s TANF program as being mixed: its
high welfare-benefit generosity and lenient time limits provide weak
incentives for welfare recipients to obtain employment. WorkFirst also
initially included sufficient child care funding so that there was not a
child care waiting list (Thompson et al. 2001).
The stated aim of WorkFirst is to help “financially struggling families find jobs, keep their jobs, get better jobs and build a better life for
their children” (Washington WorkFirst 2006). A year after its implementation, Governor Gary Locke declared that the primary aim of WorkFirst was not to get people off of welfare but to “help [them] liberate
themselves from dependency and poverty” (McDermott 2001). Yet the
initial authorizing legislation set specific goals only for welfare case-
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load reduction, leaving the development of other outcome measures of
the status of former recipients to the governor (McDermott 2001).
Welfare caseloads in Washington declined 46 percent from August
1996 to June 2000, or a little less than the national decline (DHHS
2000). The first evaluation of WorkFirst compared outcomes for female
heads of households three quarters after leaving WorkFirst (fourth quarter 1998) to those for female heads three quarters after leaving AFDC
(fourth quarter 1996). Compared to AFDC, WorkFirst was found to
significantly reduce welfare use while increasing employment rates,
hours worked, and total earnings (Washington State Institute for Public Policy 1999). But according to exit surveys given in 1998, half of
leavers used Food Stamps after leaving TANF, more than half reported
monthly cash incomes below the federal poverty threshold, 43 percent
were cutting back on meal portions sometimes or often, and 24 percent were skipping meals altogether (McDermott 2001). Nevertheless,
in a study of the postwelfare experiences of 1999 and 2000 TANF recipients, the 1999 recipients reported higher employment rates, wage
rates, hours worked, and greater likelihood of fringe benefits such as
health insurance than the 2000 recipients. This suggests that it takes
time for former recipients to improve their postwelfare economic wellbeing (Klawitter, Griffey, and VanNynatten 2002).
For 1996–2000, Washington’s annual job growth averaged a robust
2.9 percent. As in the nation, manufacturing employment in the state
peaked in 1998, but over the next two years Washington experienced
a steep 8.0 percent decline. One of the hardest-hit sectors was aerospace product and parts manufacturing, where employment declined
from 112,000 in 1998 to 86,100 in 2000, a 23.1 percent drop. The losses
appear to have had particularly adverse effects on males. Conversely,
strong overall employment growth for the four-year period was associated with significant improvements in the female employment and
unemployment rates.2 Welfare reform likely contributed to an increased
supply of females, which facilitated greater job growth, but given the
hourly wages of these jobs, this growth had much more modest effects
on income.3 Thus, it appears that Washington’s strong employment
growth and welfare reform in the late 1990s had a more modest effect
on reducing poverty than did the nation’s.
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Case Study Epilogue: Post-2000 Trends
Given the change in economic fortunes brought about by the 2001
U.S. recession and the subsequent long-lasting weakness of the labor
market, an examination of post-2000 trends in poverty rates, employment, and welfare caseloads for the case study states may provide additional insights. In a general way, they provide a limited out-of-sample
test of the regression conclusion that the economy—not welfare reform—was responsible for the poverty decline in the late 1990s.
As Table 5.2 shows, poverty rates increased after 2000 in all case
study states, while nonfarm employment (“Empl. growth”) decreased,
and manufacturing employment declined precipitously. These trends
held true nationally as well. From the beginning of the recession in FebTable 5.2 State Case Study Statistics for Postsample Period (% change)
Ala.
Poverty ratea
1.7
b
Empl. growth
−2.9
Mfg. empl. growth
−16.4
Male empl./pop.c
−2.0
Female empl./pop.
−1.4
Male unempl.
0.9
Female unempl.
1.5
d
Welfare cases, Feb. ’01–Feb. ’04
2.9
Welfare cases, 2002–2003
6.3
Food Stamp cases, May ’02–’03e
6.1

Minn.
1.7
−0.9
−13.4
−1.2
−1.4
1.9
1.4
4.0
0.3
9.1

N.J.
1.3
−0.4
−16.9
−3.8
−0.2
2.6
1.6
−7.8
−1.6
8.1

Wash.
1.8
−2.0
−19.5
−4.0
−2.9
3.0
1.6
2.9
1.9
17.8

U.S.
1.2
−1.4
−15.9
−3.0
−1.4
2.4
1.6
−4.6
−0.7
10.9

a

“Poverty rate” is the cumulative percentage change in the poverty rate for persons
from 2000 to 2003.
b
“Empl. growth” is the cumulative percentage change in average annual total nonfarm
employment over the 2000–2003 period, and “Mfg. empl. growth” is the comparable
measurement for average annual manufacturing employment.
c
Male and female employment-population rate change and male and female unemployment rate change statistics come from BLS (2005).
d
“Welfare cases” is measured as the percentage change in the total number of TANF
cash recipients over the relevant periods. Data from NCSL (2005).
e
“Food Stamp cases” is measured as the percentage change in the number of Food
Stamp caseloads over the period (Llobrera 2004).
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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ruary 2001 to three years later in February 2004, welfare caseloads continued to decline nationally while poverty rose. Thus, as suggested by
our regression results, a reduction in welfare caseloads does not appear
to reduce poverty. For example, from Federal Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 to
FY 2002, the number of U.S. single mothers without jobs increased by
181,000 (Children’s Defense Fund 2003a). Even the number of welfare
caseloads barely budged in 2003, decreasing only slightly, which suggests the economy drove both poverty rates and welfare caseloads.
Despite the reduction in welfare caseloads nationally, Food Stamp
caseloads increased dramatically, a divergence that appeared with the
implementation of welfare reform (Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003).
Unlike Food Stamps, welfare caseloads are less variable because they
are not as tied to the economy; this is due to time limits for welfare
caseloads and other state policies. The state-specific post-2000 experiences follow below.
Alabama
Following its pattern from 1996–2000, Alabama’s economy underperformed compared to the nation’s from 2000 to 2003, including
a slightly greater-than-average percentage loss of manufacturing jobs.
Despite continued investment by Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and Hyundai, Alabama lost 57,700 manufacturing jobs over the 2000–2003 period, and its losses were widespread across sectors (Wingfield 2004).
The decline in Alabama’s female civilian employment rate (and the increase in the female civilian unemployment rate), which the regression
analysis shows to be strongly related to higher poverty, followed the
national trend. This development likely underlies Alabama’s increase
in poverty.
Alabama’s increase in the poverty rate exceeded the national increase. Correspondingly, in contrast to the national trend, Alabama’s
welfare caseloads increased for the three-year period beginning with
the onset of the 2001 recession, particularly from 2002 to 2003. One
likely reason for the increase in welfare caseloads is that Alabama raised
the maximum family welfare payment from $164 to $215, which made
more families eligible for payments since families previously making
between $164 and $215 were ineligible because their income was above
the maximum payment (Crowder 2003). Food Stamp usage increased
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6.1 percent from May 2002 to May 2003, less than the national average
(AP 2003).
Alabama also found that subsidizing child care was more expensive
than paying welfare. In 2002, Alabama was one of seven states not to
use available federal day care dollars because they were not matched
with state money. In fact, a family of three earning $20,000 would not
qualify for assistance (Children’s Defense Fund 2003b). The next year,
Alabama’s Department of Human Resources trimmed enrollment in its
child care subsidy program by not replacing those who had departed
because of insufficient resources (Chandler 2003). Moreover, with the
September 2003 defeat of Governor Riley’s tax and accountability plan,
the state scaled back its ALL Kids health care plan for poor children
(Birmingham News 2003). Therefore, lackluster economic performance appears to increase poverty through reducing both employment
opportunities and state financial assistance for those most likely to be
affected by the economic downturn.
Minnesota
Post-2000, Minnesota’s poverty rate increased more than the nation’s, and its welfare caseloads also increased, whereas the nation’s
dropped. In contrast, Minnesota’s labor market performance was not
as weak, with both nonfarm and manufacturing employment declining
less than that of the nation (Table 5.2). Minnesota’s male employment
rate declined less than the nation’s, and its male and female unemployment rates both increased less than the nation’s.
Welfare caseloads in Minnesota increased from February 2001 to
February 2004, differing markedly from the continued nationwide drop.
This is consistent with the late 1990s experience, in which welfare caseloads declined relatively less in Minnesota.
In 2003, the Minnesota legislature approved several major changes
to MFIP proposed by incoming governor Tim Pawlenty (Minnesota
Public Radio 2003). The governor’s proposal was based on a pilot
project in Dakota County that reported success in holding down welfare caseloads (Rosario 2003). Among the changes enacted were these
three: 1) a significant reduction in child care assistance, 2) counting
$50 of federal housing subsidy and $125 of Social Security Insurance
as income against MFIP grants, 3) increasing the maximum sanction
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from 30 to 100 percent of welfare money withheld after the sixth occurrence of noncompliance, and 4) reducing the MFIP exit level from 120
to 115 percent of the federal poverty line (Minnesota Department of
Human Services 2003). The child care funding cuts amounted to nearly
$90 million, and eligibility for assistance for child care was reduced
from 290 to 170 percent of the federal poverty line for a family of three
(Children’s Defense Fund 2003a). In terms of income eligibility, this
reduced Minnesota’s ranking from fourth to twenty-ninth in the nation
(Howe 2004).
In contrast to Minnesota’s superb record on reducing poverty in
the late 1990s despite lower-than-average reduction in welfare caseloads, Minnesota’s post-2000 reforms were associated with relatively
poor poverty performance. The post-2000 reforms also did not appear
to have successfully reduced welfare caseloads; they may have simply
reduced the income of those receiving assistance. Early results suggest
the changes have been counterproductive. Yet Minnesota more recently
has implemented even more sweeping reforms with the state’s Diversionary Work Program. Under the program, participants must wait four
months before receiving welfare checks, during which time welfare
checks are replaced with paid rent, Food Stamps, and a small amount of
expense money. Participants in the program also must spend 35 hours
a week looking for a job, and unlike diversion programs in other states
all families applying for welfare assistance must participate (Hopfensperger 2005). The uniqueness of the program will help shed light on
the relative effectiveness of various features of state welfare reform efforts.
New Jersey
Despite New Jersey’s lower rate of decline in payroll employment
relative to the nation’s, only its female employment rate fared better
than that of the nation. As was consistent with the relatively worse outcomes for male employment and unemployment rates, New Jersey’s
decline in manufacturing employment exceeded the national decline.
From February 2001, the beginning of the recession, to February
2004, New Jersey’s welfare caseloads declined 7.8 percent, which was
greater than the decline nationally. The decline from 2002 to 2003 also
exceeded the nation’s, and Food Stamp cases increased less than the
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national average. In response to high profile reports of child abuse, including the death of a 7-year-old boy, New Jersey recently overhauled
its child welfare system (New Jersey Department of Human Services
2004). The focus of the plan is on providing more resources to handle
child welfare caseloads and increasing accountability within the system.
Washington
Among the case study states, Washington’s poverty rate increased
the most from 2000 to 2003, perhaps reflecting its dramatic employment losses. In particular, there was a 23.9 percent decline in aerospace
product and parts manufacturing employment from 2000 to 2003, which
was part of a broader decline over the 1998–2003 period of more than
40 percent. Despite the job losses, Washington maintained strong population growth of 12 percent from April 1, 2000, to July 1, 2004 (U.S.
Census Bureau 2005a). Of this growth, 4.4 percent was attributable to
immigration, while 2.1 percent was attributable to internal in-migration. The combination of job losses and population growth dramatically reduced employment rates (and increased unemployment rates),
particularly for males.
Correspondingly, Washington has experienced an increase in welfare caseloads since the recession, which continued into 2003. Eligibility for child care assistance was reduced from 225 to 200 percent of
the federal poverty line (Children’s Defense Fund 2003c). Because of
a budget shortfall, there were a number of cuts made to WorkFirst in
2003, including funding cuts to the Child Care Career and Wage Ladder Pilot Program (Cook 2003). According to a support services staff
memo, among the reductions implemented on July 1, 2003, were lower
allowances for clothing, car repairs, and license fees, and a six-month
limit for post-TANF recipients to receive support services (Washington
WorkFirst 2003). Moreover, in May 2004 the sanction for noncompliance with WorkFirst requirements for first-time offenders increased to
a 40 percent benefit reduction for a minimum of one month, and welfare checks were to be immediately sent to a protective payee to pay
rent and utilities (J. Martin 2004). Yet in 2003 Washington expanded its
Targeted Wage Initiative, which does more in-depth assessment to help
transition TANF recipients into higher-paying jobs, rather than simply
push them into the first available job (Stevens 2003).
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The case of Washington illustrates the strong influence of the economy on poverty outcomes, and even its success in reducing welfare
caseloads. It also reinforces the notion that a declining economy hurts
the impoverished both directly, through a loss of employment opportunities, and indirectly, through the loss of state financial assistance.

Conclusions
Case studies of Alabama, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington
generally confirm the empirical results examined in Chapter 4. For example, despite Alabama’s stricter welfare program and fair success in
reducing its caseloads, the state’s progress in reducing poverty stagnated in the late 1990s as its economy faltered. On the other hand, although
Minnesota was perceived as having been less successful at reducing
its welfare caseloads, its strong economy in the late 1990s—particularly as evidenced by strong wage growth—helped that state achieve
the second lowest poverty rate in the nation in 2000. The significantly
greater actual decline in Minnesota poverty relative to that predicted
by our regression results for 1996–2000 also suggests that Minnesota’s
welfare program may have played a role in reducing poverty. However, Minnesota’s scaling back of financial assistance for welfare recipients correlated with an increase in poverty above that for the nation.
Washington’s sluggish economy, particularly in manufacturing, led to
the worst poverty performance among the case study states and an increased number of post-2000 welfare caseloads.
The most positive aspects of welfare reform appear to be those that
provide work support such as child care and transportation subsidies.
These help to facilitate transitions from welfare to work and to lift families above poverty status. However, the adverse effects of the sluggish
economy on state budgets made matters worse, as many of the lowincome support programs were cut.4 This made it less likely that those
who left welfare would be lifted out of poverty, as was evidenced by
the nationwide post-2000 rise in poverty and by a dramatic rise in Food
Stamp use. For example, both Minnesota and Washington have made
their programs stricter. On a favorable note, Washington is increasing
its efforts to place former recipients into higher-paying jobs.
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In short, the increasing emphasis on pushing welfare recipients into
jobs makes it imperative that there are sufficient job vacancies, particularly if state and federal assistance for former recipients is not enough to
provide training and placement. Otherwise, many former recipients will
simply be replacing welfare payments with equivalently small grosslabor-market rewards. In this case, those with the fewest job skills and
cognitive abilities may experience even more severe forms of poverty.
Thus, in contrast to recent welfare reforms, given the importance of job
creation in reducing poverty rates, economic development policies appear to be an important part of the mix that could be used to reduce poverty, as well as to level out geographic pockets of high poverty. Because
economic development often occurs at the local level, the next three
chapters’ emphasis on counties or metropolitan areas will shed light on
the potential effectiveness of these policies in reducing poverty.

Notes
The first epigraph to this chapter comes from the Office of the Legislative Auditor’s
program evaluation report on welfare reform in Minnesota (Office of the Legislative
Auditor 2000, p. xii). The second epigraph comes from the Associated Press (2004)
story “Census: 15.1 Percent of Alabama Residents Live in Poverty,” August 26, 2004.
1. These were obtained by first summing the results of multiplying the coefficients
in column (7) by the corresponding changes in employment and unemployment
rates by gender. To this was added the product of the coefficient for the employment-growth interaction term and the 1996–2000 employment-growth rate. A
final adjustment to the estimate was made by adding the result obtained by multiplying the employment-growth coefficient by the change in job growth. Thus,
the result assumes that all changes in employment and unemployment rates were
attributable to the strong economy, an assumption supported by the general lack
of significance of the welfare variables.
2. For the decade, however, Washington’s median average hourly wages increased
4.0 percent from 1989 to 1999, while 20th percentile average hourly wages increased 7.5 percent. The corresponding national average increases were 2.4 and
5.6 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
3. This confirms a trend found by Waldfogel and Mayer (2000) that the gender
gap for low-skilled workers narrowed because of decline in male earnings, not
increases in the real earnings of low-skilled women.
4. At least 13 states decreased spending for child care assistance in 2002, while
others enacted cuts in 2003 (Weinstein and Blank 2003).
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6
County Employment
Growth and Poverty
In previous chapters we found that economic growth reduces poverty at the state and national levels, especially when U.S. unemployment rates are low. This supports the belief that a “rising tide lifts all
boats,” particularly approaching high tide, when the tide reaches the
boats stranded on the beach. We found less evidence that the 1996 federal welfare reform affected poverty rates.
However, we have yet to answer some critical questions. For one,
does economic growth evenly reduce poverty in all localities? Are the
growth effects on poverty greater in urban areas? Does metropolitan
growth affect poverty in all parts of the area? Can poverty be reduced
in remote rural areas?
Examination of national or even state data overlooks these important localized effects. Moreover, understanding how labor markets affect local poverty is complicated by factors such as commuting or migration within states or metropolitan areas, which affect the ability of
the poor to get the jobs that lie beyond their immediate vicinity. Local
responses to economic growth may differ completely from the corresponding national or state responses found in Chapters 1 and 4. Indeed,
the county-level descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 reveal how poverty
rates vary greatly across county types. Analysis of smaller geographical
units is necessary to fully assess the effects of local economic development policies on poverty outcomes.
This chapter describes an empirical methodology for the assessment
of county poverty. The resulting empirical analysis focuses on the “average” county response across the entire country; we then use the model to assess the poverty outcomes of various demographic subgroups
within the county. In a more spatially focused discussion, Chapters 7
and 8 present separate analyses of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
counties. Most of this chapter’s discussion dwells on the links between
labor markets and county poverty rates; Appendix A describes in more
detail the empirical approach and findings for other key demographic
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factors. The appendix also presents several simulations to ascertain the
influence of economic development policies and employment growth
on poverty rates.

Why Examine Counties or Metropolitan Areas?
Along with the phenomenon that poverty is locally persistent, there
are related policymaking and labor market considerations that need to
be weighed in deciding a study’s geographical scale. For our purposes,
we believe the optimal local scale on which to assess poverty outcomes
is the county and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level.1 One advantage of examining these geographical units is that they are large
enough to represent an area in which most residents live and work.
Correspondingly, economic development policies are usually limited
in geographical scope, rarely exceeding the size of counties, with an
entire MSA being about the largest scale in use. Hence, states or nations
are not the optimal-sized unit for assessing the effects of such policies.
Decentralization in both the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and the 1998 Workforce Investment
Act (Bartik 2001) means that counties and MSAs have a greater role in
designing welfare and training programs that affect labor markets for
disadvantaged workers.
Any definition of a local labor market has a somewhat arbitrary
nature, which has drawbacks. An illustration of the complications that
arise in practice can be seen in the view that a labor market can be
defined as a commuting zone. Under this definition, a neighborhood is
far too small to frame a labor market, because its residents don’t need
to commute—they can simply walk to neighboring job opportunities if
necessary. At the other extreme, a labor market can extend far beyond
the boundaries of a commuting zone. Indeed, for university professors,
one could argue that the appropriate market is national, because the
participants typically have high mobility and reliable information about
national employment opportunities.
In most cases, “local” labor markets fall somewhere in between a
neighborhood and the nation, depending on commuting and information flows. Yet there is considerable room between a neighborhood and
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the entire nation. The example of university professors illustrates that
the geographic scope of a labor market likely varies by skill and occupation. Fortunately, analysis of poverty focuses more on the low-skilled
end of the labor market, which is unlikely to be far-ranging because
migration rates are typically lower for that end than for skilled professionals (Borjas 1996), and because low-income residents often have
commuting limitations stemming from a lack of reliable auto or public
transportation. Additionally, child care needs further limit the accessibility of jobs for many low-income residents, especially single mothers.
Given these considerations, counties should be the units that most
closely approximate nonmetropolitan labor markets, especially for lowincome households. For one thing, the largest city is usually the county
seat, which is often centrally located in the county. As well, commuting data support the argument that nonmetropolitan counties generally
reflect labor markets. Statistics reported in Appendix Table A.2 show
that in 1999 fully 69 percent of employed residents in a typical nonmetropolitan county worked in their county of residence. Moreover, the
lower mobility of less-skilled workers implies that the figures are likely
higher for them. It should be kept in mind that residents who live near
the border of their county would likely view employment options in
neighboring counties as being almost as desirable as a job opportunity
in their own county. So although conditions in the county of residence
appear to generally reflect the labor market options available to most
nonmetropolitan low-skilled residents, labor market conditions in surrounding counties (with the exception of remote counties) also play a
role.
In MSAs, the appropriate labor market more likely crosses county
boundaries, because commuting patterns are more widespread. Yet this
assumption should not be exaggerated. In the typical MSA county in
1999, 63 percent of employed residents—five out of eight—worked
in their county of residence. Job accessibility constraints likely mean
that less-skilled MSA workers have a higher employment share in their
county of residence.
The issue of job accessibility in larger urban areas spawned the
spatial mismatch literature described in Chapter 3 (e.g., Kain 1992). It
becomes increasingly likely in large MSAs that vacant jobs are more
distant from job seekers; an MSA population of 800,000 appears to reflect a point beyond which job accessibility becomes increasingly prob-
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lematic (Bartik 2001). This suggests that aggregate MSA data obscure
the disparities that often exist between central cities and suburbs, particularly for large MSAs. Thus, we primarily examine individual MSA
counties rather than aggregate MSAs; this enables us to explore potential intra-MSA distinctions.

Conceptual Model of County Poverty
While the county and metropolitan trends and statistics examined
in Chapter 2 help us understand the underlying patterns from the 1990s,
they are insufficient alone to inform policymaking. To fully analyze
the degree to which local economic development policies can reduce
overall poverty or chip away at persistent pockets of poverty, we return
to regression analysis. We first briefly outline the conceptual determinants of county and MSA poverty rates. In particular, as was described
in Chapter 3, the smaller geographical size of these local labor markets
means that the underlying responses differ somewhat from those at the
state and national levels. The following section outlines the empirical
methodology used to ascertain the underlying causes of county poverty
rates.
Labor Demand Factors
As noted in Chapter 3, theory alone does not provide clear guidance
as to whether greater employment reduces poverty in small geographic
areas. In responding to an exogenous labor demand shock within a region, commuters and migrants may eventually take most of the newly
created jobs (Bartik 2001; Partridge and Rickman 2006). Thus, the region’s “original” residents may receive few benefits, and the poverty
rate would be left relatively unaffected. The strength of the business
cycle also complicates how local economic activity affects the lowwage labor market. It is not surprising that past poverty studies have
produced inconsistent findings, as their final conclusions appear sensitive to both the geographic scope and the time period used in the study
(Bartik 1994, 2001; Blank and Card 1993; Freeman 2001; Levernier et
al. 2000).
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As is consistent with the methodology in previous chapters, labor
market conditions are measured by variables for employment growth,
unemployment rates, and employment-population ratios. While these
three labor market tightness measures capture their own independent
effects, they are interrelated, which can make it difficult to draw ceteris
paribus conclusions. For example, faster job growth likely raises employment-population ratios and reduces unemployment rates. Thus, we
conduct various sensitivity tests and simulations to test the robustness
of the results. For some specifications we omit the unemployment- and
employment-rate measures, which means that the employment growth
coefficient should then reflect its direct effects in reducing poverty plus
its indirect effects through changing the unemployment- and employment-population rates.
A further complicating factor is the question of whether local poverty rates should be modeled as being in equilibrium. If poverty rates
follow an equilibrium process, they immediately reflect the underlying
socioeconomic conditions. But if modeled as a disequilibrium process,
poverty rates may respond sluggishly to changes in the underlying determinants, making them dependent upon past poverty rates. Neither
the theory in the field nor the literature offers clear guidance on this
question, and the equilibrium/disequilibrium issue is typically ignored
by most research.2
Sluggish disequilibrium adjustment can occur when there are selfperpetuating effects. For one thing, there is tremendous persistence for
households that fall into poverty in any given year, and there is also persistence for workers in low-wage jobs.3 Chapter 3 describes how, at the
neighborhood level, residents in persistently high-poverty areas often
have few employed role models, which could further inhibit them from
obtaining long-term employment (Weinberg 2004; Weinberg, Reagan,
and Yankow 2004). Further reinforcing the persistence of local poverty
rates are migration patterns: migration flows are inversely related to education, which implies that disadvantaged households will be less likely
to leave their current location (Borjas 1996; Bound and Holzer 2000).
Slow adjustment is reinforced by other delayed responses. For instance, in counties that are faring well economically, it may take time
for employers to realize that the economic upswing is permanent or
to recognize that job openings are going unfilled and begin offering
jobs to those on the lower rungs of the ladder (Freeman 2001; Holzer,
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Raphael, and Stoll 2003). Similarly, rapid economic growth may attract new migrants, but only after a delay stemming from imperfect
information being relayed across regions and from raising the money
for moving costs.
Related to the equilibrium/disequilibrium issue is the timing of the
county’s growth-poverty linkage. Poverty rates may be more affected
by recent economic performance than by conditions that existed for
many years in the past (Bartik 1993b). Even so, Bartik (1996, 2001)
contends that lags of economic growth from the distant past can benefit
less-skilled individuals through hysteresis effects.4 A strong economy
can have persistent effects if, over time, low-skilled workers gain experience and confidence, receive training, and acquire good work habits
(Gladden and Taber 2000). However, Levernier et al. (2000) did not
find such local effects for the 1980s, which they attributed to the relatively soft labor market of that decade. It may be, though, that persistent
effects from economic growth only emerge if the local labor market has
been sufficiently tight for many years, such as in the 1990s expansion.
A final point is that besides the overall employment growth effect
from the loss of higher-paying jobs, greater industry dislocation is associated with large declines in employees’ postdisplacement earnings
and more long-term joblessness (Carrington and Zaman 1994). Indeed,
adjustments that are due to restructuring and job search could further
slow the response of poverty rates to current conditions.
Other Factors Affecting County Poverty
Numerous other supply and demand factors potentially affect county poverty rates. Examples include demographic factors such as the immigrant, racial, and ethnic composition of the population, as well as the
share of families with children that are headed by single men or women. Especially for counties, racial composition varies greatly. Higher
concentrations of minorities tend to reside in inner cities (Corcoran et
al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Holzer 1991), and these minority
groups usually have below-average levels of education. This deficiency
reduces their labor market opportunities (Smith and Welch 1986).
County poverty also may be related to population size because
of factors such as agglomeration economies and skills-matching in
the labor market, which generally increase wages and reduce poverty
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(Glaeser et al. 1992; Henderson et al. 1995). Yet congestion may reduce
productivity, which could increase poverty. Population’s role also depends on how the scale of the urban center affects the distance between
residence and employment and, hence, how it affects an inhabitant’s
access to jobs.

Empirical Model of County Poverty Rates
The empirical model nests the equilibrium outcome within the disequilibrium approach and tests for the appropriate specification. The
particular disequilibrium process we implement is the partial adjustment model (Greene 1997). Appendix A more fully develops the empirical model and describes the exact specification. Descriptive statistics
also are reported in Appendix Table A.2.
We separately examine 1989 and 1999 patterns in county poverty
rates for the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia. Considering
both decades allows us to compare outcomes when economic growth is
geographically more uneven, as in the 1980s, versus more widespread,
as in the late 1990s. The 1990s also straddle the historic 1996 welfare
reform and other federal policy changes, such as the expansion of the
EITC. As detailed in Box 6.1, the poverty rate (POV) in county i, state
s, year t (for 1989 or 1999) will be regressed on various explanatory
variables intended to capture the direct effects and the interrelationships
of the person-specific and place-specific effects described above.

Empirical Assessment of Local Poverty:
Local Attributes
Sluggish or Rapid Poverty Rate Adjustment?
Table 6.1 presents the regression results for the models described
above. Columns (1) to (3) report the 1989 results, and columns (4) to
(6) report the 1999 results. Most of the discussion will focus on the
1999 labor market results, but comparisons with 1989 will be drawn
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Box 6.1 County Regression Model
The base county model has the poverty rate (POV) in county i, state
s, year t (1989 or 1999) being regressed on various explanatory factors:
(6.1)

povist

=  α1povist-1 + β1 cty_typeist + γ1 demogist + φ1 econist + σst + εist ,

In Equation (6.1), the X vector from Equation (A.3) is decomposed
into three subcomponents: cty_type represents the type of county, demog
denotes demographic characteristics of the population, and econ contains
measures related to area economic performance. α1 is (1− αt ) in Equation (A.3) of the appendix, and reflects the sluggish poverty adjustment,
while β1, γ1, and φ1 represent corresponding regression coefficients.
The specific explanatory variables included in the model closely follow
the specification used by Levernier et al. (2000). Closing out Equation
(6.1) is σs , which denotes the state fixed effect, and ε, which is the error
term carrying the usual assumptions. By state fixed effects, we simply
mean 48 zero-one dummy variables that take on a value of 1 when the
county observation is from that state.a
The specific explanatory variables are described in the appendix.
Note that the state fixed effects account for the poverty effects of omitted
or nonincluded state-level factors that have a common effect across the
entire state (i.e., they either raise or lower the poverty rate a set amount
across all counties in a given state). Omitted factors may include costof-living differences, amenity effects, and cultural influences. State-level
factors also include state government policies such as welfare programs.
Even in the old AFDC welfare program that existed until the 1996 federal
reform, there was significant state variation in benefits and in the administration of the program. The inclusion of state fixed effects means that the
slope coefficients reflect cross-county variation within states.b
a

One state category is omitted so that all of the state poverty-rate effects are measured relative to that omitted state.
b
Including state fixed effects or dummies is the equivalent of first-differencing
the explanatory variables around the state mean. In general, if these common
state effects were correlated with the included independent variables, omitting
the state dummy variables would bias the coefficients of the remaining variables.
However, the state fixed effects may in essence overcontrol for other factors if
they are common across the state. For example, if a state has faster-than-average
employment growth across most counties, some of the influence of job growth
should be reflected in the state fixed effect, or the explanatory-variable results
may not fully reflect their total impact.
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when pertinent. Many of the explanatory variables are included to account for other independent factors. Although interesting, their discussion will be left to Appendix A.5
Because the matter is closely related to the spatial persistence of
poverty, it should first be determined whether local poverty adjustment
is a rapid or a slow process. Columns (1) and (4) present the base disequilibrium adjustment model. Columns (2) and (5) report the equilibrium model, in which the only difference is that the lagged poverty rate
from the previous decade has been omitted. Comparing the disequilibrium and equilibrium models indicates that key results are different.
For example, the five-year employment growth variables take on the
expected inverse relationship with poverty rates in the disequilibrium
models, but they are positive and statistically insignificant in the equilibrium approach.
The empirical findings strongly support a sluggish disequilibrium
adjustment process for county poverty rates. Columns (1) and (4) reveal
that the 10-year lagged poverty rate is highly statistically significant in
both the 1989 and 1999 models. The large values of the lagged poverty rate coefficients indicate that the underlying determinants of local
poverty rates have half-lives of almost one decade. Indeed, such persistence is consistent with the spatial patterns identified in the 1979, 1989,
and 1999 county poverty rate maps shown in Figures 2.8 through 2.10.
Hence, the remaining discussion focuses on the models that include the
10-year lagged poverty rate.6
The persistence in county poverty rates likely has two explanations.
One, households in poverty choose to remain in their original counties,
and household poverty is persistent. Two, the communities themselves
have characteristics that are conducive to higher poverty rates regardless of an individual’s or a household’s characteristics. Statistics regarding the persistence of individual poverty indicate that place plays a key
role because individual persistence is less than what would be expected
if individual behavior were the sole source of the large 10-year laggedpoverty-rate coefficient. For example, a study by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003) found that only 51 percent of the population that was in
poverty in 1996 remained in poverty in 1999, while about 4 percent of
the population that was not in poverty in 1996 was in poverty in 1999.
The spatial persistence supports the argument that policies designed
to reduce poverty should include a component to provide development
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1989 poverty rate
(1)
Group
Lagged poverty rate

Base

(2)
Base
equivalent

(3)
Base + broad
labor market

−1.53
(2.21)
−1.69
(2.11)
−1.66
(2.14)
−1.76
(2.47)
−1.53
(2.16)
1.2e−6
(3.55)
−8.6e−8
(1.18)
−2.3e−5
(6.42)

0.44
(22.74)
0.09
(5.57)
−1.18
(2.14)
−1.16
(1.81)
−1.07
(1.71)
−1.10
(1.90)
−1.15
(1.99)
4.8e−7
(2.35)
−4.0e−8
(0.74)
−1.1e−5
(4.22)

0.47
(28.1)

Weighted surrounding-city poverty
Single-county MSAsa
Big-MSA central countyb
Big-MSA suburban countyb
Small-MSA central countyb
Small-MSA suburban countyb
Population
MSA population
Nonmetro county × population

−0.78
(1.47)
−0.79
(1.30)
−0.49
(0.83)
−0.68
(1.24)
−0.57
(1.04)
5.2e−7
(2.43)
−6.3e−8
(1.13)
−1.3e−5
(4.93)

1999 poverty rate
(4)
Base

(5)
Base
equivalent

0.39
(27.31)

−0.58
(1.40)
−0.59
(1.27)
−1.15
(2.54)
−0.47
(1.09)
−0.99
(2.41)
2.9e−7
(1.56)
6.9e−8
(1.75)
−8.7e−7
(0.46)

−1.36
(2.25)
−1.50
(2.17)
−1.83
(2.77)
−1.43
(2.27)
−1.75
(2.87)
2.3e−7
(0.89)
−2.3e−8
(0.40)
−1.2e−5
(5.16)

(6)
Base + broad
labor market
0.38
(23.94)
0.06
(4.17)
−0.89
(2.04)
−0.74
(1.49)
−1.40
(2.93)
−0.72
(1.59)
−1.25
(2.89)
2.9e−7
(1.44)
8.6e−8
(2.19)
−3.7e−7
(0.19)
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Table 6.1 Poverty Rate Regression Model for all Counties, 1989 and 1999
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1985–90 or 1995–2000 empl. growth
1988–90 structural changec

−0.016
(3.30)
5.86
(2.17)

0.008
(1.40)
7.16
(2.15)

−0.012
(2.45)
5.91
(2.22)

1995–2000 structural changec
Pop. × structural changec
% male employment/population

% civilian male unemployment rate
% civilian female unemployment rate
% residential employment in agricultureforestry-fisheries
% residential employment in goods
% residential employment in
transportation or public utilities
% residential employment in trade or
trade & entertainment
% residential employment in information

−8.5e−5
(4.20)
−0.16
(9.13)
−0.21
(9.73)
0.23
(5.39)
0.08
(2.00)
0.25
(8.86)
−3.7e−4
(0.02)
0.08
(2.44)
0.12
(4.54)

−3.9e−5
(3.06)
−0.09
(6.26)
−0.15
(8.62)
0.18
(5.29)
0.07
(2.03)
0.13
(6.06)
0.03
(1.57)
0.12
(4.10)
0.12
(5.35)

0.006
(1.22)

−0.014
(2.92)

6.59
(3.55)
−1.1e−5
(1.71)
−0.03
(2.03)
−0.19
(11.98)
0.15
(5.74)
−0.04
(1.25)
0.21
(10.14)
0.05
(3.70)
0.02
(0.82)
0.10
(5.34)
0.02
(0.43)

5.64
(2.89)
−1.4e−5
(1.55)
−0.06
(4.16)
−0.30
(15.39)
0.23
(6.61)
−0.01
(0.29)
0.29
(10.22)
0.03
(1.71)
−0.02
(0.80)
0.15
(6.29)
0.11
(1.86)

6.90
(3.80)
−1.2e−5
(1.67)
−0.02
(1.30)
−0.18
(11.31)
0.15
(5.83)
−0.04
(1.17)
0.21
(9.91)
0.06
(4.29)
0.03
(1.11)
0.09
(4.97)
0.03
(0.64)
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% female employment/population

−4.2e−5
(3.05)
−0.08
(6.02)
−0.16
(9.14)
0.17
(5.12)
0.07
(2.02)
0.13
(5.64)
0.01
(0.85)
0.11
(3.83)
0.12
(5.49)

−0.014
(3.06)

Partridge.indb 138

(1)
Group
% residential employment in finance,
insurance, and real estate
% residential employment in services
% residential employment in public
administration
1985–90/1995–2000 commuting zone
employment growthd
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA employment
growth (# MSA counties ≥ 2)e
% of workers employed in county of
residence
% education < high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)

Base
−0.04
(1.18)
0.06
(2.63)

1989 Poverty rate
(2)
(3)
Base
Base + broad
equivalent
labor market
−0.03
(0.57)
0.08
(2.73)

−0.05
(1.27)
0.06
(2.69)

(4)
Base
0.05
(1.70)
0.10
(5.13)

1999 Poverty rate
(5)
(6)
Base
Base + broad
equivalent
labor market
0.03
(0.83)
0.15
(5.78)

−0.02
(2.93)
0.004
(0.43)
−0.003
(0.73)

−0.16
(10.30)
−0.20
(9.03)
−0.16
(4.36)

−0.33
(18.87)
−0.39
(13.92)
−0.34
(7.45)

−0.16
(10.02)
−0.20
(8.92)
−0.16
(4.44)

0.07
(2.43)
0.11
(5.43)

−0.005
(0.61)
−0.005
(0.42)
0.01
(2.9)

−0.14
(9.08)
−0.12
(6.15)
−0.18
(5.35)

−0.25
(13.29)
−0.29
(12.07)
−0.31
(7.56)

−0.14
(9.04)
−0.13
(6.45)
−0.20
(5.71)
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% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% of HHs female-headed with children
% of HHs male-headed with children
% population whitef
% population African Americanf
% population other racef

% population children < 7 yrs. old
% population children 7–17 yrs. old
% population adults 18–24 yrs. old
% population adults 25–59 yrs. old
% population adults 60–64 yrs. old
% population over 65 yrs old
% lived in same house 5 yrs. before

−0.03
(1.32)
0.85
(14.47)
0.50
(3.84)

0.03
(1.69)
0.73
(14.77)
0.52
(4.63)

−0.03
(1.91)
0.61
(11.99)
0.24
(2.88)

−0.10
(5.84)
0.97
(17.26)
0.21
(2.15)

−0.04
(2.69)
0.61
(12.18)
0.26
(3.21)

−0.04
(4.84)
0.03
(2.32)
0.01
(1.33)
0.06
(0.90)
0.08
(1.78)
0.24
(9.81)

0.01
(1.42)
0.04
(3.14)
0.01
(0.93)
0.32
(4.05)
0.20
(3.81)
0.36
(10.50)

−0.04
(5.03)
0.03
(2.65)
0.01
(1.20)
0.08
(1.27)
0.05
(1.16)
0.25
(10.10)

−0.03
(1.91)
−0.009
(0.95)
−0.01
(2.15)
0.03
(0.48)
0.08
(1.65)
0.25
(10.32)

−0.03
(3.59)
0.002
(0.15)
−0.03
(3.22)
0.07
(0.97)
0.14
(2.49)
0.41
(13.30)

−0.03
(3.89)
−0.003
(0.34)
−0.02
(2.59)
0.03
(0.49)
0.07
(1.55)
0.25
(9.90)

−0.11
(1.13)
−0.009
(0.31)
0.08
(6.21)

−0.09
(0.81)
0.30
(0.80)
0.08
(5.08)

−0.08
(0.84)
−0.004
(0.13)
0.07
(5.99)

0.24
(3.25)
−0.10
(4.36)
0.06
(4.96)

0.47
(5.43)
−0.16
(5.36)
0.11
(8.12)

0.25
(3.36)
−0.10
(4.04)
0.05
(3.88)
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% population Hispanicf

0.03
(1.48)
0.73
(14.61)
0.48
(4.24)
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(1)
Group
% lived in same county but different
house 5 yrs. before
% lived in same MSA but different house
5 yrs. before if current resident of MSA
R2
N

Base
0.07
(4.46)
−0.01
(0.57)
0.94
3028

1989 poverty rate
(2)
(3)
Base
Base + broad
equivalent
labor market
0.04
(2.27)
0.002
(0.10)
0.91
3028

0.06
(3.22)
5.2e−4
(0.03)
0.94
3028

(4)
Base
0.04
(3.04)
0.01
(0.92)
0.94
3028

1999 poverty rate
(5)
(6)
Base
Base + broad
equivalent
labor market
0.05
(2.74)
0.01
(0.53)
0.91
3028

0.003
(0.16)
0.03
(1.76)
0.94
3028

7/27/2006 1:41:41 PM

NOTE: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis
REIS county definitions. Blank indicates the variables were not included in the regression for that column, so there is no result to report.
a
Single-county MSA/PMSA, with the exception of Los Angeles and San Diego, which are included as central-county MSAs.
b
Central county includes the county or counties of the named central city or cities in the MSA definition in a multiple-county MSA.
Suburban counties do not include any of the central city or cities. A large MSA had a 2000 population of greater than one million.
c
The structural change index is the share of the county’s employment that would have to change sectors in each year so that there would
be an equivalent industry structure in each of the two years. It is a similarity index defined as one-half the sum of the absolute value of
the difference in one-digit industry employment shares between the two years.
d
For nonmetropolitan counties, the broader labor market employment growth was defined using 1990 commuting zone definitions from
the Department of Agriculture (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/lmacz).
e
For multiple-county MSAs, the broader labor market employment growth was defined using the entire metropolitan area.
f
Hispanics form an ethnic category; thus, Hispanics are also included in white, African American, and “other race” groups. In the 2000
census, individuals who claim two or more racial categories are classified in the “other race” group. Because of the two-or-more racial
category in the 2000 census, the 1990 and 2000 figures are not comparable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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assistance to communities with high poverty rates. At the very least,
poverty reduction programs should account for the need to tailor their
assistance to individuals to fit the characteristics of their community, as
well as to recognize that specific services need to be delivered differently in particular communities (Allard 2004).
Locational Differences in Poverty Determination
Among the county type indicators, only the two 1999 suburban
county indicators are significant, and no county indicators are significant in the 1989 model. Suburban counties had about 1 percentage point
lower short-run poverty rates in 1999 compared to nonmetropolitan
counties.7 Even when one accounts for faster job growth, a popular view
is that suburbs have other advantages, such as favorable neighborhood
effects. Thus it is surprising that suburban counties possess such a small
overall advantage. The specific causes for differing central-county and
suburban-county poverty rates are examined in detail in Chapter 7.
Given that job seekers may have superior opportunities to find better employment matches with higher wages in the suburbs, one might
expect that poverty rates would be lower in the most populated metropolitan areas (MSAs), ceteris paribus. However, greater overall MSA
population is positively related to 1999 MSA-county poverty rates (at
least at the 10 percent level). Thus, job accessibility and labor market
information appear to erode in larger MSAs for low-skilled workers,
which supports claims that job creation needs to be spatially targeted in
large metro areas.

Employment Growth and Poverty
Direct Job Growth Impacts
The beginning of this chapter noted that employment growth both
directly and indirectly affects poverty rates. First we examine employment growth’s direct impacts, by holding the unemployment- and employment-population rates constant. In the next subsection, we summarize the indirect effects, by allowing the unemployment and employ-
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ment rates to be affected. In assessing how local job growth affects
poverty rates, we take into account the underlying variability of county
employment growth by simulating the impact from a one standard deviation change in job growth. Roughly speaking, a one standard deviation
change in a variable would generally take a county from the middle of
the distribution to either one-third above or one-third below the mean.
For five-year employment growth, Table A.2 shows that a one standard deviation increase equaled 12.2 percent between 1985 and 1990
and 10.1 percent between 1995 and 2000. Using the results in columns
(1) and (4) of Table 6.1, we find that a one standard deviation increase
in five-year employment growth reduced the typical county’s short-run
poverty rate by 0.20 percentage points in 1989 and by 0.14 points in
1999. This yields 1989 and 1999 long-run poverty-rate reductions of
0.37 and 0.23 percentage points, suggesting a moderate response.8 In
other analysis, we find that it takes time for job growth to significantly
affect poverty, as we discover no evidence that two-year job growth
reduced county poverty rates.9
Our conclusion is that strong job growth does not immediately reduce poverty; poverty reduction will be delayed until job growth has
persisted long enough to ensure that employers have to reach down and
hire the lowest-skilled workers. Earlier in the chapter, we noted that
long-run job growth allows low-skilled workers to gain work experience and also allows these same low-skilled workers more time to find
stable employment with longer work hours (a better job match). Hence,
the findings support various hysteresis arguments. It may not so much
have been the strength of the red-hot economy of the late 1990s that
reduced poverty as it was the length of the expansion: the long duration
of the 1990s economic expansion allowed low-skilled workers the opportunity to acquire labor market skills and find suitable employment
matches.
The finding that a long duration of economic growth is more important than current conditions is somewhat at odds with Richard Freeman’s (2001) argument that national unemployment needs to fall below
5 percent before poverty rates sharply decline. However, Freeman did
not explicitly consider the duration of the economic expansion. One
way to reconcile these two views is to say that the extremely low national unemployment rates of the late 1990s were consistent with the
economic expansion lasting long enough to reach those lows and to
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reduce poverty rates.10 This interpretation has discouraging implications for national poverty rates in the near future: a seemingly positive
outcome of the 2001–2003 economic sluggishness is that the overall
poverty rate increased only 0.8 percentage points between 2000 and
2002, compared to the 1.4 and 2.0 point increases for the 1989–1991
and 1980–1982 periods (i.e., the analogous points in the business cycle).
But if economic growth influences poverty rates over a lengthier span,
such as five years, the sluggish job growth of the 2001–2003 period will
have negative ramifications for poverty rates that will last until near the
end of the decade—especially for local pockets of poverty. Even in the
case of the more mild “jobless” recovery after the 1990–1991 recession,
poverty rates did not start to decline until 1994.
In terms of “generic” local economic development policies, the results are a little cautionary. First, policies aimed at increasing economic
activity need to be of sufficient duration (greater than two years) to
help the most disadvantaged households. Second, the poverty-reducing
impacts of a generic 10 percent increase in employment are relatively
modest. Even this response would require annual employment growth
to rise about 2 percentage points more than expected for five consecutive years.
In terms of policy priorities, generic employment growth is more
effective in reducing poverty rates when it occurs nationally and even
statewide, at least when the aggregate economy is strong. Using the
results for national poverty rates in Chapter 4, a one standard deviation,
1.7 percentage-point increase in annual U.S. employment growth immediately reduces poverty rates about 0.2 percentage points when the
national unemployment rate is above 5 percent. The U.S. poverty rate
falls about 0.6 points when the unemployment rate is below 5 percent,
as was the case in the late 1990s.11 Even the state-level data indicate that
a one standard deviation increase in employment growth (1.8 percent)
would have immediately reduced poverty rates about 0.5 points in the
late 1990s. These results illustrate that if economic growth is statewide
or national in scope and the economy is already quite strong, poverty
rates will fall much more quickly and dramatically than if growth is isolated to smaller geographical areas like counties or MSAs. Yet national
growth alone is less useful for redressing poverty in spatially isolated
poverty pockets than in the nation as a whole.
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These results clearly reveal that state and national estimates should
not be simply extrapolated to assess poverty outcomes in local areas.
This further illustrates the conundrum facing local policymakers: at
the county or sub-MSA level, commuters and in-migrants can quickly
take the newly created jobs, leaving fewer jobs for the disadvantaged
original residents. Moreover, when growth is isolated to a local area,
low-skilled residents need more time than these outside competitors to
acquire the necessary training and experience to pull themselves out of
poverty. The county results suggest that two to five years of local economic growth is necessary for that growth to trickle down. The good
news in a strong national or state economy is that local employers are
forced to hire low-skilled residents almost immediately because potential commuters and migrants likely already have suitable job opportunities in their current location.
The upshot of the dampened poverty-rate response to local conditions is that if local policymakers want their economic development
activities to help their disadvantaged residents, they need to find ways
to focus their strategies directly on their needy residents. For example,
rather than giving businesses a tax break for expanding in a specific
location—in, say, an enterprise zone—give employers a tax break for
hiring residents (preferably disadvantaged residents) of these zones.
Chapter 9 describes how an employer tax credit for creating new jobs
can be targeted towards disadvantaged workers, by including a specific
residential requirement for hired workers to boost the credit’s povertyrate reducing effect. During the early days of the Clinton administration, there were efforts to include enticements to help the residents of
targeted low-income communities, but these provisions were not implemented (Bartik 2001).
Indirect Effects of Job Growth
To some extent, the overall effect of job growth on reducing poverty rates may have been understated. Greater job growth may reduce
poverty rates by also reducing the unemployment rate and increasing
the employment-population ratio, both of which are implicitly held
constant in the employment-growth simulations described above. Appendix Table A.1 presents the results of four different scenarios that
factor in various indirect effects of job growth on unemployment rates
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and employment-population ratios. After adjusting for the various indirect effects of job growth, the four simulations suggest that the total
(direct + indirect) short-run response of poverty rates ranges from −0.13
to −0.37 percentage points after a 10 percent increase in 1995–2000
employment growth, which is comparable to the −0.14 percent shortrun direct impact described above.12
The Effects of Targeted Employment Growth
Chapter 4 described how targeting state employment growth to
sectors that are faring well at the national level might have stronger
poverty-reducing impacts. For counties, we also find that targeting
employment growth to rapidly growing industries at the national level
has stronger poverty-reducing impacts. Specifically, we decomposed
the five-year employment growth rate into its industry-mix and competitiveness components (not shown).13 On average, when using these
employment measures, a 10-percentage-point increase in 1995–2000
industry-mix and competitiveness employment growth induced 0.67
(t = 1.88) and 0.12 (t = 2.56) percentage point declines, respectively,
in 1999 county poverty. This shows that if job growth comes primarily
from a favorable composition of industries, poverty rates would decline
about sixfold more than if it originated from competitiveness effects.14
These estimates again likely understate the poverty-reducing effects
of industry-mix employment growth if it indirectly affects unemployment, employment-population, and industry structural change in the
county. In a quasireduced form model that omitted these other labor
market variables, a 10-percentage-point increase in the five-year industry-mix and competitiveness growth rates yielded larger short-run
poverty rate changes of −1.04 (t = 2.71) and −0.13 (t = 2.29) percentage
points in 1999.15
Thus, although merely creating jobs in general may not have large
impacts on poverty rates, there appears to be promise in directing economic development efforts toward creating jobs in industries that are
faring well nationally. Further focusing incentives and efforts on increasing employment among the low-skilled in nationally fast-growing
industries would likely reinforce these impacts.
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Other Labor Market Measures
Besides the influence of long-run employment growth, other labor
market variables in Table 6.1 have important roles. First, it appears
that local labor market churning or restructuring leads to higher poverty rates, even after controlling for job growth, though the interaction
between population and structural change shows that the influence of
structural change declines as county population increases. For 1999,
greater industry realignment increases poverty until the county population reaches about 600,000.
With employment growth already included in the regression models, the unemployment rate and employment-population rate variables
essentially measure how labor supply availability affects poverty rates.
As these measures are allowed to change, and job growth is held constant, original residents are increasingly assumed to fill the new jobs.
At the margin, when the unemployment rate falls and the employmentpopulation rate rises, the available local labor pool shrinks and the newly employed will increasingly be less-skilled workers.
With the exception of the female unemployment rate, Table 6.1
shows that results for the male and female employment-population
rates and unemployment rates are as expected in the 1999 model. To
give a sense of the magnitude of the responses, a one standard deviation
increase in the female employment-population ratio and a one standard
deviation decrease in the female unemployment rate would have reduced short-run poverty rates by 1.31 and 0.11 percentage points in
1999.16 For men, a one standard deviation decrease in the employmentpopulation rate and a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate produces a 0.26 and a 0.44 percentage-point increase in the
1999 short-run poverty rate.17
These results show that increasing the labor market attachment of
females is particularly effective in reducing poverty rates. This may be
accomplished by reducing barriers to female participation, such as by
providing better child care, transportation, treatment for drug abuse,
and programs for family violence. Welfare reform has taken steps in
this direction: 56 percent of welfare expenditures went toward noncash
work support in Fiscal Year 2003 vs. only 23 percent in 1996 (Pear
2003). In a result that illustrates child care’s critical role, Blau and Tekin
(2003) found that among single mothers with a child under the age of
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13, receiving child care subsidies increased the probability of employment by about 13 percentage points, after controlling for family characteristics.18
There are still many workplace support needs going unfilled. For
example, only about 15 percent of federally eligible children receive
child care subsidies (Waller and Berube 2002). Nevertheless, results
from the late 1990s illustrate why the work-first approach to welfare
reform did not dramatically increase poverty rates: the associated increase in female participation likely offset other adverse effects. For
enough female-headed households, labor earnings and the Earned Income Tax Credit formed a greater sum than welfare payments alone
(Haskins 2003).
In terms of its impact on poverty reduction, the rather small influence of female unemployment rates compared to that of female employment rates indicates that there is no clear distinction between female
unemployment and nonemployment.19 Hence, it is not so much that
there are barriers that impede the job search of low-skilled unemployed
women, but rather that there are barriers inhibiting them from entering
the labor force. Besides pointing to the need for improved access to
child care and other supports, such findings support those who argue
that more direct forms of intervention, such as public employment and
wage subsidies, are necessary if the goal is to employ more low-skilled
women (Bartik 2001).
The relatively modest poverty response to changes in the male employment-population ratio suggests that increasing male labor force
participation would have only modest impacts on reducing poverty.
This finding is consistent with male-headed households already having the resources to be above the poverty line, whether because they
are in married families or because single male-headed households are
much less likely to include children than are female-headed households.
Compared to the female rate, the male unemployment rate has a more
important impact on poverty rates, illustrating a sharper divide between
male unemployment and nonemployment. For reducing poverty, it is
not so much a question of inducing more men into the labor force as it
is helping unemployed men in their job search to reduce the duration of
their unemployment spell. Yet it is not clear whether the relatively large
poverty response to male unemployment is due to a lack of skills or
whether less-skilled men do not have knowledge of, or access to, jobs.
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The literature cited in Chapter 3 indicates that all of these factors likely
play some role.
The size and the significance of the industry-share results indicate
that the county’s industry composition of employment strongly affects
poverty. With one exception, the positive industry share coefficients
suggest that a larger public-administration employment share (the omitted group) is most associated with lower poverty rates, while larger
shares in trade and services are associated with higher poverty rates.20
These patterns are inconsistent with the argument that a greater number
of entry-level jobs in low-skilled trade and service industries reduce
poverty, but it does support claims that public-sector employment is one
avenue to reducing poverty. Because trade and service jobs are generally “secondary sector” jobs characterized by lower wages and benefits,
fewer hours, and more erratic spells of employment, this is not an entirely unexpected finding.
Our findings suggest that goods employment is less of a high-wage
outlet for low-skilled blue-collar workers. Over the 1990s the goodsemployment share impact went from being insignificantly different
from public administration in 1989 to being positive and significant in
1999. Clearly, this pattern could relate to declining unionization, ongoing skill-based technological change, and increasing global competition, which is pressuring low-skilled intensive manufacturers to cut
labor costs or relocate abroad. In terms of employment, manufacturers began struggling in early 1998, well before the 2001 recession.21 A
greater agricultural share also became more associated with higher 1999
poverty rates.22 Ongoing consolidation in agriculture is likely making it
more difficult for many family farmers to have a sustainable livelihood.
Likewise, the emergence of larger-scale operations such as intensivelivestock facilities may not be creating stable employment that offers
adequate wages.
Community Demographic Attributes
It is not surprising that factors such as female headship, education,
and immigration are statistically related to county poverty rates. Because most of the results are as expected, they are not described in the
chapter, but interested readers can consult Appendix A for a detailed
discussion of their effects.
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Neighboring County Spillovers
Labor and social conditions in neighboring counties likely spill over
and affect poverty rate outcomes in a given county. We assessed the importance of these spillovers by adding the following four variables to
the base poverty model: 1) the average surrounding-county poverty rate
from the previous decade, 2) the five-year commuting-zone employment growth rate for nonmetropolitan counties, 3) the five-year MSA
employment growth rate for MSA counties (only for MSAs with two
or more counties), and 4) the percentage of the county’s workers who
are employed in the county. The regression results for these models are
reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 6.1. With few exceptions, the
previous results do not change with inclusion of the spatial spillover
variables.
Clustering of poverty occurs at the county level, even after accounting for the particular state. That is, past poverty rates in surrounding
counties (1989) have a positive and significant impact on current poverty rates (1999). This clustering likely relates to push and pull factors associated with household mobility and the spatial persistence of poverty.
Nearby counties with low poverty rates are the most logical relocation
choices for residents of a high-poverty county, for whom low poverty
serves as a pull factor and high poverty as a push factor.23
To explore the clustering push-pull pattern, the four poverty spillover variables and the previous decade’s poverty rate were added to the
auxiliary employment-population and unemployment rate regressions
described in Appendix A (not shown). The results show how localized
poverty can have persistent effects as well as cross-county spillovers.
Namely, for every one point the weighted 1989 surrounding county
poverty rate increased, the 1999 male and female employment-population rate fell about 0.25 percentage points, while the male and female
unemployment rates increased about 0.10 point (all are significant at
the 0.01 level).
There is also support for the argument that localized employment
growth is a more important determinant of individual metro-county
poverty rates than economic conditions in the broader metro area. Specifically, overall MSA employment growth had an insignificant impact
on poverty rates, or overall MSA labor market conditions had no addi-
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tional influence on county poverty rates after accounting for the MSA’s
own labor market conditions. Spatial mismatch proponents would not
be surprised by these findings. Chapter 3 described their general contention that factors such as information and transportation constraints,
as well as exclusionary zoning, limit the ability of the disadvantaged to
find or take work across an entire metro area (especially a larger one).
The spatial clustering of county poverty rates was clearly revealed
in Figures 2.8–2.10. Counties with high poverty rates tend to border
counties with high poverty rates, and vice versa. Although we include
several variables in an attempt to capture this dependence, spatial autocorrelation of the residuals may still exist.24 Various tests of spatial
autocorrelation in the residuals for the expanded models in columns
(3) and (6) uniformly suggested that this could be a concern, especially
for nonmetropolitan counties.25 Yet when we reestimated the models
to correct for spatial autocorrelation, the coefficients were essentially
unchanged, which indicated that the spatial dependence was relatively
harmless, arising out of the spatial heterogeneity of the model.26

Poverty Responses across Key
Demographic Groups
As indicated in the previous chapters, local economic and demographic characteristics should affect various groups differently. For example, while all female-headed families should be similarly affected
by labor market characteristics associated with female employment,
female-headed households with children should be more influenced by
welfare policies and responsibilities related to child rearing. Similarly,
both married families with children and female-headed households with
children have child care responsibilities. Yet the former group will be
less affected by welfare policies, and the latter group may be more affected by labor market treatment and discrimination of women.
To examine demographic differences, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 report
the base 1989 and 1999 model results using poverty rates for various
subgroups. Columns (1) to (3) report the poverty rate results for female-headed families with children, female-headed families without
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children, and married families with children. We primarily focus on the
1999 results in Table 6.3.
Compared to the overall 1999 results in Table 6.1, five-year job
growth has a much larger influence for the female-headed family with
children category in column (1), but it has a smaller influence on poverty rates for female-headed families without children and married-couple families with children. The employment-growth response on single
female–headed families was also larger in 1999 compared to 1989. The
greater 1999 poverty effect for female–headed families is consistent
with welfare reform increasing their exposure to labor market forces.27
By contrast, the potential for two earners enables married families to
be more diversified to protect against labor market conditions that may
result in dramatic income loss. Compared to 1989, the smaller 1999
employment effects on females without children and on married-couple
families with children suggest that there were some welfare reform–
related supply spillover effects from the increased labor force participation of single female heads with children. Gundersen and Ziliak (2004)
also find that welfare reform is positively (although weakly) associated with married-couple poverty rates, though they attribute this to the
changing composition of married-couple households.
It is unsurprising that the female employment rates have much
stronger impacts on female-head poverty rates than on other groups.
Conversely, the female-head poverty rates are not statistically affected
by male unemployment and employment rates. Given the differing occupational structures of low-skilled men and women, these results are
consistent with low-skilled men and women not directly competing in
the labor market. One argument that has been raised to explain high female-head poverty rates is the lack of marriageable men, especially for
minority women (Wilson 1987). Yet if this strongly were the case, we
would expect that male labor market conditions would affect femalehead poverty rates. For married-couple families, female employment
rates and male unemployment rates have the strongest impact on poverty rates—the same pattern as shown in Table 6.1.
Poverty rate models for children, adults 18–64 years of age, and
seniors 65 and over are reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. It is striking the
extent to which child poverty, compared to poverty in other age groups,
is affected by labor market conditions, demographic characteristics,
and suburban residence. Short-run child poverty rates appear to be even
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Group
Lagged poverty ratea
Single-county MSA
Big-MSA central county
Big-MSA suburban county
Small-MSA central county
Small-MSA suburban
county
1985–90 empl. growth
1988–90 structural change
Pop. × structural change

7/27/2006 1:41:42 PM

% male employment/
population
% female employment/
population

(1)
Female
head w/
children

(2)
Female
head w/o
children

(3)
Married
family w/
children

(4)
Children
< 18
yrs.

(5)
Age
18-to-64
yrs.

(6)
Age
65 yrs.
and over

0.20
(5.75)
−0.26
(0.14)
−0.05
(0.02)
−0.46
(0.23)
0.97
(0.51)
0.58
(0.32)
−0.037
(1.79)
25.6
(1.92)
−1.7e−4
(2.74)
−0.008
(0.11)
−0.74
(8.55)

0.08
(2.68)
1.61
(1.05)
0.17
(0.10)
0.99
(0.56)
1.02
(0.64)
0.83
(0.52)
−0.034
(1.91)
9.01
(0.87)
−1.0e−4
(2.79)
−0.07
(1.19)
−0.25
(3.31)

0.39
(17.02)
−0.60
(1.02)
−0.35
(0.51)
−0.36
(0.54)
−0.53
(0.87)
−0.39
(0.64)
−0.011
(1.75)
6.50
(1.75)
−8.0e−6
(0.42)
−0.09
(4.72)
−0.18
(8.42)

0.36
(17.73)
−1.10
(1.45)
−0.79
(0.90)
−1.05
(1.26)
−0.90
(1.16)
−0.92
(1.19)
−0.023
(3.00)
10.16
(2.34)
−5.9e−5
(2.60)
−0.08
(3.46)
−0.28
(9.71)

0.42
(25.26)
−1.38
(2.14)
−1.57
(2.16)
−1.10
(1.57)
−1.38
(2.09)
−1.28
(1.97)
−0.009
(1.86)
5.65
(2.13)
−4.1e−5
(3.04)
−0.10
(6.78)
−0.17
(9.60)

0.44
(25.60)
0.81
(1.07)
1.02
(1.20)
1.17
(1.39)
1.24
(1.59)
1.25
(1.61)
−0.004
(0.53)
4.79
(1.17)
−4.1e−5
(2.01)
−0.02
(0.81)
0.02
(0.84)

(7)
(8)
Under 50% 50–100%
of poverty of poverty
line
line
0.21
(17.94)
0.23
(0.59)
0.25
(0.58)
0.52
(1.24)
0.27
(0.68)
0.24
(0.62)
−0.007
(2.00)
3.54
(1.86)
−2.4e−5
(2.67)
−0.05
(4.54)
−0.11
(8.30)

0.26
(19.74)
−1.01
(3.17)
−1.04
(2.94)
−1.00
(2.93)
−0.95
(2.91)
−0.81
(2.55)
−0.009
(2.27)
2.32
(0.90)
−1.8e−5
(1.92)
−0.03
(3.05)
−0.05
(3.94)
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Table 6.2 Poverty Rate Regression Results for Selected Subgroups, 1989
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% pop. other race
% pop. Hispanic
R2
N

8.0e−4
(0.01)
−0.03
(0.46)
−0.16
(1.51)
−0.23
(1.25)
−0.13
(1.89)
1.34
(6.51)
−0.25
(0.50)
0.02
(0.66)
−0.04
(0.83)
0.01
(0.40)
0.66
3027

0.21
(1.76)
−0.13
(2.13)
−0.31
(3.17)
−0.11
(0.66)
0.008
(0.14)
0.43
(2.25)
0.39
(0.76)
0.007
(0.25)
0.11
(2.32)
−0.07
(2.95)
0.47
3027

0.09
(1.94)
−0.20
(9.28)
−0.16
(5.22)
−0.24
(4.78)
−0.04
(1.90)
−0.03
(0.40)
0.29
(2.06)
−0.12
(10.15)
0.01
(0.84)
0.05
(4.93)
0.86
3028

0.08
(1.50)
−0.24
(9.00)
−0.29
(7.70)
−0.28
(4.27)
−0.06
(2.00)
1.38
(16.07)
0.60
(3.01)
−0.03
(2.20)
0.02
(0.86)
0.03
(2.39)
0.91
3028

0.06
(1.74)
−0.12
(7.77)
−0.14
(5.92)
−0.13
(3.25)
0.11
(6.02)
0.55
(11.21)
0.55
(4.86)
−0.06
(7.33)
0.03
(2.26)
0.003
(0.41)
0.92
3028

0.04
(0.75)
−0.22
(9.82)
−0.32
(8.80)
−0.14
(2.46)
−0.16
(5.86)
0.13
(1.54)
0.05
(0.27)
0.04
(3.22)
0.01
(0.64)
0.006
(0.43)
0.88
3028

0.02
(0.96)
−0.06
(5.82)
−0.05
(2.88)
−0.05
(1.74)
0.08
(7.04)
0.48
(12.61)
0.33
(4.30)
−0.009
(1.73)
0.03
(3.12)
−0.005
(0.74)
0.89
3028

0.04
(1.69)
−0.10
(8.39)
−0.16
(8.80)
−0.12
(3.98)
−0.05
(3.95)
0.26
(6.42)
0.15
(1.80)
−0.03
(4.54)
−0.003
(0.28)
0.02
(2.30)
0.89
3028

7/27/2006 1:41:42 PM

NOTE: The specification is the same as used in column (1) of Table 6.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity. Absolute values of
robust t-statistics are in parentheses. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions.
See the notes to Table 6.1 for more details on variable definitions.
a
Because of data availability, the total county lagged poverty rate is used in columns (3), (5), (7), and (8), while the overall female-head
poverty rate is used in columns (1) and (2).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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% civilian female
unemployment rate
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or
more (age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% households femaleheaded with children
% households male-headed
with children
% pop. African American
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Group
Lagged poverty rate
Single-county MSA
Big-MSA central county
Big-MSA suburban county
Small-MSA central county
Small-MSA suburban county
1995–2000 empl. growth
1995–2000 structural change
Pop. × structural change
% male employment/population
% female employment/
population

(1)
Female
head w/
children

(2)
Female
head w/o
children

(3)
Married
family w/
children

(4)
Children
< 18
yrs.

(5)
Age
18-to-64
yrs.

(6)
Age 65
yrs. and
over

0.17
(6.97)
−0.72
(0.45)
−0.04
(0.02)
−0.22
(0.12)
0.69
(0.41)
−0.43
(0.27)
−0.044
(2.58)
7.75
(1.34)
−1.9e−5
(0.80)
−0.07
(1.44)
−0.52
(7.54)

0.08
(3.01)
−1.50
(0.88)
−2.47
(1.27)
−1.86
(0.97)
−2.20
(1.21)
−1.01
(0.55)
−0.003
(0.22)
12.31
(1.94)
−4.6e−5
(2.29)
−0.007
(0.17)
−0.41
(6.47)

0.29
(15.03)
−0.24
(0.54)
−0.19
(0.38)
−0.78
(1.70)
−0.31
(0.68)
−0.50
(1.18)
−0.007
(1.09)
5.15
(2.12)
5.3e−6
(0.54)
−0.05
(2.69)
−0.23
(9.28)

0.32
(19.86)
−1.23
(1.89)
−1.30
(1.73)
−2.20
(3.10)
−0.90
(1.33)
−1.74
(2.65)
−0.017
(2.13)
8.83
(3.07)
−5.4e−6
(0.48)
−0.05
(2.52)
−0.31
(11.51)

0.41
(25.35)
−0.57
(1.29)
−0.54
(1.09)
−1.00
(2.08)
−0.47
(1.02)
−0.95
(2.19)
−0.014
(3.07)
6.14
(3.34)
−1.4e−5
(2.11)
−0.02
(1.88)
−0.18
(10.85)

0.36
(22.96)
0.53
(0.88)
0.46
(0.65)
0.17
(0.26)
0.35
(0.55)
0.24
(0.39)
−2.3e−4
(0.04)
3.21
(1.13)
−4.9e−6
(0.45)
0.03
(1.69)
−0.10
(4.42)

(8)
(7)
Under 50% 50–100%
of poverty of poverty
line
line
0.31
(18.17)
−0.47
(1.57)
−0.44
(1.33)
−0.80
(2.48)
−0.48
(1.55)
−0.70
(2.36)
−5.7e−4
(0.21)
2.09
(1.95)
−3.0e−6
(0.78)
−0.01
(1.64)
−0.09
(9.05)

0.33
(19.91)
−0.24
(0.91)
−0.31
(1.00)
−0.47
(1.60)
−0.15
(0.55)
−0.42
(1.60)
−0.010
(2.93)
4.28
(3.36)
−8.4e−6
(2.09)
−0.02
(2.04)
−0.12
(9.39)
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Table 6.3 Poverty Rate Regression Results for Selected Subgroups, 1999
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% pop. other race
% pop. Hispanic
R2
N

0.12
(1.27)
−0.03
(0.28)
−0.10
(1.74)
−0.008
(0.09)
−0.21
(1.56)
−0.18
(3.14)
1.18
(6.78)
0.21
(0.55)
−0.10
(4.08)
−0.06
(2.06)
0.01
(0.48)
0.71
3027

0.12
(1.38)
−0.17
(1.70)
−0.10
(1.80)
−0.09
(1.22)
−0.08
(0.61)
0.03
(0.65)
0.46
(2.93)
−0.39
(1.24)
0.03
(1.64)
0.05
(1.61)
−0.04
(2.00)
0.46
3026

0.18
(4.42)
−0.04
(0.94)
−0.19
(9.02)
−0.12
(4.58)
−0.20
(4.52)
−0.09
(4.60)
0.13
(1.85)
−0.05
(0.39)
−0.05
(5.15)
−0.01
(0.91)
−0.006
(0.74)
0.83
3028

0.19
(4.51)
−0.06
(1.01)
−0.21
(8.12)
−0.12
(3.98)
−0.30
(5.49)
−0.07
(2.86)
1.16
(13.42)
0.31
(2.08)
−0.04
(3.36)
−0.03
(2.14)
−0.02
(1.91)
0.90
3028

0.15
(5.48)
−0.03
(1.05)
−0.11
(7.40)
−0.09
(4.33)
−0.16
(4.40)
6.0e−4
(0.04)
0.48
(9.89)
0.27
(3.42)
−0.03
(4.16)
−0.01
(1.29)
−0.01
(2.18)
0.92
3028

0.09
(2.70)
−0.05
(1.09)
−0.19
(8.83)
−0.26
(9.59)
−0.10
(2.35)
−0.15
(7.54)
0.23
(3.40)
−0.04
(0.35)
0.01
(1.55)
0.01
(0.72)
−0.001
(0.12)
0.85
3028

0.06
(3.24)
0.008
(0.40)
−0.05
(5.48)
−0.06
(4.62)
−0.10
(4.58)
0.01
(1.28)
0.39
(12.96)
0.15
(2.50)
−0.006
(1.42)
−6.4e−4
(0.10)
−0.02
(3.26)
0.89
3028

0.11
(5.42)
−0.04
(1.75)
−0.11
(8.74)
−0.09
(5.78)
−0.10
(4.39)
−0.05
(4.86)
0.29
(7.74)
0.09
(1.41)
−0.02
(4.41)
−0.007
(1.02)
−0.001
(0.27)
0.89
3028

7/27/2006 1:41:43 PM

NOTE: The specification is the same as used in column (4) of Table 6.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity. Absolute values of
robust t-statistics are in parentheses. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions.
See the notes to Table 6.1 for more details on variable definitions.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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% civilian male unemployment
rate
% civilian female
unemployment rate
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% households female-headed
with children
% households male-headed
with children
% pop. African American
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more affected by a county’s labor market conditions than those for the
18–64 age group, the group actually in the labor market. Not surprisingly, poverty rates for seniors are not very responsive to labor market
conditions, or to county type.
The child poverty findings illustrate how the welfare of children
is affected by the broader well-being of their parents and their communities. In fact, they may reflect the strongest hysteresis effects of
all, because current local conditions can have a strong impact on children through their family’s income. For this reason, there is a growing
literature on how a child’s family income has long-term impacts on
that child’s health, education, nutrition, income, and future welfare as
an adult (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Case et al. 2003; Karoly et al.
1998). These results relate to the emerging literature suggesting that
early-childhood intervention programs have large short- and long-term
future returns (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Currie 2000; Karoly et al.
1998). A lack of labor market opportunities for poor children’s parents,
along with the corresponding lack of early-childhood enrichment and
well-being, may underlie some of the high spatial persistence of poverty rates described earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2.
The last set of results examines whether the strong labor market
conditions of the late 1990s and the 1996 federal welfare reform lessened the number of people who were very poor vs. the number who
were less poor. The corresponding dependent variables are 1) the share
of the population whose household income is less than one-half of the
poverty threshold, and 2) the share whose household income falls between 50 and 100 percent of the threshold. If anything, there is weak
evidence that MSA counties had higher relative shares of the very poor
in 1999 compared to 1989, all else being constant. Suburbs of large
metropolitan areas had lower shares of the very poor in 1999—about
0.8 percentage points lower than nonmetropolitan counties, again all
else being equal.
In terms of labor market effects, it is notable that there were few differences between the very poor and the less poor in 1989, as both groups
benefited from stronger labor markets. By 1999, this had changed. The
less poor cohort was much more strongly affected by labor market conditions than the very poor group. Indeed, this is consistent with welfare
reform primarily prodding those who have some minimum level of skills
to obtain work. Increasing the exposure of disadvantaged groups to la-
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bor markets was one goal of the 1996 federal welfare reform. However,
this would leave a very poor cohort that lacks labor market skills, many
of whom possess physical and mental disabilities that further limit their
ability to take work (Freeman 2001; Moffitt 2002; Schoeni and Blank
2000). It may be the case that the five-year (or less) time limits in TANF
eventually leave a large number of very poor households without reliable support and having little realistic opportunity to find employment.
With the exception of the population share that has an associate
degree, the very poor poverty share was considerably less affected by
average educational attainment. Conversely, the very poor share was
more strongly affected by the share of female-headed and male-headed
households with children. This is particularly alarming because of the
short- and long-run implications for the well being of children and their
community.

Summary of Overall County Findings
This chapter has examined overall U.S. county-level poverty rates
using 1990 and 2000 census of population data. The analysis produced
five key findings:
1. Local poverty rates are highly persistent. We find the halflife of a county’s poverty rate to be almost one decade, a duration that
seems likely to underlie much of the persistence of local poverty rates
identified in Chapter 2. These long-lasting effects suggest that economic shocks have lengthy impacts on localized poverty rates, which illustrates the need to tailor poverty reduction policies not just to people but
also to high-poverty places.
2. Employment growth reduces poverty rates after a long duration. County employment growth in the previous five years had a statistically significant influence on poverty rates, while two-year job growth
did not. This pattern implies a long-term cumulative effect for job creation that is consistent with the views of those who argue that greater
labor market experience and the associated increase in wages have independent effects. Thus, the 1990s economic expansion may have had
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its greatest impact on poverty through its longevity, not through the
remarkable labor shortages experienced near its conclusion. Child (and
their parents’) poverty rates were even more affected by labor market
conditions than rates for the adult age groups. Because early childhood
experiences have such a long-running influence on a variety of measures of well-being, these findings may have the biggest long-term impact of all.
3. The link between generic county employment growth and
poverty rates is moderate. Compared to larger responses found at the
state and national levels, these results suggest that a five-year employment growth increase totaling about 2 percent a year would have directly reduced the average overall 1999 county poverty rate by a modest
0.14 percentage points in the near term (and almost double that rate over
the course of many years). There is another approximately 0.10-percentage-point indirect decline in the near term poverty rate that comes
through increasing the employment-population rate and decreasing the
unemployment rate.
4. Targeted employment growth can more effectively reduce
poverty rates. When local job growth is concentrated in industries that
are faring well at the national level, there is a much stronger povertyreducing effect than from generic job growth. We believe that strong
national performance in an industry reduces the incentive for migration for workers in that industry and makes it more likely that current
residents will benefit from employment growth. Thus, assuming economic development efforts are worthwhile, targeting job growth can
have a much greater poverty-reducing impact, which would be further
enhanced if firms had incentives to hire the least-well-off original residents.
5. Poverty rates for female-headed families with children are
most affected by employment growth. Compared to female-headed
families without children and married-couple families with children,
female-headed families with children had their poverty rates most affected by five-year employment growth. Because this influence was
greater in the 1990s, this was taken as evidence that welfare reform
increasingly exposed these families to labor market forces.
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Conclusion
Although the results are suggestive of strong employment growth—
possibly in conjunction with welfare reform—helping to reduce poverty during the 1990s, the results are equally cautionary about the future. For example, welfare reform exposed female-headed households
more to the labor market. With a strong labor market such as occurred
in the late 1990s, this can be good. But the jobless recovery after the
2001 recession will likely have detrimental poverty impacts that last
well into the decade. In fact, there are early signs of adverse effects:
fewer welfare leavers report that they were employed in 2002 than did
in 1999, and a larger percentage of leavers report no source of income
(Loprest 2003).
The results in this chapter suggest how county poverty rates are influenced by local labor markets and other local attributes. This chapter
also shows why it is important to examine different-sized geographical
groupings. Compared to the national- and state-level responses identified in Chapters 1 and 4, we found that county poverty rates are only
about one-half as responsive to greater job growth. These findings suggest that 1) extrapolating results to larger or smaller geographical regions can lead to inaccurate conclusions, and 2), it can be challenging
to eliminate smaller geographic pockets of poverty.
Beyond what was examined in this chapter, there are a host of metro
and nonmetro distinctions that may affect local poverty rates. For example, unlike their rural counterparts, metropolitan counties are likely
to have their own labor market effects, which relate to transportation,
housing availability, and information constraints between suburban
and central counties. Rural labor markets appear to be more spatially
isolated than their urban cousins, which means labor market shocks in
rural areas appear to have larger impacts on local wages and produce
smaller commuting and migration responses (Renkow 2003; Renkow
and Hoover 2000). As described in Chapter 3, each of these factors
likely influences local poverty dynamics. To further capture the geographical diversity of poverty rates, Chapters 7 and 8 provide more detailed analyses of how local labor market conditions affect poverty in
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties.
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Notes
1. Metropolitan areas are generally defined by strong commuting patterns. The
government definition of a metropolitan area is given in Box A.1.
2. One exception is Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), who examine annual poverty
rates using state data. There are other examples of a dynamic specification following from the welfare caseload literature that present evidence that current
caseloads are affected by past caseload levels (e.g., Ziliak et al. 2000).
3. Illustrating the persistence in low-skilled labor markets, Andersson et al. (2002)
find that 53 percent of all workers who earned below $12,000 (1998 $) each year
between 1993 and 1995 also earned below $12,000 each year between 1996 and
1998. Likewise, 54 percent of low-wage workers from 1996 to 1998 remained in
low-wage jobs from 1999 to 2001 (Andersson et al. 2003). Stevens (1999), also,
finds that about 30 percent of the white households and 50 percent of the black
households that fall into poverty for any one year remain in poverty for at least 5
of the following 10 years.
4. Hysteresis refers to a state in which the underlying initial conditions have longrun effects, and the effects from forces of change are slow to take shape. The
result is a persistent process with sluggish adjustment.
5. Not including these variables could create what is called an omitted variable
bias, in which the included explanatory variables would inadvertently pick up
some of the excluded variables’ impact.
6. Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) find much smaller persistence using state data. Yet
there are so many differences between our study and theirs that the results are
not comparable. Besides differences in the use of annual data, using states may
result in different offsetting aggregation patterns compared to those gotten by
using counties. As well, Gundersen and Ziliak’s study included measures of state
income distribution. We do not include income distribution measures because
there is a high likelihood of reverse causality between the poverty rate and income distribution.
7. The R2 equaled about 0.94 in both the 1989 and 1999 poverty models. In other
models that omitted all of the variables except for population measures and the
state and county type indicators, the R2 value declined to 0.48 and 0.45, respectively, for those two variables, suggesting that the other explanatory variables
besides state of residence explain a significant share of the variation of the regression.
8. As described in this chapter’s appendix, the more immediate impact of a variable can be derived from the corresponding variable’s regression coefficient in
columns (1) and (4) of Table 6.1. The disequilibrium model implies that the longrun response is larger. While we will not regularly discuss the long-run impact,
using the lagged poverty-rate coefficient in column (1) indicates that the 1989
long-run effect is approximately 1.887 times larger than the short-run response,
while the corresponding measure in column (4) indicates that the 1999 long-run
response is about 1.639 times larger.

Partridge.indb 160

7/27/2006 1:41:43 PM

County Employment Growth and Poverty 161
9. Moreover, when the two-year 1988–1990 and 1998–2000 job growth rates were
added to the respective base models, they were actually positively related to
poverty rates in both decades, and neither was considered further. In fact, the
two-year job growth term was statistically significant in the 1999 model. The
unexpectedly positive two-year employment growth response indicates that the
currently employed and new commuters can fill the labor supply needs for shortterm job growth spurts but that low-skilled workers will increasingly benefit if
the local economy remains strong.
10. To further examine whether the influence of labor market conditions on poverty
rates differs in strong or weak conditions, the 1989 and 1999 models were reestimated on subsamples that included counties in either the lower one-third in terms
of five-year job growth or the upper two-thirds in terms of five-year job growth.
There is no clear evidence suggesting the labor market variables had a larger effect in the strong employment growth counties.
11. The derivation of the national response is as follows. First, using the same
USDOL sources as in Table 4.2, we regressed the 1960–2002 change in the national annual unemployment rate on the percentage change in national annual
employment from the household survey along with the three time-period dummies shown in the table. Annual growth rates are used because at the national
level lagged changes in the unemployment rate were insignificant. The results
from this auxiliary regression suggest that a one standard deviation change in job
growth (1.74 percent) is associated with a 0.87-point fall in the national unemployment rate (i.e., the unemployment rate falls by about 0.50 points for every
one point increase in job growth). If we go by the results in column (2) of Table
1.1, a 1.00 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate reduces poverty
rates by 0.23 percentage points when the unemployment rate is above 5 percent
and by 0.73 points (0.23 + 0.50) when the unemployment rate falls below 5
percent. Hence, a 0.20 and a 0.64 percentage point decline in U.S. poverty rates
after a one standard deviation increase in national employment growth follow
from taking 0.87 × 0.23 and 0.87 × 0.73.
12. The scenario we prefer is the implicit reduced-form model that omits the unemployment and employment rate variables from the regression model, allowing
the five-year employment growth coefficient to reflect the direct and indirect
effects of job growth. This approach suggests short-run poverty rates would decline by −0.20 percent.
13. See Note 13 in Chapter 4 for the formal definitions of industry-mix and competitiveness employment growth. We constructed the industry-mix and competitiveness employment terms using the 11 industries in the BEA 2000 REIS data; we
used overall U.S. growth rates to calculate industry-mix totals. In many counties,
employment was not reported for all industries in a given year because of disclosure restrictions. In these cases, industry employment was interpolated and
extrapolated, while ensuring the sum of employment in the 11 industries equaled
total county employment. The unweighted mean of the 1985–1990 industry mix
and competitiveness growth rates equaled 9.0 percent and −0.4 percent (std. dev.
= 3.0 and 11.1). The corresponding 1995–2000 industry-mix and competitive-
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ness growth rates equaled 10.1 percent and −0.9 percent (std. dev. = 2.0, 9.5).
14. For 1989, a 10-percentage-point increase in 1985–1990 industry-mix and competitiveness employment growth induced 0.72 (t = 2.79) and 0.12 (t = 2.41) percentage-point reductions in 1989 poverty. The industry-mix response is significantly different from the competitiveness effect in the 1989 model (F = 4.89,
p = .027), but not in the 1999 model (F = 2.24, p = .134).
15. The competitiveness and industry-mix coefficients are significantly different
from each other. The F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the industry-mix coefficient equals the competitiveness employment growth coefficient is
5.41 (p = .020).
16. The corresponding 1999 long-run poverty rate responses resulting from a one
standard deviation change in the female employment-population rate and the
female unemployment rate were 2.15 and −0.18 percentage points. By way of
comparison to earlier chapters, a one-point decline in the 1990 and 2000 female
unemployment rates is associated with a −0.07 and a 0.04 point change in the
1989 and 1999 short-run poverty rates.
17. The corresponding 1999 long-run poverty rate responses resulting from a one
standard deviation change in the male employment-population rate and the male
unemployment rate were 0.43 and 0.71 percentage points. In earlier chapters we
saw that a one-point decline in the 1990 and 2000 male unemployment rates is
associated with −0.17 and −0.15 point changes in the 1989 and 1999 short-run
poverty rates.
18. Encouraging the disadvantaged to work by improving child care access could
have adverse effects if the children suffer from poor-quality care. In their assessment of this issue, Loeb et al. (2003) find that children from disadvantaged
backgrounds experienced positive cognitive effects when enrolled in stable arrangements, involving center-based day care or, to a smaller degree, licensed
family home–based care. Hence, public support for stable child care arrangements in high-quality centers would appear to have the most favorable outcomes
for disadvantaged children.
19. Unemployment is defined as both being out of work and actively seeking work,
whereas nonemployment is defined as not working regardless of whether the
person is seeking employment.
20. The industry-share coefficients are measured relative to public administration,
the omitted category.
21. Based on USDOL employment data accessed at http://www.bls.gov/data and at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (BLS 2006b,c).
22. Additional analysis indicated that this increase was not related to the large share
of foreign immigrants engaged in agricultural production. In other analysis (not
shown), two variables representing the share of the population that had immigrated to the United States between the periods of 1990–1994 and 1995–2000
were added to the 1999 poverty model, but the agricultural share coefficient was
only slightly smaller than reported in Table 6.1.
23. A good example of low-income residents making short moves to neighboring
areas follows from the welfare literature. Compared to the population share of
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welfare recipients in the interior of a high- (low-)welfare-benefit state, McKinnish (2005) finds that there is a significantly higher (lower) share of welfare recipients in bordering counties when those counties share a border with neighbor
states that pay relatively low (high) benefits.
Spatial dependence can arise for several reasons. For one, spatial autocorrelation
may exist because a labor-demand shock in a county spills over and affects the
labor market in neighboring counties. This problem can be corrected by including weighted averages of neighboring-county characteristics (e.g., their labor
market variables) as independent variables and adjusting for the autocorrelation
in the residuals to improve efficiency. Another type of spatial dependence arises
when there is slight spatial heterogeneity in the underlying parameters, which is
mostly harmless. For instance, the determinants of poverty rates in rural Mississippi and rural Iowa counties are slightly different. Similarly, there is usually a
positive spatial correlation in the explanatory variables (e.g., rural Mississippi
counties tend to have low educational attainment and more minorities, and the
opposite is true for rural Iowa). In this case, there will also be a positive correlation between the residuals (e.g., the model consistently overforecasts [underforecasts] poverty in rural Iowa [Mississippi]), although this has more to do with a
slight misspecification due to pooling than a mechanism of shocks spilling over
into nearby counties. We pool all counties to obtain the average national effect
and increase efficiency, but estimating a uniform national effect does produce a
loss of information when there is spatial heterogeneity. Nonetheless, standard
spatial autocorrelation tests will be unable to identify whether the spatial autocorrelation in the residuals is due to spatial heterogeneity in both the specification and the explanatory variables, to omitted neighboring-county variables, or to
an economic process of shocks spilling over into nearby counties. For a similar
discussion, see McMillen (2003, 2004).
Spatial autocorrelation of the residuals was tested with a Lagrange multiplier
test (Bera and Yoon 1993), using both a Delaunay Triangulation and nearestneighbor routines to compute the spatial contiguity weight matrices. The Delaunay Triangulation was computed using a MATLAB program (xy2cont) written by Kelly Pace that relied on a Delaunay routine provided by MATLAB. We
employed the w2 matrix, which is a row-stochastic spatial weight matrix. The
nearest-neighbor-based contiguity matrices were computed using the MATLAB
program make_neighborsw, written by James LeSage, in which the number of
prespecified nearest neighbors ranged between four and eight. All programs can
be found at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.
A spatial error model was estimated using the sem.m MATLAB routine written
by James LeSage and accessed at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.
Evidence consistent with welfare reform being a strong impetus for a greater
1999 labor market response for female-headed families with children is provided
in analogous 1989 and 1999 regressions using the percentage of the population
between 100 and 150 percent of the poverty line (not shown). First, the five-year
employment growth had similar statistically significant negative effects in both
periods. Yet the percentage of households that were female-headed families with
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children had virtually no effect in the 1989 model, while it had a positive and
significant response in the 1999 model. Hence, female heads with children—the
group most affected by welfare reform—was more concentrated among the nearpoor, suggesting that welfare reform may have helped lift many of these families
above poverty, though this does not rule out offsetting adverse effects on other
demographic groups.
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7
Poverty in Metropolitan America
That wealth is not their wealth.
—Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo,
during a 1999 visit to Guadalupe, Arizona, contrasting the tremendous growth in the Phoenix metro area with the persistent poverty
in Guadalupe
Chapter 2 illustrated the wide variation in poverty rates across
U.S. counties—both across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties
and across central-city and suburban counties. Chapter 6 assessed the
causes of poverty rates using regression analysis for all U.S. counties.
While this analysis discovered a multitude of findings for the “typical”
U.S. county, it may have overlooked heterogeneities that exist between
densely populated metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. For example, metropolitan areas may attract more migrants in response to job
growth, and they are often home to higher shares of minorities. Large
metro areas also include a disproportionate share of welfare recipients
(Waller and Berube 2002). Having more than twice as many long-term
welfare recipients as what would be expected based on population further reinforces this high share, giving large MSAs an especially hardto-serve disadvantaged population.1
Even within metropolitan areas, there is often significant heterogeneity between central cities and their suburbs. Chapter 3 described how
factors such as spatial mismatch and neighborhood effects can produce
entirely different poverty dynamics. For example, Berube and Frey
(2002) find that among the 102 largest MSAs, central cities had poverty
rates that were more than double those found in the suburbs, which
was also the pattern revealed in Chapter 2.2 This chapter more directly
assesses the underlying determinants of poverty rates for metropolitan
areas, leaving it to the next chapter to focus on nonmetropolitan counties.
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Trends in 1989 and 1999 Metropolitan Area
Poverty Rates
The 2000 census defined 318 U.S. metropolitan areas, but we will
not consider Anchorage or Honolulu, which leaves 316. As in Chapters
2 and 6, to ensure consistency we use the same MSA boundaries as the
2000 census for our definition of 1990 metro areas. We classify metropolitan areas by size groupings; again, we use the same size categories
for each of the two periods to further ensure consistency.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present 1999 and 1989 descriptive statistics for
the 15 metropolitan areas with the lowest poverty rates in the top panel
and the 15 with the highest poverty rates in the bottom panel. Comparing the overall poverty rates in both decades, we see there was little
change in the overall average for the 15 lowest poverty rates between
the decades, but the average poverty rate among the 15 highest poverty
rate MSAs declined by about 3 percentage points. In fact, it is remarkable that the Brownsville and McAllen-Edinburg metropolitan areas in
Texas had poverty rates in 1989 above 40 percent, which is the rate
applied by researchers and federal programs to assess whether an individual neighborhood or census track has chronically high poverty.3
While these two MSAs still had high poverty rates in 1999, they both
had declined by more than 6 percentage points, falling well below the
40 percent line.
In 1989, the metropolitan areas with the five lowest poverty rates
were concentrated just outside of New York City, and four others in
the top 15 were on the northeast coast. The metro areas with the highest poverty rates were all located in Sun Belt states, particularly Texas
and Louisiana. Consistent with the historically high poverty rates in the
South, 9 of the 15 highest-poverty MSAs were southeastern metropolitan areas, stretching from Gainsville, Florida, to Monroe, Louisiana.
The poverty rate patterns had changed somewhat by 1999. No longer do the MSAs surrounding New York City dominate the low-poverty
rankings; the lowest metropolitan-area poverty rates are now more typically found in the Upper Midwest and Plains states. While certain Texas metropolitan areas are still in the 1999 highest poverty rate group,
MSAs in central and southern California are now almost as prominent,
and there are fewer high poverty rate MSAs in the Southeast. In both
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decades, college towns such as Athens, Georgia; Auburn-Opelika, Alabama; Flagstaff, Arizona; Bryan–College Station, Texas; Gainesville,
Florida; and Las Cruces, New Mexico, were among the metropolitan
areas with the highest poverty rates.4
For the key socioeconomic characteristics of these high and low
poverty rate MSAs, we look at the values in Table 7.1, some of which
are for 1999 and some of which are for 2000. The 2000 minority population share (defined as 100 minus the percent white [only] share) was, on
average, about three times higher in high poverty rate counties than in
low ones. However, Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, New Jersey, had
the third-lowest 1999 MSA poverty rate even though more than onefourth of its population is minority. Not surprisingly, median household
income in low poverty rate MSAs, on average, was almost two-thirds
higher than it was in high poverty rate MSAs. The median household
income was uniformly low in high poverty rate counties, but there are
metropolitan areas, such as Sioux Falls, South Dakota, that had a relatively low median household income and a low poverty rate.
In high poverty rate counties, both the average share of the 2000
population that did not graduate from high school and the average 2000
unemployment rate were more than twice the level found in low poverty
rate MSAs. There is more uniformity among low poverty rate metropolitan areas, though York, Pennsylvania, had a relatively low high-school
completion rate. Among high poverty rate metro areas, non–high school
degree attainment ranged from 11.9 percent in Gainesville, Florida, to
a remarkably high 49.5 percent in McAllen-Edinburg, Texas. Likewise,
unemployment rates varied from a relatively low 5.8 percent in AuburnOpelika, Alabama, to a high 13.1 percent in Merced, California.
Between 1990 and 2000, there were some unexpected changes. In
2000, there was a much larger gap between low and high poverty rate
metropolitan areas in terms of percent minority, less-than-high-school
education, and unemployment rate. The average unemployment rate in
high poverty rate MSAs was higher in 2000 despite the widespread
“labor shortages” of the period. While other indicators such as race,
educational attainment, and unemployment strongly delineated low and
high poverty rate metro areas in 1999–2000, population and median
household income were distinguishing features in 1989–1990. Illustrating how the 1990s boom filtered down to high poverty MSAs, median
household income increased, on average, by about 50 percent over the
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Rank/MSA countya
Lowest poverty rates
1 Sheboygan
2 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah
3 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon
4 Nassau-Suffolk
5 New London–Norwich
6 Rochester
7 Cedar Rapids
8 Wausau
9 Monmouth–Ocean City
10 Minneapolis–St. Paul
11 York
12 Barnstable–Yarmouth
13 Green Bay
14 Sioux Falls
15 Janesville-Beloit
Highest poverty rates
302 Bakersfield
303 Lafayette

State

Median
%
Poverty
household education Unempl.
rate (%) Population % minority income ($) <12 years rate (%)

WI
WI
NJ
NY
CT
MN
IA
WI
NJ
MN-WI
PA
MA
WI
SD
WI

5.2
5.4
5.4
5.6
6.4
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.6
6.7
6.7
6.9
6.9
7.1
7.3

112,646
358,365
1,169,641
2,753,913
259,088
124,277
191,701
125,834
1,126,217
2,968,806
381,751
222,230
226,778
172,412
152,307

7.5
5.3
26.3
18.0
13.1
9.7
6.0
5.8
11.7
13.9
7.2
5.7
8.8
6.5
8.9

46,237
47,687
67,308
68,555
50,646
51,316
46,206
45,165
56,183
54,481
45,268
45,933
46,447
43,374
45,517

15.6
12.8
13.5
13.6
14.0
8.9
9.4
16.2
14.4
9.4
19.3
8.2
13.7
11.4
16.1

2.6
3.3
4.4
3.8
4.1
3.7
3.5
3.8
4.8
3.5
3.6
5.2
3.8
2.8
5.6

CA
LA

20.8
20.9

661,645
385,647

38.6
30.3

35,446
31,177

31.5
28.7

12.0
7.8
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Table 7.1 Highest and Lowest Metropolitan Area Poverty Rates, 1999
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GA
GA
CA
AL
CA
FL
TX
CA
NM
TX
TX
TX
TX

21.4
21.4
21.7
21.8
22.7
22.8
23.8
23.9
25.4
26.9
31.2
33.1
35.9
12.6

120,822
153,444
210,554
115,092
922,516
217,955
679,622
368,021
174,682
152,415
193,117
335,227
569,463

53.0
27.1
44.2
26.0
44.7
26.5
25.9
42.1
32.1
25.4
17.8
19.6
22.3

34,554
34,317
35,532
30,952
34,933
31,426
31,051
33,983
29,808
29,104
28,100
26,155
24,863

24.8
19.9
36.2
18.6
32.8
11.9
34.2
38.3
30.0
18.7
47.0
44.8
49.5

8.6
7.9
13.1
5.8
12.0
7.0
9.5
12.7
9.2
8.5
9.3
11.4
12.0

NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1999; the other variables are for 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu are
not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Metropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details, see
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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304 Albany
305 Athens
306 Merced
307 Auburn-Opelika
308 Fresno
309 Gainesville
310 El Paso
311 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville
312 Las Cruces
313 Bryan–College Station
314 Laredo
315 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito
316 McAllen-Edinburg
Avg. pov. rate, all MSAs (std. dev. = 4.4)

Partridge.indb 170

Rank/MSA countya
Lowest poverty rates
1 Nassau-Suffolk
2 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon
3 Dutchess County
4 Monmouth–Ocean City
5 Bergen-Passaic
6 York
7 New London–Norwich
8 Sheboygan
9 Washington
10 Rochester
11 New Haven–Bridgeport–Stamford–
Danbury–Waterbury
12 Elkhart-Goshen
13 Hartford
14 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah
15 Ventura

State

Median
%
Poverty
%
household education Unempl.
rate (%) Population minority income ($) <12 years rate (%)

NY
NJ
NY
NJ
NJ
PA
CT
WI
DC-MDVA-WV
MN
CT

4.2
4.2
5.4
5.4
6.1
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6

2,609,212
1,019,835
259,462
986,327
1,278,440
339,574
254,957
103,877
4,223,485

11.5
15.1
11.5
9.1
18.2
4.8
8.2
3.5
32.6

51,671
48,906
42,250
40,289
45,119
32,605
37,488
31,603
46,538

16.8
18.2
20.2
20.7
22.7
27.2
19.1
22.6
15.7

4.5
4.4
4.2
5.5
5.4
3.8
6.0
4.1
3.7

6.9
7.0

106,470
1,631,864

4.1
14.8

35,789
44,263

12.0
20.7

3.4
5.6

IN
CT
WI
CA

7.0
7.1
7.2
7.3

156,198
1,123,678
315,121
669,016

6.3
13.7
2.6
20.8

30,973
41,446
32,125
45,612

27.2
20.9
19.1
20.6

3.7
4.9
4.1
4.8
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Table 7.2 Highest and Lowest Metropolitan Area Poverty Rates, 1989
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AZ-UT
GA
FL
LA
AR
LA
MS
AL
NM
LA
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX

22.7
22.8
23.5
23.6
23.9
24.7
24.7
24.9
26.5
26.6
26.7
26.8
38.2
39.7
41.9
13.6

101,760
112,561
181,596
182,842
85,487
142,191
98,738
87,146
135,510
344,953
121,862
591,610
133,239
260,120
383,545

33.9
46.7
22.4
19.0
43.9
32.0
25.8
25.5
8.7
28.4
22.2
23.4
29.5
17.6
25.2

25,859
24,653
22,084
21,601
21,322
21,129
19,612
21,227
21,859
20,074
20,411
22,644
18,074
17,336
16,703

20.8
32.1
17.3
42.0
34.1
28.4
27.5
26.8
29.6
36.4
20.2
36.3
52.2
50.0
53.4

8.9
9.4
5.6
8.2
9.9
8.7
7.8
6.7
9.4
9.5
5.7
10.7
11.6
13.3
14.3

NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989; the other variables are for 1990. Anchorage and Honolulu are
not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Metropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details, see
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Highest poverty rates
302 Flagstaff
303 Albany
304 Gainesville
305 Houma
306 Pinebluff
307 Monroe
308 Hattiesburg
309 Auburn-Opelika
310 Las Cruces
311 Lafayette
312 Bryan–College Station
313 El Paso
314 Laredo
315 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito
316 McAllen-Edinburg
Avg. pov. rate, all MSAs (std. dev. = 5.1)
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decade for the high poverty rate metro areas, while the corresponding
increase for low poverty rate areas was only about 25 percent.5 Hence,
despite a relative weakening in some indicators over the decade, the 3percentage-point average decline in the poverty rate in the high poverty
group appears to relate to greater household income.

Poverty Rates by Metropolitan Size
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 report 1999–2000 and 1989–1990 socioeconomic indicators in large, medium, and small metro areas for the highest
and lowest poverty rate MSAs in each size classification. Following the
classification criteria used in Chapters 2 and 6, “large” metropolitan areas are the 61 MSAs with a 2000 population greater than 1 million. For
these 61 MSAs, the lowest and highest five poverty rates are reported.
Cities with a 2000 population of less than one million were divided
into 160 “small” metropolitan areas of less than 300,000 people and
95 “medium” metropolitan areas of between 300,000 and 1,000,000
people. For the small and medium MSA groups, the lowest and highest
10 metropolitan areas in terms of poverty rates are reported.
On the positive side, among the largest metropolitan areas in 1999,
Minneapolis–St. Paul broke into the lowest poverty group. A more discouraging finding for large metro areas in 1999 is that the two largest
U.S. metropolitan areas—New York and Los Angeles–Long Beach—
had the highest and fourth-highest poverty rates. The three other highpoverty-rate large metro areas in the top five in 1999—Memphis, Miami, and New Orleans—were also in the top five in 1989, as was New
York.
The medium-sized metropolitan areas with the lowest poverty rates
in 1999 tend to be concentrated in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the
Midwest. Nine of the ten highest poverty rate medium-sized MSAs
were in Louisiana, Texas, and California, with the highest rates found
near the Rio Grande. The one outlier—an MSA encompassing Huntington, West Virginia, and Ashland, Ohio—is located in Appalachia.
Among the smaller metropolitan areas, the lowest poverty rates tend
to be concentrated in the Upper Midwest. Eight of the ten highest pov-
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erty rates among small metro areas were located in the Deep South and
Texas, including a strong representation of college towns.
Not surprisingly, a consistent pattern across the three size groups
is that the highest-poverty metropolitan areas tend to have two to four
times greater minority population shares than the lowest poverty rate
MSAs. Yet there are exceptions, such as Huntington-Ashland, which
had only about a 4 percent minority share even though its 1999 poverty
rate was over 18 percent. One distinction across the size categories is
that the highest-poverty large metropolitan areas tend to have lower
unemployment rates than the corresponding medium and small metropolitan areas.
Table 7.5 reports the largest and smallest decreases in poverty rates
between 1989 and 1999 using the same three size categories. One pattern that emerges in Table 7.3 is that areas with high poverty rates in
1989 had among the largest declines— a reversion to the mean. Across
the size groupings, the largest declines often occurred in Texas metro
areas or in other historically high-poverty southern MSAs. Michigan’s
Rust Belt metropolitan areas were among the group with the greatest
declines in poverty rates (Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw–Bay City–Midland), and there were rapid declines in high-amenity magnets in Arizona, Colorado, and Utah. Consistently, MSAs that experienced the
largest poverty rate declines tended to be less populated.
A troubling pattern is that the greatest poverty rate increases were
clustered near heavily populated New York and Los Angeles. Both areas struggled in the early 1990s, and their 2000 unemployment rates
had grown from their 1990 levels. They also experienced large influxes
of foreign immigrants, which may have placed further pressure on the
wages and opportunities of disadvantaged native workers. Like the
New York City and Los Angeles MSAs, small and medium-sized New
York and California metropolitan areas experienced among the highest
increases in poverty rates. A feature they have in common with the two
largest cities is that these smaller areas did not appreciably gain from
the 1990s economic boom.
Perhaps the clearest way an area’s overall health is revealed is
through its net migration flows (Partridge and Rickman 2003a). Table
7.5 shows that among medium and large metropolitan areas, those having the largest decreases in poverty rates in the 1990s also had population growth rates about 2 percentage points greater on average than
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Table 7.3 Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates for Large, Medium, and Small Metropolitan Areas, 1999
Median
%
Poverty
%
household education Unempl.
rate 1999 Population minority income <12 years rate 2000
Rank/MSA countya
State
(%)
2000
2000
1999 ($)
2000
(%)
Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon
NJ
5.4
1,169,641
26.3
67,308
13.5
4.4
2 Nassau-Suffolk
NY
5.6
2,753,913
18.0
68,555
13.6
3.8
3 Monmouth–Ocean City
NJ
6.6
1,126,217
11.7
56,183
14.4
4.8
4 Minneapolis–St. Paul
MN-WI
6.7
2,968,806
13.9
54,481
9.4
3.5
5 Washington
DC-MD7.4
4,923,153
40.0
63,675
13.3
4.3
VA-WV
Highest poverty rates
57 Memphis
AR-MS15.3
1,135,614
47.1
40,101
20.2
6.4
TN
58 Los Angeles–Long Beach
CA
17.9
9,519,338
51.4
42,189
30.1
8.2
59 Miami
FL
18.0
2,253,362
30.3
35,966
32.1
8.7
60 New Orleans
LA
18.4
1,337,726
42.7
35,784
22.3
6.8
61 New York
NY
19.5
9,314,235
51.2
42,137
26.0
8.8
Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah
WI
5.4
358,365
5.3
47,687
12.8
3.3
2 York
PA
6.7
381,751
7.2
45,268
19.3
3.6
3 Des Moines
IA
7.5
456,022
10.2
46,709
11.4
4.4
4 Lancaster
PA
7.8
470,658
8.4
45,507
22.6
3.0
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5 Colorado Springs
6 Santa Rosa
7 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle
8 Fort Wayne
9 Ann Arbor
10 Wilmington-Newark
Highest poverty rates
86 Corpus Christi
87 Huntington-Ashland

8.0
8.1
8.1
8.2
8.2
8.2

516,929
458,614
629,401
502,141
578,736
586,216

18.7
18.5
12.2
11.9
14.6
23.9

46,844
53,076
43,172
42,876
55,101
52,139

8.7
15.1
16.9
14.7
9.9
15.2

4.7
4.3
3.9
4.2
3.8
5.0

TX
KY-OHWV
88 Shreveport–Bossier City
LA
89 Bakersfield
CA
90 Lafayette
LA
91 Fresno
CA
92 El Paso
TX
93 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville
CA
94 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito
TX
95 McAllen-Edinburg
TX
Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000
Lowest poverty rates
1 Sheboygan
WI
2 New London–Norwich
CT
3 Rochester
MN
4 Cedar Rapids
IA
5 Wausau
WI

18.2
18.3

380,783
315,538

27.0
4.0

35,761
29,380

26.1
24.4

7.6
7.9

19.2
20.8
20.9
22.7
23.8
23.9
33.1
35.9

392,302
661,645
385,647
922,516
679,622
368,021
335,227
569,463

40.3
38.6
30.3
44.7
25.9
42.1
19.6
22.3

33,079
35,446
31,177
34,933
31,051
33,983
26,155
24,863

21.1
31.5
28.7
32.8
34.2
38.3
44.8
49.5

8.2
12.0
7.8
12.0
9.5
12.7
11.4
12.0

5.2
6.4
6.4
6.5
6.6

112,646
259,088
124,277
191,701
125,834

7.5
13.1
9.7
6.0
5.8

46,237
50,646
51,316
46,206
45,165

15.6
14.0
8.9
9.4
16.2

2.6
4.1
3.7
3.5
3.8
(continued)
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CO
CA
PA
IN
MI
DE-MD
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Table 7.3 (continued)

State
MA
WI
SD
WI
WI
LA
LA
GA
GA
CA
AL
FL
NM
TX
TX

20.5
20.7
21.4
21.4
21.7
21.8
22.8
25.4
26.9
31.2

126,337
147,250
120,822
153,444
210,554
115,092
217,955
174,682
152,415
193,117

33.8
35.6
53.0
27.1
44.2
26.0
26.5
32.1
25.4
17.8

29,856
32,047
34,554
34,317
35,532
30,952
31,426
29,808
29,104
28,100

25.4
21.4
24.8
19.9
36.2
18.6
11.9
30.0
18.7
47.0

7.1
8.2
8.6
7.9
13.1
5.8
7.0
9.2
8.5
9.3

7/27/2006 1:41:46 PM

NOTE: Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million in 2000, avg. 1999 pov. rate = 10.6 (std. dev. = 2.9). Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million
in 2000, avg. 1999 pov. rate = 12.7 (std. dev. = 4.9). Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000, avg. 1999 pov. rate = 13.3 (std. dev. = 4.3). Poverty
rates and median household income are measured for 1999; the other variables are for 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu are not included.
Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Metropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details, see
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Rank/MSA countya
6 Barnstable-Yarmouth
7 Green Bay
8 Sioux Falls
9 Janesville-Beloit
10 Kenosha
Highest poverty rates
151 Alexandria
152 Monroe
153 Albany
154 Athens
155 Merced
156 Auburn-Opelika
157 Gainesville
158 Las Cruces
159 Bryan-College Station
160 Laredo

Median
%
Poverty
%
household education Unempl.
rate 1999 Population minority income <12 years rate 2000
(%)
2000
2000
1999 ($)
2000
(%)
6.9
222,230
5.7
45,933
8.2
5.2
6.9
226,778
8.8
46,447
13.7
3.8
7.1
172,412
6.5
43,374
11.4
2.8
7.3
152,307
8.9
45,517
16.1
5.6
7.5
149,577
11.5
46,970
16.5
5.8
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those that had the largest poverty rate increases (or smallest decreases).
For the smallest MSAs, those with the greatest declines in poverty rates
averaged approximately 4 percentage points larger population growth
than the least successful ones. This pattern is consistent with metro areas that had the most rapid declines in poverty rates becoming generally
more attractive to the overall population. Yet, as column (10) shows, it
was only in the small and medium-sized MSAs that the more rapid average population growth translated into a significant advantage in average
employment growth. In these MSAs, it appears that favorable economic
conditions attracted new migrants while also improving wage and job
opportunities for the disadvantaged.
There is no clear relationship between the minority population
share and whether an MSA experienced one of the largest or smallest
declines in poverty rates. For example, poverty rates declined rapidly in
Memphis, Tennessee, which had a 47 percent minority population share
in 2000, and also in Grand Junction, Colorado, which had an 8 percent
minority population share. The same can be said about metro areas that
experienced the largest increases in poverty rates. New York and Los
Angeles are prime examples of cities having high minority population
shares, while Elmira and Binghamton, New York, have the opposite
characteristics. But all experienced large increases in poverty rates.
However, a more telling demographic was recent immigrant population. Metro areas with the largest poverty rate declines tended to have
about half the share of recent immigrants as those with the smallest
declines.6 One surprising pattern is that the MSAs with the most rapid
declines in poverty rates had approximately the same adult population
share that did not graduate from high school as those that had the greatest increases (or slowest declines). Similarly, MSAs with the fastest
increases in poverty rates tended to have higher median household incomes than those with the greatest declines.
The above finding demonstrates that economic conditions are important. MSAs with the largest poverty rate declines consistently had
lower unemployment rates in 2000 than in 1990, and the opposite applied for those with the largest increases (or smallest decreases). While
the link is not as strong, metropolitan areas with the largest poverty rate
declines tended to have faster job growth.
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Rank/MSA countya
Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Nassau-Suffolk
2 Middlesex-SomersetHunterdon
3 Monmouth–Ocean City
4 Bergen-Passaic
5 Washington

State

Pov.
Median
%
rate
%
household education Unempl.
1989 Population Population minority income <12 Years rate 1990
(%)
2000
1990
1990 1989 ($)
1990
(%)

7/27/2006 1:41:46 PM

NY
NJ

4.2
4.2

2,753,913 2,609,212
1,169,641 1,019,835

11.5
15.1

51,671
48,906

16.8
18.2

4.5
4.4

NJ
NJ
DC-MDVA-WV

5.4
6.1
6.6

1,126,217
986,327
1,373,167 1,278,440
4,923,153 4,223,485

9.1
18.2
32.6

40,289
45,119
46,538

20.7
22.7
15.7

5.5
5.4
3.7

17.5
17.9
18.5
19.5
21.3

9,314,235
2,253,362
1,135,614
1,592,383
1,337,726

8,546,846
1,937,094
1,007,306
1,324,749
1,285,270

43.5
26.9
42.0
24.6
37.8

32,490
26,909
26,890
26,060
24,456

29.7
35.0
26.9
27.5
28.1

8.3
7.7
7.3
8.3
9.2

6.3
7.2

381,751
358,365

339,574
315,121

4.8
2.6

32,605
32,125

27.2
19.1

3.8
4.1

Highest poverty rates
57 New York
NY
58 Miami
FL
59 Memphis
AR-MS-TN
60 San Antonio
TX
61 New Orleans
LA
Medium: MSA pop. >300,000 & < 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 York
PA
2 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah
WI
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Table 7.4 Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates for Large, Medium, and Small Metropolitan Areas, 1989
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7.3
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.5
7.6
7.6
7.8

753,197
518,821
350,761
637,958
586,216
458,614
502,141
629,401

669,016
451,186
325,824
595,081
513,293
388,222
456,281
587,986

20.8
27.8
24.8
5.7
17.5
9.3
8.4
8.6

45,612
38,539
41,227
31,971
38,256
36,299
31,318
31,755

20.6
17.8
22.9
26.5
20.5
15.6
20.0
23.1

4.8
5.8
5.2
4.7
3.9
4.8
4.8
3.8

19.9
20.3
21.0
21.6
22.4
22.6
26.6
26.8
39.7

540,258
315,538
922,516
380,783
392,302
368,021
385,647
679,622
335,227

476,923
312,529
755,580
349,894
376,330
311,921
344,953
591,610
260,120

28.9
2.6
35.5
24.1
35.7
34.1
28.4
23.4
17.6

23,554
21,172
26,493
24,922
22,822
24,450
20,074
22,644
17,336

29.2
33.3
34.1
32.4
26.5
39.8
36.4
36.3
50.0

8.2
9.4
9.8
8.6
10.7
10.7
9.5
10.7
13.3

41.9

569,463

383,545

25.2

16,703

53.4

14.3

5.4
6.4

280,150
259,088

259,462
254,957

11.5
8.2

42,250
37,488

20.2
19.1

4.2
6.0
(continued)
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3 Ventura
CA
4 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa
CA
5 Trenton
NJ
6 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton
PA
7 Wilmington-Newark
DE-MD
8 Santa Rosa
CA
9 Fort Wayne
IN
10 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle
PA
Highest poverty rates
86 Mobile
AL
87 Huntington-Ashland
KY-OH-WV
88 Fresno
CA
89 Corpus Christi
TX
90 Shreveport–Bossier City
LA
91 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville
CA
92 Lafayette
LA
93 El Paso
TX
94 Brownsville–Harlingen–
TX
San Benito
95 McAllen-Edinburg
TX
Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000
Lowest poverty rates
1 Dutchess County
NY
2 New London–Norwich
CT
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Rank/MSA countya
3 Sheboygan
4 Rochester
5 Elkhart-Goshen
6 Barnstable-Yarmouth
7 Punta Gorda
8 Sioux Falls
9 Wausau
10 Portland
Highest poverty rates
151 Albany
152 Gainesville
153 Houma
154 Pinebluff
155 Monroe
156 Hattiesburg
157 Auburn-Opelika
158 Las Cruces
159 Bryan–College Station
160 Laredo

State
WI
MN
IN
MA
FL
SD
WI
ME

Pov.
Median
%
rate
%
household education Unempl.
1989 Population Population minority income <12 Years rate 1990
(%)
2000
1990
1990 1989 ($)
1990
(%)
6.5
112,646
103,877
3.5
31,603
22.6
4.1
6.9
124,277
106,470
4.1
35,789
12.0
3.4
7.0
182,791
156,198
6.3
30,973
27.2
3.7
7.5
222,230
186,605
3.8
31,766
11.6
7.1
7.5
141,627
110,975
5.1
25,746
24.3
4.5
7.8
172,412
139,236
2.5
27,850
17.3
2.8
7.9
125,834
115,400
2.6
30,143
24.1
3.9
8.0
265,612
243,135
2.0
32,286
15.0
5.2

GA
FL
LA
AR
LA
MS
AL
NM
TX
TX

22.8
23.5
23.6
23.9
24.7
24.7
24.9
26.5
26.7
38.2

120,822
217,955
194,477
84,278
147,250
111,674
115,092
174,682
152,415
193,117

112,561
181,596
182,842
85,487
142,191
98,738
87,146
135,510
121,862
133,239

46.7
22.4
19.0
43.9
32.0
25.8
25.5
8.7
22.2
29.5

24,653
22,084
21,601
21,322
21,129
19,612
21,227
21,859
20,411
18,074

32.1
17.3
42.0
34.1
28.4
27.5
26.8
29.6
20.2
52.2

9.4
5.6
8.2
9.9
8.7
7.8
6.7
9.4
5.7
11.6
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Table 7.4 (continued)
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NOTE: Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million in 2000, avg. 1989 pov. rate = 10.9 (std. dev. = 3.4). Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million
in 2000, avg. 1989 pov. rate = 13.6 (std. dev. = 5.8). Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000 in 2000, avg. 1989 pov. rate = 14.6 (std. dev. = 4.8).
Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989; the other variables are for 1990 or 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu
are not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Metropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details, see
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(5)
(6)
% change in
Population % foreign
%
% education
poverty rate Population change % immigrants minority <12 years
Rank/MSA countya
State 1990–2000
2000
1990–2000 1995–2000b 2000
2000
Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million in 2000
Largest decrease in poverty rates
1 Austin–
TX
−4.8
1,249,763
32.3
4.4
27.6
15.2
San Marcos
2 San Antonio
TX
−4.4
1,592,383
16.8
2.1
29.3
22.7
3 Memphis
AR-MS−3.1
1,135,614
11.3
1.2
47.1
20.2
TN
4 New Orleans
LA
−2.9
1,337,726
3.9
0.8
42.7
22.3
5 Detroit
MI
−2.4
4,441,551
3.9
2.0
28.8
17.9
Largest increase in poverty rates
57 Bergen-Passaic
NJ
1.5
1,373,167
6.9
5.4
27.5
17.9
58 Orange County
CA
1.9
2,846,289
15.3
5.8
35.3
20.5
59 New York
NY
2.0
9,314,235
8.2
7.2
51.2
26.0
60 Los Angeles–
CA
2.8
9,519,338
6.9
6.3
51.4
30.1
Long Beach
61 Riverside–San
CA
2.9
3,254,821
20.5
3.0
38.1
25.4
Bernardino
Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million in 2000
Largest decrease in poverty rates
1 Brownsville–
TX
−6.6
335,227
22.4
4.3
19.6
44.8
Harlingen–
San Benito
2 McAllenTX
−6.0
569,463
32.6
5.6
22.3
49.5
Edinburg

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Median hh. Unempl. Unempl. Empl.
income
rate (%) rate (%) growth (%)
1999 ($)
1990
2000 1995–2000

48,991

5.9

4.0

28.1

39,059
40,101

8.3
7.3

5.7
6.4

15.7
11.4

35,784
49,249

9.2
8.9

6.8
5.9

6.5
10.0

59,532
58,820
42,137
42,189

5.4
4.8
8.3
7.4

5.1
5.0
8.8
8.2

7.2
18.7
12.4
9.6

42,456

7.4

7.9

24.4

26,155

13.3

11.4

18.5

24,863

14.3

12.0

27.9
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Table 7.5 Change in Poverty Rates from 1990 to 2000 for Large, Medium, and Small Metropolitan Areas
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−5.7
−4.4

385,647
363,988

10.6
14.2

0.5
0.7

30.3
24.1

28.7
19.8

31,177
36,836

9.5
8.3

7.8
6.4

12.8
14.2

−3.6
−3.4
−3.4
−3.4
−3.2

540,258
380,783
436,141
368,536
392,302

11.7
8.1
1.3
28.5
4.1

0.8
0.9
0.4
2.7
0.3

30.7
27.0
24.8
7.7
40.3

21.8
26.1
16.9
9.1
21.1

35,410
35,761
41,951
45,833
33,079

8.2
8.6
10.9
5.2
10.7

6.7
7.6
7.1
4.8
8.2

11.6
10.6
-0.3
25.6
7.8

−3.1

403,070

0.9

0.5

15.3

16.7

40,086

9.8

6.7

5.6

1.4
1.6

373,638
399,347

9.9
7.4

1.0
4.3

11.8
27.3

22.0
20.8

44,714
46,677

4.5
5.4

5.1
6.7

10.0
12.5

1.7
1.7
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.6

922,516
732,117
446,997
401,762
753,197
563,598
962,886

18.1
−1.4
17.1
11.5
11.2
14.7
4.8

4.1
1.1
3.2
6.6
3.6
3.7
2.2

44.7
11.2
30.9
44.1
30.2
42.1
15.6

32.8
16.2
29.6
31.6
19.9
28.8
22.9

34,933
39,698
40,101
48,305
59,666
41,282
41,599

9.8
5.8
10.0
8.4
4.8
8.8
6.7

12.0
6.2
11.7
8.7
5.2
10.3
5.7

9.6
3.7
17.1
17.4
13.3
13.9
7.4

3.8

661,645

17.9

3.1

38.6

31.5

35,446

9.7

12.0

12.2
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3 Lafayette
LA
4 BiloxiMS
GulfportPascagoula
5 Mobile
AL
6 Corpus Christi
TX
7 Flint
MI
8 Provo-Orem
UT
9 Shreveport–
LA
Bossier City
10 Saginaw–Bay
MI
City–Midland
Largest increase in poverty rates
86 Reading
PA
87 Santa Barbara–
CA
Santa Maria–
Lompoc
88 Fresno
CA
89 Syracuse
NY
90 Modesto
CA
91 Salinas
CA
92 Ventura
CA
93 Stockton-Lodi
CA
94 ProvidenceRI
WarwickPawtucket
95 Bakersfield
CA
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(5)
(6)
% change in
Population % foreign
%
% education
poverty rate Population change % immigrants minority <12 years
Rank/MSA countya
State 1990–2000
2000
1990–2000 1995–2000b 2000
2000
Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000 in 2000

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Median
Unempl. Unempl. Empl.
hh. income rate (%) rate (%) growth (%)
1999 ($)
1990
2000 1995–2000

Largest decrease in poverty rates
1

Laredo

TX

−7.0

193,117

31.0

5.9

17.8

47.0

28,100

11.6

9.3

2

Houma

LA

−5.7

194,477

6.0

0.4

21.8

33.3

35,085

8.2

5.9

18.7

3

Hattiesburg

MS

−5.6

111,674

11.6

0.8

28.4

19.4

30,991

7.8

6.6

14.3

4

Pueblo

5

Flagstaff

6
7
8
9

24.3

CO

−5.4

141,472

13.0

0.8

20.6

18.7

32,775

9.0

6.3

15.5

AZ-UT

−5.0

122,366

16.8

1.2

35.0

16.1

38,058

8.9

6.9

19.2

Grand Junction

CO

−4.9

116,255

19.9

0.7

7.8

15.0

35,864

7.0

5.7

21.7

Lawrence
Victoria

KS
TX

−4.7
−4.7

99,962
84,088

18.2
11.6

2.4
0.9

14.1
25.9

7.6
23.8

37,547
38,732

5.3
6.5

4.6
4.7

18.4
11.3

Sumter

SC

−4.4

104,646

1.9

0.5

49.8

25.7

33,278

7.9

7.6

6.1

10 Monroe

LA

−4.0

147,250

3.4

0.2

35.6

21.4

32,047

8.7

8.2

12.1

Largest increase in poverty rates
151 Chico-Paradise

CA

0.9

203,171

10.4

1.5

15.7

17.7

31,924

9.5

9.3

12.3

152 Yolo

CA

0.9

168,660

16.3

5.8

32.5

20.2

40,769

7.2

7.1

12.4

153 Santa Cruz–
Watsonville
154 Elmira

CA

1.2

255,602

10.1

3.7

24.9

16.8

53,998

5.2

6.1

10.9

NY

1.6

91,070

-4.5

0.3

9.3

17.9

36,415

7.3

7.8

7.6

155 Binghamton

NY

1.6

252,320

-4.8

1.0

7.3

16.0

36,357

5.7

5.3

5.1

156 Redding

CA

1.6

163,256

9.9

0.5

10.9

16.7

34,335

8.8

8.7

11.0
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Table 7.5 (continued)
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157 Merced

CA

1.8

210,554

15.3

4.2

44.2

36.2

35,532

10.6

13.1

8.8

158 Bellingham

WA

1.9

166,814

23.4

2.5

11.7

12.5

40,005

4.8

7.4

11.0

159 VinelandMillvilleBridgeton
160 Dutchess
County

NJ

2.0

146,438

5.7

1.9

34.2

31.5

39,150

7.4

9.9

4.5

NY

2.2

280,150

7.4

1.6

16.5

16.0

53,086

4.2

5.7

9.9

NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and 1999; the other variables are for the period stated in the column headings.
Anchorage and Honolulu are not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial
group. See discussion of census and BEA statistics in Appendix A.
a
Metropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details, see Chapters 2 and 6.
b
Percentage of the population that immigrated to the United States between 1995 and 2000.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data for employment growth (BEA 2002).
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Regression Analysis of MSA Poverty Rates
Although the general patterns above are suggestive of the determinants underlying metropolitan variation in poverty rates, regression
analysis is needed to draw more definitive conclusions. In the remainder of this chapter we use the empirical model from Chapter 6, in which
counties remain one unit of analysis, to further examine metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan poverty rates. We experimented with using the entire metropolitan area as the unit of observation, but the results were
completely unsatisfactory.7
Table 7.6 reports regression results that divide the sample into metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties.8 Columns (1) and (2) report
the 1989 metro county results, while columns (5) and (6) contain the
1999 metro county results. Columns (3) and (4) and columns (7) and
(8) report the corresponding nonmetropolitan county results. The nonmetropolitan results are only reported to facilitate comparison. A full
assessment of those results will be given in Chapter 8.
The discussion stresses the 1999 findings, though the 1989 results
will be highlighted when there are key differences. Consider the 1999
results in column (5): after we account for the poverty effects of differences in their socioeconomic characteristics, big metropolitan suburban
counties have approximately a half-percentage-point lower poverty rate
than single-county MSAs (significant at the 0.01 level).9 There is evidence that small-MSA (less than one million in population) suburban
counties have slightly lower poverty, but this is measured imprecisely.
Along with other results that suggest that poverty rates are positively
related to overall metropolitan area population (not shown), these results are consistent with moderate spatial mismatch effects, especially
in larger MSAs with more accessibility concerns.10
Metropolitan county poverty rates appear to be less affected by labor
market conditions than nonmetro poverty rates. For example, industrial
structural change appears to be statistically unrelated to metropolitan
area poverty rates. This may be a scale effect in that metro areas may
be large enough for dislocated workers to obtain a suitable employment
match. Likewise, five-year employment growth has a very small influence on metropolitan county poverty rates.11 For comparison to Chapter
6, we assess the impacts of an overall one standard deviation change,
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which equals 10.1 percent for 1995–2000 employment growth (from
column [4] of Table A.1). This increase in five-year job growth reduces
short-run metro county poverty rates by 0.07 percentage points, or less
than half of the corresponding nonmetro response.
As indicated in Chapters 4 and 6, an avenue through which job
growth reduces poverty rates is by reducing male and female unemployment rates and increasing employment-population rates. The quasireduced form model that omitted the unemployment rate and employment-population variables was one way to allow employment growth to
affect poverty rates while allowing the employment and unemployment
rates to vary. Using this model, a 10.1 percent increase in 1995–2000 job
growth is now estimated to reduce poverty rates by about 0.13 percentage points (t = 2.10), with a long-run impact almost twice as large (see
Note 8 in Chapter 6). While the quasireduced form results are stronger,
they still indicate that overall MSA poverty rates are only modestly affected by new job growth.
The employment-population rate and the unemployment rate findings also indicate a larger nonmetropolitan labor market influence compared to the corresponding MSA models. One difference, however, is
that the male unemployment rate is relatively more important and the
female employment rate is relatively less important in affecting MSA
poverty rates. Holding job growth constant, a one standard deviation
increase in the female employment rate and a corresponding one standard deviation decline in the male unemployment rate would reduce
the typical 1999 short-run MSA-county poverty rate by 0.55 and 0.67
percentage points.12
This pattern is further supported by the smaller single-mother coefficient in the MSA model, compared to its corresponding nonmetropolitan coefficient in Table 7.6. The relative metro or nonmetro femaleheaded household share pattern is similar in both the 1989 and 1999
models, suggesting that it was not caused by welfare reform or other
policy changes such as the EITC expansion but, rather, reflects a factor
associated with metro areas. Finally, the 1999 MSA female-head share
response remains smaller than in the 1989 model, which continues a
pattern that emerged in Chapter 6.
Labor market linkages with surrounding counties are assessed in
the models reported in columns (2) and (6) by including the previous
decade’s surrounding-county average poverty rate, the overall five-year
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Group
Lagged poverty rate
Weighted surrounding-city
poverty
Single-county MSA
Big-MSA central county
Big-MSA suburban county
Small-MSA central county
Small-MSA suburban county
1985–90/1995–2000 empl. growth
1988–90/1995–2000 structural
change
Pop. × structural change
% male employment/population
% female employment/ population

(1)
MSA
base

1989
(2)
(3)
(4)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.

7/27/2006 1:41:48 PM

0.49
(14.97)

0.49
(14.67)
−0.003
(0.15)

−0.13
(0.62)
−0.10
(0.46)
0.14
(0.89)
−0.02
(0.12)
−0.006
(0.76)
1.16
(0.31)
−2.5e−5
(2.09)
−0.06
(2.16)
−0.14
(5.00)

0.13
(0.47)
0.15
(0.51)
0.36
(1.61)
0.17
(0.65)
−0.003
(0.40)
0.65
(0.17)
−2.3e−5
(1.95)
−0.06
(2.12)
−0.14
(5.02)

0.47
(24.25)

−0.020
(3.37)
12.31
(2.54)
−4.8e−4
(2.80)
−0.09
(5.19)
−0.16
(8.27)

0.42
(19.14)
0.11
(5.39)

−0.016
(2.53)
11.46
(2.44)
−4.3e−4
(2.56)
−0.09
(5.34)
−0.16
(7.90)

(5)
MSA
base

1999
(6)
(7)
MSA broad Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base

0.43
(13.01)

0.44
(13.28)
−0.01
(0.88)

−0.11
(0.67)
−0.54
(2.85)
0.10
(0.82)
−0.19
(1.20)
−0.007
(1.35)
1.11
(0.53)
−2.6e−6
(0.48)
−0.03
(2.08)
−0.08
(3.12)

0.16
(0.67)
−0.27
(1.13)
0.31
(1.61)
0.06
(0.29)
−0.005
(0.91)
0.49
(0.23)
−9.6e−7
(0.17)
−0.03
(1.91)
−0.08
(3.08)

(8)
Nonmetro
broad lab.

0.38
(23.65)

0.35
(19.89)
0.08
(4.75)

−0.017
(3.05)
10.58
(3.49)
−2.4e−4
(2.66)
−0.03
(1.88)
−0.21
(11.50)

−0.017
(2.83)
10.65
(3.68)
−2.2e−4
(2.60)
−0.02
(1.19)
−0.20
(10.73)
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% pop. other race
% pop. Hispanic

0.32
(4.91)
0.02
(0.33)
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−0.10
(3.82)
−0.23
(7.12)
−0.05
(0.68)
0.06
(2.07)
0.59
(7.61)
0.18
(0.72)
−0.03
(1.74)
0.02
(0.82)
0.02
(1.96)

0.30
(4.74)
0.02
(0.35)
−0.017
(1.41)
−0.004
(0.53)
−0.10
(3.79)
−0.24
(7.09)
−0.04
(0.67)
0.06
(2.03)
0.59
(7.41)
0.18
(0.74)
−0.03
(1.68)
0.02
(0.71)
0.02
(2.09)

0.15
(4.27)
0.07
(1.86)

0.16
(4.40)
0.07
(1.85)

−0.17
(9.13)
−0.19
(6.56)
−0.19
(4.37)
−0.004
(0.16)
0.77
(13.43)
0.54
(4.40)
−0.04
(4.21)
0.02
(1.78)
0.01
(1.27)

−0.02
(1.87)
−0.003
(0.54)
−0.16
(8.80)
−0.18
(6.43)
−0.18
(4.33)
0.003
(0.13)
0.75
(13.26)
0.57
(4.75)
−0.04
(4.54)
0.03
(2.36)
0.009
(0.96)

0.23
(3.81)
−0.02
(0.30)

−0.15
(5.58)
−0.20
(6.62)
−0.15
(3.18)
−0.10
(4.24)
0.43
(6.55)
−0.14
(1.02)
−0.01
(1.59)
−0.04
(2.48)
0.002
(0.26)

0.23
(3.78)
−0.02
(0.40)
−0.019
(1.50)

0.004
(0.87)
−0.15
(5.54)
−0.21
(6.52)
−0.16
(3.33)
−0.11
(4.29)
0.43
(6.59)
−0.13
(0.97)
−0.01
(1.51)
−0.04
(2.45)
0.003
(0.31)

0.14
(5.19)
−0.05
(1.36)

0.15
(5.32)
−0.04
(1.31)

−0.14
(7.79)
−0.11
(4.42)
−0.19
(4.89)
−0.02
(0.96)
0.62
(10.50)
0.28
(3.03)
−0.03
(3.50)
−0.009
(0.75)
−0.02
(1.98)

−0.005
(0.55)
0.01
(2.36)
−0.14
(7.57)
−0.11
(4.57)
−0.21
(5.17)
−0.03
(1.69)
0.61
(10.69)
0.30
(3.30)
−0.03
(3.46)
−4.6e−5
(0.00)
−0.02
(2.52)
(continued)
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% civilian male unemployment
rate
% civilian female unemployment
rate
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA empl.
growth (#MSA counties ≥ 2)
1985–90/1995–2000 commuting
zone empl. growth
% of workers employed in county
of residence
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% households female-headed
w/ children
% households male-headed
w/ children
% pop. African American
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Group

(1)
MSA
base

R2
N

0.96
824

1989
(2)
(3)
(4)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.
0.96
824

0.93
2204

0.93
2204

(5)
MSA
base
0.96
824

1999
(6)
(7)
MSA broad Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
0.96
824

0.93
2204

(8)
Nonmetro
broad lab.
0.93
2204

NOTE: The specifications follow those in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 6.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity.
Blank = not applicable. Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of
Economic Analysis REIS county definitions. See the notes to Table 6.1 for more details on variable definitions.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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metropolitan area employment growth rate, and the corresponding share
of workers that were employed in their county of residence. Focusing
on the 1999 results, column (6) shows that all three of these measures
are statistically insignificant. In terms of the surrounding-county poverty rate, the insignificance could represent heterogeneity in county responses. For example, low-income residents from neighboring counties
may relocate to counties with lower poverty rates, which would tend
to produce a positive surrounding-county effect. Yet, in other cases,
wealthier residents of neighboring counties with higher poverty rates
may “flee” those counties, reducing the poverty rate of the destination
county. This can occur if the middle and upper classes want to avoid
possible ramifications such as a deteriorating tax base, declining public
services, and falling property values.
In sum, the generally different metro and nonmetro poverty responses illustrate Allard’s (2004) claim that the delivery of public assistance
programs needs to be differentiated for urban and rural communities.
For instance, the unemployment results suggest metropolitan programs
should place more emphasis on disadvantaged men than nonmetropolitan programs. Finally, although the demographic variables will not be
discussed in detail, note that greater concentrations of minorities are not
directly linked to higher MSA-county poverty rates (ceteris paribus),
although we find evidence that greater shares of immigration increased
1999 (but not 1989) poverty rates.13

Suburban/Central County Poverty Rate
Disparities
General Regression Results
The spatial mismatch hypothesis described in Chapter 3 is one reason why different poverty patterns may exist between central counties
and suburbs. Namely, factors such as limited transportation and information about suburban job opportunities reduce the likelihood that disadvantaged central city workers will be able to take these positions,
while affordability, zoning, and housing discrimination limit their ability to relocate to the suburbs. Yet if employment growth occurs closer

Partridge.indb 191

7/27/2006 1:41:49 PM

192 Partridge and Rickman

to poor communities, the spatial mismatch hypothesis implies that a
greater share of disadvantaged workers will take these jobs. Hence,
central county job growth would have stronger impacts on poverty than
corresponding growth in suburban counties. Conversely, if disadvantaged workers lack the requisite hard and soft skills to acquire work
or to remain in a job, there are fewer reasons to expect that nearby
employment opportunities will make a noticeable dent in poverty rates,
regardless of location.
To examine spatial differences within metropolitan areas, we divide
the MSA sample into the 391 central counties and 433 suburban counties using the definitions outlined in Chapter 2.14 The corresponding descriptive statistics for key variables are reported in Table 7.7. Table 7.8
reports the regression results. In it, columns (1) and (2) report the 1989
suburban county results, followed by the 1989 central county results
in columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) to (8) report the analogous 1999
suburban and central county results. As before, most of the emphasis
will be on the base 1999 suburban and central county results in columns
(5) and (7).
The considerably smaller lagged 1989 suburban poverty rate coefficient suggests that central county poverty rates adjust more slowly
to socioeconomic shocks, making them more persistent. To put it into
perspective, a shock to a central county poverty rate would have a halflife of more than 10 years, while a shock to a suburban county has a
half-life of more than six years.15 As noted before, this persistence likely not only reflects individual household persistence of poverty rates
but also “place” persistence, because central county labor markets may
not adjust as quickly through migration and commuting. While place
persistence may be generated by individual spatial mismatch factors
such as a reduced tendency to relocate where there is more vibrant job
growth, it can be exacerbated by the relocation of jobs to faster growing suburbs. For example, in the 1990s, firm relocation worsened the
spatial mismatch between jobs and the residences of African Americans (Dworak-Fisher 2004; R. Martin 2004; Raphael and Stoll 2002).
Consistent with this point, suburban counties in large metro areas have
about a 0.5-percentage-point lower poverty rate than small metropolitan suburban counties, all else being equal.
Five-year job growth is now weakly associated with reduced suburban poverty rates (at the 0.10 level), though the link to greater job
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growth is much stronger in central counties (at the 0.05 level). For example, a 10.1 percent (one standard deviation) increase in employment
growth reduces short-run central county poverty rates by about 0.2 percentage points, while the suburban response is just over half that size.
Using the lagged 1989 poverty rate coefficient, greater persistence in
central counties suggests that long-run poverty rates would fall about
0.45 percentage points and that the suburban response would be only
about one-third that size.16
There appear to be some key gender roles in how labor market effects are transmitted. First, the short-run poverty-reducing impacts of
the female employment-population rate are about twice as large in suburban counties as in central counties. Again using the overall one standard deviation changes reported in Table A.1, a 6.9-percentage-point
increase in the female employment-population rate reduces short-run
suburban poverty rates by about 0.9 percentage points, and the corresponding response in central-city counties is a little less than half the
size. Likewise, a 2.9-percentage-point reduction in the male unemployment rate reduces short-run suburban poverty rates by about 0.84 percentage points but central county rates by only 0.35 points.
These labor market findings suggest that, compared to suburbs,
central county poverty rates are more affected by job growth than by
whether labor supply is tight, as reflected through their smaller responsiveness to the male unemployment rate and the female employment
rate. These findings further support those who argue that public assistance policies cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach, as significant differences even exist within a given metro area. For example, transportation and household mobility constraints may be why disadvantaged
persons in central counties benefit more from employment growth than
their suburban counterparts. Disadvantaged suburban residents appear
to benefit more from policies that enhance their ability to enter the labor
force and find work. Rather than policies that enhance job growth, the
suburbs may benefit more from policies that augment job-hunting and
job-retention skills as well as improve child care assistance to increase
labor force participation among disadvantaged females. Since jobs are
more accessible to suburban dwellers, there is less need to improve
work transportation.17
In general, the finding that minority shares are not positively related
to 1999 poverty rates counters claims that urban poverty is an issue of

Partridge.indb 193

7/27/2006 1:41:49 PM

Partridge.indb 194

1989–1990
(1)

Group
Single-county MSAb
Big-MSA central countyb
Big-MSA suburban countyb
Small-MSA central countyb
Small-MSA suburban
countyb
Population
MSA population
1988–90 or 1998–2000
empl. growth
1985–90 or 1995–2000
empl. growth
1988–90 or 1998–2000
structural change
1985–90 or 1995–2000
structural change

Total
MSA
0.17
(0.37)
0.12
(0.32)
0.29
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39)
0.23
(0.42)
239,597
(478,619)
1,200,309
(1,554,358)
5.1
(4.8)
15.4
(11.8)
0.029
(0.015)
0.06
(0.024)

(2)
(3)
MSA pop. MSA pop.
over
under
1 million 1 million
0.01
(0.12)
0.28
(0.45)
0.71
(0.46)

0.28
(0.45)

1999–2000
(4)

(5)

(6)

Central
MSA city

Suburban
MSA city

Total
MSA

0.36
(0.48)
0.24
(0.43)
0.56
(0.50)

0.33
0.40
(0.47)
(0.49)
0.40
0.44
(0.49)
(0.50)
383,433
138,048
385,526
107,822
(704,857) (125,351) (645,131) (154,923)
2,427,554 333,868
825,282 1,538,958
(1,788,952) (223,534) (1,388,983) (1,618,273)
5.4
4.9
4.5
5.7
(5.1)
(4.5)
(4.1)
(5.2)
17.6
13.9
13.5
17.2
(12.7)
(10.9)
(9.8)
(13.1)
0.030
0.028
0.023
0.034
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.009)
(0.018)
0.062
0.058
0.051
0.068
(0.022)
(0.025)
(0.016)
(0.027)

0.17
(0.37)
0.12
(0.32)
0.29
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39)
0.23
(0.42)
272,984
(528,087)
1,371,422
(1,745,655)
4.7
(3.7)
13.8
(10.8)
0.022
(0.012)
0.048
(0.024)

(7)
(8)
MSA pop. MSA pop.
over
under
1 million 1 million
0.01
(0.12)
0.28
(0.45)
0.71
(0.46)

0.28
(0.45)

(9)

(10)

Central
MSA city

Suburban
MSA city

0.36
(0.48)
0.24
(0.43)
0.56
(0.50)

0.33
0.40
(0.47)
(0.49)
0.40
0.44
(0.49)
(0.50)
439,496
155,425
433,856
127,716
(774,102) (141,460) (711,111) (173,764)
2,788,184 371,183
938,897 1,761,994
(1,963,929) (244,702) (1,545,049) (1,824,308)
5.9
3.8
4.0
5.3
(4.1)
(3.1)
(2.9)
(4.1)
17.3
11.3
11.2
16.1
(12.8)
(8.3)
(7.4)
(12.7)
0.022
0.022
0.019
0.025
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.01)
(0.013)
0.048
0.047
0.040
0.055
(0.026)
(0.022)
(0.016)
(0.027)
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70.0
(6.3)
53.4
(6.6)
5.9
(2.1)
6.1
(2.2)
12.9
(7.0)

72.3
(6.6)
55.7
(6.5)
5.5
(2.1)
5.5
(1.9)
13.4
(7.7)

68.4
(5.6)
51.9
(6.2)
6.2
(2.0)
6.5
(2.3)
8.8
(7.7)

68.9
(5.5)
53.4
(5.9)
6.4
(2.0)
6.3
(2.1)
12.5
(7.8)

71.0
(6.8)
53.5
(7.2)
5.5
(2.1)
5.8
(2.3)
13.2
(6.5)

68.0
(6.6)
55.4
(6.1)
5.2
(2.0)
5.3
(2.1)
11.6
(5.8)

70.3
(6.7)
57.2
(5.7)
4.6
(1.9)
4.9
(2.0)
13.7
(6.2)

66.3
(6.0)
54.2
(6.0)
5.6
(2.0)
5.7
(2.2)
6.7
(5.7)

66.4
(5.9)
54.8
(5.6)
6.0
(1.9)
6.0
(2.1)
11.2
(6.0)

69.4
(6.8)
56.1
(6.4)
4.5
(1.8)
4.8
(2.0)
11.8
(5.7)

65.9
(20.5)
35.8
(8.1)
11.6
(7.4)
824

57.9
(17.7)
38.6
(7.1)
16.1
(8.1)
341

71.6
(20.5)
33.7
(8.2)
8.5
(4.8)
483

81.3
(15.0)
33.8
(8.1)
8.2
(5.6)
391

52.0
(13.8)
37.5
(7.8)
14.7
(7.5)
433

63.2
(20.5)
37.4
(7.7)
14.2
(8.0)
824

55.4
(17.1)
39.7
(6.5)
19.2
(8.5)
341

68.7
(20.9)
35.7
(8.0)
10.6
(5.3)
483

78.9
(15.3)
35.5
(7.7)
10.5
(6.3)
391

49.0
(12.8)
39.1
(7.2)
17.5
(8.0)
433

NOTE: Unweighted descriptive statistics. Blank = not applicable. For some groups, there are fewer counties than listed, if the census did not report any
individuals in that category. A metropolitan county employs 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions using the MSA population from
the 2000 census.
a
All values are in percentages except for the rows on “Population” and “MSA Population.”
b
See the text and Table A.1 for definitions of various MSA groups.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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% male employment/
population
% female employment/
population
% civilian male
unemployment rate
% civilian female
unemployment rate
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA
employment growth
(# MSA counties ≥ 2)
% of workers employed in
county of residence
% workers with 20–45
minute commute
% workers with 45–90
minute commute
N
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1989

Group
Lagged poverty rate

(1)
Suburban
base

(2)
Suburban
broad lab.

(3)
Central
city base

0.41
(10.21)

0.42
(9.44)
−0.009
(0.25)

0.53
(12.44)

0.53
(12.5)
−0.001
(0.05)

0.06
(0.24)
0.12
(0.74)

Weighted surrounding-city poverty
Single-county MSAa
Big-MSA central county
Big-MSA suburban county
Small-MSA central county
Small-MSA suburban countyb

1999

0.41
(1.98)
−0.006
(0.67)

0.41
(1.95)
−0.005
(0.57)

−0.016
(1.51)

1985–90/1995–2000 structural
change

−0.83
(0.18)

−1.44
(0.30)

Population × structural change

−2.79e−5
(0.59)
−0.03
(1.04)

−2.12e−5
(0.45)
−0.03
(1.10)

1985–90/1995–2000 empl. growth

% male employment/population

(4)
(5)
Central city Suburban
broad lab.
base

(6)
Suburban
broad lab.

(7)
Central
city base

(8)
Central city
broad lab.

0.34
(8.43)
0.007
(0.27)

0.53
(17.86)

0.53
(17.45)
−0.004
(0.24)

0.47
(1.40)

0.07
(0.37)

0.18
(0.67)

0.44
(1.81)

0.07
(0.53)

0.16
(0.80)

0.35
(8.70)

−0.008
(0.74)

0.46
(2.59)
−0.012
(1.66)

0.47
(2.62)
−0.012
(1.71)

−0.021
(2.18)

−0.180
(1.69)

−1.19
(0.15)

−3.26
(0.40)

1.39
(0.46)

1.60
(0.52)

−1.34
(0.41)

−1.46
(0.44)

−1.24e−5
(0.89)
−0.05
(1.46)

−7.15e−6
(0.51)
0.05
(1.24)

−7.64e−6
(0.40)
−0.02
(1.11)

−7.67e−6
(0.38)
−0.02
(1.05)

−4.70e−6
(0.87)
−0.04
(1.40)

−4.16e−6
(0.75)
−0.04
(1.32)

196 Partridge and Rickman

Table 7.8 Suburban and Central County Poverty Rate Regression Results, 1989 and 1999

7/27/2006 1:41:49 PM

Partridge.indb 197

% female employment/population

% of population other race

−0.14
(4.04)
−0.29
(6.63)
−0.54
(0.49)
0.54
(1.58)
0.60
(5.82)
0.07
(0.25)
−0.008
(0.48)
0.042
(0.79)

−0.12
(3.38)
0.44
(5.22)
0.070
(0.88)
−0.007
(0.38)
−0.012
(1.11)
−0.14
(4.00)
−0.28
(6.25)
−0.50
(0.47)
0.06
(1.82)
0.59
(5.75)
0.06
(0.19)
−0.007
(0.39)
0.036
(0.68)

−0.18
(4.52)
0.24
(2.57)
0.054
(0.54)

−0.13
(3.71)
−0.19
(4.13)
0.05
(0.61)
0.03
(1.11)
0.52
(4.85)
0.25
(0.73)
−0.044
(2.76)
−0.007
(0.32)

−0.18
(4.61)
0.25
(2.70)
0.035
(0.35)
−0.024
(1.75)
0.005
(0.50)
−0.13
(3.79)
−0.20
(4.32)
−0.04
(0.57)
0.02
(0.78)
0.51
(4.71)
0.29
(0.83)
−0.040
(2.40)
−0.007
(0.32)

−0.13
(4.16)
0.29
(3.54)
−0.088
(1.15)

−0.14
(4.24)
−0.15
(3.39)
−0.23
(3.56)
-0.10
(3.01)
0.34
(3.67)
0.01
(0.03)
0.004
(0.33)
0.010
(0.34)

−0.12
(3.99)
0.30
(3.61)
−0.087
(1.12)
0.005
(0.23)
0.005
(0.60)
−0.14
(4.26)
−0.15
(3.45)
−0.23
(3.55)
-0.10
(3.09)
0.34
(3.81)
0.01
(0.04)
0.004
(0.27)
0.013
(0.45)

−0.06
(1.84)
0.12
(1.75)
0.049
(0.70)

−0.21
(6.71)
−0.21
(6.38)
−0.17
(2.85)
-0.13
(5.31)
0.36
(4.15)
−0.16
(0.76)
−0.024
(2.21)
−0.017
(1.04)

−0.07
(1.84)
0.12
(1.75)
0.047
(0.67)
−0.008
(0.63)
0.001
(0.11)
−0.11
(6.59)
−0.21
(6.37)
−0.17
(2.87)
-0.13
(5.17)
0.36
(4.11)
−0.14
(0.69)
−0.024
(2.12)
−0.017
(1.02)
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% civilian male unemployment
rate
% civilian female unemployment
rate
1985–90/1995–00 MSA empl.
growth (# MSA counties ≥ 2)
% of workers employed in county
of residence
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% households female-headed
w/ children
% households male-headed
w/ children
% of pop. African American

−0.12
(3.30)
0.45
(5.37)
0.061
(0.75)
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1989

Group
% of population Hispanic
R2
N

1999

(1)
Suburban
base

(2)
Suburban
broad lab.

(3)
Central
city base

0.53
(1.92)
0.959
433

0.53
(1.90)
0.960
433

0.01
(0.87)
0.972
391

(4)
(5)
Central city Suburban
broad lab.
base
0.01
(0.98)
0.972
391

−0.04
(1.72)
0.956
433

(6)
Suburban
broad lab.

(7)
Central
city base

(8)
Central city
broad lab.

−0.04
(1.80)
0.956
433

−0.02
(1.58)
0.980
391

−0.02
(1.54)
0.980
391

NOTE: The specifications follow those in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 6.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity.
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Blank = not applicable. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of
Economic Analysis REIS county definitions. The central counties include single-county MSAs. See Chapters 2 and 6 for details of the
suburban/central county definitions.
a
In the central county regressions, the single-county metropolitan area is the omitted category.
b
In the suburban county regression, the large metropolitan area suburb is the omitted category.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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race, not space. One of the factors that could be influencing the race and
ethnic results is that a disproportionate share of immigrants that arrived
in the 1990s were Hispanic and thus more likely to be less skilled and to
face language barriers. Moreover, recent immigrants are considerably
more likely to concentrate in central counties than in outer suburbs.18
To examine whether recent immigration affects metropolitan poverty,
we added the shares of the population that immigrated to the United
States between 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 to the base 1999 suburban
and central county models (not shown). Despite the larger share of recent immigrants in central counties, the 1995–2000 central county immigrant share was insignificant. In the suburban model, there was a
strong direct relationship in which a 1-percentage-point increase in the
1995–2000 immigrant population share raised suburban county poverty
rates by 0.66 percentage points (t = 3.98).19
While a complete explanation for the spatial difference between
central county and suburban immigration responses is hard to trace,
one likely reason for the difference is that less-skilled workers are more
likely to out-migrate in response to greater immigrant competition in
central counties than they are in the suburbs.20 One possible reason for
such a differential response is that a labor market–driven relocation
from the central city to the suburbs is a short move towards what is
likely greater access to jobs. Yet if one relocates from the suburbs for labor market reasons, the central city may not be an appealing economic
option, which means that such a person would consider more-distant
moves. However, the added relocation costs would dampen this migration response.
The results are robust when the lagged average surrounding-county
poverty rates, the 1995–2000 metropolitan area job growth rate, and
the share of workers employed in their county of residence are added
to the model (shown in columns [6] and [8]). In neither central counties
nor suburbs is there any evidence that these variables are significant
determinants of poverty rates, which is consistent with the overall MSA
results in Table 7.6.
Intrametropolitan Area Differences By Race
Racial composition may alter the way labor market conditions affect poverty rates in both suburban and central county MSAs. For ex-
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ample, Raphael and Stoll (2002) find that the spatial mismatch between
employment and residence in metropolitan areas is considerably greater
for African Americans than for whites. Hispanics and Asians fall almost
exactly in the middle. Together, this suggests that the responsiveness
of poverty rates to labor market conditions may be modified by the
community’s racial composition.
To examine whether the racial and ethnic composition of the metropolitan county alters the determination of poverty rates, the base 1999
suburban and central county regression models were reestimated after
adding interactions of the race and Hispanic population shares with various labor market indicators. Panel A of Table 7.9 presents the results
of adding interactions of the population shares with five-year employment growth.21 The estimates suggest that job growth reduces poverty
rates more in counties with higher African American population shares,
although only the central county coefficient is significant at conventional probability levels. Suburban job growth reduces poverty rates
more when there are greater non–African American minority population shares. These are rather large effects considering the scale of the
share measures.22 By contrast, suburban job growth does not appear to
reduce poverty rates when the Hispanic population share is above 1 percent. Supporting these results, Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2004)
also find that job access has smaller impacts on Hispanic employment
rates.
Our earlier analysis indicated that the male unemployment rate and
the female employment rate best reflect the availability of less-skilled
labor. Panel B reports regression results when we have the race and
Hispanic shares interact with the male unemployment rate and the female employment-population rate. The unemployment results almost
exactly correspond to the job growth findings. For example, a higher
central county unemployment rate has greater adverse poverty effects
when the African American share is larger.23 The influence of the suburban female employment-population rate also appears to be strongly
affected by racial composition, but not in central counties. In particular,
a greater female employment rate has greater poverty-reducing impacts
when the suburban county has greater shares of African Americans and
Hispanics.
In summary, central counties with higher shares of African Americans experience greater poverty rate declines as a result of job growth.
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Table 7.9 Alternative Metropolitan Labor Market Effects by Race and
Ethnicity
Panel A: Dependent variable: 1999 county poverty rate
Suburban
Central county
−1.29e−3
1995–2000 employment growth × % African
−6.9e−4
(1.31)
(2.19)
American
1995–2000 employment growth × % non–
African American minority

−5.5e−3
(2.61)

−1.27e−3
(0.85)

1995–2000 employment growth × % Hispanic

6.3e−3
(2.77)
−5.5e−3
(0.68)

1.4e−3
(1.63)
−8.5e−3
(0.58)

1995–2000 employment growth
F-interactionsb
(p-value)

3.74
(p = 0.0113)

2.56
(p = 0.0555)

Panel B: Dependent variable: 1999 county poverty ratea
Suburban
Central county
6.1e−3
2000 male unemployment rate × % African
−1.25e−3
(0.37)
(2.19)
American
2000 male unemployment rate × % non–African
American minority
2000 male unemployment rate × % Hispanic
2000 male unemployment rate
F-interactionsb
(p-value)
2000 female empl./pop. × % African American
2000 female empl./pop. × % non–African
American minority
2000 female empl./pop. × % Hispanic
2000 female empl./pop
F-interactionsb
(p-value)

0.048
(3.17)

4.7e−3
(0.74)

−0.029
(2.13)
0.224
(2.40)
3.60
(p = 0.0138)
−3.0e−3
(2.52)
0.016
(2.64)

4.3e−3
(0.85)
−0.033
(0.40)
3.04
(p = 0.0293)
1.5e−3
(1.29)
−7.6e−5
(0.03)

−8.5e−3
(1.69)
−0.154
(4.43)
3.69
(p = 0.0122)

9.2e−4
(0.56)
−0.093
(2.28)
0.68
(p = 0.5634)

NOTE: The coefficients reflect the estimates when the interaction variables are added
to the model shown in columns (5) and (7) of Table 7.8. In parentheses are the robust
t-statistics and F-statistic p-values.
a
In Panel B, all six race–labor market interactions were simultaneously added to the
respective models.
b
The F-statistics test the joint significance of the corresponding three interactions.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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Yet in suburban counties with higher African American shares, poverty
rates are more affected by having a tighter female labor market than by
simple job creation (i.e., higher female employment rates). For other
minorities, greater job growth and lower male unemployment rates have
stronger poverty-reducing impacts in suburban counties but a smaller
impact in central counties. Finally, there is evidence that greater job
growth and lower male unemployment rates have smaller poverty-reducing impacts in suburban counties with greater Hispanic population
shares.
Stoll’s (1999) study helps explain these disparate racial findings. He
finds that increasing Latino and African American access to employment induces more extensive job search but that the impact is much
greater for Latinos. Stoll’s results are consistent with Latinos already
having significant job opportunities in ethnic enclave economies, which
would explain why greater job opportunities and tighter labor supplies
have a smaller impact for Hispanics. He suggests that one possibility is
that African Americans have weaker skills and less knowledge about
more distant job opportunities. These tendencies are likely reinforced
by their greater spatial isolation from employment and by a general
reluctance to migrate away from family ties (Spilimbergo and Ubeda
2004). Therefore, creating jobs in central counties may have strong
poverty-reducing impacts for African Americans. The large male unemployment rate response in central counties with large African American
populations (holding job growth constant) supports adding structural
policies, including more job counseling. Moreover, if the suburban responses relate to a general reluctance of suburban employers to hire African Americans (Holzer and Reaser 2000), then enhanced affirmative
action policies are needed.

Case Studies of Metropolitan Poverty Trends
The statistical analysis provides an assessment of the typical causes
of county poverty rates, both on average and for central and suburban
counties in isolation. For context on these results in specific instances,
we examine three metropolitan areas as case studies: Decatur, Alabama,
an example of a small metropolitan area in the South; Philadelphia, a
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larger and older metro area in the Northeast; and Phoenix, Arizona, a
fast-growing western Sun Belt metro area.
Decatur, Alabama
Decatur, a metropolitan area of nearly 150,000 people located in
northern Alabama, ranked 245 out of 316 metropolitan areas in 2000
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e). It consists of Lawrence and
Morgan counties; the city of Decatur is the Morgan county seat. Like
many regions in the South, Decatur’s post–World War II economic
growth was spurred by startups of chemical plants, paper mills, and
other factories seeking a nonunionized, low-cost labor force (Davis
2002). In 2000, 28 percent of employed residents in the Decatur MSA
worked in manufacturing, compared to an unweighted national metro
average of 14 percent.
Decatur entered the 1990s economic recovery inauspiciously; its unemployment rate peaked at 8.1 percent in 1992 and 1993 (BLS 2006a).
National economic growth appeared to bypass Decatur despite the fact
that it set aside prime property for industrial development and despite
its close proximity to rail lines and an interstate highway (Davis 2002).
Like many areas of the South, Decatur suffered from a less-educated
labor force and a perceived lack of the amenities that executives demand. Yet as the national economy continued to expand, booming areas
began to price themselves out of the market. Real estate prices soared in
these booming areas, which not only directly increased business costs
but also indirectly increased costs through discouraging workers from
locating there, creating labor shortages and higher wages. This made
places like Decatur more economically attractive to firms seeking lowcost employees.
By 1996, the Decatur metro area unemployment rate had dropped
to 5.1 percent, and it reached a low of 4.1 percent in 1998 (Davis 2002).
The employment boom was fueled by high-profile openings of manufacturing facilities, such as the one by Trico Steel Company. This was
accompanied by a boom in the retail and local service sectors, as a result of which occupancy at Decatur’s only mall jumped from 70 percent
in 1995 to 90 percent in 2000.
The tight labor market caused wages to rise. McDonald’s began
paying new hires $6 an hour instead of the $5.15 minimum wage, while
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mall security guards saw their starting wages rise 25 percent. Accompanying the increase in wages across occupations were increases associated with workers moving up the job chain. For example, McDonald’s
workers reportedly quit to take higher-paying jobs elsewhere or to start
their own businesses.
The poverty rate in Lawrence County rose from 16.5 percent in 1989
to 17.8 percent in 1993, before falling to 16.6 in 1995, 15.2 in 1998, and
14.0 percent in 2000. Morgan County’s poverty rates rose from 11.5
percent in 1989 to 12.9 percent in 1993, before steadily falling to 11.1
percent in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005b). Thus, Lawrence County
was left with poverty above national and statewide rates in 2000, while
Morgan County had lower relative poverty. Median household income
increased in the two counties; the largest annual increases occurred during the 1993–1995 period in both metro counties, and the smallest occurred during the 1998–2000 period. In fact, in Lawrence County the
median household income decreased at an annual rate of 0.5 percent
from 1998 to 2000.24 The decline may have been partly attributable
to falling manufacturing employment. For instance, Courtland Mill, a
subsidiary of International Paper and the largest employer in Lawrence
County, in 1998 began the first of two rounds of layoffs that eventually
totaled 600 workers (Decatur Daily 2003). Median household income
growth also may have slowed because of an increased proportion of
below-average-paying jobs at the end of the 1990s expansion.
Following the national economy, Decatur’s boom ended by 2001.
In that year its unemployment rate climbed to 7.4 percent in August,
up from 4.3 percent the previous August (BLS 2006a). Included in the
layoffs was the shutdown of the Trico Steel plant in response to fierce
global competition (Davis 2002). Consistent with state and national
trends, the layoffs in manufacturing were widespread across industries
and continued into 2003 (ADECA 2006). Manufacturing employment
dropped to 14,552 in 2002, the lowest it had been since 1982 (BEA
2006). The unemployment rate rose to an average of 7 percent in 2002,
its highest rate since 1993. Low-cost advantages relative to the rest of
the nation were offset by increased globalization and even lower costs
in developing nations.
Decatur’s large employment share in manufacturing meant that
losses in that sector greatly affected the secondary economy. Laid-off
workers who were more experienced, or educated, moved down the job
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ladder, squeezing out less-qualified workers (Davis 2002). Others who
were laid off enrolled in a community college for training in new careers such as cosmetology and child care. Yet the availability and profitability of careers in secondary sectors often depend on basic employment sectors such as manufacturing, making it difficult for the region
to offset the income losses associated with the layoffs. Annual wages
in the Decatur metro area dropped 1.7 percent from 2001 to 2002, in
contrast to a 1.4 percent gain nationally (BLS 2002).
The experience of Decatur demonstrates the importance of strong
sustained national economic growth for poverty reductions. Poverty
and welfare caseload declines coincided with reductions in the unemployment rate post-1993, prior to implementation of welfare reforms,
and did not accelerate after their implementation. Sustained national
growth forced firms to move to where there was low-cost labor, making
poverty reductions geographically widespread. Conversely, high real
estate prices and a lack of informal support networks likely precluded
disadvantaged households from being able to make utility-improving
moves to booming areas. Thus, the Decatur experience suggests that
place needs to be taken into account in the design of antipoverty programs. In addition, sustained growth is required for those at the bottom
of the skill distribution to benefit, as workers move up the job ladder
and wage increases occur across occupations. The 2001 recession and
subsequent jobless recovery have unraveled some of the 1990s’ progress in reducing poverty rates, particularly in the face of strict work
requirements in Alabama’s welfare program. Lawrence County’s poverty rate climbed to 15.1 in 2001 before before settling back down to
14.4 percent in 2002, while Morgan County’s poverty rate climbed to
12.4 percent in 2001 before inching down to 12.3 percent in 2002 (U.S.
Census Bureau 2005b).
Philadelphia
Encompassing Greater Philadelphia, the Philadelphia–New Jersey
metropolitan area (PMSA) was the sixth largest metro area in the country, registering just over five million people in the 2000 census. Even so,
it grew only 3.6 percent in the 1990s.25 Median household income increased 34 percent from 1989 to 1999, while the poverty rate increased
from 10.4 to 11.1 percent. By comparison, median U.S. household in-
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come increased 40 percent, while the poverty rate decreased from 13.1
to 12.4 percent. The Philadelphia PMSA unemployment rate began the
1990s at 4.9 percent and climbed to 7.9 percent in 1992 before dropping
to 3.9 percent in 2000. At the same time, the U.S. unemployment rate
dropped more substantially, from 5.6 to 4.0 percent from 1990 to 2000
(BLS 2006a,d).
In the midst of lackluster growth, the Philadelphia metro area continued to extend farther from its core in the 1990s (Brookings Institution 2003a). The suburbs experienced 7.4 percent population growth,
although population losses occurred in most inner suburbs and the city
of Philadelphia lost over 4 percent of its population (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Among the 10 largest U.S. cities, this made Philadelphia
just one of two to lose population (Perry and Mackun 2001). A large
population decline in the 1990s among whites, combined with modest
increases in other racial categories, changed the racial composition of
the city from majority white to majority minority (Brookings Institution 2003a). Nine percent of the city of Philadelphia’s populace in 2000
was foreign-born, with nearly half arriving in the 1990s (U.S. Census
Bureau 2006b). This is a lower immigration rate than in most large cities and may be partly attributable to more than twice as many foreignborn persons living in the suburbs as do in other metropolitan areas
(Brookings Institution 2003a). Having lost married-couple families in
the 1990s, Philadelphia had more single-parent families than married
couples with children in 2000.
Not surprisingly, the poverty rate in the city of Philadelphia increased from 20.3 to 22.9 percent from 1989 to 1999, while the child
poverty rate increased from 30.3 to 31.6 percent (Brookings Institution
2003a). Poverty in excess of 40 percent was present in several neighborhoods. Median household income increased only 25 percent, failing
to keep pace with the 34 percent increase in the region’s average price
level and leaving it at 73 percent of the national average (BLS 2006e;
U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Only 56 percent of people 16 years and
older were in the labor force in 1999, down from 58.4 percent in 1989
(U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). This meant the city of Philadelphia had
the fourth-lowest labor force participation rate among the 100 largest
U.S. cities, potentially reflecting an increasing distance between innercity residents and job growth in outer suburbs (Brookings Institution
2003a). The unemployment rate for males was 6.8 percent, while it
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was 5.5 percent for females (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Additional
evidence of weak central city vitality is that only 9.9 percent of workcommutes are from the suburb to the central city and more than half
of metro workers commute between suburbs. Conversely, almost onequarter of the city of Philadelphia’s employed residents work outside
the central city (Brookings Institution 2003a).
A study by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
(MDRC) suggests that welfare reforms implemented in Pennsylvania
had little effect on the city of Philadelphia’s poverty between 1992 and
2000. The area’s weak economy was listed as a prime factor (MDRC
2003). The study found that welfare caseloads declined but that this
began before the implementation of welfare reform measures, suggesting that the economy was the primary impetus for the decline. Although
TANF appeared to increase the exit rate of long-term recipients, former recipients experienced marginal work placements, with pay rates
near minimum wage, few fringe benefits, or only part-time hours. The
percentage of women in the MDRC sample that were neither working
nor receiving welfare doubled with implementation of welfare reform.
Most women faced multiple barriers to working. Nearly three-fourths
of the surveyed women did not have a valid driver’s license or access
to an automobile, which was noted as a sizable barrier considering that
job creation mostly occurred in the suburbs.
Employment outcomes were better for those with a high school diploma, a level not attained by nearly 50 percent of the sampled women.
Some good news was that the high school completion rate increased in
the 1990s. Despite the dramatic drop in the number of welfare recipients, those who remained on welfare were geographically and socially
isolated from nonrecipients. Yet the MDRC found that social conditions
improved in Philadelphia’s poorest neighborhoods in the 1990s and that
welfare recipients in high-welfare neighborhoods were just as likely as
others to work. Jargowsky (2003, p. 18) reports that the percentage of
people living in neighborhoods with over 40 percent poverty fell by 3.4
percent in the 1990s; during the same decade, the corresponding drops
for blacks and Hispanics were 7.5 and 12.1 percent.
The Philadelphia experience points to the importance of the economy for poverty reduction, particularly during a time of welfare reform.
It also highlights the difficulties for inner-city residents of improving
their economic fortunes in a large, relatively stagnant, increasingly dis-
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persed metro area. Increased employment and lower poverty are likely
to follow when there is increased job creation in the inner city, more
education, or reduced barriers for inner-city residents to gain access to
jobs in growing suburbs through commuting or relocating.
Phoenix
The city of Phoenix is located within the Phoenix-Mesa metropolitan area, which consists of Maricopa and Pinal counties. Its 2000 population of 3,251,876 people made it the twelfth largest metro area in the
nation. It grew 45.3 percent in the 1990s, eighth fastest among the 316
MSAs in our sample. Only two of the seven metro areas that grew faster
than Phoenix-Mesa had populations over one million—Las Vegas, Nevada, and Austin–San Marcos, Texas.
Except for a few neighborhoods in South Phoenix, the entire metro
area experienced robust growth in the 1990s; the fastest growth (53.8
percent) occurred in the suburbs (Brookings Institution 2003b). The
city of Phoenix registered a population of 1,321,045 in the 2000 census,
making it the sixth largest city in the nation (Perry and Mackun 2001).
And Phoenix grew 34 percent in the 1990s, making it the fastest growing city among the 10 largest U.S. cities.
Arecent Brookings Institution (2003b) study highlights several notable
characteristics of Phoenix MSA residents. Approximately three-fourths
were employed in the four central cities (Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale,
and Tempe). Slightly over 30 percent of the metro population moved
there during the five years prior to the census. About one in five residents were foreign-born, which is about the same share as in the 100
largest U.S. cities. However, the number of foreign-born residents tripled in the 1990s, which meant that 6 of 10 foreign-born residents arrived in the 1990s. Thus, only one in five of the foreign-born residents
were naturalized citizens, and three-fourths of the foreign-born originated from Mexico. In contrast to the Dallas and Denver MSAs, more
immigrants resided in the city of Phoenix than in its suburbs. Phoenix’s high immigration rate contributed to a younger, less educated, and
poorer population. Yet nearly two-thirds of its adults were in the labor
force. Immigration from Mexico during the 1990s grew the Latino population share from one-fifth to over one-third. Those over 64 years old
disproportionately resided in the suburbs.
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Despite the high immigration rate, during the 1989–1999 period
median household income in the metro area grew from $30,797 to
$44,752, a 45 percent increase, while the poverty rate declined from
12.3 to 12.0 percent. This was accompanied by a decrease in the unemployment rate from 6.0 to 3.1 percent. The poverty rate was 13.4
percent in the cities of Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Tempe, and 9.6
percent outside these cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b).
Moreover, the number of people that lived in neighborhoods with
extreme poverty—again, defined as those with a rate in excess of 40
percent—declined by 829, which when combined with population
growth resulted in a reduction from 15.2 to 10.5 percent of the MSA
population living in such areas (Jargowsky 2003, p. 18). Even the town
of Guadalupe in Maricopa County, which then–Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo described during a visit as an
example of extreme poverty in America, saw its person poverty rate decline from 40.1 percent in 1989 to 26.7 percent in 1999 (Herbert 1999;
U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Yet the number of neighborhoods defined
as having extreme poverty increased from 27 to 30 over the period
(Jargowsky 2003, p. 18). Most of the commuting occurred from central
city to central city (57.3 percent); 18.4 percent occurred from suburb to
central city, and 14.5 percent between suburbs (Brookings Institution
2003b).
Median household income grew 40.6 percent in the city of Phoenix from 1989 to 1999. In contrast to the metropolitan area, where it
dropped slightly, poverty in the city of Phoenix increased from 14.2 to
15.8 percent during 1989–1999. Related child poverty also ratcheted
up, from 20.0 to 21.0 percent over the period. In that same time, unemployment declined only 1.0 point, to 5.6 percent, which was less than
for the entire metro area (Brookings Institution 2003b).
In November 1995, Arizona implemented a set of welfare reforms
through federal waivers to the AFDC program. The reforms were called
EMPOWER—Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (Mills et al. 2001, p. 1). Except for exemptions to
work requirements, most of the reforms were along the lines of those
that later became part of the federal welfare reform implemented in
August 1997. An evaluation of a sample of Phoenix metropolitan area
welfare recipients when EMPOWER was implemented reveals that,
while caseloads decreased dramatically and earned income increased
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significantly, total household income did not increase, as earned income
simply replaced reductions in cash assistance and Food Stamps (Mills
et al. 2001, p.8). In addition, caseloads had begun to decrease before the
implementation of welfare reform measures, suggesting the economy
was partly responsible for caseload reductions (p. 15). For example,
metro unemployment declined from a peak of 6.6 percent annual unemployment in 1992 to 3.5 percent by 1995, eventually reaching a low
of 2.7 percent in 2000 (BLS 2006a). The reasons listed by welfare recipients for not working included illness, disability, or a desire to stay
at home to care for their children (Mills et al. 2001, p. 2). This further
points to the benefits of a strong economy for implementing welfare
reform, as well as a continuing need to improve child care supports.
The case of Phoenix points to the antipoverty benefits of strong
growth in a metropolitan area. Yet the poverty rate in the city of Phoenix increased, as did the number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in
the metro area. Thus, growth is not a panacea for reducing poverty.
Overall metro area improvement may mask persistent pockets of poverty and countertrends within it, particularly for an area experiencing
high immigration rates of younger and less-educated cohorts. Even in
the midst of this robust growth, welfare reform appears to be more effective at reducing welfare caseloads and increasing self-sufficiency
than at reducing poverty.

A Policy Framework to Alleviate
Metropolitan Poverty
The findings in this chapter reinforce the conclusion that the underlying causes of poverty have a strong element of place. Not only are
average poverty rates about two-thirds higher in central counties than
in suburban counties, but the gap actually widened slightly in the 1990s.
Besides these differences, the underlying determinants, such as for job
growth, can differ. The influence of labor market conditions is even
affected by county racial composition. The strong persistence of both
place and person poverty rates suggest that policies need to be tailored
to fit the community.
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One conclusion is that job creation in central counties can help reduce poverty rates, especially when there are greater African American
population shares. To be sure, job growth can mitigate poverty rates in
suburban counties with high non–African American population shares
as well, but its effects in such cases are more limited. Simple job growth
will likely be ineffective when there are large shares of Hispanics. Nevertheless, in the cases where employment growth has been identified as
being effective, we must ask what the optimal way is to achieve it.
The conventional way of encouraging economic growth is through
various incentives and business tax breaks.26 For across-the-board tax
breaks at the state or regional level, Bartik (1991, 2004) contends that
lost tax revenue can be justified through enhanced economic activity,
especially when there are underutilized workers and infrastructure. Yet
our analysis suggests that incentives need to be geographically targeted.
Since the early 1980s, a common method to target economic growth
in a local area has been through various types of enterprise zones. The
incentives are typically state corporate-tax credits for investment and
jobs, as well as local property-tax abatements (Peters and Fisher 2002).
These incentives can be used in conjunction with customized training
and the provision of infrastructure. Initially, enterprise zones were only
utilized by states and localities, but in 1993 the federal government began to implement enterprise zones with the Empowerment Zone and
Enterprise Community Act, passed that year.
Enterprise zones are typically located in distressed communities or
neighborhoods (Peters and Fisher 2002). A key feature is that their incentives are aimed at encouraging firms to locate in particular places
that have seen economic distress, but they generally provide few incentives to actually employ the specific residents of these distressed
zones. For this and other reasons, spatially targeted enterprise zones
have come under attack in recent years.
Peters and Fisher provide the most cogent criticism of enterprise
zones. First, they argue that they are expensive: using early 1990s data,
they find that the present discounted value of subsidies costs at least
$52,000 per induced job (Peters and Fisher 2002, p. 230). Peters and
Fisher argue that more cost-effective programs could be developed for
disadvantaged workers, including programs that raise their skill level
and enhance their mobility. A second criticism the authors level at a
typical enterprise zone is that it has a design flaw that usually favors
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the use of capital over labor, which runs counter to the goal of hiring
disadvantaged workers. Third, they say that in the 75 enterprise zones
they examined, the vast majority of zone residents worked outside of
the zone, while the vast majority of those working in the zone resided
outside of it. The diffusion of economic activity has already been discussed in the case of generic job creation. This disappointing outcome
likely relates to the lack of restrictions that would force firms to hire
residents of the enterprise zones. Overall, Peters and Fisher contend
that it is much better to focus efforts on directly helping the people in
need rather than on targeting firms.27
Notwithstanding, we believe an effective policy aimed at reducing poverty rates must have some orientation toward place in terms of
creating more job opportunities in distressed areas. Our primary rationale is that poverty rates are geographically persistent and low-income
households are less mobile. Indeed, there is evidence that high-poverty areas actually have net in-migration of low-income households,
which further exacerbates the already high poverty rates (Nord 1998).28
Although efforts to induce residential relocation and enhance reverse
commuting in urban areas have potential benefits, we are skeptical that
they ever can be sufficiently implemented to make an appreciable dent
in poverty. By contrast, our evidence indicates that certain types of job
growth can reduce poverty. Moreover, the evidence suggests that while
standard business tax incentives have modest impacts at the state level,
they have far larger impacts at the intrametropolitan level.29 Intrametropolitan development efforts have been criticized because it is presumed they primarily redistribute growth within the region. But this is
precisely the goal in this case. Simply redistributing growth can reduce
overall poverty in the broader region. Chapter 9 will provide more specific recommendations for antipoverty policies.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined trends in inter- and intrametropolitan
poverty rates found by comparing the 1990 and 2000 censuses. We use
basic descriptive statistics to conduct regression analysis. The primary
findings can be summarized under the following six headings:
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1. The lowest and highest metropolitan area poverty rates shifted west during the 1990s. The lowest metropolitan poverty rates in
1989 occurred near New York City, while the highest poverty rates were
in the Deep South and Texas. By 1999, the lowest MSA poverty rates
were typically found in the Upper Midwest, and the highest were found
in Texas and in southern and central California.
2. Across small, medium, and large metropolitan areas, there
were considerable geographical disparities. Among large MSAs, the
lowest 1999 poverty rates tended to be in the Northeast. The lowest
poverty rates in small and medium-sized MSAs tended to be more dispersed—in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and the Midwest. Among the 61
largest metropolitan areas, the two biggest—New York and Los Angeles—had the first- and fourth-highest poverty rates in 1999. Across all
MSA size groupings, many of the highest poverty rates in 1999 were
clustered in the Deep and Middle South, Texas, central and southern
California, and a sampling of college-town MSAs. The largest metropolitan poverty rate declines occurred in some of these same places:
the South, Texas, and certain college towns. In what likely reflects a
rebound in the Rust Belt’s economic fortunes, there were also large
declines in metropolitan areas in Michigan.
3. There are clear socioeconomic patterns for high and low poverty rate metropolitan areas. The largest poverty rate decreases consistently occurred in MSAs that had lower unemployment rates in 2000
than in 1990. Higher shares of both minorities and recent immigrants
were associated with higher poverty rates, but this was not universal.
There was a strong positive link between greater shares of the population that did not complete high school and higher metropolitan poverty
rates.
4. The labor market linkages within metropolitan areas differ
between central-city and suburban counties. With the exception of
male unemployment rates, MSA-county poverty rates tend to be less
affected by labor market conditions. Further investigation suggests that
suburban county poverty rates are less affected by new job growth,
while central county rates are less affected by labor supply tightness
measures such as male unemployment and female employment rates.
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Hence, new jobs are critical in centralized cores, and efforts to increase
labor market participation and reduce the length of job searches are
more appropriate in suburban counties.
5. The racial and ethnic composition of the metropolitan counties modifies how labor market conditions affect poverty rates. Job
growth reduced poverty rates more in central counties with greater African American population shares. There was evidence that in metro
counties with larger Hispanic population shares, stronger labor markets
had smaller poverty rate–reducing effects, especially in the suburbs.
6. Programs aimed at reducing poverty rates need a targeting
mechanism for the most distressed communities. We argue that a set
of targeted efforts to reduce poverty in distressed urban cores is a necessary component of an effective antipoverty policy. These efforts should
focus more on central counties with high African American population
shares. They should also target residents of the zones rather than encourage firms to locate there. Examples of possible programs that fit
these criteria are described in Chapter 9.
We conclude that, in general, metropolitan counties are not dramatically different from other counties. Yet they do vary in terms of the role
played by labor market conditions, as well as in terms of other factors
such as the influence of female-headed families. Moreover, place-based
policies appear to be necessary, but they need to be carefully targeted
to certain parts of metropolitan areas, and they need to consider racial
composition. More sparsely populated nonmetro counties are also likely to have unique trends that call for their own tailored policies. That is
the topic of the next chapter.
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Notes
The epigraph at the start of the chapter comes from Herbert (1999).
1. Long-term recipients are defined as those who have accumulated 48 months of
assistance towards the federal five-year time limit.
2. In Berube and Frey’s (2002) analysis, “central city” is defined as the largest or
best-known city in the MSA. Besides not counting as many central cities in their
definition as we do, they do not include the inner-ring suburbs that are included
in our central-county definition. As noted in Chapter 2, our suburban definition
better reflects the newer, more vibrant suburbs at the exurban edge. The formal
definition of a metropolitan area is given in Figure A.1.
3. A census track is a reasonably homogenous grouping set up by the U.S. Census
Bureau and has about 4,000 people on average. Jargowsky (2003) provides more
discussion on the 40 percent poverty rate threshold and on high poverty rate
metropolitan-area census tracks.
4. Berube and Frey (2002) also find regional distinctions in poverty rate changes
for central cities and suburbs during the 1990s. Rust Belt and south Texas central
cities fared well, but northeastern and California cities did not. Southern suburbs
tended to fare well, while suburbs in New England, New York, and California
tended to fare poorly.
5. By comparison, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) reports that the consumer price index increased by 34.4 percent between 1989 and 1999. Data can be
accessed from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006e) Web site at http://data
.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu (accessed March 30, 2006). Note that there is a
composition effect, as the precise high- and low-poverty-rate metropolitan areas
changed between the decades, but this pattern still illustrates trends between the
two categories.
6. Slower population growth and greater recent immigration shares in areas with
rising poverty rates are consistent with native out-migration, which likely mitigated any further poverty rate increases that would have occurred otherwise.
7. The regression coefficients were consistently estimated with less precision when
using MSA-level observations. One likely cause is that there are only 316 MSA
observations, while there are 824 metropolitan counties. Also, as indicated in
Chapter 2, aggregating metropolitan area counties into one MSA-level observation loses much of the intra-MSA variation that improves the precision of the
results. Finally, we also would lose the richness of being able to separately consider central counties and suburban counties.
8. Key descriptive statistics are reported in Table 7.7. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A.
9. The interpretation of the county-type results differs from Chapter 6 because the
omitted county group is now single-county MSAs—in other words, the centralcity and suburban coefficients are measured relative to the effects of a singleMSA county. The results show no clear evidence that big or small metropolitan
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area central counties have different poverty rates than single-county MSAs, ceteris paribus.
The metropolitan area population coefficient equals 9.94e − 8 (t = 2.48). Conversely, the county population coefficient is insignificant, further indicating that
in MSAs it is the size of the entire metropolitan area that limits employment access.
The 1995–2000 employment growth coefficient is only significant at the 20 percent level.
In Table A.1, a one standard deviation change in the overall female employmentpopulation rate equals 6.9 percentage points, and the corresponding change in
the overall 1999 male unemployment rate equals 2.9 percentage points.
When the percent of the population that immigrated to the United States between
1990–1995 and 1995–2000 is added to the metropolitan model, the racial and
ethnic share variables became even more inversely related to poverty rates (not
shown). The 1995–2000 immigrant share result suggests that a one-percentagepoint greater share immigrating in the five-year period increases the MSA-county poverty rate by just over a quarter of a percentage point (t = 2.91). As before,
the 1990–1995 immigrant share is insignificant in the 1999 model and both of the
corresponding immigrant shares are insignificant when added to the 1989 MSAcounty model.
In interpreting the results, recall that there are 139 metropolitan areas that are
each located in a single county and are thus classified as central county MSAs.
As shown in Table 7.6 and the corresponding results in Chapter 6, poverty rates
in single-county MSAs are essentially the same as central county poverty rates
(ceteris paribus). While these MSAs may appear to differ because they are smaller and more suburban than other central-county MSAs, they are similar in terms
of poverty rates. Specifically, the 1989 average poverty rate in single-county
MSAs equals 14.5 percent (std. dev. = 6.0) and the average equals 13.5 percent
(std. dev. = 5.3) in 1999. This compares to the overall population-weighted average central county poverty rate of 13.3 percent in 1989 and 13.2 percent in 1999
(from columns (4) and (9) of Table 2.2).
A “half-life” refers to the period of time that elapses before one-half of the effect
of a shock dissipates.
To examine whether job growth has additional indirect effects through affecting
unemployment and employment rates, the quasireduced form model was estimated. It indicates that the direct and indirect effects of job growth through unemployment and employment rates are about one-third greater than these direct
figures (not shown).
Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2003) report that the prevalence of medium- and
high-paying jobs for disadvantaged persons tends to be concentrated in central
counties. But the overall lack of nearby job creation remains a concern.
The share of the population that immigrated to the United States between 1995
and 2000 equaled 2.0 percent (std. dev. = 1.9) in central counties and 1.0 percent
(std. dev. = 1.2) in suburban counties. Note that this migration pattern is consistent with foreign immigrants locating in central county enclaves where there are
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already well-established immigrant communities, rather than individual immigrants choosing to locate where there are greater job opportunities, which would
have implied a greater likelihood of locating in the suburbs.
The results suggest that greater 1990–1995 immigrant shares had no statistical
impact on either suburban or central county poverty rates.When the shares of the
population that immigrated to the United States between 1980–1985 and 1985–
1990 were added to the 1989 central-county and suburban models, they had an
insignificant impact.
To assess this issue, we examined African American migration and residentialchoice decisions during the 1990s. We focused on this group because their population share should be much less confounded by new immigrants than the Hispanic or other-minority population shares. Specifically, we regressed the change
in African American population shares between 1990 and 2000 on the share of
the population that immigrated to the United States between 1990–1995 and
1995–2000, on the beginning 1990 African American population share, and on
the county’s 1990 population. Focusing on the 1995–2000 immigration share,
for central counties there appears to be almost a one-for-one inverse tradeoff
between the change in the African American population share and the recent
immigrant share (significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level). This relationship applies regardless of whether the regression is or is not weighted by
the 1990 county population. Hence, African American location decisions almost
completely offset recent immigration patterns in central counties, which helps
explain why central county rates on balance were unaffected by recent immigration. Conversely, there is little statistical evidence that the change in the African
American suburban population share is related to the 1995–2000 recent immigrant share. The lack of an African American migration response in suburban
counties is consistent with a greater supply of low-skilled workers competing
for suburban jobs (which likely increased unemployment and reduced wages for
low-skilled groups).
The F-statistic suggests the three interactions are jointly significant at about the
0.05 level in both cases.
The race and ethnic shares are measured in percentages. For a county with a 10
percent share of one of the groups, one calculates the influence of job growth by
multiplying the interaction coefficient by 10 and adding that value to the main
employment growth (or unemployment rate, or employment-population rate) coefficient. Hence, in counties with large minority population shares, employment
growth’s overall effect can vary considerably from the average result.
These racial effects can be rather large. In a suburban county, a 2.9-percentagepoint increase in the male unemployment rate increases the poverty rate by about
0.65 points when the Hispanic population share is zero (and the other minority
shares are assumed to be zero), but it reduces the poverty rate when the Hispanic population share rises above 7.7 percent. In this simulation, the other-race
population shares are assumed to be zero for ease of presentation. In reality, the
other-race group shares will be greater than zero and their corresponding effect
will be added to the total effect.
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24. A study of a four-county region that includes Lawrence and Morgan counties
reports that monthly welfare caseloads dropped from 1,577 in 1993 to 1,167 in
1996 and to 645 in 1998, a 59 percent decline in five years (Farrell, Opcin, and
Fishman 2001).
25. U.S. Census Bureau Summary File 3 (SF3) files from the 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Follow same link to SF3 files for all later  
text citations of U.S. Census Bureau (2006b) in this chapter.
26. A general overview of the various business incentives can be found in Bartik
(1991, 2001, 2004) and in Fisher (2004).
27. The Peters and Fisher (2002) view appears to reflect a large share of the economic and public-policy profession. However, a recent, widely cited study by
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) suggests that blockbuster incentive packages
(e.g., Chicago’s efforts to lure Boeing) are economically worthwhile (see Fisher
[2004] for a critique).
28. In terms of central counties, we are also concerned by evidence that job growth
increasingly became more distant from African American residences in the 1990s
(Raphael and Stoll 2002).
29. The general rule of thumb in the literature is that a 10 percent decrease in business taxes increases economic activity in a state by about 2–3 percent, while the
same 10 percent reduction in a small suburb’s taxes increases economic activity
10–30 percent (see Bartik 1991, p. 43; 2004; Fisher 2004). In more-populated
central counties, it is less clear whether tax cuts will have as large of an impact on
business location decisions (Bartik 2004). However, in heavily populated metropolitan areas with relatively small central cities (e.g., Atlanta), a tax cut in the
central city would be much more effective because that area is just one of several
possible business locations.
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Poverty in Rural America
Some of the same signs of despair and breakdown that wore out aging
American industrial cities in the 1960s have come to the rural plains.
Among teenagers, there is now a higher level of illicit drug use in rural areas than in cities or suburbs, recent surveys indicate. The middle
class is dwindling, leaving pockets of hard poverty amid large agribusinesses supported by taxpayers.
—Timothy Egan, “Amid Dying Towns of Rural Plains, One Makes a
Stand,” New York Times, December 1, 2003
Fundamental structural changes in technology, markets, and organizations are redrawing our nation’s economic map and leaving many rural
areas behind.
—Robert D. Atkinson, Reversing Rural America’s Economic Decline, Progressive Policy Institute, 2004
Chapter 7 showed that larger population and other characteristics
help produce different poverty rate patterns and dynamics for metropolitan areas than for the nation as a whole. Low population densities and
differing demographic characteristics also suggest that nonmetropolitan
patterns may vary from national patterns. These variations likely mean
that nonmetro regions have different commuting patterns and responses
to job growth, which translate into different poverty rates. As reported
in Table A.1, average nonmetro county poverty rates were more than 6
percentage points higher than metro county poverty rates in 1989, and
more than 4 points higher in 1999. Yet these averages obscure tremendous diversity in poverty rates across nonmetro counties.1 Some nonmetro counties in the Northeast and Midwest possess very low poverty
rates, while others, such as those in the South, have persistently high
poverty rates. This chapter assesses the underlying causes of higher
nonmetropolitan poverty rates as well the sources of nonmetro counties’ tremendous diversity.
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What is Different About Rural or
Nonmetropolitan Counties?
What Is Rural?
The meaning of the word “rural” is ambiguous and is regularly applied in confusing or contradictory ways that often depend on the user’s
purpose or agenda. The U.S. Census Bureau defines rural areas as being
those with less than 500 people per square mile (Box 8.1). The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service says “rural areas
comprise open country and settlements with fewer than 2,500 residents”
(ERS 2004a). However, this latter definition means that relatively small
towns and communities would be classified as “urban,” which would
be misleading in most cases and would be inconsistent with popular notions. Thus, we follow the convention of referring to nonmetropolitan
counties as rural, and we will use the two terms interchangeably.
Chapter 7 describes how metropolitan areas comprise economically
linked counties surrounding an urbanized area of at least 50,000 people.
Outlying counties are included when a 25 percent commuting threshold
is surpassed. Nonmetro counties are the remaining counties. In 2003,
the federal government divided nonmetro counties into noncore and
micropolitan areas.2 Micropolitan areas include an urbanized cluster of
at least 10,000 people but less than 50,000, while outlying counties are
included if the 25 percent commuting threshold is exceeded (Box A.1).
Micropolitan counties now account for approximately 60 percent
of the nonmetropolitan population. During the 1990s, population in
these counties grew about 10 percent on average, compared to about
8 percent for the less-populated noncore rural counties. Average metro
county population grew about 14 percent (ERS 2004b). So while rural
areas grew less than metropolitan counties during the 1990s, it should
be noted that even noncore rural counties experienced almost doubledigit growth on average. Yet there is tremendous diversity within that
category, as many noncore rural counties suffered significant population loss during the decade.
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Box 8.1 Official Definitions of Rural and Urban
The following is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004f) Web
page “Census 2000 Urban and Rural Classification”:
Urban and Rural Classification
For Census 2000, Census Bureau classifies as “urban” all territory, population, and housing units located within an urbanized area
(UA) or an urban cluster (UC). It delineates UA and UC boundaries
to encompass densely settled territory, which consists of
• core census block groups or blocks that have a population
density of at least 1,000 people per square mile, and
• surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at
least 500 people per square mile.
In addition, under certain conditions, less densely settled territory may be part of each UA or UC.
The Census Bureau’s classification of “rural” consists of all territory, population, and housing units located outside of UAs and
UCs. The rural component contains both place and nonplace territory. Geographic entities, such as census tracts, counties, metropolitan areas, and the territory outside metropolitan areas, often are
“split” between urban and rural territory, and the population and
housing units they contain often are partly classified as urban and
partly classified as rural.

Distinctions in Rural Labor Markets and Demographics
Nonmetropolitan counties possess several distinguishing povertyrelated characteristics. For one thing, depending on household size, the
official poverty rate threshold is a fixed nominal dollar figure for each
year that applies across the country. Yet rural areas are estimated to have
a 16 percent lower cost of living than urban areas, primarily because of
lower housing costs, though housing costs alone would overstate the
rural/urban difference in cost of living (Nord 2000). A lower cost of
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living means that rural poverty rates are generally overstated relative to
urban areas. Low-income rural residents are also believed to be more
reliant on informal economic arrangements in which individuals agree
to do unpaid work for each other, which also suggests that measured
rural poverty rates are overstated (Harvey et al. 2002).3
Despite these advantages, low-income nonmetropolitan residents
can suffer from the effects of living in an area with low population density. Low population density means that workers may have to commute
long distances for work. Commuting is further hampered by the lack of
public transportation, making owning a reliable automobile paramount.
Small population and low density can limit the quantity and quality
of child care; licensed centers are especially scarce in poor nonmetropolitan areas (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001; Whitener, Weber, and
Duncan 2002). Child care solutions are further complicated because
workers may have to travel longer distances not only to work but also
to their care provider. Key social services for training, disabilities, and
health care are also more dispersed or, worse yet, nonexistent. Hence,
rural low-income families and households that are already under tremendous stress may find it more difficult to escape poverty.
Rural labor markets have offsetting factors that both hinder and
improve the well being of low-income households. On one hand, we
expect that job growth has stronger poverty-reducing effects in rural
communities, especially when those communities are more isolated.
This follows because rural migration and commuting responses are
relatively muted in response to labor demand shocks compared to such
responses in metro areas (Renkow 2003; Renkow and Hoover 2000).
If fewer commuters and migrants take the new jobs, more of the jobs
go to disadvantaged rural residents. One reason for this outcome may
be that potential workers are less informed about a given rural county’s
economic conditions, while a larger metro area’s economic conditions
(e.g., Las Vegas’s) may be well known. For example, in the case of a
city with 1 million total jobs and a town with a total of 1,000 jobs, it
would be big news if a new firm created 10,000 jobs in the city (1 percent of the city’s employment), but it would hardly be known outside
of the county if a new firm created 10 jobs in the small rural town (1
percent of the town’s jobs). Relocation costs are also greater between
urban and remote regions than between urban and nearby suburban or
exurban communities.
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On the other hand, despite higher shares of poor rural female heads
that work either part-time or full-time, there is a larger share of single
working mothers who are in poverty in rural areas than in metro areas
(Lichter and Jensen 2002). Moreover, nonmetro residents tend to have
less educational attainment than their metro counterparts (see Table
A.1). There is a considerably higher share of the rural adult population
that did not complete high school, and there is a lower share with a college degree. Finally, reliance on agriculture and other extractive industries may exacerbate rural poverty rates (Brown and Warner 1991).
It is not surprising that with lower average education and lower cost
of living, rural wages are considerably below the metropolitan average.
For example, in 1993, average nonmetropolitan wages were about 72
percent of the average MSA wage, and by 2001 they had fallen to 66
percent.4 For nonemployed rural residents, finding a suitable employment match is further hindered because low population density reduces
the diversity of job opportunities, meaning that a person may find it
harder to obtain a job that requires his or her particular skill set (Gibbs
2002). Nevertheless, smaller communities may facilitate the formation
of informal labor market networks that help low-income residents identify a larger share of suitable employment opportunities over a wider
geographical area. Simply put, in small communities, disadvantaged
persons may be more likely to personally know someone employed at
the nearby firms that are hiring workers.
Overall Trends in Rural Poverty Rates
Poverty rates in rural areas have historically been higher than in
urban centers. In the late 1950s, nonmetropolitan poverty rates were almost 20 percentage points higher.5 But over the next 15 years rural poverty rates declined so dramatically that by the mid-1970s the gap was
less than 5 points. The gap somewhat increased in the 1980s because of
the economic fallout in the resource and farm sectors, but subsequent
improvements in the rural economy reduced the gap to 3.1 percentage
points in 2001.
In that year, nonmetropolitan poverty tended not only to be highest
in the South, at 17.6 percent, but the gap between rural and metropolitan poverty rates was also greatest in that region of the country, at 5.4
percentage points (ERS 2004a). The West had the second-highest rates
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in both categories, followed by the Northeast. The Midwest’s nonmetro
poverty rate was only 9.8 percent, and the rural/metropolitan gap was
a barely perceptible 0.6 percentage points. Among racial groups, the
rural/metropolitan poverty gap was largest among black non-Hispanics
(at more than 10 percentage points) and “other” minorities (at about
13 points). The metro/nonmetro gap was only 3 percentage points for
Hispanics.
Another trait is the persistence of pockets of extreme rural poverty.
The Economic Research Service of the USDA uses a 20 percent threshold in defining a high poverty county. Miller and Weber (2004) report
that out of just over 3,000 counties, a remarkable 382 had 20 percent
or greater poverty rates in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 (using
income from the year preceding the decennial census). Only 19 of these
are metropolitan area counties. The remaining 363 persistent-poverty
counties are nonmetropolitan, and 229 of them are not adjacent to an
MSA. There are 2,248 total nonmetropolitan counties. Thus, about onesixth (363 out of 2,248) rural counties have struggled with consistently
high poverty for at least the last 40 years.
Figures 2.8 through 2.12 showed the tremendous diversity in nonmetropolitan poverty outcomes over the 1979–1999 period. The pockets of highest rural poverty are generally found in the Southeast, and
the lowest nonmetro poverty rates are centered in the northern Great
Plains and the Upper Midwest. Further illustrating the diversity, by
1999 there were even pockets of low poverty in the Piedmont regions
of North Carolina and Virginia, despite those areas being near high poverty counties. In the 1979–1999 span, rural poverty increased the most
in the Mountain and Pacific states; it also rose in central Appalachia and
New England. The largest reductions occurred in the Upper Midwest
and the Southeast. Highlighting the tremendous variations that occurred
even among stronger performing states like Iowa, there were isolated
counties that experienced marked increases in poverty rates.
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Characteristics of High and Low Poverty Rate
Rural Counties
Tables 8.1 (for 1999) and 8.2 (for 1989) present the 15 counties with
the lowest and the highest poverty rates among the 2,248 nonmetropolitan counties.6 The counties in the bottom half of the two tables were
all among the 363 persistently high nonmetro poverty rate counties
over the 1959–1999 period. Illustrating the depths of their problems,
all 15 of these counties were just at or above the 40 percent poverty rate
threshold used by federal agencies to define chronically high poverty
rates for not counties but neighborhoods.
Focusing on the 1999 patterns in Table 8.1, we see that the 15 lowest
poverty rate counties were geographically dispersed. In contrast, the 15
highest poverty rate counties were located in or near Native American
Indian reservations, areas with high concentrations of African Americans or Hispanics, and predominantly white areas of Appalachia. The
15 lowest poverty rate counties tended to have more inhabitants. Compared to the highest poverty rate counties, the lowest poverty rate counties generally have lower minority population shares, more than twice
the median household income, considerably lower population shares
that did not complete high school, and an average unemployment rate
about 13 percentage points lower than in the highest poverty rate counties. Very often, a majority of the population in the highest poverty rate
counties were members of national minority populations. Nevertheless,
there is diversity even among the highest poverty rate counties. For
example, the two Appalachian counties had very few minorities. In another example, Brooks County, Texas, and Owsley County, Kentucky,
did not suffer from exceedingly high unemployment rates.
Tables 8.3 (for 1999) and 8.4 (for 1989) report the 10 lowest and
highest nonmetropolitan county poverty rates for the 984 counties adjacent to a metropolitan area, for the 1,264 counties not adjacent to a
metropolitan area, and for the 243 nonadjacent counties that had a 2000
population of less than 5,000 (using 2000 population to ensure comparability across decades).7 As before, the counties in the highest poverty
rate group all were persistently high poverty counties.
Concentrating on the 1999 figures in Table 8.3, we see that the distinguishing characteristics between the lowest and the highest poverty
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Rank/Non-MSA countya
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
2 Elbert County
3 Gilpin County
4 Litchfield County
5 Union County
6 Grundy County
7 McLeod County
8 Piatt County
9 Iowa County
10 Bremer County
11 Scott County
12 Green County
13 Wasatch County
14 Morgan County
15 Columbia County

State

(1)
Poverty
rate
1989

TX
CO
CO
CT
OH
IO
MN
IL
IO
IO
KS
WI
UT
UT
WI

0.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.6
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.0
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.2
5.2

(2)
Population
1990

(3)
%
minority
1990

(4)
Median hh.
income
1989 ($)

(5)
% education
< 12 yrs.
1990

(6)
Unempl.
rate
1990

67
19,872
4,757
182,193
40,909
12,369
34,898
16,365
15,671
23,325
5,120
33,647
15,215
7,129
52,468

17.9
4.6
7.3
4.1
4.5
0.9
3.1
1.7
1.0
1.9
3.5
1.7
5.1
2.0
3.0

40,000
62,480
51,942
56,273
51,743
39,396
45,953
45,752
41,222
40,826
40,534
43,228
49,612
50,273
45,064

13.7
7.5
5.9
14.1
14.0
13.5
15.3
11.3
13.0
12.3
15.5
15.9
10.7
7.4
13.8

0.0
2.4
2.1
3.8
2.3
3.6
3.8
2.9
2.3
5.8
2.2
3.2
4.3
3.8
3.5
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Table 8.1 Highest and Lowest Nonmetropolitan County Poverty Rates, 1999
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Highest poverty levelb
Bennett County
Sioux County
Clay County
Wilcox County
Brooks County
East Carroll Parish
Corson County
Holmes County
Zavala County
Owsley County
Todd County
Ziebach County
Starr County
Shannon County
Buffalo County

SD
ND
KY
AL
TX
LA
SD
MS
TX
KY
SD
SD
TX
SD
SD

39.2
39.2
39.7
39.9
40.2
40.5
41.0
41.1
41.8
45.4
48.3
49.9
50.9
52.3
56.9

3,574
4,044
24,556
13,183
7,976
9,421
4,181
21,609
11,600
4,858
9,050
2,519
53,597
12,466
2,032

58.6
83.2
6.4
72.6
24.3
68.7
62.3
79.6
35.5
0.9
86.2
73.5
12.0
95.0
83.3

25,313
22,483
16,271
16,646
18,622
20,723
20,654
17,235
16,844
15,805
20,035
18,063
16,504
20,916
12,692

28.7
21.5
50.6
40.5
50.1
42.1
24.0
40.3
56.6
50.8
25.9
28.6
65.3
30.0
36.1

10.5
23.3
10.7
15.2
8.5
15.0
13.2
17.3
16.7
8.8
18.4
17.4
20.9
33.0
21.7

NOTE: All 1999 Non-MSA unweighted avg. poverty rates = 15.4 (std. dev. = 6.7); avg. lowest pov. = 4.5; avg. highest pov. = 44.4. Poverty
rates and median household income are measured for 1999 and the other variables are for 2000, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Percent
minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Nonmetropolitan-area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b
All counties on this page are persistent-poverty counties, defined as having a 20 percent or higher poverty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989,
and 1999.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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2234
2235
2236
2237
2238
2239
2240
2241
2242
2243
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248
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(5)
% education
< 12 yrs.
1990

(6)
Unempl.
rate
1990

44.0
19.1
16.8
16.5
21.0
10.6
22.5
17.0
27.8
18.6
5.3
19.6
33.3
18.2
24.1

0.0
4.7
5.9
0.5
4.8
2.1
3.8
4.4
3.2
3.2
3.4
6.9
2.7
3.0
7.7

31.7
48.7

23.0
10.1
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Table 8.2 Highest and Lowest Nonmetropolitan County Poverty Rates, 1989
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Poverty
%
Median hh.
rate
Population minority
income
Rank/Non-MSA countiesa
State
1989
1990
1990
1989 ($)
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
TX
0.0
107
16.8
26,563
2 Litchfield County
CT
4.0
174,092
2.1
42,565
3 Merrimack County
NH
5.5
120,005
1.3
35,801
4 Clark County
KS
5.6
2,418
3.4
24,003
5 Steuben County
IN
5.6
27,446
0.8
29,203
6 Nantucket County
MA
5.7
6,012
2.8
40,331
7 Putnam County
OH
5.8
33,819
1.8
32,492
8 Piatt County
IL
6.1
15,548
0.2
31,369
9 Dubois County
IN
6.1
36,616
0.5
31,227
10 Roberts County
TX
6.2
1,025
2.8
30,203
11 Pitkin County
CO
6.3
12,661
3.4
39,991
12 Belknap County
NH
6.5
49,216
0.7
31,474
13 Moore County
TN
6.5
4,721
3.9
28,056
14 York County
NE
6.6
14,428
1.4
25,722
15 Ottawa County
OH
6.6
40,029
2.7
31,360
Highest poverty levelb
2234 Sioux County
ND
47.4
3,761
75.9
14,838
2235 Sharkey County
MS
47.5
7,066
66.7
13,304
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2236
2237
2238
2239
2240
2241
2242
2243
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248

Presidio County
Dimmit County
Issaquena County
Todd County
Zavala County
Maverick County
Ziebach County
Owsley County
Holmes County
East Carroll Parish
Tunica County
Starr County
Shannon County

TX
TX
MS
SD
TX
TX
SD
KY
MS
LA
MS
TX
SD

48.1
48.9
49.3
50.2
50.4
50.4
51.1
52.1
53.2
56.8
56.8
60.0
63.1

6,637
10,433
1,909
8,352
12,162
36,378
2,220
5,036
21,604
9,709
8,164
40,518
9,902

15.7
27.1
56.4
82.9
47.0
34.7
64.4
0.1
76.0
65.3
75.6
38.1
94.9

13,016
12,222
13,005
13,327
11,822
12,262
14,129
8,595
9,809
9,791
10,965
10,182
11,105

56.1
60.2
56.3
32.8
61.4
64.3
37.5
64.5
52.0
50.9
54.1
68.4
40.6

10.3
13.7
10.0
20.6
19.7
21.1
15.6
17.2
15.8
24.1
17.0
18.8
30.5
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NOTE: All 1989 Non-MSA unweighted avg. poverty rates = 18.4 (std. dev. = 8.0); avg. lowest pov. = 5.5; avg. highest pov. = 52.4. Poverty
rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and the other variables for 1990, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their racial group.
a
Nonmetropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b
All counties on this page are persistent-poverty counties, defined as having a 20 percent or higher poverty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989,
and 1999.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Table 8.3 Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates for Adjacent, Nonadjacent, and Small Nonadjacent Nonmetropolitan
Counties, 1999
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Poverty
%
Median hh. % education Unempl.
rate
Population
minority
income
< 12 years
rate
Rank/Non-MSA countya
State
1999
2000
2000
1999 ($)
2000
2000
Adjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Elbert County
CO
4.0
19,872
4.6
62,480
7.5
2.4
2 Gilpin County
CO
4.0
4,757
7.3
51,942
5.9
2.1
3 Litchfield County
CT
4.5
182,193
4.1
56,273
14.1
3.8
4 Union County
OH
4.6
40,909
4.5
51,743
14.0
2.3
5 Grundy County
IO
4.6
12,369
0.9
39,396
13.5
3.6
6 McLeod County
MN
4.8
34,898
3.1
45,953
15.3
3.8
7 Piatt County
IL
5.0
16,365
1.7
45,752
11.3
2.9
8 Iowa County
IO
5.0
15,671
1.0
41,222
13.0
2.3
9 Bremer County
IO
5.1
23,325
1.9
40,826
12.3
5.8
10 Green County
WI
5.1
33,647
1.7
43,228
15.9
3.2
Highest poverty levelb
975 Macon County
AL
32.8
24,105
86.2
21,180
30.0
12.3
976 Luna County
NM
32.9
25,016
25.6
20,784
40.2
17.1
977 Tunica County
MS
33.1
9,227
73.0
23,270
39.5
9.3
978 Willacy County
TX
33.2
20,082
29.4
22,114
51.3
13.8
979 Bullock County
AL
33.5
11,714
73.6
20,605
39.5
8.6

Partridge.indb 231

AL
TX
TX
MS
TX

34.3
35.8
35.8
41.1
50.9

9,974
3,344
12,182
21,609
53,597

81.2
12.8
14.8
79.6
12.0

19,819
21,045
24,635
17,235
16,504

35.2
53.9
46.9
40.3
65.3

13.1
8.2
11.1
17.3
20.9

TX
KS
IN
MI
UT
OH
IL
NE
MI
IO

0.0
5.1
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.8
5.9
6.0

67
5,120
39,674
21,119
921
22,908
6,086
5,639
77,654
16,424

17.9
3.5
2.2
6.3
5.8
2.2
2.4
0.7
3.8
1.1

40,000
40,534
44,169
47,062
30,833
38,839
45,492
37,819
43,169
39,020

13.7
15.5
19.8
9.3
16.3
17.5
16.2
13.4
10.7
10.8

0.0
2.2
2.5
5.0
7.7
2.9
4.9
1.8
4.6
2.8

AL
TX
LA
SD
TX

39.9
40.2
40.5
41.0
41.8

13,183
7,976
9,421
4,181
11,600

72.6
24.3
68.7
62.3
35.5

16,646
18,622
20,723
20,654
16,844

40.5
50.1
42.1
24.0
56.6

15.2
8.5
15.0
13.2
16.7
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980 Greene County
981 Hudspeth County
982 Zapata County
983 Holmes County
984 Starr County
Nonadjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
2 Scott County
3 Dubois County
4 Leelanau County
5 Daggett County
6 Wyandot County
7 Putnam County
8 Polk County
9 Grand Traverse County
10 Dickinson County
Highest poverty levelb
1255 Wilcox County
1256 Brooks County
1257 East Carroll Parish
1258 Corson County
1259 Zavala County
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Rank/Non-MSA countya
Highest poverty level
1260 Owsley County
1261 Todd County
1262 Ziebach County
1263 Shannon County
1264 Buffalo County
Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
2 Daggett County
3 Hooker County
4 Roberts County
5 Hinsdale County
6 Ouray County
7 Logan County
8 Gosper County
9 Wahkiakum County
10 Garfield County

State

(1)
Poverty
rate
1999

KY
SD
SD
SD
SD

TX
UT
NE
TX
CO
CO
KS
NE
WA
UT

(2)
Population
2000

(3)
%
minority
2000

(4)
Median hh.
income
1999 ($)

(5)
(6)
% education Unempl.
< 12 years
rate
2000
2000

45.4
48.3
49.9
52.3
56.9

4,858
9,050
2,519
12,466
2,032

0.9
86.2
73.5
95.0
83.3

15,805
20,035
18,063
20,916
12,692

50.8
25.9
28.6
30.0
36.1

8.8
18.4
17.4
33.0
21.7

0.0
5.5
6.9
7.2
7.2
7.2
7.3
7.9
8.1
8.1

67
921
783
887
790
3,742
3,046
2,143
3,824
4,735

17.9
5.8
2.2
2.1
3.2
3.5
2.5
1.2
6.5
3.8

40,000
30,833
27,868
44,792
37,279
42,019
32,131
36,827
39,444
35,180

13.7
16.3
10.3
10.0
6.9
6.6
13.3
11.1
15.8
14.2

0.0
7.7
1.3
1.3
2.2
3.6
3.8
0.8
8.1
8.1
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Table 8.3 (continued)
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Highest poverty levelb
234 Edwards County
235 Issaquena County
236 Mellette County
237 Jackson County
238 Bennett County
239 Sioux County
240 Corson County
241 Owsley County
242 Ziebach County
243 Buffalo County

TX
MS
SD
SD
SD
ND
SD
KY
SD
SD

31.6
33.2
35.8
36.5
39.2
39.2
41.0
45.4
49.9
56.9

2,162
2,274
2,083
2,930
3,574
4,044
4,181
4,858
2,519
2,032

14.7
63.9
55.1
50.3
58.6
83.2
62.3
0.9
73.5
83.3

25,298
19,936
23,219
23,945
25,313
22,483
20,654
15,805
18,063
12,692

32.9
41.2
21.9
17.3
28.7
21.5
24.0
50.8
28.6
36.1

4.9
13.5
11.5
15.7
10.5
23.3
13.2
8.8
17.4
21.7
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NOTE: Adjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1999 poverty rate = 14.5 (std. dev. = 6.1). Nonadjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1999
poverty rate = 16.1 (std. dev. = 7.0). Small nonadjacent-to-MSA with 2000 pop. < 5,000 unweighted average 1999 poverty rate = 15.8
(std. dev. = 7.2). Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1999 and the other variables for 2000, excluding Alaska
and Hawaii. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a
Nonmetropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b
All counties listed under “highest poverty level” category are persistent-poverty counties, defined as having a 20 percent or higher poverty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999.
c
For consistency, small nonadjacent nonmetropolitan counties are defined as having a population of less than 5,000 in 2000. Note that the
243 small nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Table 8.4 Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates for Adjacent, Nonadjacent, and Small Nonadjacent Nonmetropolitan
Counties, 1989
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Poverty
%
Median hh. % education Unempl.
rate
Population Population minority
income
< 12 years
rate
Rank/Non-MSA countya
State
1989
1990
2000
1990
1989 ($)
1990
1990
Adjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Litchfield County
CT
4.0
174,092
182,193
2.1
42,565
19.1
4.7
2 Merrimack County
NH
5.5
120,005
136,225
1.3
35,801
16.8
5.9
3 Steuben County
IN
5.6
27,446
33,214
0.8
29,203
21.0
4.8
4 Putnam County
OH
5.8
33,819
34,726
1.8
32,492
22.5
3.8
5 Piatt County
IL
6.1
15,548
16,365
0.2
31,369
17.0
4.4
6 Belknap County
NH
6.5
49,216
56,325
0.7
31,474
19.6
6.9
7 Ottawa County
OH
6.6
40,029
40,985
2.7
31,360
24.1
7.7
8 Kosciusko County
IN
6.6
65,294
74,057
1.9
31,666
22.5
3.6
9 Dodge County
WI
6.6
76,559
85,897
2.4
29,166
27.7
4.3
10 Adams County
PA
6.8
78,274
91,292
2.5
30,304
30.0
3.9
b
Highest poverty level
975 Clay County
WV
39.2
9,983
10,330
0.1
12,855
50.6
19.9
976 Yazoo County
MS
39.2
25,506
28,149
53.0
14,234
46.6
9.4
977 Zapata County
TX
41.0
9,279
12,182
28.0
14,926
49.9
14.5
978 Claiborne County
MS
43.6
11,370
11,831
82.5
12,876
41.3
20.3
979 Willacy County
TX
44.5
17,705
20,082
21.8
14,590
57.1
15.1
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AL
AR
MS
MS
TX

45.6
47.3
53.2
56.8
60.0

10,153
13,053
21,604
8,164
40,518

9,974
12,580
21,609
9,227
53,597

80.6
58.2
76.0
75.6
38.1

11,990
11,949
9,809
10,965
10,182

46.2
55.8
52.0
54.1
68.4

10.5
14.9
15.8
17.0
18.8

TX
KS
MA
IN
TX
CO
TN
NE
OH
MA

0.0
5.6
5.7
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.7

107
2,418
6,012
36,616
1,025
12,661
4,721
14,428
39,443
11,639

67
2,390
9,520
39,674
887
14,872
5,740
14,598
40,924
14,987

16.8
3.4
2.8
0.5
2.8
3.4
3.9
1.4
0.9
7.7

26,563
24,003
40,331
31,227
30,203
39,991
28,056
25,722
29,618
31,994

44.0
16.5
10.6
27.8
18.6
5.3
33.3
18.2
24.5
9.6

0.0
0.5
2.1
3.2
3.2
3.4
2.7
3.0
4.7
6.1

TX
TX
MS
SD
TX
TX

48.1
48.9
49.3
50.2
50.4
50.4

6,637
10,433
1,909
8,352
12,162
36,378

7,304
10,248
2,274
9,050
11,600
47,297

15.7
27.1
56.4
82.9
47.0
34.7

13,016
12,222
13,005
13,327
11,822
12,262

56.1
60.2
56.3
32.8
61.4
64.3

10.3
13.7
10.0
20.6
19.7
21.1
(continued)
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980 Greene County
981 Lee County
982 Holmes County
983 Tunica County
984 Starr County
Nonadjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
2 Clark County
3 Nantucket County
4 Dubois County
5 Roberts County
6 Pitkin County
7 Moore County
8 York County
9 Mercer County
10 Dukes County
Highest poverty levelb
1255 Presidio County
1256 Dimmit County
1257 Issaquena County
1258 Todd County
1259 Zavala County
1260 Maverick County
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Poverty
%
rate
Population Population minority
State
1989
1990
2000
1990
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Rank/Non-MSA countya
Highest poverty level
1261 Ziebach County
SD
1262 Owsley County
KY
1263 East Carroll Parish
LA
1264 Shannon County
SD
Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County
TX
2 Clark County
KS
3 Roberts County
TX
4 King County
TX
5 Haskell County
KS
6 Gosper County
NE
7 Greeley County
KS
8 Clark County
ID
9 Ouray County
CO
10 Hemphill County
TX
Highest poverty levelb
234 Guadalupe County
NM
235 Jackson County
SD

(5)
(6)
(7)
Median hh. % education Unempl.
income
< 12 years
rate
1989 ($)
1990
1990

51.1
52.1
56.8
63.1

2,220
5,036
9,709
9,902

2,519
4,858
9,421
12,466

64.4
0.1
65.3
94.9

14,129
8,595
9,791
11,105

37.5
64.5
50.9
40.6

15.6
17.2
24.1
30.5

0.0
5.6
6.2
7.3
7.6
8.5
9.2
9.3
9.6
9.6

107
2,418
1,025
354
3,886
1,928
1,774
762
2,295
3,720

67
2,390
887
356
4,307
2,143
1,534
1,022
3,742
3,351

16.8
3.4
2.8
12.1
11.8
0.1
5.0
10.6
2.5
5.8

26,563
24,003
30,203
27,625
26,761
25,669
25,709
24,583
27,500
28,697

44.0
16.5
18.6
21.8
23.9
20.9
17.6
25.3
12.5
27.1

0.0
0.5
3.2
2.0
2.4
2.0
1.4
1.9
7.0
4.1

38.5
38.8

4,156
2,811

4,680
2,930

25.9
42.5

13,350
17,246

42.2
31.1

6.4
10.6
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236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Mellette County
Edwards County
Corson County
Buffalo County
Sioux County
Issaquena County
Ziebach County
Owsley County

SD
TX
SD
SD
ND
MS
SD
KY

41.3
41.7
42.5
45.1
47.4
49.3
51.1
52.1

2,137
2,266
4,195
1,759
3,761
1,909
2,220
5,036

2,083
2,162
4,181
2,032
4,044
2,274
2,519
4,858

47.0
6.7
48.7
77.7
75.9
56.4
64.4
0.1

14,539
14,639
14,324
14,566
14,838
13,005
14,129
8,595

32.0
41.7
36.7
38.8
31.7
56.3
37.5
64.5

7.8
4.6
14.8
20.4
23.0
10.0
15.6
17.2
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NOTE: Adjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1989 poverty rate = 17.4 (std. dev. = 7.4). Nonadjacent-to-MSA unweighted average poverty rate = 19.1 (std. dev. = 8.3). Small nonadjacent-to-MSA with 2000 pop. < 5,000 unweighted average 1989 poverty rate = 18.6 (std.
dev. = 8.1). Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and the other variables for 1990, excluding Alaska and
Hawaii. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their racial group.
a
Nonmetropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For details
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b
All counties listed under “highest poverty level” category are persistent-poverty counties, defined as having a 20 percent or higher poverty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999.
c
For consistency, small nonadjacent nonmetropolitan counties are defined as having a population of less than 5,000 in 2000. Note that the
243 small nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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rate counties are the same in all three subgroupings as they were for
the overall nonmetropolitan poverty rates. There is considerable geographical diversity in the lowest poverty rate category, although there
are fewer representatives from Southern and Pacific Coast states. There
is more spatial concentration in the highest poverty rate counties. Adjacent counties with the highest poverty rates tend to be those with high
shares of African Americans or Hispanics and are located in Gulf Coast
states or the Southwest. Conversely, the highest-poverty-rate nonadjacent counties include five in South Dakota with high shares of Native
Americans and one primarily white Appalachian county.
The lowest- and highest-poverty-rate adjacent rural counties tend to
have lower poverty rates than their nonadjacent counterparts, illustrating the benefits of being closer to larger labor markets. Nonetheless, as
shown in the high poverty rate group, being near a metro area is not a
guarantee of economic prosperity. In this group, the average median
household income hovered in the $20,000 range, the average 2000 unemployment rate was about 13 percent, and the average high-school
noncompletion rate was about 44 percent. There are few differences in
the characteristics of the lowest poverty rate counties, regardless of adjacency to metro areas. Two exceptions are that low-poverty-rate adjacent counties tend to have about twice the population and about $7,000
more in median household income for 1999.
The nonadjacent group with less than 5,000 people is included so
we can examine the 243 rural counties whose isolation and small scale
mean that many are unlikely to have sufficient critical mass to attract
and retain businesses. Their small population also may mean they have
fewer cultural and urban recreational amenities to retain young adults
and professionals. Nevertheless, with an average poverty rate of about
6.5 percent, the 10 lowest poverty rate counties illustrate that it is possible to have low poverty despite some locational disadvantages. The
lowest poverty rate counties tend to be agricultural and in the Great
Plains. While their median household incomes are relatively low, they
tend to have greater high school completion rates and relatively low
unemployment rates. Despite their success in some measures, it is not
clear whether most of these counties have a viable future, given their
reliance on a declining farm base. It is possible that many unemployed
and low income residents leave these counties relatively quickly, which
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would contribute to the counties’ “success” in having low poverty and
unemployment.
Among the 10 nonadjacent less-populated high poverty rate counties, seven are in the Dakotas and have high shares of Native Americans.
They tend to have low median household incomes and relatively high
unemployment rates, although their high school noncompletion rates
are often not very high. Nevertheless, their small size, geographical isolation, and inherent risk for any private sector investor mean that most
of these counties cannot realistically expect lower poverty rates without
policy intervention. Either the policies need to encourage relocation of
low income residents, or they need to create a positive stimulus for job
creation. Likewise, as is the case for most high poverty rural counties,
these areas need help in improving their community’s capacity to offer
services, such as transportation and child care, and their ability for governmental and nongovernmental governance. And, they may need to be
better integrated into their larger economic regions to achieve a critical
economic mass.
Improving institutional cooperation between the various levels of
government would help ensure a more efficient use of resources and a
more certain direction for private investment. Likewise, by better governmental and nongovernmental coordination across larger economic
regions, these counties can more fully participate in economic growth
that may be taking place outside their boundaries. Finally, given the
economic and social duress in these counties, their nonprofit service
organizations and other nongovernmental arrangements may need financial and organizational assistance.

Changes in 1989–1999 Rural Poverty Rates
To help us consider the underlying causes for large declines or increases in poverty rates, Table 8.5 presents various characteristics of
counties that experienced the 10 largest poverty rate declines and the 10
largest increases over the 1989–1999 period, using the same three adjacent/nonadjacent categories used in Table 8.3. The best news in Table
8.5 is that seven of the ten largest declines in adjacent county poverty
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Rank/Non-MSA countya
Adjacent to MSA

(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Change in
Population
poverty rate Population change in %
%
State 1989–1999
2000
1990–2000 minority

Largest decrease in poverty rate
1 Tunica Countyb
MS

(5)
%
education
< 12 Years

(6)
Median hh.
income
1999 ($)

(7)
(8)
(9)
Unempl. Unempl.
Empl.
rate
rate
growth
2000
1990
1995–2000

−23.7

9,227

11.5

73.0

39.5

23,270

9.3

17.0

2 Lee Countyb

AR

−17.4

12,580

−3.8

57.1

43.8

20,510

13.3

14.9

6.3

3 Karnes Countyb

TX

−14.6

15,446

19.4

32.2

40.9

26,526

6.5

8.9

10.8

4 Concho County

TX

−13.9

3,966

23.2

11.9

40.7

31,313

3.6

4.0

24.8

5 West Feliciana Parish LA

−13.9

15,111

14.5

51.3

46.7

39,667

5.6

9.5

7.9

52.9

KY

−12.1

6,748

4.3

0.6

47.4

21,014

10.5

17.6

0.3

7 Holmes Countyb

MS

−12.1

21,609

0.0

79.6

40.3

17,235

17.3

15.8

−12.7

8 Clay Countyb

WV

−11.7

10,330

3.4

2.1

36.3

22,120

11.5

19.9

18.0

9 Madison County

TX

−11.5

12,940

15.5

33.7

27.2

29,418

5.8

6.4

4.4

10 Lafayette Countyb

AR

−11.4

8,559

−12.7

37.9

34.7

24,831

7.9

10.6

-0.8

6 Elliott County

b

Largest increase in poverty rate
975 Colusa County
CA

2.8

18,804

13.4

35.9

36.0

35,062

10.7

8.3

14.0

976 Ulster County

NY

2.9

177,749

7.0

11.0

18.3

42,551

6.3

5.0

11.0

977 Sullivan County

NY

2.9

73,966

6.3

14.7

23.8

36,998

9.2

6.3

5.5

978 Liberty County

FL

3.2

7,021

20.7

23.4

34.4

28,840

5.0

3.5

−0.9

979 Oldham County

TX

3.7

2,185

−4.3

9.2

19.5

33,713

6.9

1.9

18.0

980 Skamania County

WA

3.7

9,872

16.0

6.5

14.1

39,317

11.1

10.7

9.9
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981 Chouteau County

MT

4.2

5,970

8.7

15.7

12.9

29,150

5.7

3.5

8.8

982 DeSoto County

FL

4.3

32,209

25.9

25.7

36.5

30,714

5.3

5.9

7.8

983 Hendry County

FL

5.2

36,210

28.8

33.4

45.8

33,592

7.8

7.9

14.6

984 Judith Basin County

MT

6.0

2,329

2.0

1.4

12.4

29,241

2.5

2.6

12.7

Nonadjacent to MSA
Largest decrease in poverty rate
1 San Saba County

TX

−17.2

6,186

12.7

16.9

30.0

30,104

3.7

5.2

15.3

2 McPherson County

NE

−16.9

533

−2.4

2.3

11.4

25,750

0.0

0.0

−3.7

3 Guadalupe Countyb

NM

−16.8

4,680

11.2

45.6

31.7

24,783

7.7

6.4

−0.5

4 Billings County

ND

−16.8

888

−24.8

0.3

22.2

32,667

2.8

4.8

−8.2

5 East Carroll Parishb

LA

−16.4

9,421

−3.1

68.7

42.1

20,723

15.0

24.1

1.8

6 Issaquena Countyb

MS

−16.1

2,274

16.1

63.9

41.2

19,936

13.5

10.0

23.5

7 Dimmit Countyb

TX

−15.6

10,248

−1.8

22.9

45.7

21,917

14.2

13.7

9.1

8 Maverick Countyb

TX

−15.6

47,297

23.1

28.9

57.9

21,232

17.6

21.1

26.0

TX

−14.6

3,738

8.4

8.5

21.9

30,921

1.6

1.8

5.2

TX

−13.9

2,762

6.9

22.0

29.4

25,898

5.1

8.1

9.1
−4.7

Largest increase in poverty rate
1255 Rock County

NE

6.4

1,756

−15.0

2.2

12.6

25,795

2.3

1.1

1256 Modoc County

CA

6.4

9,449

−2.4

15.2

22.9

27,522

11.9

10.6

9.1

1257 Hidalgo County

NM

6.5

5,932

−0.4

15.4

31.2

24,819

9.7

7.0

−23.5

1258 Wheeler County

NE

6.6

886

−7.0

1.8

9.2

26,771

3.2

0.5

11.6

1259 Clark County

KS

7.1

2,390

−1.2

3.9

12.6

33,857

2.6

0.5

16.0

1260 San Juan County

CO

8.0

558

−33.5

3.6

7.9

30,764

3.0

10.2

5.0

1261 Clark County

ID

10.5

1,022

25.4

28.6

36.0

31,576

6.1

1.9

3.0
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9 Mason County
10 Dickens County
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Rank/Non-MSA countya
Largest increase in poverty rate

(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Change in
Population
poverty rate Population change in %
%
State 1989–1999
2000
1990–2000 minority

(5)
%
education
< 12 Years

(6)
Median hh.
income
1999 ($)

(7)
(8)
(9)
Unempl. Unempl.
Empl.
rate
rate
growth
2000
1990
1995–2000

1262 Buffalo Countyb

SD

11.8

2,032

13.4

83.3

36.1

12,692

21.7

20.4

4.7

1263 King County

TX

13.3

356

0.6

3.9

21.9

35,625

0.0

2.0

10.9

1264 Echols County

GA

14.0

3,754

37.8

22.7

39.5

25,851

3.7

4.1

61.8

1 McPherson County

NE

−16.9

533

−2.4

2.3

11.4

25,750

0.0

0.0

−3.7

2 Guadalupe Countyb

NM

−16.8

4,680

11.2

45.6

31.7

24,783

7.7

6.4

−0.5

3 Billings County

ND

−16.8

888

−24.8

0.3

22.2

32,667

2.8

4.8

−8.2

4 Issaquena Countyb

MS

−16.1

2,274

16.1

63.9

41.2

19,936

13.5

10.0

23.5

Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Largest decrease in poverty rate

5 Mason County

TX

−14.6

3,738

8.4

8.5

21.9

30,921

1.6

1.8

5.2

6 Dickens County

TX

−13.9

2,762

6.9

22.0

29.4

25,898

5.1

8.1

9.1

7 Towner County

ND

−12.6

2,876

−26.1

2.8

18.1

32,740

2.3

3.3

−5.6

8 Cottle County

TX

−11.4

1,904

−18.0

16.9

33.9

25,446

5.8

5.9

8.3

9 Kent County

TX

−11.3

859

−17.6

5.7

21.9

30,433

3.8

3.6

7.1

GA

−11.1

2,598

15.0

47.1

42.2

25,875

5.8

11.5

20.4

234 Forest County

PA

4.7

4,946

2.9

4.4

20.6

27,581

7.1

7.1

13.6

235 Butte County

ID

4.7

2,899

−0.7

7.1

17.4

30,473

5.8

2.7

5.4

236 Rock County

NE

6.4

1,756

−15.0

2.2

12.6

25,795

2.3

1.1

−4.7

10 Quitman County

b

Largest increase in poverty rate
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237 Wheeler County

NE

6.6

886

−7.0

1.8

9.2

26,771

3.2

0.5

11.6

238 Clark County

KS

7.1

2,390

−1.2

3.9

12.6

33,857

2.6

0.5

16.0

239 San Juan County

CO

8.0

558

−33.5

3.6

7.9

30,764

3.0

10.2

5.0

240 Clark County

ID

10.5

1,022

25.4

28.6

36.0

31,576

6.1

1.9

3.0

241 Buffalo Countyb

SD

11.8

2,032

13.4

83.3

36.1

12,692

21.7

20.4

4.7

242 King County

TX

13.3

356

0.6

3.9

21.9

35,625

0.0

2.0

10.9

243 Echols County

GA

14.0

3,754

37.8

22.7

39.5

25,851

3.7

4.1

61.8

NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and 1999 and the other variables for the period stated in the column headings.
Alaska and Hawaii are not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial
group.
a
Nonnetropolitan area definitions follow those in place for the 2000 census as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. See Chapters 2 and 6.
b
Indicates a persistent-poverty county, which is defined as having a 20 percent or higher poverty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999.
c
For consistency, small nonadjacent nonmetropolitan counties are defined as having a population of less than 5,000 in 2000. Note that the 243 small nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data for employment growth (BEA 2002).
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rates and five of the ten largest declines in nonadjacent counties occurred in persistent-poverty counties. Furthermore, some of the largest
declines occurred in counties that had been persistent-poverty counties
but had dropped below the 20 percent high-poverty threshold in 1999.
For both adjacent and nonadjacent counties, the largest declines tended
to occur in counties with high shares of African Americans or Hispanics in Texas or in nearby states in the Deep South. A couple of special
cases are the two counties bordering Appalachia that experienced large
poverty rate declines and two nonadjacent counties in the Great Plains.
However, it is discouraging that none of the largest declines occurred
on Native American reservations.
In the adjacent group, there are some unexpected differences between the declining and increasing poverty rate categories. Foremost
of these is that the largest declines occurred in relatively less populated
counties that experienced about a 7.5 percent population increase on
average during the 1990s. In contrast, the largest increases in poverty
rates occurred in counties where the population increased by an average
of 12.5 percent, illustrating that migration was not evening out regional
poverty differentials. Likewise, adjacent counties with the largest declines tend to have higher minority shares, larger shares of high-school
noncompletion, and lower median household income. This pattern also
extends to the two nonadjacent categories. It is heartening that poverty
rates took their sharpest drops in what appear to be significantly disadvantaged counties.
In adjacent rural counties, relatively strong economies appear to
be driving the largest poverty rate declines. Their unemployment rates
declined by about 3 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, on average, while the unemployment rates of adjacent rural counties with the
largest poverty rate increases rose. However, despite a relatively large
population growth advantage for counties with the largest poverty rate
increases, they only experienced about a 10 percent average increase
in 1995–2000 employment growth, which is approximately the same
as counties with the largest poverty rate declines. Thus, the newly created jobs in the adjacent counties with the largest poverty rate declines
appear to have been filled more from the ranks of the nonemployed.
It is also striking that the employment growth gap was only about 1
percentage point, on average, between the best and worst performers
in terms of poverty rate changes. Hence, even the worst-performing
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counties tended to have job growth, suggesting other structural causes
of poverty.
Among rural counties that are not adjacent to a metro area, the
average poverty rate fell about 16 percentage points for the 10 counties with the largest poverty rate decreases, and it rose an average of 9
points for the 10 with the largest increases. Both groups tend to have
small populations, which exceed 10,000 in only two of the 20 possible
cases. Surprisingly, nonadjacent counties with the largest poverty rate
declines from 1995 to 2000 typically had slower employment growth
(7.8 vs. 9.4 percent) even as they had faster average population growth.
The only feature that seemingly favored the nonadjacent counties with
the greatest poverty rate declines is that their unemployment rate fell
about 1.4 points between 1990 and 2000, as opposed to counties with
the largest poverty rate increases, whose unemployment rate increased
slightly. The patterns illustrate the complex nature of characterizing local poverty rate trends.
For the least-populated nonadjacent rural counties, those with the
largest decreases in poverty rates tended to have declining population
over the decade, while the counties with the largest increases tended
to have slight gains in population, which is consistent with labor supply–driven changes in poverty. It appears disadvantaged persons disproportionately left the counties with falling poverty rates because of a
lack of job opportunities; this lack is reflected by the low employment
growth in most of these counties. In sum, the distinctions between those
who had sharp increases in poverty rates and those who had sharp reductions are even less clear among small, nonadjacent rural counties.
Thus, we need regression analysis to help sort out the underlying causes
of nonmetropolitan poverty.

Rural Regression Findings
To examine whether the determinants of nonmetropolitan poverty
rates differ from the metropolitan averages from Chapter 7, we estimate
the regression models described in Chapter 6 using the 2,204 nonmetropolitan counties. Key descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.6,
and Table 8.7 reproduces a regression table from Chapter 7. The base
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(1)
Group
Population
% 1988–90 or 1998–2000 empl. growth
% 1985–90 or 1995–2000 empl. growth
1988–90 or 1998–2000 structural change
1985–90 or 1995–2000 structural change
% male employment/population
% female employment/population
% civilian male unemployment rate
% civilian female unemployment rate

7/27/2006 1:41:56 PM

% 1985–90/1995–2000 commuting zone
employment growthb
% of workers employed in county of
residence

Total
22,416
(20,746)
2.9
(5.4)
6.0
(11.4)
0.037
(0.020)
0.070
(0.033)
64.2
(8.0)
46.6
(6.9)
6.8
(3.6)
7.0
(3.4)
8.0
(8.8)
74.7
(15.0)

1989–1990
(2)
(3)
Adjacent to Nonadjacent
MSAa
to MSA
28,437
17,648
(23,893)
(16,373)
3.2
2.7
(5.2)
(5.5)
7.6
4.8
(11.0)
(11.4)
0.037
0.038
(0.020)
(0.021)
0.069
0.071
(0.034)
(0.033)
64.3
64.1
(7.3)
(8.4)
47.0
46.3
(6.5)
(7.1)
6.8
6.9
(2.9)
(4.1)
7.2
6.9
(3.0)
(3.7)
9.9
6.4
(7.7)
(9.2)
68.6
79.5
(14.7)
(13.5)

1999–2000
(4)
(5)
(6)
Adjacent to Nonadjacent
Total
MSA
to MSA
24,682
31,836
19,018
(23,332)
(27,030)
(18,020)
2.1
2.5
1.8
(4.1)
(4.0)
(4.2)
7.5
8.7
6.5
(9.3)
(9.8)
(8.7)
0.030
0.030
0.030
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.018)
0.061
0.061
0.061
(0.030)
(0.029)
(0.030)
61.8
61.9
61.7
(8.9)
(8.8)
(9.0)
50.3
50.6
50.1
(6.7)
(6.4)
(6.9)
6.0
5.8
6.1
(3.1)
(2.6)
(3.5)
5.9
5.9
5.9
(2.9)
(2.6)
(3.1)
8.2
9.4
7.2
(5.8)
(5.6)
(5.8)
69.0
62.4
74.1
(16.1)
(15.1)
(15.0)
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Table 8.6 Nonmetropolitan County Labor Market Summary Statistics, 1990 and 2000
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% workers with 20–45 minute commute
% workers with 45–90 minute commute
N

24.9
(8.5)
10.2
(6.2)
2204

28.0
(7.4)
13.0
(6.7)
974

22.5
(8.5)
8.0
(4.8)
1230

27.6
(8.4)
13.6
(7.1)
2204

30.6
(7.3)
16.9
(7.3)
974

25.3
(8.4)
11.1
(5.7)
1230

NOTE: Unweighted descriptive statistics. Standard deviations are in parentheses. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of
Economic Analysis REIS county definitions.  
a“
Adjacent to MSA” is defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as a nonmetropolitan county adjacent to a metropolitan area, using
1993 definitions.
b
For nonmetropolitan counties, the broader labor market employment growth was defined using 1990 commuting zone definitions from
the USDA’s Economic Research Service (2003a).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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1989 and 1999 nonmetropolitan poverty rate models are reported in
columns (3) and (7), and most of the discussion centers on the 1999 results. Columns (4) and (8) contain the nonmetropolitan models, which
include variables accounting for conditions in neighboring counties. To
facilitate comparison between MSA and nonmetro counties, columns
(1) to (2) and (5) to (6) report the corresponding estimates from the
specifications that use the 824 MSA counties.
Turning to the results in Table 8.7, the coefficient on the lagged
nonmetropolitan county poverty rate is of smaller magnitude than it
is for metropolitan counties, indicating slightly less persistence for rural poverty rates in terms of responsiveness to exogenous shocks. The
degree of persistence in nonmetropolitan counties declined during the
1990s. Thus the results indicate that rural counties typically adjust more
quickly to changes in socioeconomic conditions.
As noted in Chapter 7, rural counties are generally more influenced
by labor market conditions than are MSA counties. First, industrial
structural change has a stronger impact on nonmetropolitan poverty
rates. Their thinner labor markets make it harder for displaced workers who are less skilled to find suitable reemployment. The descriptive
statistics from Table A.1 show that a one standard deviation change in
the 1995–2000 industry restructuring measure is associated with a 0.14
percent increase in the poverty rate for the typical rural county when
evaluated at the mean nonmetro county population of 24,682. When the
rural county population is less than 5,000, the structural change effect
approximately doubles. Hence, if a small rural county was struggling
with a loss of employment in, say, the natural resource sector, the poverty rate would increase not only because job growth declined but also
because labor market frictions induced by the industry restructuring
would slow reemployment for some workers. Regarding the industry
structure, a greater agricultural share is most associated with higher rural poverty rates (not shown).
Greater job growth has a much larger poverty-reducing impact on
nonmetro county poverty rates than on MSA counties. To ensure comparability with Chapters 6 and 7, we continue to use the overall one
standard deviation change in the variables from Table A.1. Using the results reported in column (7) of Table 8.7, we see that a 10.1 percent (one
standard deviation) change in 1995–2000 employment growth reduces
the typical nonmetropolitan county poverty rate by about 0.2 percent-
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age points, unlike the insignificant impact it has on MSA poverty rates.
As was described above, we expected a larger rural impact because of
dampened migration and commuting responses.
Employment growth also indirectly reduces the poverty rate by
lowering the unemployment rate and increasing the employment-population ratio. Thus, following our methods in Chapters 6 and 7, we estimated the quasireduced-form model that omits the unemployment-rate
and employment-rate variables to more fully capture the direct and
indirect effects of job growth (not shown). In this case, a 10.1-point
increase in five-year employment growth reduces the poverty rate by
about 0.25 percentage points on average, which is a little greater than
when the unemployment and employment rates were held constant.
While the effects of greater job growth are not large in terms of reducing poverty rates, job growth may be more beneficial if it is targeted.
For example, as described in earlier chapters, if nonmetro employment
growth is concentrated in sectors that are faring well nationally, we
anticipate a dampened migration response. Hence, a larger number of
disadvantaged original residents would take the newly created jobs. To
examine this possibility, we replaced 1995–2000 job growth with the
corresponding measures of industry-mix and competitiveness employment growth; in results not shown, industry-mix job growth had more
than a fourfold greater impact than generic job growth.8 Thus, by targeting economic development efforts toward sectors that are doing well
nationally, successful policies for job creation can mitigate rural poverty—more so than in urban areas. Indeed, the benefits are likely larger
when the targeting is further narrowed to employing the disadvantaged
and to focusing on distressed rural communities.
Because rural areas have transportation and child care constraints,
which interact with each other, we expect female labor market participation to take on an even larger role in nonmetropolitan counties. Moreover, low rural wages likely mean that female employment is more vital in raising married-couple households above the poverty threshold.
Thus, it is not surprising that a higher 2000 female employment rate
had more than twice the effect in reducing poverty rates in rural areas
than in metropolitan areas. In fact, using the results in column (7), a one
standard deviation 6.9-point increase in the female employment-population ratio would reduce the typical nonmetropolitan county poverty
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1989
(1)
MSA
base
Lagged poverty rate

Single-county MSAs
Big-MSA central county
Big-MSA suburban county
Small-MSA central county
Small-MSA suburban county
1985–90/1995–2000 empl. growth
1988–90/1995–2000 structural
change
Pop. × structural change
% male employment/population

(2)
(3)
(4)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.

0.49
(14.97)

0.49
(14.67)
−0.003
(0.15)

−0.13
(0.62)
−0.10
(0.46)
0.14
(0.89)
−0.02
(0.12)
−0.006
(0.76)
1.16
(0.31)
−2.5e−5
(2.09)
−0.06
(2.16)

0.13
(0.47)
0.15
(0.51)
0.36
(1.61)
0.17
(0.65)
−0.003
(0.40)
0.65
(0.17)
−2.3e−5
(1.95)
-0.06
(2.12)

Weighted surrounding-city poverty

1999

0.47
(24.25)

−0.020
(3.37)
12.31
(2.54)
−4.8e−4
(2.80)
−0.09
(5.19)

0.42
(19.14)
0.11
(5.39)

−0.016
(2.53)
11.46
(2.44)
−4.3e−4
(2.56)
−0.09
(5.34)

(5)
MSA
base

(6)
(7)
(8)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.

0.43
(13.01)

0.44
(13.28)
−0.01
(0.88)

−0.11
(0.67)
−0.54
(2.85)
0.10
(0.82)
−0.19
(1.20)
−0.007
(1.35)
1.11
(0.53)
−2.6e−6
(0.48)
−0.03
(2.08)

0.16
(0.67)
−0.27
(1.13)
0.31
(1.61)
0.06
(0.29)
−0.005
(0.91)
0.49
(0.23)
−9.6e−7
(0.17)
−0.03
(1.91)

0.38
(23.65)

0.35
(19.89)
0.08
(4.75)

−0.017
(3.05)
10.58
(3.49)
−2.4e−4
(2.66)
−0.03
(1.88)

−0.017
(2.83)
10.65
(3.68)
−2.2e−4
(2.60)
−0.02
(1.19)
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% female employment/population
% civilian male unemployment rate

−0.10
(3.82)
−0.23
(7.12)
−0.05
(0.68)
0.06
(2.07)
0.59
(7.61)
0.18
(0.72)
−0.03
(1.74)

−0.14
(5.02)
0.30
(4.74)
0.02
(0.35)
−0.017
(1.41)

−0.004
(0.53)
−0.10
(3.79)
−0.24
(7.09)
−0.04
(0.67)
0.06
(2.03)
0.59
(7.41)
0.18
(0.74)
−0.03
(1.68)

−0.16
(8.27)
0.15
(4.27)
0.07
(1.86)

−0.16
(7.90)
0.16
(4.40)
0.07
(1.85)

−0.17
(9.13)
−0.19
(6.56)
−0.19
(4.37)
−0.004
(0.16)
0.77
(13.43)
0.54
(4.40)
−0.04
(4.21)

−0.02
(1.87)
−0.003
(0.54)
−0.16
(8.80)
−0.18
(6.43)
−0.18
(4.33)
0.003
(0.13)
0.75
(13.26)
0.57
(4.75)
−0.04
(4.54)

−0.08
(3.12)
0.23
(3.81)
−0.02
(0.30)

−0.15
(5.58)
−0.20
(6.62)
−0.15
(3.18)
−0.10
(4.24)
0.43
(6.55)
−0.14
(1.02)
−0.01
(1.59)

−0.08
(3.08)
0.23
(3.78)
−0.02
(0.40)
−0.019
(1.50)

0.004
(0.87)
−0.15
(5.54)
−0.21
(6.52)
−0.16
(3.33)
−0.11
(4.29)
0.43
(6.59)
−0.13
(0.97)
−0.01
(1.51)

−0.21
(11.50)
0.14
(5.19)
−0.05
(1.36)

−0.20
(10.73)
0.15
(5.32)
−0.04
(1.31)

−0.14
(7.79)
−0.11
(4.42)
−0.19
(4.89)
−0.02
(0.96)
0.62
(10.50)
0.28
(3.03)
−0.03
(3.50)

−0.005
(0.55)
0.01
(2.36)
−0.14
(7.57)
−0.11
(4.57)
−0.21
(5.17)
−0.03
(1.69)
0.61
(10.69)
0.30
(3.30)
−0.03
(3.46)
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% civilian female unemployment
rate
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA empl.
growth (# MSA counties ≥ 2)
1985–90/1995–2000 commuting
zone empl. growth
% of workers employed in county
of residence
% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25yrs.)
% of households female-headed
with children
% of households male-headed
with children
% population African American

−0.14
(5.00)
0.32
(4.91)
0.02
(0.33)

Partridge.indb 252

1989
(1)
MSA
base
% population other race
% population Hispanic
R2
N

0.02
(0.82)
0.02
(1.96)
0.96
824

1999

(2)
(3)
(4)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.
0.02
(0.71)
0.02
(2.09)
0.96
824

0.02
(1.78)
0.01
(1.27)
0.93
2204

0.03
(2.36)
0.009
(0.96)
0.93
2204

(5)
MSA
base
−0.04
(2.48)
0.002
(0.26)
0.96
824

(6)
(7)
(8)
MSA broad Nonmetro Nonmetro
labor mkt.
base
broad lab.
−0.04
(2.45)
0.003
(0.31)
0.96
824

−0.009
(0.75)
−0.02
(1.98)
0.93
2204

−4.6e − 5
(0.00)
−0.02
(2.52)
0.93
2204

NOTE: The specifications follow those in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 7.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity.
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Blank means the variable was not included in the regression model. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions. See the notes to Table 7.1 for more details
on variable definitions.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).

252 Partridge and Rickman

Table 8.7 (continued)

7/27/2006 1:41:57 PM

Poverty in Rural America 253

rate by a rather large 1.4 percentage points, indicating the importance of
facilitating job opportunities for women in reducing rural poverty.
Male unemployment has a modestly smaller role in rural areas than
in metropolitan areas. Along with the insignificant male employment
rate coefficient, these results suggest that the economic well being of
men—either directly, or indirectly through factors such as the marriage
market—plays a relatively small role in affecting nonmetropolitan poverty.
As is consistent with arguments that transportation and child care
constraints present more challenging hurdles in rural areas, both the
share of households headed by single mothers and the share headed by
single fathers have a much stronger adverse effect on nonmetro poverty rates. Low rural wages are probably another reason for this large
rural poverty rate effect. Nonmetro county poverty rates are negatively
related to the percentage of the population that is African American or
Hispanic (significant at the 0.05 level) after accounting for other socioeconomic characteristics. The non–African American minority share is
also negatively related to poverty rates, but the result is statistically
insignificant.
The models shown in columns (4) and (8) of Table 8.7 capture
the broader neighboring-county effects by including the average surrounding-county poverty rate, the five-year commuting-zone employment growth, and the percent of workers employed in their county of
residence. Illustrating how labor market access and information about
nearby counties is important, a greater share of workers employed in
their county of residence was positively related to poverty rates in the
1999 model.9 Likewise, the average surrounding-county poverty rate
is positively related to nonmetropolitan poverty rates but is insignificant in the metropolitan models. As is consistent with Figures 2.8–2.10,
these findings further support the notion of poverty clustering in rural
counties, where there are spillovers across neighboring counties in residential location decisions and labor market conditions.
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Rural Poverty and Proximity to Metro Areas
Being near a metropolitan area can provide significant advantages
to a rural county. The close proximity may enhance the delivery of government services for the disadvantaged, and there may be more accessible child care. Close proximity also helps provide additional amenities that can help attract a professional workforce that in turn creates
other employment opportunities. The larger labor market scale also
greatly mitigates the problems a person may face in finding suitable
labor market matches. Perhaps more importantly, closer proximity
greatly increases the accessibility of jobs for the disadvantaged. Compared to nonadjacent counties, adjacent counties had faster employment
growth and greater commuting-zone job growth (Table 8.6). Thus it is
not surprising that a greater share of workers in counties that are adjacent to metro areas commuted longer distances and to other counties.
With improved access, the average person poverty rate in adjacent nonmetropolitan counties was 2 to 3 percentage points below the average
nonadjacent-county person poverty rate (see Table 2.3).
Because many adjacent nonmetropolitan counties are at least partly
in the exurban fringe, their characteristics likely fall somewhere between those of metropolitan and nonadjacent rural counties. Table 8.8
reports the results of various nonmetropolitan regressions that split the
sample into counties that are and are not adjacent to metropolitan areas.
Columns (1) and (2) contain the 1989 adjacent-to-metropolitan models,
columns (3) and (4) contain the 1989 nonadjacent models, and columns
(5) through (8) report the corresponding models for 1999.
Focusing on the 1999 adjacent and nonadjacent results in columns
(5) and (7), we see that there are subtle differences in key results. For
example, at least in less populated counties, industry restructuring has
a stronger positive impact on nonadjacent poverty rates, most likely because these labor markets are thinner. Moreover, five-year employment
growth has a slightly stronger poverty-reducing impact in nonadjacent
counties. The larger impact is expected because nonadjacent counties
would likely attract fewer urban migrants and commuters than adjacent
nonmetro counties, leaving more new job opportunities for the disadvantaged.
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The greater isolation of nonadjacent counties should make them
better suited for place-based policies aimed at generating employment
because of the larger poverty-reducing response. To assess possible
gains from targeting growth, the 1995–2000 industry-mix and competitiveness-employment growth variables were considered (not shown).
For adjacent counties, the industry-mix results were insignificant, suggesting a more modest role for targeting growth. Nevertheless, for nonadjacent nonmetropolitan counties, greater industry-mix employment
growth has a marked poverty-reducing impact.10 In this case, a 10.1
percentage-point increase in industry-mix employment reduces poverty
rates by 1.3 points, indicating that targeted job growth can be an effective tool in more isolated nonmetropolitan counties. Further targeting of
hiring towards the disadvantaged in conjunction with policies that enhance labor force participation of women and single parents will likely
produce even larger effects.
Supporting the belief that transportation and child care pose greater
obstacles to employment in more isolated rural counties is the finding
that the female employment rate has a slightly stronger poverty-reducing effect in nonadjacent counties. Likewise, the share of single-parent households with children has a more deleterious poverty impact
in nonadjacent counties. These results are consistent with the notion
that improving job opportunities, especially for women, and enhancing
child care and transportation can have a stronger impact in nonadjacent
counties. Also, if rural areas that are isolated are associated with even
lower male wages than rural areas in general, then raising female labor
force participation may be even more important for avoiding poverty
for married families.
The importance of agriculture and other resource-extractive industries for many isolated rural counties appears to have increased poverty because these sectors are associated with more seasonal employment and more volatile business cycles. The typical nonadjacent county
poverty rate increases a statistically significant 0.25 percentage points
when the farm employment share rises by 1 percent with a corresponding decrease in the public administration share (not shown in Table
8.8). In metro-adjacent rural counties, poverty rates rise by only 0.15
points after a similar increase in agricultural employment (not shown).
Moreover, a 1 percent increase in the goods employment share and a
corresponding decrease in public administration is associated with a
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1989

Lagged poverty rate

1999

(1)
Base
adjacent

(2)
Broad
adjacent

(3)
Base
nonadj.

(4)
Broad
nonadj.

(5)
Base
adjacent

(6)
Broad
adjacent

(7)
Base
nonadj.

(8)
Broad
nonadj.

0.45
(15.96)

0.46
(17.47)

0.39
(16.03)

−0.015
(2.07)

0.37
(13.58)
0.07
(2.65)
−0.017
(2.18)

0.36
(17.95)

−0.019
(2.31)

0.42
(14.24)
0.12
(4.48)
−0.018
(1.90)

−0.020
(2.27)

0.34
(15.11)
0.08
(3.71)
−0.020
(2.03)

1985–90/1995–2000 empl. growth

−0.016
(1.95)

0.42
(12.28)
0.08
(2.41)
−0.015
(1.75)

1985–90/1995–2000 structural
change

6.28
(0.94)

6.19
(0.93)

16.31
(2.55)

15.48
(2.45)

6.89
(1.99)

7.12
(2.03)

12.52
(2.75)

12.70
(2.92)

Population × structural change

−2.2e−4
(1.06)
−0.08
(3.87)

−2.1e−4
(1.00)
−0.08
(3.82)

−7.6e−4
(2.49)
−0.10
(3.58)

−7.0e−4
(2.31)
−0.10
(3.74)

−8.9e−5
(1.00)
−0.03
(1.41)

−1.0e−4
(1.18)
−0.02
(1.08)

−4.1e−4
(2.23)
−0.03
(1.43)

−4.0e−4
(2.18)
−0.02
(1.10)

−0.18
(6.37)
0.20
(3.80)
0.09
(1.92)

−0.17
(5.99)
0.20
(3.88)
0.09
(2.00)

−0.15
(5.48)
0.13
(2.58)
0.06
(1.10)

−0.14
(5.31)
0.13
(2.66)
0.05
(1.03)

−0.18
(6.96)
0.16
(3.87)
−0.02
(0.34)

−0.17
(6.52)
0.16
(3.91)
−0.01
(0.17)

−0.23
(8.85)
0.13
(3.63)
−0.06
(1.49)

−0.21
(8.35)
0.13
(3.72)
−0.06
(1.47)

Weighted surrounding-city poverty

% male employment/population
% female employment/population
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% civilian male unemployment
rate
% civilian female unemployment
rate
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA empl.
growth (# MSA counties ≥ 2)
1985–90/1995–2000 commuting
zone empl. growth

−0.004
(0.26)

−0.018
(1.45)

0.005
(0.37)

−0.009
(0.60)
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% of workers employed in county
of residence
Population

% of population other race
% of population Hispanic
R2
N

1.7e−7
(0.02)
−0.17
(6.75)
−0.20
(5.12)
−0.19
(3.15)
−0.006
(0.17)
0.72
(9.30)
0.50
(3.06)
−0.03
(2.12)
0.04
(2.04)
0.020
(1.76)
0.93
1230

−1.5e−4
(0.02)
−1.6e−6
(0.16)
−0.16
(6.50)
−0.19
(4.86)
−0.17
(2.95)
0.004
(0.09)
0.71
(9.26)
0.54
(3.37)
−0.04
(2.50)
0.04
(2.46)
0.016
(1.40)
0.93
1230

3.6e−6
(0.77)
−0.15
(4.98)
−0.08
(2.25)
−0.27
(4.90)
−0.02
(0.89)
0.52
(6.56)
0.21
(1.54)
−0.02
(2.04)
−0.05
(2.78)
−0.003
(0.28)
0.94
974

3.2e−3
(0.42)
5.1e−6
(1.09)
−0.14
(4.82)
−0.08
(2.25)
−0.29
(5.16)
−0.03
(0.95)
0.52
(6.51)
0.25
(1.80)
−0.02
(2.06)
−0.04
(2.19)
−0.007
(0.60)
0.94
974

1.7e−5
(1.96)
−0.13
(5.44)
−0.12
(3.84)
−0.15
(2.91)
−0.03
(0.97)
0.63
(7.81)
0.32
(2.59)
−0.02
(1.60)
0.01
(0.89)
−0.013
(1.08)
0.93
1230

1.4e−2
(2.10)
1.5e−5
(1.70)
−0.13
(5.38)
−0.13
(3.92)
−0.16
(3.08)
−0.04
(1.41)
0.62
(7.97)
0.31
(2.64)
−0.02
(1.71)
0.02
(1.46)
−0.018
(1.55)
0.93
1230
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NOTE: The specifications follow those in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 6.1, with some of the results suppressed for brevity.
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Blank means the variable was not included in the regression model. A nonmetropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions. See Appendix A for more details on variable
definitions. See Chapter 2 for the definition of “adjacent/nonadjacent to a metropolitan area.”
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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% high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% bachelor’s degree or more
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% of households female-headed
with children
% of households male-headed
with children
% of population African American

−1.8e−6
(0.28)
−0.15
(6.21)
−0.17
(3.98)
−0.20
(3.34)
−0.02
(0.46)
0.75
(8.79)
0.53
(3.04)
−0.04
(2.99)
−0.01
(0.41)
0.016
(0.92)
0.94
974

−1.9e−3
(0.22)
−8.2e−7
(0.13)
−0.15
(5.94)
−0.17
(3.88)
−0.20
(3.41)
−0.01
(0.29)
0.74
(8.58)
0.54
(3.11)
−0.04
(3.12)
−0.003
(0.12)
0.013
(0.76)
0.94
974
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statistically significant 0.08-percentage-point increase in the typical
nonadjacent county poverty rate, vs. an imperceptible change in the adjacent county poverty rate. Hence, the act of diversifying isolated rural
economies appears to have important antipoverty benefits.
Surrounding-county spillovers are examined in the 1999 adjacent
and nonadjacent models in columns (6) and (8). Both rural county
types are about equally affected by surrounding-county poverty rates.
Yet adjacent county poverty rates are not statistically associated with
commuting-zone employment growth or the percentage of workers employed in their county of residence. Nonadjacent county poverty rates
are positively related to the share of workers employed in their county
of residence. This finding indicates that employment accessibility in
broader labor markets is one factor that can ameliorate poverty in nonadjacent counties.
Recent immigration can adversely affect rural poverty if the new
arrivals compete against low-skilled natives. This possibility was considered by reestimating the models in columns (5) and (7) after adding
the percentage of the population that had immigrated between the periods of 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 (not shown). The 1995–2000 foreign immigrant share had a positive and significant impact on poverty
rates, whereas the early 1990s immigrant share was insignificant. For
both adjacent and nonadjacent counties, a 1-percentage-point increase
in the recent immigrant share is associated with a 0.4-point increase
in the poverty rate. The poverty rate may increase because of higher
poverty rates among immigrants and because low-income rural natives
may bear some costs resulting from labor market competition with the
new immigrants.11
To summarize the findings, poverty rates in nonmetropolitan counties that are not adjacent to metropolitan areas are more responsive to
labor market conditions than their adjacent counterparts, especially for
women. Likewise, other factors, such as greater adverse impacts from
structural change and larger farm and goods employment shares, suggest a need to diversify the employment opportunities in nonadjacent
rural counties.
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Case Study: Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska
Scotts Bluff County is in the panhandle of Nebraska, located on the
western border with Wyoming. It is two counties north of Interstate 80
and derives its name from a nearby plateau that marks the beginning
of the geologic transition between the Great Plains and the Rockies
(Curtis 2003). Scotts Bluff County contains six communities, the two
largest being the cities of Scottsbluff and Gering, the county seat (ePodunk 2006). According to the latest census, 36,951 people resided in
the county in 2000, including 14,732 in Scottsbluff and 7,751 in Gering (U.S. Census Bureau 2006c). Median household income equaled
$32,016, 82 percent of the state average (U.S. Census Bureau 2006d).
As is consistent with the national reversal of the 1980s population
decline in nonmetropolitan areas, Scotts Bluff County’s population increased 2.6 percent in the 1990s, though its 2000 population was still
3.6 percent below that of 1980 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006c,e). Population growth in the 1990s was due to foreign immigration and to natural increase through propagation. Population growth in all Nebraska
nonmetro areas equaled 2.3 percent in the 1990s, while metro areas
experienced 13.9 percent growth (ERS 2006). With one exception, Nebraska counties adjacent to Scotts Bluff lost population in the 1990s.
Box Butte, Sioux, and Banner counties lost 7.4, 4.8, and 3.9 percent of
their populations, while Morrill County eked out a 0.3 percent population gain. Just across the border in Wyoming, Goshen County posted
population growth of 1.3 percent.
Scotts Bluff County’s population increase masks significant net outmigration from the county over the decade. Intercensal estimates suggest that the county saw a net loss of 1,275 people to other states and to
other Nebraska counties in the 1990s, while the 2000 census suggests
a net loss, both in-state and out-of-state, of 1,625 for 1995–2000 alone
(U.S. Census Bureau 2002c). Of this net migration of 1,625 people, a
net of 802—almost half—migrated to other counties in Nebraska (U.S.
Census Bureau 2003). Despite overall net out-migration in the 1990s,
Scotts Bluff experienced a net gain of 60 people from the four Nebraska
counties that border it and 147 people from Goshen County, Wyoming.
Also somewhat potentially offsetting the net out-migration between
Scotts Bluff and other counties was an increase of 640 foreign-born

Partridge.indb 259

7/27/2006 1:41:58 PM

260 Partridge and Rickman

residents in the 1990s (U.S. Census Bureau 2005c). In fact, 17.2 percent
of the population in Scotts Bluff is listed as being of Hispanic or Latino
origin in the 2000 census, compared to 5.5 percent for the state; 13.7
percent of the population speaks a language other than English at home
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004d). Partly related to its recent immigration,
Scotts Bluff’s share of the adult population possessing a college degree
was 17.3 percent in 2000, compared to 23.7 percent for the state. The
corresponding figures for high school completion were 79.6 and 86.6
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004h).
The person poverty rate in Scotts Bluff County declined from 15.5
percent in 1989 to 14.5 percent in 1999, but its child poverty rate barely
inched down, from 22.2 to 22.0 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2004i).
The Hispanic poverty rate was 30.1 percent in 1999, approximately
the same as in 1989, while the Hispanic child poverty rate increased
from 37.9 to 41.2 percent. These high shares put upward pressure on
the overall person poverty rate, particularly as the county gained Hispanic population. Person poverty rates also decreased in the bordering
Nebraska counties: 16.4 to 15.4 in Sioux, 21.8 to 13.6 in Banner, 14.8 to
14.7 in Morrill, and 11.7 to 10.7 in Box Butte. By comparison, the least
populated rural areas in the nation had the largest reduction in poverty
in the 1990s, declining from 17.9 to 14.9 percent (Jolliffe 2003).
Scotts Bluff County serves as a regional center for agriculture,
manufacturing, medical services, information technology, finance, retail, education, tourism, and recreation (Twin Cities Development Association 2003). Prominent manufacturers include beef and sugar-beet
processors, which are associated with having high shares of recent
immigrants (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2006). Serving as a retail
center, Scotts Bluff’s Walmart Super Center employs 450 people. A notable tourist attraction is the Scotts Bluff National Monument, at which
the Oregon Trail Museum displays pioneer and natural history exhibits
(Western Nebraska Tourism Coalition 2006). The Economic Research
Service of the USDA rates Scotts Bluff County as a 4 on a scale of 7 for
amenity attractiveness, which it reports as being positively associated
with rural U.S. population growth (McGranahan 1999).
Labor force participation remained roughly unchanged at 64 percent, while unemployment fell from 5.8 to 5.1 percent between the
1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2004i). As an example
of the connectedness between nonmetro counties, the 2000 census re-
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ported that 1,622 people commuted into Scotts Bluff County and 847 of
its residents commuted out, producing a net of 775 in-commuters (U.S.
Census Bureau 2004e). The vast majority of the in- and out-commuting
was with the four neighboring Nebraska counties and Goshen County,
Wyoming.
An evaluation of Nebraska’s welfare reform initiative, Employment
First, implemented statewide during July 1997, reveals a number of differences in program success between rural and urban counties (Ponza,
Meckstroth, and Faerber 2002). The study consisted of a sample of
January 2000 TANF recipients, for which the communities of Columbus, Gering, and Scottsbluff comprised the study’s rural areas. Among
its findings was that rural Nebraska recipients reported more personal
obstacles to working, yet were more likely to work and less likely to be
dependent on welfare. This may be evidence of greater peer pressure,
preservation of middle class values, and better social support systems.
But rural recipients also were less likely to find jobs that paid well or
offered health benefits, and were more likely to experience job turnover and nonstandard work shifts. This occurred despite the emphasis
of Nebraska’s welfare reform on matching recipient interests and needs
with economic opportunities, as opposed to simply placing them immediately into employment. The report recommended expanded offerings of education, job training, and career counseling to former rural
recipients.
Scotts Bluff County’s population remained virtually unchanged
from April 1, 2000, to July 1, 2003, while Sioux County experienced
slight growth and Banner, Box Butte, Goshen, and Morrill counties registered significant losses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006f). After reaching
a low of 4.0 percent in 2001, Scotts Bluff’s unemployment rate rose
in both 2002 and 2003, reaching its highest level (5.0 percent) since
its 1990s peak of 4.8 percent in 1996 (BLS 2006a). Job losses in 2003
were broad-based, occurring in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and services (BLS 2004). Thus, it is not surprising that, following
broader U.S. trends, the faltering Scotts Bluff economy led to the poverty rate increasing by 1.2 percentage points over the 2000–2002 period
(U.S. Census Bureau 2005d).
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Policy Implications for Fighting Rural Poverty
The discussion in Chapter 7 noted that most economists have reservations about the effectiveness of place-based strategies as a tool for local economic development. In particular, such policies are often viewed
as expensive, wasteful, prone to help those who are less in need than
others, and apt to slow market adjustments that would eliminate adverse
shocks or conditions. However, we contend that targeted policies may
be effective in reducing poverty if tailored to localities where job accessibility appears to be the largest hindrance.
We argued in Chapter 7 that targeted tax breaks and infrastructure
enhancements could be effective in central counties of metro areas. The
findings in this chapter suggest an even stronger potential role for such
place-based strategies in reducing rural poverty—especially in more
isolated rural communities—assuming the strategies are cost-effective.
Providing greater job growth and improved opportunities for women
has much larger effects in nonadjacent counties than in others, while
stimulating sectors that are growing faster than the national average
appears especially effective at reducing their poverty rates. Additional
benefits from such policies include diversifying to get away from reliance on the farm and goods sectors, which reinforces the poverty rate
reductions and better sets the stage for sustainable economic development.
There have been numerous efforts to aid rural economies through
such seemingly helpful means as farm supports or policies aimed at
encouraging mining and lumbering. Yet these policies are narrowly focused on a declining share of the rural population and are not broad
enough to support a general revitalization. These sectors simply no longer employ the large numbers they once did. The federal government
has spent countless billions of dollars supporting agribusiness in the
Great Plains region without stemming the population outflow. Though
it is not clear how expensive it would be to boost local rural job growth
rates compared to the expense of boosting local urban growth rates, it
is not hard to imagine that broader-based rural development policies
would be more effective than the current narrow industry-based rural
policy—especially in industries that are declining nationally.
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To achieve long-term economic vitality, rural communities often
need an influx of modern infrastructure, including roads, water, sewage, and educational facilities. The digital divide suggests that many
rural communities lag in their information and telecommunications infrastructure. Related government programs such as those administered
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development have an
urban bias, and federal and state governments often do not provide sufficient revenue sharing for rural communities to build or maintain infrastructure. Yet in many cases it seems more cost-effective to retain
rural population where most of the necessary infrastructure is already in
place, rather than build an entirely new infrastructure as this population
relocates to urban areas in large numbers. It also reduces sprawl.
The potential effectiveness of place-based rural policies is further
enhanced by dampened in-migration and commuting responses in smaller or more isolated economies, which leaves more jobs for the intended
disadvantaged recipients (Renkow 2003). The fact that impoverished
families and households tend to move to areas with already-high poverty rates reinforces the need to stimulate job growth in these locations
(Nord 1998). Finally, the tendency for rural poverty to be clustered in
larger regions means that there are fewer employment opportunities
within driving distance.
The new-jobs tax credits and wage subsidies that will be described
in Chapter 9 give one grounds to believe that targeting the most distressed, isolated rural areas will have favorable returns. In fact, there
is evidence that poverty rates in the highest-poverty rural counties are
more than twice as favorably affected by employment growth as in the
remaining counties, illustrating the potential effects of targeting distressed counties.12 However, in this targeting process, it should be noted
that there are rural communities that do not have a critical mass of economic activity to sustain their current population. Putting scarce government resources into these communities would be wasteful and the
funds would be better spent elsewhere, particularly in nearby regional
centers. Likewise, there are many rural counties, especially on the Great
Plains, that have experienced large, irreversible population losses for
the past few decades. Such counties are undergoing an adjustment in
which their disadvantaged people, along with the rest of their population, are naturally relocating to greener pastures. In these counties, it
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would be better to wait until the population stabilizes, as the resources
would likely be of better use elsewhere.
The regression analysis suggested that rural county poverty rates,
especially in more isolated counties, are mitigated by improved employment prospects for women and by fewer single-parent households.
Hence, policies that facilitate improved access to child care would seem
especially beneficial in rural America, particularly the farther away one
gets from metropolitan centers. Likewise, given the low population
density and the clustering of poverty in rural areas, transportation enhancements would be beneficial.
The greater importance of the informal economy in rural America
also suggests that traditional human-capital training needs to be broadened. For example, improving basic business skills and increasing entrepreneurship might help take informal enterprises into the mainstream
economy as well as help provide an alternative or a bridge for the underemployed. Programs aimed at developing business plans, marketing, identifying niche domestic and foreign markets, and providing and
brokering financing may have larger payoffs than merely teaching basic skills. Indeed, such programs may directly confront the problem of
outside investors being reluctant to invest in more distant rural areas
with uncertain economic prospects. Trends in globalization and outsourcing accentuate the need for greater entrepreneurship to ensure that
the engine of growth is more homegrown and stable. Nevertheless, this
does not rule out the need for upgrading of skills in rural areas, because
those areas tend to have lower average educational attainment. Hence,
customized training could also be used to facilitate the attraction of new
business startups.
It should be noted that, except in regions that have been undergoing
persistent population losses, it is not clear whether relocation assistance
policies will be effective in rural America. Unlike their metropolitan
counterparts, disadvantaged rural households would often have to relocate much farther away and in larger centers than they are used to. Such
moves are likely more expensive, both in terms of pecuniary costs and
in the nonpecuniary, emotional costs of leaving behind friends and family, who serve as support systems. In some rural counties dominated by
African Americans, Hispanics, or Native Americans, the costs of families leaving their informal networks may be prohibitive (Spilimberg and
Ubeda 2004). It would likely take too many resources, which are scarce
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to begin with, to successfully encourage relocation of disadvantaged
rural families.

Summary
This chapter follows up on Chapter 7 by assessing the degree to
which the underlying causes of poverty differ for nonmetropolitan
counties as opposed to other types of counties. Lower population densities are expected to produce different poverty rate outcomes, both because rural labor markets differ from others and because there are likely
fewer, or less-accessible, government services in rural markets. Goodquality child care also is lacking in many rural communities, which
further strains single and married parents’ ability to fully participate in
labor market activities.
Descriptive analysis indicates a strong persistence to rural poverty.
In all cases, the highest poverty rate counties were persistent-poverty
counties that had 20 percent or higher poverty in 1959, 1969, 1979,
1989, and 1999. Compared to nonmetropolitan counties with the lowest poverty rates, the highest poverty rate counties tend to have greater
shares of minorities and high-school noncompletion, lower median
household income, and higher unemployment rates. The good news is
that rural counties that experienced the greatest declines in poverty rates
tended to have these same characteristics, suggesting that the most disadvantaged rural counties can improve under the right conditions. Yet
one nagging problem with this premise is the persistence of extremely
high poverty that is found on many Native American reservations.
Nonmetropolitan county poverty rates tended to respond more to
employment growth, especially in the more isolated nonadjacent counties. In fact, job growth, when concentrated in sectors that are growing
rapidly nationally, tends to markedly reduce poverty rates in nonadjacent counties, suggesting potential gains from place-based strategies.
Increasing female employment also has larger poverty-reducing effects
in nonmetro counties, especially in the more isolated ones. Finally, having a greater share of single-parent households increases poverty more
in rural America than in metropolitan areas. Together, these results sug-
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gest that efforts to improve work supports for women can have a greater
impact in nonmetro counties than elsewhere.
Given the larger role of key economic and demographic factors
in nonmetropolitan counties, we argue that targeted, place-based economic-development and work-support policies can be more effective
in rural America than in large urban centers. In fact, these policies are
likely to be most effective in counties that are nonadjacent to metropolitan areas. Hence, we believe the type of employment zone–targeted tax
credits and wage subsidies described in the final chapter should be used
as a tool in reducing rural poverty. Nevertheless, we caution that some
rural counties are simply so isolated or in such a downward spiral that
expending additional resources on them would be fruitless.
We also recommend a large expansion in support for child care in
rural communities, especially for centers that provide hours of service
that can facilitate the various types of shift work that entry-level disadvantaged workers often use as stepping stones. Moreover, we support some forms of added training to augment the relatively low levels
of rural human capital. But rural areas would likely also benefit from
broader programs aimed at increasing entrepreneurship. Such programs
would allow for more of the value added in production to be captured
as area income.
Critics of place-based economic development policies have offered
a host of concerns, described in Chapter 7. In terms of rural America, it is likely these critics would argue that much effort and many
resources have already been expended, with seemingly few results in
helping to stem population outflows. While it is true that rural America
has received hundreds of billions of dollars in agriculture and related
resource subsidies, it is unclear whether those subsidies have promoted
economic vitality, let alone whether they have trickled down to lower
income groups. Indeed, one could ask whether they have harmed the rural economy by helping to maintain an undiversified economic structure
that is under persistent stress. Instead, if these billions were redirected
to promoting industries with better long-run prospects as well as to improving the infrastructure and human capital of rural America, we believe there would be significant gains for the health of the overall rural
economy and for those places’ disadvantaged residents.13
The premise that most of rural America is in a downward spiral and
cannot be saved is misguided. In the 1990s, nonmetropolitan population
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increased by 10.3 percent, which represents an increase from the 1980s.
Net-migration—likely the best indicator of quality of life—was positive for nonmetropolitan counties during the 1990s.14 Even in nonadjacent nonmetropolitan counties, population growth averaged 7.8 percent
during the decade (Table 8.6). In the rural West, more people made a
lifestyle choice to migrate to isolated and sparsely settled counties with
fewer natural amenities (Cromartie and Wardwell 1999). Thus, reports
that rural America is dead are premature. To help the disadvantaged and
general population in rural counties, it is not necessarily more funds
that are required, but a reallocation of resources away from policies
targeted at specific industries. Of course, such policy changes would
take considerable political will, and vested interests will surely fight
such changes. Nevertheless, improving the plight of the rural poor and
the larger rural population demands a new approach.

Notes
The two epigraphs to this chapter come from Egan (2003) and Atkinson (2004).
1. Table A.1 reports that the standard deviation of poverty rates in nonmetropolitan
counties is about 2 percentage points higher than in metropolitan counties.
2. Figure A.1 goes into more detail.
3. Blank (2005), Mosely and Miller (2004), and Weber and Jensen (2004) summarize the place-based differences in rural areas and some of the research on rural
poverty rate differentials.
4. In 2001, average noncore rural earnings were 62 percent of metropolitan average
earnings, while the corresponding share in micropolitan areas was 69 percent
(ERS 2003d).
5. For more details on the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan poverty gap, see ERS
(2004a).
6. Following the convention of earlier chapters, we define the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan counties as they were defined in the 2000 census.
7. Note that the 243 isolated nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
8. The respective coefficients for industry-mix and competitiveness-employment
growth were 0.079 (t = 1.83) and 0.015 (t = 2.60), compared to 0.017 for generic
employment growth. Note that the industry-mix employment growth variable is
likely measured with more error in nonmetro counties, which would bias its coefficient to zero. Greater nonmetropolitan measurement error arises because the
county industry employment figure that is used to derive the industry-mix measure had to be interpolated when there was missing data in the original Bureau of
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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.
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Economic Analysis employment series. Because of nondisclosure requirements,
missing data was more prevalent in nonmetro counties, requiring more interpolation. Likely reflecting the effects of measurement error, the null hypothesis that
the industry-mix and competitiveness-employment growth coefficients are equal
can only be rejected at the 15.2 percent level.
Comparing column (8) to column (4), we find that from 1989 to 1999 a reversal
occurs in the statistical significance of commuting-zone job growth and percent
employed in county of residence, though the underlying implications are similar.
The adjacent-to-metropolitan-area industry-mix and competitiveness-employment growth coefficients were −0.042 (t = 0.75) and −0.015 (t = 1.93), in which
the null hypothesis that the two coefficients were equal could not be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance (p = 0.63). To be sure, measurement error
may have biased these industry-mix and competitiveness results to zero. The corresponding coefficients for counties not adjacent to metro areas were −0.13 (t =
1.95) and −0.016 (t = 1.67), in which the null hypothesis that the two coefficients
are equal could be rejected at the 0.10 level.
In neither the adjacent nor the nonadjacent case are the farm employment share
and Hispanic population share results strongly affected when the immigration
shares are added to the model. Likewise, following the patterns of Chapters 6
and 7, the recent foreign immigrant share had a statistically insignificant impact
on 1989 poverty rates.
To consider this, we divided the nonmetropolitan sample into the 527 counties
that had poverty rates greater than 20 percent in both 1979 and 1989 and the
1,677 counties that did not. The 1995–2000 employment growth coefficient was
−0.049 (t = 3.49) in the high poverty sample and −0.022 (t = 3.59) in the remaining rural counties. In order to focus on the total effects of employment growth,
the specification did not include the employment rate, unemployment rate, or
mobility variables.
Atkinson (2004) presents an approach that could form a framework for redirecting current federal resources and subsidies toward reinvigorating rural America.
These figures use the 1990 definitions of metropolitan counties. For more details
on rural population change, see ERS (2004b).
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How to Win the Local Poverty War
Summary and Policy Recommendations
Forty years of movement of people and jobs away from the city have
taken a toll on Philadelphia’s revenue base; abandoned properties, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing poverty and social distress
have exacerbated the need for government intervention.
—Manpower Research Development Corporation, Welfare Reform in
Philadelphia, 2003
The rural Great Plains has been losing people for 70 years, a slow demographic collapse. Without even the level of farmers and merchants
that used to give these areas their pulse, many counties are also losing
their very reason to exist.
—Timothy Egan, “Amid Dying Towns of Rural Plains, One Makes a
Stand,” New York Times, December 1, 2003
Just as effective causal stories focus on the simultaneous role of multiple and interactive causal factors, so effective policy solutions require
attention to multiple strategies.
—Rebecca Blank, “Poverty, Policy, and Place,” International Regional Science Review, October 2005

Synopsis
After weakening in the 1980s, the link between economic growth
and poverty reduction tightened again during the record expansion of
the 1990s, particularly near the end of the decade. Yet strong economic
performance also coincided with several public policy initiatives, including efforts to reform state and federal welfare programs. Regression and case study analysis of state-level data in Chapters 4 and 5,
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however, reveal little evidence to support welfare reform as reducing
overall poverty; instead it appears the economy was primarily responsible for poverty reduction.
In particular, the state- and national-level findings indicate that a
given degree of employment growth reduces poverty more when the
national economy is strong. The findings also suggest that economic
development efforts targeted at industries that nationally are growing
rapidly reduce poverty more than broad-based attempts to accelerate local growth. These two factors lead to better poverty outcomes because
local commuting and migration flows are dampened in response to the
acceleration of regional employment growth, producing greater benefits
for disadvantaged current residents. Better labor market outcomes for
females are more important for reducing poverty than better outcomes
for males. This is true even after accounting for the influence of job
growth on female labor market outcomes, which implies that other factors such as access to good-quality child care are important for females
in obtaining work.
Despite the reduction in the overall poverty rate at the national level, persistent geographic pockets of poverty remain. Persistent pockets
of poverty include areas in central Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta,
the historic Cotton Belt in the Southeast, areas along the Rio Grande
and the Mexican border, and Native American reservations in the West
and the Great Plains. These pockets of extreme poverty reflect a general
pattern of persistence in which areas that had high (or low) poverty in
the middle of the twentieth century often have high (or low) poverty
in the early twenty-first century. In general, poverty remains higher in
nonmetropolitan, or rural, counties, particularly those more isolated
from metropolitan areas. Higher-than-average poverty also exists in
large metropolitan areas (i.e., those with a population exceeding one
million). Within metropolitan areas, higher poverty occurs in central
cities, whereas poverty generally is appreciably lower in the more economically vibrant outer suburbs.
While strong natural, historical, and cultural forces likely underlie
many of the poverty differences across areas, county-level regression
and case study analysis in Chapters 6–8 indicate that economic factors
also substantially influence place-based poverty. Yet because of likely
greater cross-county migration and commuting, the link between county-level employment growth and poverty is weaker than the growth-
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poverty link at the state and national levels. This cautions against implementing generic job creation policies on a small geographic scale.
Broader geographical spillovers of economic growth on poverty across
regions suggest that there should be fewer economic development efforts, but that those efforts should be centered on larger regions encompassing more people.
Nevertheless, as is consistent with state-level findings, we find that
employment growth attributable to a county having a composition of
nationally fast-growing industries reduced its poverty rate more than
broad-based employment growth derived from all (or most) industries
in the county growing faster than their respective national counterparts.
We hypothesize that because the nationally fast-growing sectors are doing well everywhere, there is less inducement for employed workers
already tied to these sectors through education or training to commute
or migrate into the county from other regions.
Poverty in central cities, particularly among African Americans,
appears to be affected by the trend of relocating jobs from inner core
areas to newer suburbs, which creates a spatial mismatch between jobs
and people. Spatial mismatch occurs when inner-city residents do not
completely adjust to net job losses through relocation or increased commuting. Case studies suggest that this is most likely to occur in large,
slower-growth, mature cities. Metropolitan poverty is particularly affected by male unemployment, even after controlling for the general
influence of job growth, which suggests that additional causes beyond
merely a lack of jobs are linked to male unemployment.
We find a number of differences in the relationship between poverty and the economy in nonmetropolitan counties, particularly for isolated rural areas. Compared to metro counties, rural poverty rates are
more dependent on employment growth, presumably because of lower
migration and commuting propensities. In what is also likely related
to lower migration and commuting tendencies, targeting growth towards industries that are doing well nationally has especially strong
effects on rural poverty. Increasing female employment likewise has
larger poverty-reducing effects in nonmetro counties. A greater share
of single-parent households increases poverty more in nonmetro areas
than in metro areas, which we note as being potentially attributable to
low rural wages and the greater need for two incomes for families to
rise above poverty. Nonmetropolitan counties are also more affected by
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shifts in industry structure. This is likely related to nonmetro counties’
greater dependence on a few industries and to their inhabitants’ greater
reluctance to relocate. Finally, poverty also appears to be more spatially
clustered in nonmetro areas, with the level of poverty in each county
contingent on the economic vitality of its neighbors.

Policy Recommendations
Given the spatial dimensions of poverty, we cannot imagine an effective poverty-reduction program that does not aggressively address
the place-based barriers that underlie the severe pockets of poverty.
While helping individuals to be self-reliant is laudable, recognition
needs to be given to the many root causes of poverty that exist in local
communities. Besides a host of deficiencies in a community’s capacity
to offer services, such as inadequate transportation and child care, many
areas simply do not have sufficient job opportunities for less-skilled
individuals. Clearly, healthy doses of personal values and individual responsibility cannot be expected to fully overcome problems that originate at the community level. Thus, policy initiatives need to be tailored
to place, recognizing each region’s particular circumstances.
Our analysis points to a number of policies that could potentially reduce localized poverty. Both place-based and person-based policies are
needed, and policy design should reflect their interplay. As evidenced
in the quotation by Rebecca Blank at the beginning of the chapter, the
complexity of place-based poverty requires simultaneous implementation of multiple strategies—implementation of an incomplete set of
policies will likely prove fruitless. Finally, regional policies also must
be optimally designed within the context of the national economic and
policymaking environment. Policies consistent with our findings, including both those currently used in practice and new ones that we propose, follow below.
Macroeconomic Policies
Because a rising tide has once again been found to lift all boats,
poverty reduction should become an explicit goal of macroeconomic
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policymaking. In particular, our analysis of the 1990s experience suggests that poverty reduction is more likely to occur when economic
growth is sustained. Local poverty-reducing impacts of growth accumulate over time. Sustained national growth pushes unemployment rates
and labor force participation rates to points where those with the least
education and job skills have time to move out of poverty. Prolonged
economic growth helps ensure that disadvantaged workers gain sufficient experience, confidence, and other soft and hard skills to remain
employed on a consistent basis. Likewise, sustained national growth
helps ensure that prosperity becomes geographically widespread, as
booming areas eventually bump up against supply-side constraints,
causing demand to shift to lagging regions. An example of how macroeconomic policymaking could incorporate poverty concerns would be
for the Federal Reserve district banks to provide information on the
antipoverty benefits of continued growth in their regions, which could
be weighed against general inflation risks.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The federal EITC has been lauded for greatly increasing labor force
participation (if not hours of work) and reducing welfare roles (Hotz
and Scholz 2001; Grogger 2003). Given its success, the EITC should
be simplified and made more generous at the federal level and expanded
at the state and local level. For example, in 2004 there were 18 states
with their own versions of the EITC. Beyond states, targeted EITCs
should be used in distressed substate regions. Examples of local EITCs
are found in Montgomery County, Maryland, and in one used in the
city of Denver during 2002.1 Given that an EITC tax credit is directly
based on income, it more directly helps those most in need. The EITC
is an attractive alternative to state and local minimum wage and living
wage laws, which, besides deterring employment growth, are much less
focused on needy households and thus can go to workers who are in
families well above the poverty threshold (Turner and Barnow 2003).
Along with job-creation strategies such as targeted tax breaks, wage
subsidies, or public employment, an EITC targeted at a distressed area
would provide disadvantaged workers with a supply-side carrot to encourage employment. It should be prescribed for a limited period, such
as two years, to induce disadvantaged workers to gain enough experi-
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ence and human capital to ensure long-lasting employment. Further, it
should be limited to people who have resided in the targeted area for
some set time period (say, one year) to deter people from relocating to
be eligible for the credit. Such a spatially focused supply-side inducement may be the needed impetus to ensure that geographically targeted
employment growth programs are successful. Moreover, along with
wage subsidies targeted to residents of distressed zones, an EITC that
is focused on the zone’s disadvantaged residents would also provide an
inducement for them to seek suitable employment outside of the zone.
Metropolitan and Urban Economic Development Policies
Because there is an apparent lack of jobs in the core of most large
metropolitan areas, we believe that an effective metropolitan (urban)
antipoverty strategy should encompass spatially targeted enterprise
zone policies that chiefly benefit the residents of the zone. Some characteristics of these policies are as follows:
• They would be primarily targeted at central counties, especially
those with greater African American population shares.
• Targeting efforts should emphasize industries that are growing
faster than the national average, because such growth induces
smaller in-migration flows (and likely smaller commuter flows).
That is, if the industry is faring well everywhere, then growth
in one location will likely attract fewer workers from elsewhere
because they are already likely to be employed. Efforts should
also consider targeting sectors that employ less-skilled workers at higher wages—i.e., in industries known to have positive
pay differentials even after accounting for occupational structure
(Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2002, 2003; Foster-Bey and Rawlings 2002).
• The incentives and wage subsidies should be almost entirely targeted at new hires who reside within the enterprise zone. Exceptions—hires from outside the enterprise zone—must only be
made for disadvantaged persons: for example, TANF recipients
or unemployed workers from low-income households (Peters and
Fisher 2002). The breaks should not simply go toward the firms
locating in these areas because, more often than not, the newly
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created jobs will end up going to people who reside outside of the
targeted zone.
• The incentive mechanism should be consistent with recent New
Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and targeted wage subsidy (TWS) proposals (Bartik 2001; Schweke 2004).2 One distinction is that we
believe they should be further targeted to residents of the zone.
Specifically, an NJTC would provide about a 30-percent tax
credit on wages up to about $15,000 when a firm hires additional
employees beyond some benchmark. Subsidies would only take
effect when employment rises above 102 percent of the previous year’s employment. That means subsidies are for new jobs,
not existing jobs. For residents who are certified by a workforce
board, the TWS would subsidize wage and benefits up to an average rate of about $8.50 an hour for 26 weeks. The TWS program
would be structured to allow a community workforce board to
pick potential employers who have a track record of retaining
disadvantaged workers. A central benefit is that both programs
target less-skilled workers, not capital.
• As is consistent with the incentive programs, there is further need
for community-based placement agencies and the so-called firstsource programs (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2003; Schweke
2004; Shelton et al. 2002). These nonprofit groups first screen
and train disadvantaged workers and then place them in good
employment matches. Such organizations likely have better
community networks and may be more credible with businesses
than a government agency. There remains a need for government
programs, in which efforts to improve current programs such as
the one-stop career centers are good steps.
Nonmetropolitan Economic Development Policies
The lack of well-paying jobs in many rural areas suggests the need
for the same kind of enterprise zone policies there that we advocate
for central-city counties. Chapter 8 describes how targeting place-based
economic-development and work-support policies can be more effective in rural America than in large urban centers. These policies are
likely to be most effective in counties that are farthest away from metropolitan areas.
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Enterprise zones for rural areas have been part of federal and state
rural development efforts. For example, in 1996 Nebraska implemented
an Enterprise Zone Act in which economic distress was defined as population loss in excess of 10 percent between the two most recent censuses, and an unemployment rate twice the state average or a poverty
rate in excess of 20 percent (Nebraska State Statutes 1996). Businesses
are eligible to receive income and sales tax credits for new employees hired at a qualifying wage, and for investment expenditures above
a certain threshold. The program’s eligibility requirements for metropolitan areas differ from those of rural areas (Nebraska Department of
Revenue 2006).
At the federal level, stemming from legislation in 1993, numerous
empowerment zones and enterprise communities were created in rural
areas in 24 states, with most concentrated in Appalachia, in areas across
the South with high black poverty, and in Hispanic communities across
the Southwest (Reid 1999). High poverty rates are the primary requirement for designation as either an empowerment zone or an enterprise
community, and most of the areas have poverty rates in the 25–35 percent range. The primary difference between an empowerment zone and
an enterprise community is that, in the former, business tax credits and
other tax incentives are available.
Empowerment zones and enterprise communities should consider
the following recommendations, which are specific to nonmetropolitan
areas:
• Nonmetropolitan areas that serve, or can serve, as regional centers for economic activity should be identified and targeted. The
poverty benefits of a growing economic center will spill over into
less-developed neighbors. Regional centers also serve as a commuting magnet that benefits residents far away. Empirical results
in Chapter 8 show the importance of these regional spillovers in
reducing rural poverty. However, expending resources on communities that do not possess a critical mass of businesses will
be wasteful, as residents of these small communities will simply
purchase goods and services from larger centers. In fact, Stabler
and Olfert (2002) find that financial injections into small rural
communities typically end up benefiting higher-order cities more
than the intended community.
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• Regional economic development cooperatives or corporations
should be designed for commuting zones. The advantages of
organizations that encompass a broader geographic scope than
just an individual city or county include pooling of resources and
greater internalization of the larger regional benefits. And regional efforts would likely be better monitored for their progress than
state or federal efforts and adjusted accordingly.
• For urban areas in nonmetro counties, targeting industries that
are faring well nationally helps reduce migration and increases
the benefits to existing local residents.
• As recommended for metro areas, tax credits should be provided
for newly created jobs for workers who reside in the zone. For
example, under the Nebraska Enterprise Zone Act, higher tax
credits were awarded for residents hired from the zone (Rogers
1998).
• Rural counties that are simply too isolated, or are in such a downward spiral that expending additional resources on them would
not produce tangible results, should be identified and made ineligible. In particular, peripheral regions that are part of larger
commuting zones for regional economic centers should not be
targeted for job growth. Rather, efforts should be directed at individuals in these areas to assist them in obtaining suitable employment, through either commuting or relocating.
• Empowerment zones also may need to provide infrastructure and
customized training. Unlike capital tax subsidies, customized
training programs can provide lasting benefits to zone residents
even if targeted firms close. North Carolina has been praised for
its strong emphasis on the customized training provided by community and technical colleges (Bartik 2001), which is a feature
of recent Bush administration proposals (White House 2004).
• Credits and subsidies should be given to encourage entrepreneurship that takes advantage of nonmetropolitan informal
economies. Such entrepreneurial activities may allow for more
value added in production to be retained as area income. Thus,
the credits can be based on contribution to regional income, but
this needs to be closely monitored to ensure sufficient income
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is trickling down to the lower part of the income distribution.
A trend in encouraging entrepreneurship is microlending, which
began internationally in the 1980s.3 Microlending is now finding
its way into rural empowerment zones and enterprise communities. It provides individuals who possess human capital but lack
financial capital with funding to start small businesses. From international applications, communities have learned to use peer
groups in making approval decisions, rather than basing such
decisions purely on the amount of collateral the loan applicant
can offer. This type of approach works best in rural areas, where
inhabitants’ greater familiarity with one another facilitates the
use of of peer groups. Thus, microlending would have its greatest impact where skills are most underutilized or business is most
undercapitalized (Wallace 1999).
• Empowerment zones should facilitate and broker funding for
broadband infrastructure and other investments needed to support
firms dependent upon digital technology. In more remote areas,
such investment should focus on wireless and satellite technology. Some states should consider creating a twenty-first century
counterpart to the Rural Electrification Administration, which
brought electric service to remote regions in the mid-twentieth
century.
• Empowerment zones should also financially support research to
develop promising products and services most suited for production in rural areas, such as wind power (Atkinson 2004).
• Zones should decentralize the location of government facilities,
moving them away from high-cost urban areas to lower-cost
rural areas, and particularly to rural areas located near regional
economic centers (Atkinson 2004; Blank 2005).
• Another challenge that distressed communities and cities often
face is a declining tax base and a deteriorating or crumbling infrastructure. These disadvantages can lead to municipalities imposing a heavier tax burden, which would further deter firms from
locating in these communities. Hence, an additional way to aid
distressed areas is through state and federal sources sharing more
of their revenue (Bartik 2004). Addressing infrastructure needs
has been a principal part of the federal government’s strategic
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plans for rural empowerment zones and enterprise communities
(Reid 1999).
• Particularly in disadvantaged urban and rural communities, there
is often a lack of community capacity to provide services, such as
transportation and child care. This capacity is the necessary glue
that holds communities together, making long-term economic
growth possible. A certain level of community stability is necessary to reduce the inherent risk before private investment will
begin to take hold. Thus, our final strategy relates to the need for
community capacity-building, enhanced community organizations, and greater social capital, all of which help enforce social
stability, appropriate individual behavior, and property rights
(Blank 2005). Not only should efforts focus on building governance structures, they also should ensure that the resulting institutions are transparent and accountable to the entire population.
Proper governance ensures that the needs of the entire community
are met, rather than simply those of local elites. Administrators
of state and federal economic development and antipoverty programs could foster and monitor progress in this area.
Metropolitan Person-Based Policies
Although we believe place-based proposals are needed, they are not
intended to replace necessary person-based policies. Below, we summarize some of our preferred approaches for metropolitan areas.
• Enhanced transportation incentives to facilitate reverse commuting to job-rich suburbs are worthwhile. Good examples of current efforts include funds to repair automobiles and improvement
of public transport or shuttle services. In fact, there is sufficient
evidence to support additional pilot projects for providing disadvantaged households with a serviceable automobile (Waller and
Hughes 1999; Raphael and Rice 2002).4
• We believe encouraging disadvantaged households to relocate
to areas that have a greater availability of jobs has some promise. Chicago’s Gautreaux program of the 1970s is often cited as
a program that produced long-term payoffs (Rosenbaum and
DeLuca 2000). Following up on that program’s success, the U.S.
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Department of Housing and Urban Development implemented
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program in the mid-1990s
to help households in high-poverty neighborhoods relocate to
more prosperous neighborhoods (Shroder 2001). Early evidence
shows that, with sufficient counseling and assistance in finding
housing, it may be possible to improve a disadvantaged household’s economic and social well-being through relocation.5 Yet
we are concerned that, even under the best of circumstances, disadvantaged households would be reluctant to relocate. Already
there are great incentives to leave poor neighborhoods without
any assistance, but such wide-scale migration has not occurred.
One likely reason is that, by moving, a household would leave
behind friends, family, and contacts that often provide needed
support, including child care. Another is that the poor may not
be able to move to lower poverty areas because of the lack of affordable housing. Also, minorities may face discrimination from
potential landlords and other obstacles in their new setting. In
sum, programs such as MTO are likely only a small piece of the
puzzle.
• There is an ongoing need to provide skills upgrading and training to all disadvantaged groups. However, human capital programs have a long history, and, given their cost and marginal
effectiveness (Carneiro and Heckman 2003), we think that these
programs are not sufficient without complementary increases in
employment opportunities. Moreover, a useful supplement is
counseling in job-search skills, in employment information, and
in workplace expectations, as well as ongoing mentoring to encourage retention. Community nonprofit organizations should be
more intensively utilized in delivering these programs.
• Disadvantaged residents need more information regarding job
opportunities, and they need counseling to improve job-search
skills and to retain jobs. In terms of channeling scarce resources
to where they will do the most good, Chapter 7’s findings indicate that these programs will likely have greater impacts in central-city counties.
• We found that greater minority population shares are not a determining factor behind higher poverty rates. Rather, we found that
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other factors that may be related to race, including the lack of
access to good jobs and a larger share of single mothers, underlie
higher minority poverty. Yet to improve access to jobs, especially
for African Americans, more effective Affirmative Action programs in housing may offer gains.
• Some possible reforms for helping dislocated or unemployed
workers include improving the federally supported one-stop career centers, which Congress created in 1998 to provide more
flexible training assistance and job-hunting tips such as resume
preparation (Wessel 2003). The Bush administration proposed
reforming the 1998 Workforce Investment Act by reducing overhead and red tape and by providing more attention to actual skills
that are being demanded by employers (White House 2004). The
administration also wants to create more individual flexibility through $3,000 Innovation Training Accounts—personal accounts that would give workers the choice of using this funding
at community colleges, community organizations, businesses, or
private-training providers. A similar initiative is the $4,000 New
Economy Work Scholarship proposal by the Progressive Policy
Institute. Finally, others have proposed that unemployed workers receive bonuses when they find work, while still others have
proposed that unemployment benefits decline over time to provide an increasing incentive to quickly find work (Wessel 2003;
White House 2004). For example, in 2004 the Bush administration proposed a $50 million pilot project to provide $3,000
personal reemployment accounts for unemployed workers, to be
used for child care, transportation, training, and job-search assistance. An individual could keep the balance of the account once
he or she obtained work. Of course, in these latter proposals,
policymakers need to weigh the tradeoff of the potential benefits
of encouraging unemployed workers to take employment versus
the costs incurred if unsuccessful job seekers and their families
fall below the poverty threshold.
Rural Person-Based Policies
While many of the person-based policies suggested for metropolitan areas also apply to nonmetropolitan areas, different emphases may
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be required to address needs specific to these areas. Particular emphasis
should be given to the following activities:
• Child care subsidies appear to have particularly large payoffs
for increasing female labor force participation (Blau and Tekin
2003), which we found to be strongly linked to reducing poverty in nonmetropolitan areas. Moreover, in nonmetropolitan
areas workers rely more on family day care than on child care
centers (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001). This may limit the
geographic scope of the search for employment. Additional assistance, either in the form of direct cash payments to families or
in the form of subsidies and tax credits, may increase the number of child care centers, allowing parents to expand their search
and find better jobs. Rural areas particularly need child care centers that provide the hours of service that can accommodate the
various types of shift work that entry-level disadvantaged rural
residents often find themselves in. One way to marry place-based
policy with person-based policy is to leverage rural schools to
provide additional before- and after-school day care programs.
Such programs could further utilize the school district’s resources in terms of its transportation capacity, by allocating buses to
help disadvantaged parents.
• Even though rural residents are more likely to own cars because
their area has no public transportation, some may not be able to
afford a car, which can limit their employment options. Programs
that have been mentioned for metropolitan areas for assisting individuals in obtaining reliable automobile transport may be even
more effective in nonmetropolitan areas.
• The low pay that is characteristic of rural areas suggests that career counseling could be more important there than in urban areas for obtaining employment with higher wages. Because government and nonprofit counseling services are probably widely
scattered, added effort is required to make them better known
and more accessible to rural residents.
• More training to augment the relatively low levels of rural human capital is needed. Firms requiring a higher level of skills are
unlikely to locate in rural areas lacking human capital. Of course,
to induce rural residents to improve their human capital, a simul-
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taneous strategy of attracting higher-skilled firms would need to
be in place. The human-capital programs would then need to focus on the needs of the firms being targeted.
Welfare Reform Policies
Welfare reform should place more emphasis on reducing poverty
than on reducing caseloads. Programs should de-emphasize placing recipients immediately into any form of employment regardless of the
poverty consequences, and emphasize instead moving welfare recipients permanently above the poverty line. As evidenced in many states,
this may be more expensive in the short run, but over the longer run
both welfare caseloads and poverty would likely be reduced. Nonetheless, the programs would still need to contain strong work incentives
such as earnings disregards, sanctions for noncompliance with program
directives, and time limits on benefits for those assessed as being able
to obtain gainful employment. The financial support required to reduce
poverty likely includes the following actions, some of which overlap
with needed supports for the working poor in general.
• Attempt to train recipients and best match their skills and abilities with the job placement, such as in the state of Washington.
• Continue career counseling after the initial job placement until the recipient obtains employment with adequate wages and
health benefits.
• Provide sufficient subsidies for child care expenditures.
• Financially assist current and recent recipients with transportation needs. For example, such assistance could be in the form of
cash rebates or low-interest loans for purchase of automobiles.
• Provide housing subsidies until the family is at a sufficient level
above poverty, and focus on subsidizing housing in areas with
stronger job growth.
• Subsidize health care until recipients obtain employer-provided
health benefits.
• Match the most disadvantaged, such as those suffering from
mental illness, substance abuse, or spousal abuse, to appropriate
social service agencies, since some individuals may be able to
become self-sufficient with assistance.
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Conclusion
We began this book by noting that society has much to gain from
alleviating poverty, and that the benefits extend well beyond the direct
beneficiaries. We describe how helping children in poor families can
produce strong intergenerational benefits. In Chapter 6, we find that
children appear to gain more from a strong local economy than do other
age groups. Another theme that we put forth is that the likelihood that
a given family or household experiences poverty is greatly affected by
where they reside. Poverty is simply not uniformly distributed across
the nation. It can be rather high in central cities and in more-isolated rural communities, and it usually is low in exurban areas and in the betteroff suburbs. Even within these categories, there is tremendous diversity.
Not only is poverty unevenly distributed across our communities, its
incidence is very persistent. The high-poverty areas of the mid-twentieth century were generally the high-poverty areas at the beginning of
the twenty-first century.
The complex set of circumstances that underlies the spatial distribution of poverty necessitates multiple, concurrent antipoverty policies
tailored to place. Augmenting individual skills or other personal deficiencies alone will be inadequate when the root causes are at the community level. Antipoverty policies need to be focused and coordinated;
they need to be mutually reinforcing and not working against each other. One solution at the federal level would be to consolidate economic
development programs (Atkinson 2004), while at the same time giving
policymakers enough freedom to avoid having to conform to one-sizefits-all solutions. Federal efforts could then be better coordinated with
state and local efforts as the various levels pooled expertise, resources,
and funds.
Economic development initiatives need to be informed more by
research related to broader societal objectives than are the current programs, which tend to be infused with politics and power brokering. Rural
America is probably the most prominent example of this—a geography
where misguided industry-level subsidies are too often passed off as
broader economic development. These programs have not stabilized the
rural economy and may have even undermined it. Simple reallocation
of resources could pay significant dividends; industry-level subsidies
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should only be used as part of a broader strategy to reinvigorate local
economies. Only by focusing policy on broader societal interests such
as poverty reduction can we get the best use out of the billions of dollars
that make their way through the labyrinth of government economicdevelopment and industry-support programs. Nevertheless, because the
potential gains that would result from better focusing our efforts are so
large, we are guardedly optimistic that the public will eventually demand that the necessary changes be made.

Notes
The epigraphs at the opening of this chapter come from Michalopoulos et al. (2003),
Egan (2003), and Blank (2005).
1. The Montgomery County’s EITC matched the Maryland EITC, which was 15
percent of the federal credit in 2001. Details of the EITC can be found on the
Montgomery County Web site, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/mc/
news/press/00-33.html (Montgomery County 2000). Denver’s 2002 EITC gave
a maximum credit of $788 for low-income families with children. The program
was funded through the federal allocation of TANF funds. More details of the
Denver EITC program can be found on the City of Denver’s Web site, http://
www.denvergov.org/newsarticle.asp?id=3647 (Denver 2002).
2. The NJTC is based on a similar federal program from the late 1970s, and the
TWS program mimics a similar Minnesota program of the 1980s (Bartik 2001).
3. Microlending typically involves the provision of small loans made to microenterprises by noncommercial organizations such as government agencies or
nonprofits. These normally employ a few people at most and have limited or no
access to commercial credit.
4. Even so, we believe that transportation initiatives alone will have a limited impact on poverty. Especially in areas with heavy congestion, it will be challenging
to induce disadvantaged individuals to add hours of commuting time for a lowwage job when they are already struggling with child care and other issues of
survival.
5. Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) find evidence that the MTO program improved
outcomes such as health and safety for the relocated households, but they did
not find statistically significant evidence that MTO improved short-run earnings
and employment or reduced welfare receipt. Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2004)
find evidence that MTO has led to less crime among girls of the households that
move, but they find more mixed effects on the criminal activity of boys belonging to such households.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the County
Poverty Rate Empirical Model
The underlying partial-adjustment model used in the empirical analysis assumes that in year t, county i possesses an equilibrium poverty rate, povit*, that
is a function of the county’s socioeconomic characteristics Xit. By equilibrium,
we mean that there are forces that push the poverty rate back to povit*. This
process is shown in Equation (A.1):
(A.1)

povit* =

βXit ,

where β maps the relationship between the factors in Xit and the equilibrium
poverty rate povit*. Dropping the subscript i for convenience, the actual poverty
rate in year t (povt ) only partially adjusts from the previous period some fraction α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) towards the equilibrium rate:
(A.2)

povt − povt-1 =

α(povt* − povt-1).

Equation (A.2) simply states that the change in poverty rate is some partial
fraction of the deviation of the past poverty rate from the county’s equilibrium
poverty rate.
If we combine Equations (A.1) and (A.2), the actual poverty rate in year t
can be written as
(A.3)

povt = (1

− α)povt-1 + αβXt .

The short-run poverty response to a change in one of the X variables is
αβ, which is the coefficient for the explanatory variable in a regression of the
poverty rate in year t on the lagged poverty rate and the X variables.1 By definition, in long-run equilibrium, povt equals povt-1. Hence, the long-run equilibrium response to a change in the explanatory variable is αβ/α, in which α
is simply derived from the regression coefficient on the lagged poverty rate
variable. Because α is less than one, the long-run response of a particular variable is greater than the short-run response, illustrating the sluggish adjustment
process. A larger regression coefficient on povt-1 implies either a smaller α or a
slower adjustment to the equilibrium poverty rate.
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An alternative approach would be to follow Levernier et al. (2000) and assume an equilibrium process. This is represented in Equation (A.3) by simply
omitting the lagged poverty rate term and assuming that the current poverty
rate is solely a function of the other explanatory variables. That is, the current
poverty rate equals the equilibrium poverty rate, implying that the adjustment
is rapid. An equilibrium process can be tested in Equation (A.3) by examining
the statistical significance of the lagged poverty rate term. In our results, we
generally find that the lagged poverty rate is highly statistically significant,
meaning that a disequilibrium process is supported by the data. In fact, the
labor market results vary greatly, depending upon whether equilibrium or disequilibrium adjustment is assumed.
Following from Equation (A.3), Box 6.1 on page 134 provides an overview
of the actual empirical specification. The explanatory variables used in the model
shown in Box 6.1 include the five dummy variables in the cty_type vector for
1) whether a county contains the central city of a large MSA,
2) whether the county is a suburb in a large MSA,
3) whether a county contains the central city of a small MSA,
4) whether the county is a suburb in a small MSA, and
5) whether the county is a single-county MSA.
So that the equation can be statistically estimated, the nonmetropolitan county
indicator is omitted. Hence, the MSA county-type regression coefficients are
measured relative to the typical nonmetropolitan county. Following from the
discussion of the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2, a 2000 MSA population of
1,000,000 is used as the division between large and small MSAs.
All else being equal, poverty should be higher in central-city counties relative to suburban counties if mismatches in job skills and neighborhood effects
exist. These mismatches especially apply if transportation constraints limit the
ability of central-city county residents to commute to suburbs where there is
greater job creation. For similar reasons, poverty is expected to be higher in
nonmetropolitan counties than in suburban counties. How poverty rates differ
between nonmetro counties and central-city counties is affected by the relative
strengths of their specific types of labor market mismatches and neighborhood
effects.
We caution that many central-city counties also include a large suburban
population, which acts to make various MSA county groupings appear more
homogenous. Yet the descriptive statistics discussed in Chapter 2 clearly show
that suburban and central-city counties (combined with single-county MSAs)
significantly differ in terms of economic and demographic characteristics. In
particular, the central-city counties often include older inner-ring suburbs that
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Box A.1 The 2003 Definition of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas
Metro and nonmetro areas are defined by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). In 2003, OMB defined metro areas as comprising two
types of counties: 1) central counties with one or more urbanized areas,
and 2) outlying counties that are economically tied to the core counties,
as measured by workers commuting. Metropolitan areas are centered on
urbanized areas of at least 50,000 people. Outlying counties are included
if 25 percent of workers living in the county commute to the central
counties, or if 25 percent of the employment in the county consists of
workers coming out from the central counties—the so-called reverse
commuting pattern. Nonmetro counties are outside the boundaries of
metro areas and are further subdivided into two types. The first is micropolitan areas, centered on urban clusters of 10,000–50,000 people. As
in metro areas, outlying counties are included in a micropolitan area if
the percentage of workers commuting to the central county is 25 percent
or higher, or, vice versa, if 25 percent of the employment in the outlying
county is made up of commuters from the central county. All remaining
nonmetropolitan counties form the second type of nonmetro counties,
called noncore counties.
SOURCE: ERS (2003b,c); U.S. Census Bureau (2004g).

are under stress, whose lagging performance in recent decades indicates a convergence with the central city (Hudnut 2003; Jargowsky 2003; Katz 2003). By
contrast, the suburban-county classification almost always includes the newer, faster-growing (sprawling) suburbs on the fringe of the metropolitan area
(Lucy and Phillips 2001). Hence, the suburban demarcation in this study tends
to reflect the fastest growing parts of metropolitan areas.
County and metropolitan-area population are also included in the cty_type
vector. To capture separate population scale and density effects related to productivity and job accessibility, we include the entire MSA population for metropolitan counties and a separate variable measuring the interaction of the nonmetropolitan county indicator with county population. The interaction variable will
capture any differing population-scale effects for nonmetropolitan areas.
Economic factors (econ) include several county-level measures of labor
market strength. It is an empirical issue whether job growth affects poverty immediately or whether it is a cumulative process over several years. Thus, using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) REIS data, employment growth over
two-, five-, and ten-year periods was separately considered (i.e., for 1988–90
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and 1998–2000, 1985–90 and 1995–2000, and 1980–90 and 1990–2000).2 A
negative sign for the employment growth coefficient would support the hypothesis that stronger labor markets reduce poverty. As discussed in Chapter 6, the
five-year measure of job growth performs best, suggesting a lag between initial
job growth and poverty rate declines.
The male and female unemployment rates are included as additional labor
market measures. Similarly, the county’s employment-population ratios by gender are also included in econ. Given the inclusion of job growth, the employment
rate coefficients should reflect effects beyond labor demand. We also conduct
simulations to capture the fact that greater job growth not only has direct effects
on poverty but also has indirect effects through changing the unemployment and
employment-population rates.
Also included in econ is recent industrial structural change (ISC). Similar
to the measure used for states in Chapter 4, the ISC is simply a dissimilarity
index measured as the sum of the absolute changes in the 11 BEA one-digit industry employment shares between two periods, divided by two.3 For example,
the 1995–2000 ISC measures what share of the workforce would have to shift
one-digit sectors such that the two periods would have the same sectoral composition. Theory does not provide guidance as to the length of time it may take
structural change to affect poverty. Thus, for both 1989 and 1999, we experimented with both the two-year and five-year measures of structural change (i.e.,
1988–90 and 1998–2000, and 1985–90 and 1995–2000). In general, the twoyear (1988–90) measure appeared to be superior in the 1989 poverty rate model,
and the five-year (1995–2000) measure appeared to work best in 1999.4
A positive ISC coefficient would suggest adjustment costs in the reallocation of labor across sectors that worsen economic outcomes at the lower end
of the skill distribution through increased unemployment, withdrawal from the
labor force, and lower wage rates. However, restructuring is likely to have a
smaller impact when there is a greater diversity of job opportunities in a labor
market, because nonemployed or laid-off workers can find jobs that more readily match their skills and experience. Thus, an interaction of the ISC measure
with the county’s population is also added to the model, in which the improved
job-matching hypothesis suggests a negative coefficient.
Labor market and other characteristics in surrounding counties may spill
over and affect a county’s poverty rate. First, job growth in nearby counties
may create employment opportunities for a county’s low-skilled residents, or,
alternatively, slower job growth in neighboring counties may increase the supply of low-skilled individuals crossing into the county for employment. Thus,
for some models we include the MSA five-year employment growth for metropolitan counties,5 and for nonmetropolitan counties we include the five-year
job growth rate for the county’s commuting zone.6

Partridge.indb 290

7/27/2006 1:42:01 PM

Appendix A 291
Second, the percentage of workers employed in the county of residence is
included as a proxy for nearby employment accessibility. After controlling for
county employment growth, we expect that poverty rates should be positively
associated with this measure, as it signals a lack of accessible job opportunities
in nearby counties and may relate to housing discrimination and transportation.
Similar accessibility measures have been utilized in spatial mismatch studies
(Kain 1992; Madden 1996). Finally, to capture neighborhood spillovers, nearby migration patterns, and the supply of low-skilled workers in neighboring
counties, the ten-year lagged average poverty rate of the immediate surrounding counties is included in a sensitivity analysis.
One-digit industry shares of employed county residents are included in econ
to capture the influence of industry composition on county poverty. Because the
omitted category is public administration, these coefficients measure an industry’s effect relative to public administration. Each industry-share regression coefficient is interpreted as the response of increasing that industry’s employment
share by 1 percent (or 0.01) while reducing the public administration share by
1 percent (0.01).
Demographic variables (demog) include five educational attainment categories ranging from high school graduate to bachelor’s degree. Each variable
is measured as the percentage of the population greater than 24 years old with
the attainment defined by that category. The percentage that are high school
dropouts is the omitted group, so the education coefficients are measured relative to the effects of an equivalent offsetting change in the high school noncompletion share. Poverty is expected to be lower in counties with greater
educational attainment. Yet we expect educational attainment to have a declining marginal effect in reducing poverty. That is, at low educational attainment
levels, increases in education can lift many households from below poverty
status into the middle class. However, a greater share of college graduates primarily moves middle class families further above poverty, and there may be
anomalies in college towns in which measured poverty rates will be higher
even as there are high shares of recent college graduates.
Two other key demographic factors in the model are the percentage of
households that are female-headed with children and the percentage that are
male-headed with children. Such families are the primary recipients of welfare, which has a positive effect on income but negative effects through labor
market disincentives. Hence, given major policy changes, any difference in the
single-parent-share coefficients between the decades should partially relate to
changes in incentives due to welfare reform. For one thing, if welfare reform
increased labor market participation among single parents, then the size of the
female- and male-head coefficients would be smaller in 1999, as these groups
would appear more like the general population.
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Five age-share categories are included to capture differing effects due to
age. The coefficients are measured relative to the omitted prime age (25–59)
category, meaning the age coefficients are measured relative to an offsetting
change in the 25–59 category. In particular, the question of whether greater
concentrations of children and seniors are associated with differing poverty
rates is of policy importance. However, we expect that greater concentrations
of young adults aged 18–24 will be positively related to poverty rates, as that
group likely possesses less work experience and is generally less attached to
the labor market because of higher college enrollment.
Two racial categories are included to assess the differing effects for minorities: 1) percentage of the population that is African American, and 2) percentage of the population that is minority but not African American.7 Likewise,
the percentage of the population that belongs to the Hispanic ethnic group is
added to the model. Note that because Hispanic is an ethnic group, its members are also included in one of the racial groups. The interpretation of the
Hispanic coefficient is more complex because Hispanics are more likely to be
recent immigrants, although we also consider some models that account for
immigration.
Besides commuting to more distant jobs, another way for at-risk households to avoid poverty is to migrate to areas with more favorable economic
conditions. Residential mobility is associated with economic growth in general as migrants move to areas with superior labor market conditions. With
job growth and other labor market indicators included in the model, migration
rates should mostly reflect the mobility preferences of the population. Thus,
the model includes the following three factors: the percentage of the population that 1) lived in the same house five years before the census, 2) lived in a
different house but the same county five years before the census, or 3) lived in
a different house but the same MSA five years before the census (MSA counties only). If these variables serve as a proxy for lower geographical mobility in
the population, they should be positively related to the poverty rate.

SIMULATING THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF JOB GROWTH
The total effect of job growth on reducing poverty rates may be understated to some degree when including unemployment and employment rates
because these rates are implicitly held constant. In Table A.1, we consider this
possibility with four simulations of how job growth indirectly affects poverty
through these other measures. The first scenario assumes that five-year job
growth does not have any indirect effects on employment-population rates or
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Table A.1 Direct and Indirect Changes Due to Investment in
Employment Growth (%)
1989
Short run Long run

1999
Short run Long run

No change in the employment/population and unemployment rates
Employment growth
Indirect effects:
Employment/population
Unemployment rate
Total

−0.20

−0.37

−0.14

−0.23

—
—
−0.20

—
—
−0.37

—
—
−0.14

—
—
−0.23

−0.20

−0.37

−0.14

−0.23

−0.31
—
−0.51

−0.58
—
−0.95

−0.23
—
−0.37

−0.38
—
−0.61

One-fifth of the new jobs taken by original residents
Employment growth
Indirect effects:
Employment/population
Unemployment rate
Total

Quasireduced form omit: unemployment and employment/population rates
Employment growth
Total

−0.35
−0.35

−0.88
−0.88

−0.20
−0.20

−0.40
−0.40

Direct estimate from employment/population and unemployment rate modelsa
Employment growth
Indirect effects:
Male employment/population
Female employment/population
Male unemployment rate
Female unemployment rate
Total

−0.20

−0.37

−0.14

−0.23

insig. ≈ 0
−0.09
−0.04
−0.02
−0.35

insig. ≈ 0
−0.17
−0.07
−0.04
−0.65

0.01
insig. ≈ 0
insig. ≈ 0
insig. ≈ 0
−0.13

0.02
insig. ≈ 0
insig. ≈ 0
insig. ≈ 0
−0.21

NOTE: Table shows the changes in poverty rates after a one standard deviation change
in 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 employment growth. A one standard deviation change
= 12.2 and 10.1 percent, respectively.
a
The employment rate and unemployment rate responses are derived as follows. First,
using the results in Table A.3, the change in the respective employment-population
and unemployment rates were calculated after a one standard deviation change in fiveyear employment growth. Then, using Table 6.1, the respective changes in poverty
rates were calculated using the estimated change in the employment-population and
unemployment rates. When either the employment-growth coefficient in Table A.3 or
the corresponding employment-population or unemployment rate coefficient in Table
6.1 was insignificant at the 0.10 level, the result was not reported and was estimated
to be zero.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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on unemployment rates, which is the assumption we use in most cases. This
scenario is consistent with Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) finding that migration
responds sufficiently quickly that, after about five years, all newly created jobs
are taken by new residents, implying that the employment-population ratio and
the unemployment rate are approximately unchanged. Because Blanchard and
Katz considered states rather than local labor markets, they did not measure
commuters from outside the county who also take many of the newly created jobs, making the authors’ result even more plausible at the county level.
Hence, most of the results presented in Chapters 6 through 9 are consistent
with Blanchard and Katz’s assumption for the long run, in that they assume
no indirect effects. The first group of values in Table A.1 shows only the direct poverty rate reduction that is due to greater job growth, since there is no
change in the employment/population and unemployment rates.
Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) long-run conclusions have been questioned
for a variety of reasons. Representative of this alternative literature are Bartik
(1991, 1993b) and Partridge and Rickman (2006), who find that in-migrants
take about 30–50 percent of newly created jobs in the first year. That figure
rises to about 80 percent after about five years.8 These migration responses
suggest that, at least in the short run, the remaining new jobs are taken either
by unemployed original residents or by nonemployed original residents who
were not previously part of the labor force. This research suggests that after
about five years most of the original-resident response is through attracting
additional people into the labor force, in the end producing little net change in
the long-run unemployment rate.9 Thus, each locality appears to have its own
equilibrium unemployment rate to which the local labor market returns after
an economic shock (Bartik 1993b; Blanchard and Katz 1992; Partridge and
Rickman 1997b,c).
A rough approximation of the indirect effects of five-year employment
growth, then, can be derived by assuming that there is no change in the male
and female unemployment rate, and that about one-fifth of the newly created
jobs come through changes in the male and female participation (or employment) rate (Bartik 1993b). Because a one standard deviation increase in the
1985–1990 and 1995–2000 job growth rates equals 12.2 and 10.1 percent, this
implies that the corresponding employment growth attributable to changes in
the employment-population ratio equals 2.4 and 2.0 percent.
Assuming that the share of men and women in the workforce remains
unchanged, a 2.4 percent (not percentage point) increase in the 1989 employment-population ratio would have reduced the short-run poverty rate by an additional 0.31 percentage points and the long-run poverty rate by an additional
0.58 points.10 Thus, the total decline in the 1989 poverty rate from the direct
and indirect effects of employment growth equals 0.51 percentage points (0.20
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+ 0.31) in the short run and 0.95 points (0.37 + 0.58) in the long run. For 1999,
a 2 percent greater male and female employment-population ratio would have
reduced the short-run poverty rate by an additional 0.23 points and the longrun rate by an additional 0.38 points. The total direct and indirect effects from
a one standard deviation increase in 1995–2000 employment growth would be
a 0.37-point (0.23 + 0.14) decline in the short-run poverty rate and a 0.61-point
(0.23 + 0.38) reduction in the long-run rate. The responses are summarized in
the second gorup of values in Table A.1, which shows the results when onefifth of the new jobs are taken by original residents.
We see that even though original residents take only a modest 20 percent
share of the newly created jobs, if we allow job growth to also affect the employment-population rate it more than doubles the poverty rate response to an
acceleration of five-year job growth. This pattern suggests that while greater
job growth may directly increase wages and allow disadvantaged workers to
gain needed work experience, the indirect response of increasing the share of
the population at work can be important.
A weakness of the approach in Panel 2 is that it arbitrarily uses estimated
employment-population and unemployment rate responses that come from
studies primarily based on state and MSA data, not on county data. Thus, these
estimates could be inaccurate for our purposes. To address this concern, we try
two other alternatives in estimating the indirect effects of employment growth.
In both cases, we assume that employment growth is what drives changes in
the unemployment rate and the employment-population rate; this assumption is consistent with the causality used in many VAR studies (Bartik 1991;
Blanchard and Katz 1992).
The first alternative is to estimate a quasireduced form poverty rate model
by removing the two unemployment rates and the two employment-population
rates from the base specification in columns (1) and (4) of Table 6.1 on page
136. In this case, the unemployment rate and the employment-population ratio are no longer held constant, and the regression coefficient on employment
growth can reflect the indirect impacts through changes in these variables. The
model in the third part of Table A.1 shows the results of this exercise. For 1989,
the total short- and long-run job growth effects on poverty increase by twofold
compared to the base results in row 1. The total short- and long-run responses
increase by about one-half in the 1999 model.11
The second alternative approach in allowing the employment-population
and unemployment rates to indirectly affect poverty rates is through a series
of auxiliary regressions. Specifically, for both periods, the male and female
unemployment rates and the employment-population rates were regressed on
the same control variables as in the reported poverty-rate models in Table A.2,
with the exception that these auxiliary models omitted the ten-year lagged pov-
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(1)
Group
Total person poverty rate, 1989 or 1999
Total person poverty rate, 1979
Single-county MSAa
Big-MSA central countyb
Big-MSA suburban countyb
Small-MSA central countyb
Small-MSA suburban countyb
Population

Total
16.7
(7.8)
15.8
(7.2)
0.05
(0.21)
0.03
(0.17)
0.08
(0.27)
0.05
(0.22)
0.06
(0.24)
81,516
(268,219)

MSA population
1988–90 or 1998–2000 empl. growth
1985–90 or 1995–2000 empl. growth
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3.5
(5.3)
8.6
(12.2)

1989–1990
(2)
MSA
county
12.3
(5.6)
11.7
(4.9)
0.17
(0.37)
0.12
(0.32)
0.29
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39)
0.23
(0.42)
239,597
(478,619)
1,200,309
(1,554,358)
5.1
(4.8)
15.4
(11.8)

Total

1999–2000
(5)
MSA
county

(6)
Non-MSA
county

14.1
(6.4)

11.0
(4.8)

15.3
(6.6)

22,416
(20,746)

0.05
(0.21)
0.03
(0.17)
0.08
(0.27)
0.05
(0.22)
0.06
(0.24)
92,252
(297,380)

2.9
(5.4)
6.0
(11.4)

2.8
(4.2)
9.2
(10.1)

0.17
(0.37)
0.12
(0.32)
0.29
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39)
0.23
(0.42)
272,984
(528,087)
1,371,422
(1,745,655)
4.7
(3.7)
13.8
(10.8)

(3)
Non-MSA
county
18.4
(7.9)
17.3
(7.4)

(4)

24,682
(23,332)

2.1
(4.1)
7.5
(9.3)
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Table A.2 County Regression Summary Statistics, 1990 and 2000
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1988–90 or 1998–2000 structural changec
1985–90 or 1995–2000 structural changec
% male employment-population
% female employment-population
% civilian male unemployment rate
% civilian female unemployment rate
% residential employment in agricultureforestry-fisheries
% residential employment in goods
% residential employment in transportation/
public utilities
% residential employment in trade

0.035
(0.019)
0.067
(0.03)
65.8
(8.0)
48.5
(7.4)
6.6
(3.3)
6.8
(3.1)
8.4
(8.2)
27.3
(10.2)
6.5
(2.1)
20.7
(3.6)

0.029
(0.015)
0.06
(0.024)
70.0
(6.3)
53.4
(6.6)
5.9
(2.1)
6.1
(2.2)
2.9
(2.5)
26.5
(8.0)
7.1
(2.1)
22.7
(2.8)

0.037
(0.020)
0.070
(0.033)
64.2
(8.0)
46.6
(6.9)
6.8
(3.6)
7.0
(3.4)
10.5
(8.6)
27.6
(10.9)
6.3
(2.0)
19.9
(3.6)

% residential employment in finance,
insurance, and real estate

4.4
(1.8)

5.9
(2.1)

3.8
(1.2)

0.022
(0.012)
0.048
(0.024)
68.0
(6.6)
55.4
(6.1)
5.2
(2.0)
5.3
(2.1)
1.5
(1.7)
23.3
(7.3)
5.3
(1.8)

0.030
(0.017)
0.061
(0.030)
61.8
(8.9)
50.3
(6.7)
6.0
(3.1)
5.9
(2.9)
7.5
(6.7)
25.5
(9.2)
5.5
(1.8)

21.6
(4.0)
1.9
(1.0)
4.6
(1.9)

23.2
(3.2)
2.6
(1.2)
6.2
(2.2)

21.0
(4.2)
1.6
(0.8)
4.0
(1.2)
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% residential employment in trade and
entertainment
% residential employment in information

0.028
(0.016)
0.057
(0.029)
63.5
(8.8)
51.7
(6.9)
5.7
(2.9)
5.8
(2.7)
5.9
(6.4)
24.9
(8.7)
5.5
(1.8)
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Group

Total

1989–1990
(2)
MSA
county

% residential employment in services

27.9
(5.4)
4.8
(2.8)

29.9
(5.4)
4.9
(3.1)

72.3
(17.1)
27.9
(9.7)
10.6
(6.6)
30.5
(10.3)
34.4
(6.1)
16.4
(4.5)
5.3
(2.1)

12.9
(7.0)
65.9
(20.5)
35.8
(8.1)
11.6
(7.4)
25.1
(8.2)
32.5
(6.2)
18.4
(4.1)
6.0
(1.7)

(1)

% residential employment in public
administration
1985–90/1995–2000 commuting zone empl.
growthd
1985–90/1995–2000 MSA employment
growth (# MSA counties ≥ 2)e
% of workers employed in county of residence
% workers with 20–45 minute commute
% workers with 45–90 minute commute
% education < high school graduate
(age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% high school graduate (age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% some college, no degree (age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% associate college degree (age ≥ 25 yrs.)

(3)
Non-MSA
county
27.1
(5.2)
4.7
(2.7)
8.0
(8.8)
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74.7
(15.0)
24.9
(8.5)
10.2
(6.2)
32.5
(10.3)
35.1
(5.9)
15.6
(4.4)
5.1
(2.2)

Total

1999–2000
(5)
MSA
county

30.3
(5.0)
5.3
(2.9)

32.8
(4.9)
5.1
(3.0)

67.4
(17.6)
30.3
(9.3)
13.8
(7.3)
22.7
(8.7)
34.8
(6.5)
20.4
(4.3)
5.7
(2.0)

11.6
(5.8)
63.2
(20.5)
37.4
(7.7)
14.2
(8.0)
18.6
(6.7)
31.5
(7.0)
21.4
(3.7)
6.4
(1.6)

(4)

(6)
Non-MSA
county
29.4
(4.8)
5.4
(2.9)
8.2
(5.8)

69.0
(16.1)
27.6
(8.4)
13.6
(7.1)
24.2
(8.9)
36.0
(5.9)
20.0
(4.5)
5.5
(2.0)
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% bachelor’s degree or more (age ≥ 25 yrs.)
% households female-headed with children
% households male-headed with children
% population whitef
% population African Americanf
% population other racef
% population Hispanicf
% population children < 7 yrs. old
% population children 7–17 yrs. old
% population adults 18–24 yrs. old
% population adults 25–59 yrs. old

% population over 65 yrs. old

18.1
(7.9)
5.9
(1.8)
1.3
(0.4)
86.2
(12.8)
9.8
(11.8)
4.0
(5.6)
4.7
(9.7)
10.3
(1.3)
15.9
(2.1)
10.6
(3.3)
46.9
(3.2)
4.2
(0.9)
12.1
(3.5)

11.7
(4.8)
5.2
(2.4)
1.4
(0.6)
88.1
(16.0)
8.2
(15.1)
3.8
(8.0)
4.2
(11.4)
10.0
(1.5)
17.1
(2.3)
8.7
(3.3)
43.3
(3.2)
4.9
(1.0)
16.0
(4.1)

16.4
(7.7)
6.1
(2.3)
2.1
(0.6)
84.9
(15.8)
8.8
(14.5)
6.4
(8.6)
6.1
(12.0)
9.0
(1.4)
16.5
(2.0)
8.9
(3.3)
46.3
(3.5)
4.5
(1.0)
14.8
(4.1)

22.1
(9.2)
6.6
(1.9)
2.1
(0.5)
82.5
(14.2)
10.1
(12.3)
7.4
(7.6)
7.0
(11.2)
9.5
(1.2)
16.2
(1.8)
9.6
(3.3)
48.5
(3.0)
3.9
(0.8)
12.3
(3.4)

14.3
(5.7)
5.9
(2.5)
2.1
(0.7)
85.7
(16.3)
8.2
(15.2)
6.0
(9.0)
5.8
(12.3)
8.8
(1.5)
16.6
(2.1)
8.6
(3.3)
45.5
(3.4)
4.7
(0.9)
15.8
(3.9)
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% population adults 60–64 yrs. old

13.4
(6.5)
5.4
(2.3)
1.4
(0.5)
87.6
(15.2)
8.6
(14.3)
3.8
(7.4)
4.4
(11.0)
10.1
(1.4)
16.8
(2.3)
9.2
(3.4)
44.3
(3.6)
4.7
(1.0)
15.0
(4.3)
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Total

1989–1990
(2)
MSA
county

58.6
(8.4)
21.3
(4.5)
7.7
(12.8)
3028

53.7
(8.2)
22.8
(5.1)
28.4
(4.3)
824

(1)
Group
% lived in same house 5 yrs. before
% lived in same county but different house
5 yrs. before
% lived in same MSA but different house
5 yrs. before if current resident of MSA
N

(3)
Non-MSA
county
60.5
(7.7)
20.8
(4.2)

2204

Total

1999–2000
(5)
MSA
county

58.9
(7.3)
20.0
(4.7)
7.7
(12.8)
3028

54.7
(7.1)
22.2
(5.2)
28.3
(4.3)
824

(4)

(6)
Non-MSA
county
60.5
(6.8)
19.2
(4.2)

2204
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NOTE: Unweighted descriptive statistics. A metropolitan county is defined using 2000 Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS county definitions. Standard deviations are in parentheses. A blank means the variable was not included in the regression model.
a
Single-county MSA/PMSA with the exception of Los Angeles and San Diego, which are included as central-county MSAs.
b“
Central county” includes the county (or counties) of the named central city (or cities) in the MSA definition in a multiple-county MSA.
Suburban counties do not include any of the central city (or cities). A large MSA had a 2000 population of greater than one million.
c
The structural change index is the share of the county’s employment that would have to change sectors in each year so that there would be
an equivalent industry structure in the two years. It is a similarity index defined as one-half the sum of the absolute value of the difference
in one-digit industry employment shares between the two years.
d
For nonmetropolitan counties, the broader labor market employment growth was defined using 1990 commuting zone definitions from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/lmacz).
e
For multiple-county MSAs, the broader labor market employment growth was defined using the entire metropolitan area.
f
“Hispanics” is an ethnic category, and Hispanics are included in the white, African American, and other race groups. Individuals who
classified themselves as belonging to two or more racial categories in the 2000 census are classified in the “other race” group. Because
of the two-or-more racial category in the 2000 census, the 1990 and 2000 figures are not comparable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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erty rate and the three measures of five-year household mobility (so as to not
hold migration constant).12 Because we are trying to examine how five-year
job growth rates directly and indirectly affect poverty, we do not consider job
growth measured over shorter periods. Yet, as described below, more-immediate employment growth does have a larger effect because potential migrants
would not have had time to fully respond.
In a surprising outcome, Table A.3 shows that five-year employment
growth reduced the male employment-population rate in both 1990 and 2000,
although this relationship was only significant in the 2000 model. Actually, the
negative response even runs counter to any potential endogeneity concerns.
Consistent with expectations, the female-employment population ratios are
lifted by greater five-year job growth, but this effect was only significant in
the 1990 model. To be sure, even in the case of female employment-population rates, a 1-point increase in five-year job growth only increased the 1990
employment-population rate by about 0.04 points. While it was expected that
migrants and commuters would eventually fill most of any newly created jobs,
the negative response for men was still unexpected.13 One possible reason for
the unexpected male result is that a shock to labor supply created significant
competition for less-skilled men. For example, jobs that many less-skilled men
vied for were disproportionately taken by less-skilled women, many of them
pushed into the labor market by welfare reform. This type of behavior is consistent with the large national increase in the labor force participation of female
heads of households. Yet this possibility should be a focus of further research.
Table A.3 shows that a 1-percentage-point increase in the 1985–1990 employment growth rate reduced the 1990 male and female unemployment rate by
about 0.02 points. However, a 1-point increase in 1995–2000 job growth had an
insignificant impact on 2000 male unemployment rates, and it would only have
reduced the average 2000 female unemployment rate by 0.01 points. As before,
there is evidence that current employment growth has a much larger influence
in reducing unemployment rates.14 Hence, while short-term job growth does reduce unemployment rates, after about five years equilibrium forces push the
typical county’s unemployment rate back to its original level.
Using the auxiliary male/female employment-population and unemployment rate models, estimated changes in the employment-population and unemployment rates were derived after a corresponding one standard deviation
change in 1985–1990 or 1995–2000 employment growth. Then, using the coefficients from the poverty rate models in Table 6.1, the estimated changes in the
employment-population and unemployment rates were used to derive the indirect changes in the poverty rate due to job growth.15 These indirect responses are
reported in Panel 4 of Table A.1. Generally, these indirect responses are considerably smaller than the estimates in Panels 2 and 3. In fact, the indirect responses
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Table A.3 Employment-Population and Unemployment Rate Auxiliary
Models

1990 models
1985–90 empl. growth
1988–90 structural change
Pop. × structural change
N
R2
2000 models
1995–2000 empl. growth
1995–2000 structural change
Pop. × structural change
N
R2

(1)
Male
empl./pop.

(2)
(3)
(4)
Female
Male
Female
empl./pop. unempl. rate unempl. rate

−0.012
(1.29)
−14.290*
(2.64)*
−3.7e−5
(0.93)
3028
0.76

0.045*
(4.99)*
−14.949*
(2.91)*
4.5e−5*
(1.81)*
3028
0.77

−0.019*
(4.18)*
8.465*
(3.40)*
4.1e−5*
(2.83)*
3028
0.66

−0.023*
(5.18)*
6.088*
(2.50)*
3.9e−5*
(3.02)*
3028
0.63

−0.032*
(2.93)*
−4.397
(1.24)
1.7e−5
(0.80)
3028
0.80

0.004
(0.60)
−4.094
(1.59)
1.6e−5
(1.59)
3028
0.81

−0.005
(1.14)
1.216
(0.80)
7.5e−6
(0.86)
3028
0.63

−0.013*
(3.10)*
6.681*
(4.45)*
2.2e−6
(0.34)
3028
0.65

NOTE: Table shows the auxiliary regression model using the dependent variable reported in the column heading. The specification is the same as in Table 6.1 except that
the lagged poverty rate, employment-population rates, unemployment rates, and fiveyear residential mobility variables are omitted. Absolute values of robust t-statistics
are in parentheses. * = significant at the 0.10 level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, U.S. Census Bureau (2006e), and 1969–2000 U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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in the 1999 model are approximately zero, and the indirect responses in the 1989
model a little larger.
Averaging the total direct and indirect responses across Panels 2-4 of Table
A.1 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in job growth decreased
short-run poverty rates by about 0.4 percentage points in 1989 and by about 0.8
points in the long run. This result means that about half of the 1985–1990 employment growth response was indirect, through reducing unemployment rates
and increasing employment-population rates (especially the latter). However,
the average total short-run response to the 1999 poverty rate after a one standard
deviation increase in 1995–2000 employment growth is about one-quarter of a
point, and the long-run response is only about four-tenths of a point.
The relatively modest direct and indirect poverty response to local job
growth suggests that in-migrants, commuters, or nonemployed members of families above the poverty threshold eventually take many of the new jobs. Thus, if
not targeted, local job growth policies such as enterprise zones will only have
a modest impact on poverty rates. These results support Bartik’s (2001) conclusion that the benefits of generic local economic growth are quite dispersed
throughout the income distribution, not concentrated on lower income groups.
These findings reaffirm the need to concentrate economic development policies
on disadvantaged residents to ensure that growth trickles down.

The Role of Community Demographic Attributes
Not surprisingly, the regression results in Table 6.1 reveal that the demographic characteristics of the population strongly relate to the community’s
average poverty rate. Medium levels of education are particularly influential
in reducing poverty rates. The education results suggest that, relative to the
high-school dropout share, a one-point increase in the share of the population
having a high school degree, or some college, but not an associate degree, reduced the short-run poverty rate by 0.12–0.18 percentage points in 1999 (and
by correspondingly larger long-run impacts). Clearly, these results point to
the importance of reducing high-school dropout rates and encouraging some
postsecondary education. Such educational attainment appears to increase the
chances of obtaining stable employment with sufficiently high wages to ensure
that a worker and his or her family can remain above the poverty line. In implementing such a policy, while “first chance” programs designed to increase
high-school completion may be expensive, they are likely to be more successful than “second chance” programs like GED programs and training programs
(Carneiro and Heckman 2003).
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The bachelor’s degree effects are surprisingly small in both decades. It
may be that this small response reflects a university-town effect in which the
college graduate share also relates to a large number of low-income students.
A college degree also may simply boost the income of those already in the
middle class and have a marginal impact, if any, on poverty rates. Thus, policy
aimed at enhancing support for individuals to attain their four-year college
degree should be based on other reasons than reducing poverty.
Female headship is one of the strongest predictors of community poverty
rates. A one standard deviation increase in the female-head share with children is associated with a 1.40-percentage-point short-run increase in the poverty rate in 1999 and with a slightly larger effect in 1989.16 Bear in mind that
these responses are derived after holding labor market conditions constant. By
contrast, the response to a one standard deviation increase in the male-head
share with children is only about one-tenth the size of the female headship
response.
Both the male and the female headship response point to the simple fact
that single-parent families have fewer financial resources. Yet the significantly
larger female response indicates that there are significant constraints faced by
female-headed households in fully participating in the labor market. Thus, the
results are suggestive of a need to facilitate ways to help single parents find
employment and earn higher salaries. In particular, there is a need for better and more accessible child care, though other assistance, such as enhanced
counseling for job retention and programs for skills augmentation is also needed for the least-educated group of single mothers (Moffitt 2002). The particularly large positive influence played by female headship could also indicate
employer discrimination toward single mothers—perhaps related to fears that
these women will miss work for child-related reasons.
The magnitude of the single-parent coefficients is somewhat smaller in the
1999 model. One possible reason is that employers may have been more willing to work around constraints faced by single parents because of the severe
labor shortages of the late 1990s.17 Another potential reason is that the 1996
federal welfare reform pushed many low-skilled single parents into the labor
market, meaning these demographic groups behaved more like other lowskilled groups. Yet these results are good news in that if there were significant
welfare reform labor-supply spillovers on other low-skilled workers, then the
single-parent coefficients would not have greatly changed (i.e., there merely
would have been a redistribution of who was in poverty, from single parents to
other low-skilled workers).
The national data show that average poverty rates are much higher for
racial and ethnic minorities. The findings in Table 6.1 suggest that it is not necessarily race that matters. For example, in both 1989 and 1999, the percentage
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of the population that is African American was negatively associated with poverty rates (at the 0.10 level). Also, compared to 1989, both the other-race share
and the Hispanic share measures became more associated with less poverty in
1999. To be sure, because of classification changes in the 2000 census, the race
results are not directly comparable. Yet they suggest that, at least in 1999, after
accounting for socioeconomic characteristics, concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities did not produce higher county poverty rates.
The race and ethnicity results suggest that the causes of higher minority
poverty rates are not so much due to direct factors as they are to concentrations
of minority groups being more likely to be found in locales with weak labor
markets or where the population has lower labor market skills. Nevertheless,
the results are not consistent with overt labor market discrimination and thus
support the finding by Holzer et al. (2003) that employer hiring discrimination
based on race apparently declined during the 1990s. These results do not rule
out other types of discrimination, such as in the housing market, in education,
or in certain firms avoiding locating in areas with greater minority concentrations. Yet even in the case of where firms choose to locate, there is evidence that the spatial mismatch between jobs and residence of minority groups
declined in the 1990s, especially in the case of African Americans—though
there remains significant isolation from nearby employment (Raphael and Stoll
2002; Dworak-Fisher 2004).
One factor that could be influencing the estimated racial and Hispanic responses is the presence of recent foreign immigrants. In other analysis, greater
concentrations of foreign immigrants had strong adverse effects on local poverty rates in 1999.18 In fact, concentrations of recent immigrants appear to have
had a much more adverse effect on local poverty than concentrations of minorities did.
It is not immediately clear why the five-year recent-immigrant share had
such an adverse effect on 1999 poverty rates. For example, an insignificant
effect would imply that, after accounting for other factors, either there is no direct immigrant effect, or there is offsetting native out-migration such that there
was little net change in low-skilled labor supply (Borjas et al. 1996). Perhaps
the late 1990s cohort had fewer labor market skills and more language difficulties than earlier cohorts, or perhaps welfare reform changes reduced transfer
payments to recent immigrants. Yet there is some evidence that recent foreign
immigrants were increasingly competing with native low-skilled workers for
jobs that would lift poor households out of poverty. Specifically, in counties
with higher recent immigrant shares, five-year job growth had a smaller influence on reducing 1999 poverty rates.19 Welfare reform’s labor market emphasis
may be one cause of this pattern, because the lowest-skilled natives would
be more likely to compete against immigrants, and their lack of financial re-
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sources would limit any offsetting migration response to the increase in labor
market competition.20
Turning to the age composition of the population, the strong positive association between the 18-to-24 young-adult population share and poverty rates
is expected. Yet, compared to 1989, when both were insignificant, it was a little
surprising that the 60–64 share coefficient was positive and significant in 1999
while the 65-and-older coefficient was negative and significant. Regarding the
60–64 age group, the tremendous restructuring in the latter 1980s and the first
half of the 1990s not only greatly increased worker anxiety, but it disproportionately hit middle-aged and older workers in terms of fewer reemployment
opportunities and reduced reemployment earnings (Evans and Behr 1997;
Farber 1997; Kletzer 1998; Mandel 1996). The problem is particularly acute
for many in the 60–64 age cohort because they are not prepared to retire yet are
in the least-likely cohort to be reemployed.
The household mobility results support the contention that greater mobility (after controlling for labor market conditions) is one way to alleviate
poverty. For example, using Table 6.1, we see that a one standard deviation
increase in the share of the population that lived in the same house five years
before, and in the share of the population that changed houses but remained
in the same county, together increased the 1999 short-run poverty rate by 0.63
percentage points. In other analysis, because job growth may affect residential
mobility, and because mobility may be endogenously related to poverty, we
experimented with the base 1999 model in column (4) of Table 6.1 by omitting these residential mobility measures (not shown). Generally, the results are
similar, though the five-year employment growth coefficient was about onehalf greater in this model and the male employment rate coefficient was only
about one-third the size and no longer significant (t = − 0.97). Nonetheless, we
prefer to control for residential mobility because of its important implications
for poverty clustering and neighborhood effects.
Welfare reform led to a host of diversion programs to encourage possible
enrollees to stay in the labor market (Blank 2002). The household-mobility/
migration results suggest that a potentially effective diversion would be to subsidize moving costs to counties with either stronger labor markets, better job
accessibility, or a history of lower poverty rates (i.e., less persistence and better
neighborhood effects). Although relocation support policies are easy to discuss
in the abstract, successful relocation requires disadvantaged households to obtain a host of supports beyond merely information regarding opportunities in
their new labor market (Allard 2004). These additional supports include child
care, as poor households often rely on relatives for these arrangements, along
with other anchors that are often provided by relatives, long-time friends, and
institutions such as religious organizations (Spilimbergo and Ubeda 2004). In
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addition, there are other obstacles: as white flight to the suburbs demonstrates,
suburban residents may resist these relocation initiatives.

Notes
1. For those who prefer examining the change in poverty rates, Equation (A.3) can
be interpreted in that fashion by simply subtracting povt−1 from both sides:
		 povt − povt−1 = −αpovt−1 + αβXt.
2. BEA employment data is based on the number of jobs in the county, meaning
that it measures labor conditions among the county’s employers. Note that because the data includes 1990 or 2000, there is a one-year lead in the employment
growth measures. This formulation follows Levernier et al. (2000) and reflects
the notion that local labor markets are both forward- and backward-looking in
that migration flows are much more strongly affected by shocks that are expected
to be permanent (Topel 1986).
3. The ISC terms are constructed using the 11 industries in the BEA 2000 REIS
(Regional Economic Information System) data. In their derivation, for many
counties, employment was not reported for all industries in a given year because
of disclosure restriction. In these cases, industry employment was interpolated
and extrapolated, while ensuring that the sum of employment in the 11 industries
equaled total county employment.
4. As in the case of employment growth, structural change is measured one year
into the future to capture the likely possibility that labor market participants have
some foresight as to future structural changes in the local labor market.
5. The MSA employment growth rate is only included if the MSA contains at least
two counties, because the county’s job growth would equal the MSA job growth
in single-county MSAs.
6. The commuting zones are from the USDA’s Economic Research Service definitions for 1990 (ERS 2003a).
7. The 2000 census created a new category, in which the respondent could indicate that he or she is a member of two or more racial categories. This multirace
group is included in the non–African American category for 2000. However, this
change means that the 1989 and 1999 race results are not directly comparable.
8. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find a much larger long-run response by migrants to
employment growth. One reason these long-run findings have been questioned
is that measurement error could bias the response (Rowthorn and Glyn 2003).
Likewise, Blanchard and Katz’s assumption of stationarity for the VAR model
somewhat forces the long-run outcome. Others have questioned their choice of
specification, including their particular lag structure (Bartik 1993b; Partridge and
Rickman 2006).
9. The employment in a region E can be represented as
		 E = E/LF × LF/pop × pop ,
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		 where LF is the labor force and pop is the noninstitutionalized population. E/LF
equals 1 minus the unemployment rate (UR) when measured in ratio form, and
LF/POP is the labor-force participation rate. After taking logs, totally differentiating, and multiplying by 100, we derive the following for small changes:
(A.4)  %ΔE = %Δ(1 − UR) + %ΔLF/pop + %Δpop.
		 After noting that LF equals E+UNEP (number unemployed) and assuming that
the unemployment rate is approximately unchanged in the long run, Equation
(A.4) can be rewritten to observe that the employment growth rate will equal the
labor force growth rate:
(A.5)  %ΔE = %Δ(1 − UR) + %ΔE/pop + %Δpop.
10. From Equation (A.5) in Note 9, we see that if the unemployment rate is unchanged, then the first term on the right hand side approximately equals 0. If
the percentage change in 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 employment growth equals
12.0 and 10.0 percent, and one-fifth of these changes come through the employment-population ratio, then the employment-population ratio respectively
changes by 2.4 and 2.0 percent in 1990 and 2000. Thus, using Table A.2, a 2.4percentage-point increase in the 1990 average female and male employmentpopulation ratios corresponds to increases of 1.16 and 1.58 percentage points
(i.e., 0.024 × 48.5 and 0.024 × 65.8). The corresponding 2000 changes in the
female and male employment-population rates after a 2 percent increase are 1.03
and 1.27 percentage points. For 1989, using the results in column (1) of Table
6.1, the short-run change in the poverty rate after a 1.16 and a 1.58 point increase in the female and the male employment-population ratio approximately
equals 0.31 percentage points. After dividing through by 0.53 (1 − 0.47 using the
lagged poverty rate coefficient), the long-run indirect reduction in the poverty
rate approximately equals 0.58. For 2000, using the results from column (4), the
short-run change in the poverty rate after a 1.03 and a 1.27 point increase in the
female and the male employment-population ratio approximately equals 0.23
percentage points. After dividing by 0.61 (1 − 0.39 using the lagged poverty rate
coefficient), the long-run indirect reduction in the poverty rate approximately
equals 0.38.
11. Including the state fixed effects may capture some growth effects common to the
entire state. In another model that omitted state fixed effects, unemployment rate,
and employment-population ratio, the 1989 five-year employment growth effect
was about triple the size of the reported effect in column (1) of Table 6.1 (β =
0.048, t = 8.79). But it was only a little over half again as large as the reported
1999 effect in column (4) (β = 0.023, t = 4.11). Thus, this upper-bound estimate
suggests that faster job growth had relatively strong long-run effects in reducing
poverty in 1989 but smaller effects in 1999.
12. These auxiliary regressions also did not control for the other employment-population or unemployment rates.
13. To examine the possibility that employment growth has greater short-run ef-
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fects before commuters or migrants can fully respond, the two-year 1998–2000
employment growth rate was added to the auxiliary employment-population rate
models. It was positive and significant at about the 15 percent level in the case
of men, while it had a statistically significant large positive short-run effect for
women (not shown). Hence, short-term employment growth appears to have a
much larger influence on employment-population rates.
This was examined by including 1998–2000 job growth in the 2000 male and female unemployment models. In regard to the two-year job growth variable, there
was a large negative response that was statistically significant (not shown).
In the cases in Table 6.1 where the unemployment rate or the employment-population rate had an insignificant influence (at the 0.10 level) or when five-year job
growth had an insignificant impact on the employment-population or the unemployment rate in Table A.3 (at the 0.10 level), the indirect influence on poverty
was assumed to be zero.
The corresponding 1989 and 1999 long-run responses from a one standard deviation increase in the female headship share are 3.17 and 2.30 percentage points.
To examine whether there was a smaller single-parent effect in areas with strong
labor markets, the male head with children and the female head with children
shares were placed in interaction with the male and female employment-population ratio. When these interactions were added to the 1989 and 1999 models, the
male interaction was insignificant, but the female interaction was negative and
significant, with a modestly stronger effect in the 1989 model. Similar results
were also obtained when these single-parent shares were interacted with the fiveyear employment growth. These results suggest that when the labor market is
sufficiently tight, employers increasingly begin to hire less-skilled female heads
with children.
Specifically, we estimated other regressions that included the percentage of the
population that immigrated between 1990–1994 and 1995–2000 (not shown).
The 1995–2000 immigrant share was positive and significant (t = 4.65) in the
1999 model (the 1990–94 immigrant share was insignificant). A one standard deviation, 1.3-percentage-point increase in recent immigrants was associated with
a more-than-0.5-point increase in short-run poverty rates. In addition, the race
and Hispanic coefficients all became more inversely related to poverty rates and
significant at the 0.05 level. Conversely, the corresponding immigrant shares
were statistically insignificant in the 1989 model.
Namely, when an interaction of the 1995–2000 foreign immigrant share with the
1995–2000 job growth variable was added to the 1999 model, it was positive and
significant at the 0.07 level (t = 1.86).
The possibility of an offsetting domestic resident labor-supply response was assessed by regressing the percent change in domestic population on the percentage
of the population that are foreign immigrants who arrived in the previous decade,
and other controls described below. The results suggest that for every 1 percent
of the population that immigrated in the previous decade, domestic population
fell by 0.80 percentage points in 1990 but by only 0.58 points in 2000. Thus there
is some evidence that the offsetting low-skilled native supply response declined,
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which would be consistent with greater competition among natives and recent
immigrants for jobs that require fewer skills. The other controls were state fixed
effects, the MSA county-type indicators, the previous decade’s population (1980
or 1990), and, to proxy for deaths and births, the population shares for ages 6
years and under, 7 to 17 years, and 65 and over. The percentage change in domestic population was defined as the actual percentage of population change during
the previous decade minus the percentage of the population that had immigrated
during the previous decade.
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The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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